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Abstract
This thesis is a study of Korean municipal orchestras which focuses on both the internal 
and external environment in order to examine and better understand arguments that 
they face ‘challenges’ that are not to be solved simply through ‘efficiency’ or ‘better 
organisation’, but are part of wider socio-cultural change that previous studies have 
failed to take adequately into consideration. This study, therefore, examines diverse 
aspects of the difficulties faced by contemporary Korean municipal orchestras while 
addressing five research questions concerning Korean cultural policy, the 
socio-economic context in which orchestras operate, job satisfaction, interpersonal 
conflict, and diminishing local government funding. In pursuit of this investigation, a 
triangulation methodology is adopted, which includes the scrutiny of documentation 
along with qualitative in-depth interviews (with orchestral players, administrative staff, 
and civil servants) and a quantitative questionnaire survey (with 128 players and 10 
administrative staff).
The research findings are given in detail in relevant chapters, but the key findings may 
be summarised here as follows: Political, economic, historic, and socio-cultural factors 
have greatly influenced the cultural policy of the Korean central government, but Korean 
municipal orchestras are influenced more by policies of local governments who provide 
them with a source of funding. Players in Korean municipal orchestras are highly 
satisfied with their work but dissatisfied with present pay, lack of authority, and the 
hierarchical structure. Orchestral administrative staff are dissatisfied with lack of 
autonomy and promotion. Male players have higher perception of intrapersonal conflict 
and intergroup conflict compared to female players, and male players have a greater 
preference for using integrating and compromising styles when managing interpersonal 
conflict with peers. Korean municipal orchestras, having a public service role, have 
been used to receiving relatively stable financial aid from local governments, but this 
has created a lack of commercial awareness about what is required to bolster their 
legitimacy in the face of potential financial cuts and small audiences. The ‘civilizing 
mission’ of the arts is no longer accepted as automatic justification. Although a complete 
governance change is considered a key factor for the success of municipal orchestras, 
such change is inadequate in itself: the real challenge for a brighter future lies with 
players, administrative staff, and the cities and their cooperation.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1
1.1 Introduction
This chapter contains an overview of contemporary Korean municipal orchestras in four 
sections. First, the background of the study is described; the aims and methodology are 
then explained, followed by an outline of the structure of the thesis.
1.2 Research background
After the establishment of Korea’s very first orchestra, the Joongang Music Band in 
1926, there were several orchestras operating under the Japanese regime (1910-45): 
the Kyungsung Imperial College Orchestra (1928), the Yeonhee College Orchestra 
(1934), the Kyungsung Orchestra (1934) and the Chosun Symphony Orchestra (1940). 
When Korea was given independence from Japan in 1945, the Goryeo Symphony 
Orchestra, which had the features of a modern orchestra, was established, and can be 
seen as a vital starting point for the presence of Western classical music in Korea. 
Some people consider that the Kyungsung Music Band was founded in 1920 as the first 
Korean orchestra (Min, 2006: p. 125), whereas others consider the Joongang Music 
Band as the first (Lee, 1986: p. 10; Lee, 1992: p. 28). The former, however, was 
established by five Japanese founders, and mainly consisted of Japanese players. In 
addition, the main purpose of the foundation was to rationalise Japanese colonial policy 
by providing opportunities to hear and to study music. Therefore, the Joongang Music 
Band seems to have the greater claim to being the first Korean orchestra.
Since the introduction of Western classical music to Korea a century ago, there have 
been remarkable developments, especially a rapid growth in popularity in 
post-independent Korea. This expansion is evidenced by the growth of academic 
courses on offer, which has seen in 1953, first and, so far, the only classical music 
course at Seoul National University grow to include over thirty music colleges, with 
around five thousand new graduates each year. According to a survey by Jung, in 2004, 
there were 40 public orchestras, 103 private orchestras, and at least 40 orchestras 
affiliated with universities. Thus, Western classical music in Korea has undergone a 
significant expansion in terms of quantity and quality in just sixty years: Korean 
orchestras were strongly promoted after World War II in a specific social, economic, 
political and cultural context— what we might call a cultural policy ’regime’.
The values of the municipal orchestras in Korea
The history of Korean orchestras began with the founding of the Joong-Ang Music
Society in 1926, under Japanese rule, and then symphony orchestras began to be 
established from 1950 onwards. Many municipal orchestras were established after the 
1980s as a result of contemporary cultural policy (arts for all, and decentralisation) and 
remarkable economic growth. In contrast to the symphony orchestras in America and 
Great Britain which introduce a business concept into the orchestra, Korean municipal 
orchestras pursue the concept of a public service. They are established and controlled 
by local governments in terms of finance and administration, so that local politicians are 
decision makers and the amount of public funding towards an orchestra depends on the 
local financial situation and the cultural taste of local politicians (especially the mayor). 
The main objective of municipal orchestras has been to provide high-quality music to 
their local citizens as a public service, thus municipal orchestras have had little or no 
concern with economic or commercial aspects of their activities: they have not been 
concerned with earning or losing money because the total budget is subsidised from 
local governments. They have been concerned, instead, with the reduction of the total 
budget that is related to the quality of performance (for instance, inviting a guest player) 
and the total number of concerts, although municipal orchestras are currently about to 
be forced to look for more money in the commercial sphere, which I argue is influenced 
by the cultural industries trajectory of central government. Musicians in Korean 
municipal orchestras have a civil servant-like status, which gives stability in salary and 
job security.
Western classical music is not a part of the Korean tradition, but it is more appreciated 
by Korean than Korean traditional classical music (Kim, 1993: p. 9; Kim, 1997: p. 23). I 
would suggest that this is because South Korea has achieved its economic 
development under US hegemony, and traditional Korean culture was hidden and 
marginalized, compared to the western high arts. Western classical music is considered 
a ‘cool’ thing to the Korean younger generation.
According to the ‘Survey report on cultural enjoyment’1 in 2008, carried out by the 
Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the 
main audience for classical music and opera performance was the 30-39 year-old age 
group (5.9%), followed by 20-29 (5.8%), 40-49 (5.6%), 10-19 (4.7%), 50-59 (4.6%) 
and over 60 (2.1%). It is interesting to note that the young age group (in the age range 
20-39) is the main audience for classical music performances, compared to western 
countries, which are facing problem with ageing audiences: for instance, 45-54 and 
55-64 year-old age groups are the main classical music attendees in Great Britain 
(Baker, 2000: pp. 16-17). One of the most outstanding violinists, Elmar Oliveira,
2
1 The survey was carried out among 4000 people whose age was over 15 years old throughout 
Korea from 3rd May 2008 to 11th April 2008 by one to one interview.
remarked that ‘...audience in U.S. is gradually decreased. Audiences are older people. 
However, there concert halls are full (in Korea). In addition, there is much energy from 
young audiences’ (Lee, 2010). Studying at least one musical instrument2 seems 
essential to a number of young Koreans regardless of whether it is their or their parents’ 
wish, and this may be attracting a young audience to the concert hall: the earlier and the 
more consistently children are exposed to music education and music experience, the 
more likely they will be to appreciate classical music and become ticket buyers (Lin, 
2008: p. 23) Higher education graduates (7.4%) are more likely to go to concerts, 
compared with high school graduates (3.9%) and under or middle school graduates 
(2.5%).3 Education is also an important demographic determinant of classical music 
attendees in Great Britain: 'people educated beyond formal schooling are nearly three 
times as likely to attend classical concerts as the population as a whole’ (Baker, 2000: p. 
16). There is little difference between the sexes: 6.1% of female respondents and 3.7% 
of male respondents attended classical music performances (p. 34). This trend also 
happens in Britain: females are more likely to attend classical music concerts (Baker, 
2000: p. 16).
Municipal orchestras are important to Korean musicians (especially to local musicians). 
Most students studying musical instruments want to be a member of an orchestra (Lee, 
2001, Nam, 2003, Jung, 2004) and a few of them want to be a member of staff of the 
orchestral executive constitution; thus, local municipal orchestras create direct 
employment for approximately 80 to 150 individuals (full-time and part-time musicians 
and full-time administrative staff). They provide musicians with a stable employment to 
develop their professional skills as well as providing the opportunity to develop 
secondary income streams such as private lesson or playing in an ensemble (a member 
of a municipal orchestra has a better chance to enjoy a secondary income, compared to 
those of private orchestras or freelancers). In addition, the orchestral executive 
constitution provides an opportunity to music graduates who might not want to be 
orchestral players, but would like to work in an orchestra surrounded by the music they 
love. There are around 120 music graduates from each university every year, and the 
municipal orchestra is the workplace they prefer most.
Players, administrative staff, and civil servants share similar ideas to the public about 
the value of municipal orchestra, that it has a duty to provide high-quality performances 
to citizens, and it is considered vital for improving the general quality of local citizens’ life
3
2 Generally speaking, Korean public schools do not teach musical instruments, so that Koreans 
learn musical instruments from private tutors.
3 Middle school is an academic institution between elementary (primary) school and high school.
as well as enhancing civic pride. Furthermore, they also believe that the symphony 
orchestra has a positive influence on the image of the locality, acting as a cultural icon 
that represents the city.
Early research on symphony orchestras in terms of musicology, philanthropy, non-profit 
management and sociological aspects was carried out by people from various western 
countries after 1960, and particularly after 1990 (Lehman, 2002), but since 1995 the 
majority of studies of symphony orchestras (on narrow themes) have been carried out 
by graduate student researchers in Korea. Other written papers do exist, but the 
majority are too short to discuss, and some articles simply repeat the same issues, 
albeit in different ways. There are continually increasing numbers of Masters’ degree 
papers concerning Korean professional orchestras, on various themes ranging from 
their history to revitalisation.
Korean Masters’ studies of professional symphony orchestras, which are related to this 
study, numbered 43 between 1975 and 2007. As can be seen in Table 1, almost half of 
the studies indicated the current problematic situation of Korean orchestras, in terms of 
management, structure and systems, and finance, comparing Korean orchestras within 
different cities, or Korean orchestras with the top orchestras in the U.S., U.K. and Japan, 
and suggesting some possible solutions.
4
Table 1.1 Korean research on symphony orchestras
5
Year Theme of Master’s thesis
1975 Performing history
1981 Comparison of repertoire
1986 Orchestral history
1987 Orchestral development plan 
Private orchestra management
1993 Analysis of the situation of 3 public orchestras
1997 Situation and solution
Comparative analysis of performing activity
1998 Business strategy
1999 Orchestra structure and audience
2000 Orchestra development— comparing with three foreign orchestra 
Comparison among Korean orchestras 
Orchestra situation and comparative analysis 
Orchestra management
2001 Problems of structure and management and the future
Players’ professionalism
Repertoire
2002 3 Repertoire analysis studies
2003 Trend of repertoire 
Players’ satisfaction 
Performing guality development
2004 3 studies on management situation and solution
Marketing
Business strategy
Performing activities
2005 2 studies on development strategy for private orchestras 
2 studies on management situation and the solution
2006 Repertoire
Service quality
Performing activity
Private orchestra management
Professionalism in orchestra management
Management development
2007 2 studies of orchestral history
Management development of a private orchestra
Programme study
The majority of people involved in orchestras insist that money is an essential factor, 
and that if they had more money to spend, they could operate the orchestra effectively 
in terms of quality and quantity. In other words, many people who have researched 
Korean orchestras over the years (especially municipal orchestra) have identified that 
they have been suffering from various problems (which could be summarised as 
matters of finance and management) and I have come to understand this issue in the 
course of this research. Although there has been substantial research carried out on 
orchestral organisations, the research available is still very limited. Furthermore, many 
studies have tended to focus on the problems of the orchestra itself, to the exclusion of 
all challenges within the wider context of the cultural policy regime that Korean 
municipal orchestras face in the post-welfare state. That is, as we can see from the 
above table, organisational factors that focus on structure and finance have so far 
dominated the problems of Korean symphony orchestras, and other important aspects
of internal factors, such as organisational process, work environment, or group 
behaviour in orchestra have been ignored.
Significant questions facing contemporary Korean municipal orchestras are essential to 
be considered, before investigating further the problems of Korean orchestras: Is the 
current model of a Korean orchestra not working? Are orchestras struggling? If the 
current model is working, why would there be a need to change it? Are orchestras not 
producing work of a high standard, or are they not attracting sufficient audience 
members? It could be argued that the current structure of the Korean municipal 
orchestra is working, in spite of some hardships, and generally Korean municipal 
orchestras provide a relatively high standard of work to their citizens. However, Korean 
municipal orchestras do need to change in order to keep up with external changes: the 
post-welfare-state model, in which public funding is challenged; the growing role of the 
market; more links to cultural industries; and the arts becoming part of a wider cultural 
sector, all form part of a relatively widespread policy regime.
Therefore, it is imperative that comprehensive research be carried out into this 
complicated social organisation.
When I played a piano concerto with Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra when I was 14 
years old, the orchestra leader was very friendly and the other members were also 
supportive, so I felt welcomed by the atmosphere whenever I had rehearsals with them: 
thus, my view of symphony orchestras does not differ from the preconceptions that are 
commonly held about orchestras. For me, the important experience was working at an 
opera company, which was rehearsing Tosca, with three different performing groups 
(Italian, Seoul, and a young musician team), and interest in Korean municipal 
orchestras was sparked by conversation with an administrative member of staff at the 
opera company, who had been working for seven years, and he told me of several 
difficult episodes they had experienced with orchestras and artists. My working 
experience at an opera company finally prompted me to begin this study and persuaded 
me that orchestras were a valid field of enquiry.
When I started studying Korean orchestras, it was a new territory, and presented a lot of 
challenges. Although I consider myself as a former pianist, having trained for 18 years, 
including 4 years studying music at university, I had little knowledge about symphony 
orchestras, so I spent a lot of time visiting the orchestral office of the CPO during my 
holidays in Korea, and helped with the work of administrative staff to prepare rehearsals 
and concerts. This was very helpful for better understanding the orchestra, because I 
was able to talk with staff and some of the players in an unofficial way, and to gain
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insight into what lay behind various actions and events.
These early experiences affected my subsequent perceptions of Korean municipal 
orchestras especially when identifying their problems. Although a few professionals in 
performing arts organisations in Korea told me that there was nothing else to investigate 
about Korean symphony orchestras except management and finance, I felt that there 
had to be an another way to study the orchestras to make them important and effective 
arts organisations and improve players’ and staff’s professional development and job 
satisfaction. Hence, I was able to rebuild my view of symphony orchestras and sample 
the orchestras’ hidden nature and behaviour. In other words, all these personal 
experiences along with having read deeply into various orchestral issues, have 
significantly developed my knowledge and perspective of Korean municipal orchestras 
and their problems, and my arguments differ from the views of most Korean researchers. 
Like other Korean researchers, my initial thought at the beginning of this study was that 
the various problems centering on the Korean symphony orchestras were caused by 
financial inefficiency, and could be overcome by more effective marketing, which would 
generate greater public interest, and thus increase money from ticket sales. However, 
the more I have read of orchestral organisations, the more I have come to recognise the 
fact that the structure of an orchestra is a reflection of an extremely complex social 
organisation: 1) reading about orchestral issues discussed from the viewpoint of 
economists, sociologists, psychologists, non-profit management experts, musicologists, 
public policy analysts (Lehman, 1995) helped to link my own experience of the music 
industry with the issues; and 2) it helped in the formation of my critical views on papers 
of Korean researchers about key problems and the solutions, and meant that I could 
look at the indicated problems in different lights.
As mentioned earlier, Korean symphony orchestras have achieved excellent outcomes 
regarding the quality of performance and have increased in number: in addition, Korean 
municipal orchestras have been running in accordance with financial and managerial 
support from their local authority, without radical changes. Despite its relative success 
and stability, there remain several problems in Western classical music in Korea as a 
consequence of the failure to keep pace with the changing environment. In particular, 
the current challenges of Korean symphony orchestras could be summarised In terms of 
the lack of finance, the internal organisational structure of the orchestras, and the job 
satisfaction and conflict of players and administrative staff. These challenges are likely 
to be caused by limited financial resources, inflexibility and inefficiency in the 
organisation, isolation from the audience and local community, and indifference in 
human resources. The following section examines Korean municipal orchestras’ 
financial problems, organisational problems, and job satisfaction and conflict problems.
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8Financial problem
As for finance, it is difficult to run arts organisations, including orchestras, solely through 
box office income; therefore, such organisations need, extra financial support from 
central and local government, private companies and individuals. However, less than 
10% of total expenditure is earned from box office income (Kang, 2000) in Korea, and 
outside funds are strictly prohibited to municipal orchestras according to local 
regulations. Thus, subsidy from local governments is the only financial source. Although 
Korean municipal orchestras have received consistent financial support from their local 
authorities since their foundation, the amount of subsidy is not sufficient to provide 
additional activities, which are a way of communication with their local citizens: the main 
reason that orchestras have a limited number of concerts4 is that personnel expenses 
are heavy, ‘accounting for 80-95% of total expenditure in Korean symphony orchestras, 
and the rest of the expenses are used for concert giving’ (Kang, 2000). According to 
Allmendinger and Hackman (1996: p. 6), public performance of orchestral works within 
the standard symphonic repertoire and nontrivial compensation for the members of 
orchestra are the key features in being defined as a professional symphony orchestra; 
thus it may be assumed that Korean municipal orchestras, in general, do not fulfill their 
core task.
One may suppose that limited funding arises from the fact that orchestras are not part of 
the Korean tradition, so state and local governments do not increase public funding for 
them, or do not give them attention, and, as a result, municipal orchestras are facing 
financial problems. However, it would be untrue to say that local governments are not 
satisfactorily funding their orchestras on the grounds that they are not part of Korean 
traditional culture.
Table 1.2 Central government’s subsidy for arts and cultural activities (1973-2000)
______________ __________ _________ _________  ______  (Unit: million won)
Classification 1973-95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Western performing arts 22,665 
(£12.7m)
2,116
(£1.2m)
2,231
(£1.3m)
2,483
(£1.4)
4,574
(£2.6m)
4,928
(£2.8m)
38,997 
(£21.8m)
Korean traditional arts 7,036
(£3.9m)
1,027
(£0.6m)
1,815
(£1m)
882
(£0.5m)
996
(£0.6m)
1,020
(£0.6m)
12,686
(£7m)
(Source: refer from Lee, 2000: p. 11)
As we can see from the above table, the Korean government’s public support for 
western performing arts was much higher than for Korean traditional arts, even though 
Lee did not mention what performing arts were included here. In addition, private
4 Kang (2000) insists that the average number of performances of public orchestras was 25 in 
1998, and the number is not enough to be considered a professional symphony orchestra 
standard.
support for western classical music was 6,745 million won (approximately £3.8m), 
whereas support the Korean traditional arts totalled 806 million won (£0.5m) in 2000 
(Korean Business Council for the Arts, 2001: p. 41).5 The following table further 
illustrates the popularity of western classical music as compared to Korean traditional 
music.
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Table 1.3 Yearly number of performance (1995-2005)
Classification 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
W CM 3,047 3,193 3,892 3,934 4,168 4,628 4,957 4,855 4,834 4,082 4,444
KTM 1,146 1,381 1,440 1,884 1,801 2,192 2,076 2,301 2,535 2,680 2,685
(Sources: refer from Arts Council Korea, 2005a and 2006)
Note: WCM: western classical music; KTM: Korean traditional music.
From the above, we can see that the total number of performances of western classical 
music between 1995 and 2006 is higher than the performance of Korean traditional 
music. Thus, insufficient funding for the orchestra is not a matter of favouring Korean 
traditional culture or otherwise. Furthermore, it is interesting that western classical 
music, rather than Korean traditional classical music, appears to be more interesting to 
Koreans, although neither belongs to the top popular arts and cultural activities with 
regard to the enjoyment of Koreans.
Organisational problem
Another key problem of Korean municipal orchestras rests with organisational structure. 
Korean municipal symphony orchestras in each city are founded, owned and managed 
based on the regulations of local self-government, so that all municipal orchestras have 
almost the same governance structure (the regulations of most Korean municipal 
orchestras are driven from those of the KBS Symphony Orchestra). The orchestras are 
run by a Board Director (normally the Mayor or a Vice Mayor of the local city), Board 
Members (Members of Parliament or volunteers), an Executive Director (normally the 
Mayor or a Vice Mayor of the local city), a Music Director (a Conductor), an Orchestral 
Manager and Administrative Staff. The position of an Executive Director is generally 
more powerful than that of a Music Director. The president of the municipal arts centre 
also belongs to the local government (or is the Vice Mayor if the city does not have 
municipal arts centre), and is normally the Vice Executive Director, who is from a 
practical point of view in charge of the management.6 With respect to this personnel
5 Private support for western classical music has been continuously huge compared to that 
given to Korean traditional classical music: from 2005 to 2008, 30,163 (approximately £16.9m), 
29,172 (£16.3m), 22,512 (£12.6m), and 22,439 (£12.5m) million won was given to western 
classical music, whereas 2,386 (£1.3m), 1,595 (£0.9m), 1,872 (£1m), and 1,832 (£1m) million 
won was given to Korean traditional classical music (Korean Business Council for the Arts, 2009: 
p. 62).
6 The city or the municipal arts centre uniformly manages the orchestras, along with other public 
arts organisations.
arrangement, many Korean researchers (Park, 2004; Kang, 2000; Jung, 2004; Ahn, 
2006; Lee, 2005b; Han, 2000) suggest different balance of power structures: between 
Executive Director (sometimes Orchestra Manager) and Artistic Director; or between 
staff at orchestral executive constitution and civil servant, and argue as to which one 
should have more power than the other in an ideal structure.
Meanwhile, because of this governance structure, the Korean municipal orchestra has a 
dual management team: one in the city and the other one in the orchestral executive 
constitution. Actual plans regarding administration, finance, and concert giving are 
made by the staff in the orchestral executive constitution (although the orchestra 
manager has almost no flexibility in any decision making), while the civil servants are in 
charge of the administrative process in the arts centre or city hall; therefore, the work 
process can be increasingly complicated, overlapping and time consuming (Park, 2004). 
Overall, professionalism, enthusiasm, coherence and continuity in the management of 
orchestra are generally not expected, due to: 1) the high turnover of civil servant (who is 
in charge of orchestra management is regularly rotated in every two or three years); 2) 
homogeneous management with other public arts organisations (such as choirs, Korean 
traditional orchestras, or dance); and 3) role ambiguity and role conflict between the 
orchestral executive constitution and the city or within the orchestral executive 
constitution.
Namely, because of the way they are founded, it results in every local authority within a 
city being in charge of all matters regarding finance and management, and therefore 
conflicts between the city and the orchestral executive constitution,7 or between the city 
and orchestral players are inevitable in this situation.
Financial or artistic crises and organisational instability or inefficiency are not a new 
issue for Korean symphony orchestras as it first surfaced in the late 1980s, and this is 
understandable because of their people-related nature, which may cause the most 
difficult and complex problems for the organisation: some problems such as finance, 
management, administration and artistic policy have always been there, but the 
problems became more recognised and emphasised with the arrival of newly educated 
arts or cultural management and policy people in the late 1990s. Thus, the cultural 
policy agenda coming from Europe and America, but also from the evolution of Korea 
and its thinking about the role of culture, has moved forward, leaving the orchestras 
feeling very outdated. Economic issues have been strongly emphasised to Korean 
symphony orchestras, and they are under pressure to become more commercial, and to
7 The Korean term is orchestral executive constitution (it can also be called the orchestral office) 
and it might encompass the whole team of orchestral management in the west.
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justify the public spending they receive, mainly because they perform for a limited 
audience and are expensive to maintain. In other words, marketisation is crucial to the 
post-welfare-state model, which places an emphasis on cultural industries. Yet Korean 
municipal symphony orchestras were primarily established based on the welfare-state 
model, and still show the hallmarks of this in the lack of significant change in their 
operations.
Thus, financial inefficiency or power-position issues driven from organisational structure 
are a part of the problems relating to symphony orchestra management, and the key 
challenge facing Korean municipal orchestras is their future continuity, which currently 
depends heavily on job satisfaction and conflict reduction. They have continuously 
supported their orchestras at a workable level, in terms of finance and administration, 
but cities would like to see the tangible value of orchestras, both in economic reality and 
public services: therefore, if local governments are not satisfied with their orchestras, 
they could be abolished, or merge with other municipal orchestra nearby.
Job satisfaction and conflict problem
The issues facing Korean municipal orchestras are greater than financial pressures or 
organisational structure. People issues are also at the heart of this matter, and if existing 
misunderstanding among groups or individuals within an orchestra is not tackled, 
Korean municipal orchestras will not be able to resolve the challenges. In other words, 
municipal orchestras need to consider the preferences of their clients (who pay for 
concerts and artistic excellence), and the abilities and willingness of orchestral players, 
conductors, and administrative staff to engage in newly required activities. This cannot 
be implemented without reaching an understanding of the thoughts of the administrative 
staff and musicians (including the conductor) towards new challenges.
“The symphony orchestra world is one of the most complex, competitive, and stratified 
organizational sets in existence” (Faulkner, 1973: p. 336), and the lifestyle and career of 
orchestral musicians are unlike those of other professionals. Loebel (1977) states about 
the musicians that “To begin with, a life-long daily discipline, involving mind and body, is 
required [...] On the contrary, it is only the beginning of a never-ending effort toward the 
unattainable [...] Working hours are irregular and in no case conform to the traditional 
nine-to-five schedule. Free time will frequently occur when most other people are at 
work” (pp. 81-84). Karen O ’Connor also remarked to Graham Snowdon (2008: online) 
during her interview that “It’s a physically demanding job and there’s a huge amount of 
stamina required. It can be hard on tour, with not enough time to rest, or eat, or to 
generally recover, and then the show must go on. They can be tough times.”
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Furthermore, the physical and mental problems of orchestral musicians, ranging from 
‘bullying, burn-out and stage fright to hearing damage and dependence on drink or 
drugs’ were noted by Higgins (2006: online). In addition, financial rewards are not fairly 
provided, despite the years of study and hours of work, compared to other professions: 
as a result, extra teaching is required to supply the shortage of income (Loebel, 1977). 
Due to these hardships of musicians’ life, Loebel (1977), thus, insists that someone who 
wants to be a musician should initially have, and continue to have, a compelling love for 
music (p. 77).
According to Lee’s survey in 2001, the players of Korean municipal orchestras exhibit 
two strong professional features (p. 42): ‘service to the public’, which refers to the idea 
that their work is necessary and beneficial for society as well as themselves; and ‘sense 
of the field’ which means that they show commitment at work and would like to continue 
to do their work although external compensation is decreased (Hall, 1968: p. 93). The 
interviewees of this study also said that they were themselves proud with their work; and 
did not mind having more concerts without extra payment if it meant they were providing 
more cultural activities for the public. In addition, they organised several ensemble 
groups to access their public more closely. Lee (2001) investigates the important factors 
influencing players’ professionalism based on Hall’s features (reference group, service 
to the public, self-regulation, sense of the field, and autonomy). The statistical results 
showed that most significant factor influencing ‘service to the public’ and ‘sense of the 
field’ was job satisfaction (Lee, 2001: pp. 56-58): if municipal orchestras wish to provide 
more activities in order to communicate with a wider audience while retaining the 
players’ cooperation in addressing this challenge, it is important to ensure players feel 
satisfied.
Thus, it is important to understand the thinking of musicians (players and conductors) 
and staff regarding their current work environment, and to challenge them to erase 
existing misunderstandings: Are they happy to play various genres of music, or to 
expand repertoires? Do they have the ability to perform certain pieces of music? What 
restricts their job performance? What do they think of the current organisational 
structure? Is it working well or not? Do they mind increasing the number of 
performances? Do they have any concerns or difficulties doing their job?
In order to understand human relationships within the unique nature of the orchestra, 
and investigate personal issues within and across both orchestra and city, I focus on 
issues surrounding the job satisfaction of employees, and conflict that is closely related 
to their creativity (Tang and Chang, 2010), which is vital for reaching a desired goal and 
for organisational survival and success (Henry, 2004; Amabile, 1983; Beehr and Glazer,
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2005; and Jex, 1998). Furthermore, employees’ job satisfaction and conflict are 
investigated at a group level in the context of organisational behaviour, because this 
remains central to understanding people (Middlemist and Hitt, 1981).
1.3 Aim of the study and methodology
The aim of this study is to examine diverse aspects of the problems of contemporary 
Korean municipal orchestras, along with the cultural policy situation and the new cultural 
environment. The managerial, financial and cultural policy of contemporary, publicly 
funded Korean municipal orchestras is also investigated. In addition, this study attempts 
to explore the factors that lie behind the growing problems in Korean municipal 
orchestras, and how these problems might be addressed. In particular the study will 
look at:
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• How does the changing context of Korean cultural policy impact upon 
orchestras?
• What is the context of Korean municipal orchestras?
• How and why do players and staff become satisfied or dissatisfied with their jobs, 
and does this link to turnover?
• What types and degrees of conflicts do players and staff experience, and how do 
they handle conflicts with supervisors and peers?
• Why is local government public funding to municipal orchestras restricted, and 
how far can Korean municipal orchestras adapt and grow in the current 
situation?
Answers to these questions are sought by using multiple methods. The main research 
method was a case study, along with interviews with players, administrative staff, civil 
servants and conductors to drive data collection and analysis through four periods of 
fieldwork and documentations, including a review and analysis of archives, white papers, 
programmes, orchestra regulations, newspapers and magazines. In addition, 
quantitative research was undertaken, in order to acquire tangible data on job 
satisfaction and conflict, and to produce deeper insights into the data provided by 
qualitative analysis.
Research design process
The research design process has developed based on my own knowledge of players 
and staff, with additional advice from experts of arts organisations in Korea. As far as I 
could understand, professionals in the music field were not easy to obtain access to, 
and might not open up their opinions to strangers.
I first decided to collect data using a qualitative research strategy, mainly using 
documentation and one-to-one in-depth interviews, which would provide the greatest 
insight into the work of orchestras. E-mail was not a good way to gain permission from
orchestras, so I began to use my personal relationship to start to contact target 
interviewees.
When I conducted interviews, I used a mixture of purposive, convenience, and snowball 
sampling within three case studies of Korean municipal orchestras. Because of the 
snowball sampling technique (due to difficulty of access), there are more brass players 
compared to string players, which I did not intend. However, I do not believe this is a 
problem because they are all highly trained players who have experienced a similar 
educational background and share the same long-term wish to be a member of a 
symphony orchestra: according to Lee’s survey in 2001, players consult with their fellow 
players as a reference group when they need to think or decide something related to 
their work, because they all have expert knowledge through long-time professional 
education. Furthermore, I interviewed them primarily as a member of a municipal 
symphony orchestra rather than as a particular section player (such as woodwind, or 
brass).
The interview questionnaire was semi-structured, but questions could be flexible 
according to the interviewee’s willingness and openness: Initially, I tried to ask all the 
questions in the questionnaire, but I subsequently learnt from very early interviews that I 
need to be more flexible about questions based on individuals: for example, if 
interviewee was willing to talk more about one question, I should allow more time and 
help him/her by listen carefully. If one was avoiding a question, I changed question in an 
indirect way or came back to this question later again.
To begin the quantitative research, I contacted the orchestra managers and players’ 
representatives by e-mail, but no one replied.8 Hence, I called each orchestra manager 
and players’ representative of the three orchestras. As with the previous fieldwork, there 
was no problem distributing the questionnaires to the staff and players of the CPO. In 
the case of the KSO, although I considered that the players of KSO were the most 
difficult to gain access to, because of their being top-class musicians in Korea, it 
seemed relatively easy to set a timetable for the questionnaire, as the players' 
representative, who was a close friend of my friend, assured me of this possibility, 
despite some degree of worries by his last call that he was unable to force them to fill in 
the questionnaires. However, gaining access to the administrative staff of the KSO 
remained problematic. On the one hand, the head of the administrative staff changed, 
and I needed to look for another route to ask for help. On the other hand, the status of 
the KSO was unstable, because of serious conflict between the orchestra and the
8 | already conducted interviews with most of them, so I thought I could have answer from e-mail 
contacts.
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company. Therefore, the administrative staff of the KSO were very sensitive about my 
questionnaire in case their answers were abused. It was fortunate that my friend’s father 
was a presenter of the KSO, and he asked his colleague, a radio presenter of classic 
music programmes, to gain access to the administrative staff.
Although my personal connection with people involved in classical music was very 
helpful in conducting this research, it detracted from the collection of questionnaires 
from the BPO. Because of the unpleasant relationship between the orchestra manager 
and the former players’ representative9 (he was the players’ representative when I 
interviewed him), the orchestra manager prevented me from having any access to the 
players, and asked me to send questionnaires to her by post, which she agreed she 
would ask the players to complete.
Therefore, overall, it was not easy to gain access to municipal orchestras (especially 
with research exploring job satisfaction and conflict relationship, which they did not want 
to be exposed to outsiders). I felt quite lucky to know people in the classical music fields 
who could introduce me to appropriate people for this research. Because of my 
personal relationships and experiences in music, I could gain deeper insights and 
information than many others. In addition, it also helped me to interpret the findings: 
although my understanding of municipal orchestras gradually increased and I was able 
to acquire relatively solid knowledge of the dynamics of the orchestras after several 
years of research, I still suffered some degree of limitation in understanding the nature 
of orchestras fully. Thus, I was open to contrary results or findings, and discussed these 
matters with orchestral players, and professionals and experts in the fields of classical 
music whenever I had a question or struggled with some interpretative points. This 
helped me to get rid of my bias; indeed, it may have increased my comprehension of the 
situation and enabled me to gain extra relevant information.
Having had the experience of conducting research in Korean municipal orchestras, I 
now think that if we do not have personal connections in the field of classical music 
(especially in symphony orchestras) it can be very difficult to conduct research. Thus, 
the key point in conducting this research is to assure willingness of cooperation from an 
orchestra manager and a players’ representative and to keep a good relationship with
9 I first contacted the representative, and he agreed to help me. But he appeared to change his 
mind when I called him again, and asked me to call the orchestral manager. I explained again 
about the questionnaire by telephone (I had already sent e-mails and made calls before coming 
to Korea), and asked her permission for access to the players, which I believed was a way of 
maximizing the response rate. She asked me which orchestras I had already done the 
questionnaire survey with, and the result of the response rate; I told her that I had started with the 
KSO and the response rate was approximately 50% of total players. She accused me of lying to 
her, so I asked her to check it with the orchestral executive constitution of the KSO to ascertain 
this.
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them by understanding the nature of their work and its environment; moreover, e-mail 
contact does not seem to be a good tool to access to people working in Korean 
municipal orchestras.
More specific information on data collection and analysis is discussed in Chapter 2.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
This present chapter is an introduction, describing the background of Korean symphony 
orchestras and the need for this study. It defines the aim of the study, the formulation of 
the research questions, and briefly explains the methodology used.
In chapter 2, I outline the methodology that was designed to answer the research 
questions. I used a combination of interview and documentation techniques to collect 
data over several months in three Korean municipal symphony orchestras, by means of 
a case study approach. Quantitative data collection was conducted through a 
questionnaire survey. I explain how I finally chose three municipal orchestras, and 
provide a detailed description of each fieldwork, research difficulties and analysis 
techniques.
Chapter 3 covers the background to Korean cultural policy and explains how cultural 
policy and environmental factors influence orchestras, aiming to provide a broader 
picture of the relevant circumstances. I outline four main themes of Korean cultural 
policy, which directly and indirectly influence Korean symphony orchestras.
Chapter 4 presents the findings for each of three cases studies, in order to provide 
general information and make the reader more familiar with Korean municipal 
orchestras. In each case, I outline the orchestra’s organisational and environment 
context, including an overview and description of the main changes (if appropriate), the 
main activities, repertoire (if appropriate), audience and finance status. I then outline the 
government structure and the nature of the work for orchestral players, conductors and 
members of the management team. Three cases are generally similar, but the details of 
each orchestra vary slightly. Relevant tables and figures are provided.
Chapter 5 and 6 present the combination of the main findings using both quantitative 
and qualitative data to explore job satisfaction and conflict. Chapter 5 provides the 
results of data analysis regarding job satisfaction, attempting to identify the problematic 
factors for Korean municipal symphony orchestras. This chapter provides two different 
sets of data. The first half of chapter 5 presents the results of quantitative data using one 
of most esteemed questionnaires for measuring job satisfaction, the Job Descriptive
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Index (JDI) invented by Smith et al.; the rest of the chapter presents the results of 
qualitative data. One-to-one interviews in accordance with the results of quantitative 
data and the direct narrations of interviewees are also provided.
Chapter 6 presents the results of the data analysis regarding conflict, aiming to identify 
the problematic conflicts between players, management teams, civil servants and 
conductors, using both quantitative and qualitative data. The first half of chapter 6 
presents the results of quantitative data using reliable questionnaires measuring three 
types of organisational conflict and five styles of handling interpersonal conflict, the 
Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventory (ROCI) I and II are provided; the remaining part 
of the chapter presents the results of qualitative data, in parallel with the previous 
quantitative data.
Chapter 7 addresses the legitimacy of public subsidy toward Korean municipal 
symphony orchestras and the reasons why local governments do not sufficiently fund 
their orchestras. Finally, through the case of Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, it examines 
whether the decision to turn a municipal orchestra into a for-profit corporation in order to 
address the new challenges that Korean symphony orchestras are about to face is 
appropriate.
Chapter 8 summarises the main findings, and draws conclusions, followed by an 
assessment of the originality of this study, its implications (divided roughly into three 
parts) for the cities, players, administrative staff, and civil servants, the identification of 
some limitations, and brief recommendations for the future of Korean municipal 
orchestras.
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Chapter 2 Methodology
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the research methods used in gathering and analysing data. The 
first section presents the choice of the triangulation method. The second and third 
sections cover qualitative (interview and documentation) and quantitative (surveys 
using a questionnaire) research, along with the choice of sites, means of access, data 
collection and its analysis.
2.2 Choosing methods
The primary difference between qualitative research and quantitative research is that 
the former works with a few variables and many cases, while the latter deals with a few 
cases and many variables (Ragin, 1987). The detailed characteristics of qualitative 
and quantitative research are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Contrasts between qual tative and quantitative research
Qualitative research Quantitative research
• Words • Numbers
• Points of view of participants • Point of view of researcher
• Researcher close • Researcher distance
• Theory emergent • Theory testing
• Process • Static
• Unstructured • Structured
• Contextual understanding • Generalization
• Rich, deep data • Hard, reliable data
• Micro • Macro
• Meaning • Behaviour
• Natural setting • Artificial setting
(Source: Bryman, 2008: p. 393)
To pursue the aims of this study, I initially use qualitative research rather than 
quantitative research. Creswell (1998) indicates several reasons for conducting 
qualitative research: the nature of the research questions, which frequently begin with a 
how or a what in order to describe what is going on; the topic which needs to be 
explored; the need to present a detailed view of the topic; and emphasis on the 
researcher’s role as an active learner rather than as an expert (pp. 17-18).
Qualitative research was useful in this study to understand mechanisms, the 
relationships between players, administrative staff, and cities, meaningful information, 
general atmosphere, and key issues of Korean municipal orchestras (at the time of this 
study). More importantly, several questions arose during the process of conducting 
qualitative research with respect to job satisfaction and conflict relationships. With 
these questions, I wanted to acquire generalised, reliable, numerical, and statistical
data to measure job satisfaction and conflict around Korean municipal orchestras. To 
address these and to fill some of the gaps from the shortcomings of qualitative 
research, I conducted a quantitative questionnaire survey regarding job satisfaction 
using the Job Descriptive Index (JDI) and conflict using the Rahim Organizational 
Conflict Inventory (ROCI) I and II. Simple random sampling was used in the survey 
questionnaire, which has the advantage of ‘high generalizability of findings’ (Sekaran, 
2003: p. 281). The sampling design used in interview and survey are summarised in 
Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 Sampling design
There are a number of studies designed to show the relationship between job 
satisfaction, conflict, conflict management, turnover, job performance, age, gender, 
ethnicity or race, tenure (number of years of service), education, and absenteeism in 
organisations in order to demonstrate how to achieve organisational effectiveness.
Because of their validity and reliability through many years of studies (see pp. 38-40, 
pp. 43-44 in Electronic Resources for the JDI and JIG, 2000; see p. 27, pp. 30-31, pp. 
43-46 in Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventories, 2004), the Job Descriptive Index 
(JDI) and Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventories (ROCI) I and II are frequently used 
to collect data about job satisfaction, three different types of organisational conflict, and 
five styles of handling interpersonal conflict. More importantly, these two instruments 
include all the themes of job satisfaction and conflict that I collected from interviews 
regarding job satisfaction and conflict. In addition, ROCI-II is the only instrument which 
contains five independent dimensions for measuring the styles of handling 
interpersonal conflict with a supervisor, subordinates, and peers (Rahim, 2004: p. 41). 
Along with job satisfaction and conflict, this study also investigates job turnover
regarding thoughts of quitting, thoughts of relative important facets influencing job 
satisfaction, demographic factors10 developed by a researcher, and the cross­
relationships between them.
To investigate these relationships, mixed methods, combining qualitative (interviews) 
and quantitative research (questionnaire survey) are used in a supporting role, and 
information was collected through both methods: data from qualitative or quantitative 
research in this study also help to explain findings generated by each method (Bryman, 
2008: p. 609). For instance, according to the survey result, the players of the BPO have 
higher satisfaction in promotion, compared to the other two orchestras. This 
phenomenon is explained by the information from interviews: only the audition result of 
the BPO actually leads to players’ promotion in the orchestra. In addition, according to 
interviews, conflict with the conductor is one of important issues among players and 
they described many episodes: this could be supported by the survey result that 
players have relatively higher perception of intragroup conflict (which is related to 
conductor).
The correspondence between survey and Interview instruments; and players and staff 
correlation table between JDI, ROCI-I, ROCI-II with peers, previous conductor, and 
current conductor, and job turnover is displayed in Table 2.11, Table 2.12, and Table 
2.13.
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Figure 2.2 Methodological triangulation design in this research
Sequential studies
Qualitative research (interviews) -* Quantitative research (questionnaire survey)
Equivalent status of methods
Qualitative data = Quantitative data
(Source: adapted from Denscombe, 2007: p. 114-15)
Combining qualitative and quantitative research methods in the study of the same 
phenomenon is defined as triangulation (Denzin, 1970). According to Denzin (1989), 
there are four types of triangulation in terms of the combination of research methods 
and designs, theories, and data.
• Data triangulation refers to examining the object based on three dimensions—
10 According to Blazer and Smith (1990), demographic information is useful to calculate 
subgroup satisfaction and conflict indicating strong and weak areas within an organisation. It is 
also helpful to investigate the specific group of employee, and it allows a comparison to be 
made.
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time, space, and person.
• Investigator triangulation refers to the use of multiple observers to examine 
the same object.
• Theory triangulation consists of more than one perspective on the same set of
objects.
• Methodological triangulation includes a between-method or within-method 
approach: the former refers to use different methods on the same object, 
while the latter refers to use the same method on different occasions.
(pp. 237-44)
Thus, even though this study is grounded overall in qualitative research, 
methodological triangulation (between-method), a strategy designed to overcome the 
weaknesses of one method with the strengths of another (Denzin, 1989: p. 244), is 
adopted in order to investigate job satisfaction and conflict around Korean municipal 
orchestras. The linking of quantitative and qualitative approaches in this study follows 
the recommendations of Bullock:
• The quantitative findings are illustrated by qualitative case studies.
• Qualitative results are used to amplify the findings of quantitative research.
• Qualitative evidence is used to produce hypotheses, which are tested by 
quantitative research.
(Bullock et al., 2003: p. 87)
Embracing these approaches, the results of surveys, which are more structured, will be 
placed first in Chapters 5 and 6, followed by the results of the interviews.
However, caution is needed when the results of some parts of the research are 
contradictory, even though Glaser and Strauss say reassuringly: ‘there is no 
fundamental clash between the purposes and capacities of qualitative and quantitative 
methods or data’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: p. 17). The reverse data results yielded by 
methodological triangulation in this study, therefore, are to be respected.
To summarise, qualitative research in this study was designed to understand and 
explore internal and external problems of Korean municipal orchestras, such as their 
mechanisms, problematic issues and threats, concerns, relationships, and the work of 
staff and players. In contrast, quantitative research was designed to explore general 
trends and gain reliable data of job satisfaction and conflict among players and staff as 
a mean of expanding the qualitative research.11
11 As mentioned earlier, the results of quantitative research will be given prior to the qualitative 
research in Chapters 5 and 6, because of relatively unstructured and less systematic character 
of qualitative research.
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2.3 Qualitative research
Case study approach
The case study is a common research strategy in the social sciences, such as 
psychology (Bromley, 1986), social work (Platt, 1981), and management studies 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Denscombe comments that the case study has become ‘extremely 
widespread in social research, particularly with small-scale research’ (2003: p. 30). Yin 
(2003: p. 1) explains, ‘case studies are the preferred strategy when how or why 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over the events, and 
when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context’. 
Denscombe (2003) suggests five characteristics of the case study approach: the ability 
to put the spotlight on one case; to carry out in-depth study; to focus on relationships 
and processes; to look at the natural setting; or to use multiple sources and methods. 
Therefore, it is evident that the case study method is particularly appropriate to the 
study of a complex phenomenon in a natural setting such as an orchestral organisation, 
as it has the ability to ‘discover how the many parts affect one another’ (Denscombe, 
2003: p.31) and investigate detailed relationships. Furthermore, a case study has more 
flexibility than other research methods because, according to Denscombe (2003: p. 31), 
it provides a chance for 'the researcher to use a variety of sources, a variety of types of 
data and a variety of research methods as part of the investigation’ and ‘whatever is 
appropriate can be used for investigating the relationships and processes that are of 
interest’. Thus, in spite of the argument about ‘the credibility of generalisations’ 
(Denscombe, 2003: p. 39) from case study findings and the difficulty in ‘deciding the 
boundaries of a case’ (Creswell, 1998: p. 64), I have chosen a case study for my 
research strategy. To minimise any disadvantages, I tried to identify distinguishing 
features among each group by setting up ‘clear and consistent boundaries’ 
(Denscombe, 2003: p. 38). To define the boundaries, decisions on what, when and 
where to sample were necessary. The study population can be divided into four factors: 
elements, sampling units, extent, and time (Tull and Hawkins, 1993), but I chose to 
omit one of factors, ‘elements’, as in my case it was similar to the ‘sampling unit’ 
(Kumar, 2005). Thus, the population considered in this study was:
• Sampling units: three Korean • municipal orchestras having different 
governmental structures.
• Extent: three cities in Korea.
• Time: during the period of data collection (January 2007 to April 2007, May 
2007 to July 2007, February 2008, May 2008 to June 2008).
Research methods
Creswell (1998) indicates four basic types of information: interviews, documents, 
observations, and audio-visual materials in qualitative research, which allow a ‘deep
involvement in issues of gender, culture, and marginalized groups’ (p. 19). The first two 
methods— interviews and documents, were preferred in this study.
Interviews
Although conducting interviews seems to be a reliable source for research 
(Denscombe, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000), this is not always the case. That is 
because ‘the spoken or written word has always a residue of ambiguity; no matter how 
carefully we word the questions and how carefully we report or code the answers' 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: p. 645). However, Yin (2003: p. 89) considers the interview 
‘one of the most important sources of case study information’. Interviewing is one of the 
most common and powerful ways in which we try to understand people, by seeking to 
obtain a viewpoint based on their opinions and experiences (see Sykes, 1990; Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2000; Mason, 2002; and Patton, 2002). Thus, obtaining large amounts of 
data from various subjects, with the possibility of immediate follow-up and clarification 
and understanding of people’s beliefs in their everyday activities, can be seen as 
particular strengths of interviews (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: p. 80).
An interview has a broad range of forms and a multiplicity of uses (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000: p. 645). The term ‘qualitative interviewing’ is ‘often referred to in-depth, semi- 
structured or loosely structured forms of interviewing’ (Mason, 2002: p. 62). 
Denscombe (2003) describes six different types of interview in two groups: structured 
interviews, semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews, which are 
distinguished by ’the degree of control exercised by the researcher over the nature of 
the responses and the length of the answers allowed by the respondent’ (Denscombe, 
2003: p. 167); and one-to-one interviews, group interviews and focus groups, which are 
distinguished by the number of interviewees. Highly educated respondents (my 
interviewees are professionals in music and management holding high educational 
achievements) usually expect to have a chance to express their particular views. Very 
structured questionnaires that do not allow sufficient opportunity for them to respond in 
their own words can be unpopular and can lead to aborted interviews.
Therefore, the qualitative interviews conducted in this study were semi-structured; and 
these have provided in-depth investigations especially related to personal experiences 
and feelings, an allowance for the development of the interviewee’s ideas, and a 
chance to ‘speak widely on the issues’ (Denscombe, 2003: p. 167), and ‘a multiplicity of 
uses’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: p. 645), via one-to-one interactions, taking place face 
to face, or via the telephone or the Internet (Mason, 2002: p. 62). Along with semi- 
structured interviews, I decided to carry out face-to-face interviews because of the
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following advantages: their relatively high response rates and prompt corrections of 
clear misunderstandings (Robson, 2002: p. 282); their appropriateness, and fewer 
practical problems in use (Moyser, 1988: p. 112).
Documentation
It is undeniable that interview data is an important source of case study evidence, yet 
‘they [the data] are subject to the common problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or 
inaccurate articulation’ (Yin, 1994: p. 85), so that Yin (1994) suggests using interview 
data along with other types of information such as documents and observations.
Although documentary research is considered old fashioned nowadays (McNeill and 
Chapman, 2005), this type of research is still useful. According to Tim May (2001), 
documents ‘tell us about the aspirations and intentions of the periods to which they 
refer and describe places and social relationships at a time when we may not have 
been born, or were simply not present’ (p. 176). In other words, we can gain access to 
the past and to areas of difficult, sensitive and taboo themes through various 
documentary resources.
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Documentary research covers a wide range of sources (Bryman, 2004; May, 2001), 
and documentary information is likely to be relevant to every case study topic (Yin, 
2003: p. 85). This type of information can take many forms and should be the object of 
explicit data collection plans (Yin, 2003: p. 85). For instance, consider the following 
diversity:
• Letters, memoranda, and other communiqués.
• Agendas, announcements and minutes of meetings, and other written reports 
of events.
• Administrative documents— proposals, progress reports and other internal 
records.
• Formal studies or evaluations of the same ‘site’ under study.
• Newspaper clippings and other articles appearing in the mass media or in 
community newsletters.
(Yin, 2003: pp. 85-86)
There could be personal docum ent, official documents from both government and 
pnvate sources, and med,a outputs, Yin (2003) pointed out the usefulness of these 
different types of documents, in spite of some degree of inaccuracy and bias Thus 
careful use of documents is required. In addition, according to Denscombe (2003) the 
good researcher should always ask if he/she has evaluated the documents rather than 
accepted them a. face value (p. 220). There are four oriteria for evaluating documents 
in good document research: the authenticity of the article, credibility, 
representativeness, and meaning of words (Platt, 1981).
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Denscombe (2003) describes the advantages and disadvantages of documentary 
research. The advantages are the easy and inexpensive access to data, its cost- 
effectiveness, and the permanence of data, but the disadvantages are the credibility of 
the source and its social constructions (subjective because of the interpretations made 
by the originator of the document). These disadvantages might be overcome by 
evaluating 'the authority of the source and the procedures used to produce the original 
data’, as Denscombe mentions (2003: p. 228).
Therefore, after careful consideration, in accordance with the documentation above, 
the present research was derived from four major sources of documentation: 1) current 
and historical reports and documentation from each orchestra, central and local 
government offices, the Korean Assembly Library and Arts Council papers related to 
music policies; 2) regulations and laws related to the performing arts, especially Korean 
municipal orchestras; 3) newspapers; 4) e-mails; 5) journal articles; and 6) theses on 
orchestral studies.
Classifying documents
The classification of documents falls into three main groups (May, 2001): primary, 
secondary and tertiary documents; public and private documents; and unsolicited and 
solicited sources (p.180). As this research focused on three Korean municipal 
orchestras, the majority of documents were drawn from primary and secondary sources, 
public, and both solicited and unsolicited materials from three central government 
organisations, local cities, and the three Korean municipal orchestras. Because of their 
importance,121 will describe briefly the three central government organisations and their 
functions.
Three central government organisations
The Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), the Republic of Korea
The MCT is one of the most important central government agencies and operates on
1.06 percent of the total budget of the government. The ministry is responsible for 
affairs in the areas of culture, the arts, religion, tourism and sports. The ministry has 
one assistant minister, two main offices, six bureaus, one commission, six officers, 26 
divisions, 6 teams, and nine subordinate organisations. The total staff is 1,884 
(Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2009a: online13). The MCT
12 As I was mainly in UK during my study, there was a difficulty in access to materials, and three 
central government organisations, which provide easy online access, were one of main 
secondary sources.
13 Available at: http://www.mcst.qo.kr/enalish/aboutus/historv.isp [Accessed 09 May 2009],
changed its name to the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in February 2008, with 
the start of the new Korean government.
As the Ministry of Culture and Tourism makes public its information, including the 
process of important decision making, on its website, I could easily access a variety of 
information. I also contacted the following departments to ask for relevant information 
(which was not on the website).
• Arts Bureau: Arts Policy Team, Performing Arts Team.
• Cultural Policies Bureau: Cultural Policy Team.
• Cultural Industry Bureau: Cultural Industry Policy Team.
The Art Way
This Comprehensive Culture and Arts Information System (CCAIS), runs as part of the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism Information Policy, and is designed to provide culture 
and art related information online for the major organisations of culture and arts in 
Korea (Korea Culture Information Service, 2008a: online).14
Korea Culture and Tourism Policy Institute
On the 5th December in 2002, the Korea Cultural Policy Institute (KCPI) merged with 
the Korean Tourism Research Institute (KTRI), to form Korea Culture and Tourism 
Policy Institute (KCTPI) (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2007: online).15 The 
cultural and tourism data centre of the Korea Culture and Tourism Policy Institute is 
open to scholars, students, and the general public through its webpage. It changed its 
name to the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute in February 2007. Many useful 
materials were provided through this website, especially in the following subsections:
• Periodical publication: Newsletter, Magazine.
• Statistics of culture and tourism.
• Research reports.
Other sources of Information
In addition to the research resources I have mentioned previously, I also accessed the 
websites of local cities16 and related orchestras; visited the offices of the three public 
orchestras (Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, Busan Philharmonic orchestra and 
KBS Symphony Orchestra); and browsed the digital content of the Korean National 
Assembly Library.17
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14 Available at: http://www.art.qo.kr/index.isD [Accessed 09 May 2009].
15 Available at: http://www.kcti.re.kr/index.dmw [Accessed 21 January 2010],
16 Changwon City Hall (2006) [Online], Available at: http.//enq .chanowon go. kr/home/home. isp 
[Accessed 09 May 2009]; Busan Metropolitan City (2009) [Online], Available at: 
http://www.busan.go.kr/01 citvhall/05 administration/05 01 Ol.isp [Accessed 26 October 
2009].
17 Available at: http://u-lib.nanet.go.kr.8080/dl/Searchlndex.php [Accessed 09 May 2009].
Choice of sites
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Purposeful sampling
In quantitative research design, probability sampling and convenience sampling are 
commonly used (Maxwell, 1996: p. 70), while qualitative research design favours 
purposeful or purposive sampling (Patton, 2002: p. 230; Kumar, 2005: p. 179), which 
emphasises in-depth understanding (Mason, 2002; Patton, 2002).
In purposeful sampling, the researcher goes only to those people who, in his or her 
opinion, are likely to have the required information and are willing to share it (Kumar, 
2005; p. 179). Purposeful sampling is extremely useful when the researcher wants to 
construct a historical reality, describe a phenomenon, or develop ideas about 
something of which only a little is known (Kumar, 2005; p. 179).
The crucial point that there must be understanding and evaluation of sampling and 
selection in qualitative research is emphasised (Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Mason, 
2002; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003). Thus, sampling decisions require considerable 
knowledge of the setting of the study and should also take into account the 
researcher’s relationship with study participants, the feasibility of data collection, 
validity concerns, and ethics (Maxwell, 1996: p. 72).
The focus of purposeful sampling is to choose information-rich cases whose study will 
illuminate the research questions (Patton, 2002). One of the goals of purposeful 
sampling can be seen as ‘maximum variation’, which ‘documents diverse variations 
and identifies important common patterns’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p. 28). 
Purposeful sampling, then, provides the best way to obtain the kind of information for 
the present investigation. As a result, purposeful sampling is considered to be 
important when selecting cases and the criteria for this research.
Selection of the case studies
The importance of understanding how to take decisions about sampling and selection 
in qualitative research has been emphasised by several writers. There are a number of 
publications written on Western orchestras that focus on how those organisations are 
categorised. However, one of the most common classifications of Korean orchestras 
divides them into civic (municipal) or private. Public orchestras are usually founded by 
the province, city, or district in which the orchestra is based, whereas private orchestras 
are founded by individuals. Generally speaking, the majority of Korean municipal 
orchestras have comparatively stable funding, a long history, and qualified players 
(especially in big cities) compared to private orchestras. There are around 103 private 
orchestras, in contrast to 40 municipal orchestras (Jung, 2004). At the start of my 
research, I wished to include both municipal orchestras and private orchestras, but 
Korean private symphony orchestras are more or less ad-hoc orchestras, and the
continuity of such orchestras was not guaranteed during the periods of this research. 
Furthermore, information such as facts, figures, or management structure simply does 
not exist in written form. Thus, I decided to focus on the case of Korean municipal 
orchestras.
According to the available literature, three different government structure groups exist 
among Korean municipal orchestras: orchestras with an independent executive 
constitution who are directly communicated with and controlled by the city, orchestras 
with an executive constitution under the control of a municipal arts centre, and 
orchestras operated by a department of a public broadcasting company without their 
own executive constitution. These three types of public orchestras are reasonably 
homogeneous regarding funding resources, their main organisational structure and 
performing activities, but they differ in size, in the amount of funding received, and in 
their performance levels. Therefore, it was necessary in my research to select one 
case from each of the three different government structure groups.
In addition, I made every effort to involve all the key people working for municipal 
symphony orchestras. They can be categorised in three groups: players (including 
conductor), administrative staff of the orchestral executive constitution, and city staff 
(normally one civil servant who is in charge of managerial work and cooperates with 
the administrative staff). A  Korean municipal orchestra cannot run if any of these 
personnel are missing: moreover, we would not be able to say that we know a Korean 
municipal orchestra without understanding how these groups interrelate. Therefore, 
each group is equally important.
While many orchestras in European countries, the U.K. and the U.S. place more 
attention on education, community work, and the recording industry, the primary work 
of Korean municipal orchestras is concert-giving. The types of concert-giving activities 
can be summarised as regular concerts, special concerts, national tour concerts, 
international concerts, and broadcast output. The average number of performances of 
public and private orchestras was 25 and 21.7 in 1998, respectively (Kang, 2000). Only 
one orchestra gives 71-90 concerts, and 11 orchestras provide 10-50 concerts per 
year among 14 Korean municipal orchestras (Ahn, 2006: p. 40). Thus, Kang (2000) 
and Ahn (2006) both insist that the number of performances is insufficient for 
professional symphony orchestras.
The young age group (20-29 and 30-39 years old age group), higher education 
graduates, and females are the main audience for classical music in Korea, based on
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the ‘Survey report on cultural enjoyment’ in 2008. The important factors in choosing 
performances are satisfaction in terms of previous experience (3.68%), the performer’s 
fame (3.43%), the programme (3.38%), the evaluation of arts critics (3.37%), the 
atmosphere of the performing venue and facilities (3.12%), and the ticket price (2.86%) 
(Koh, 1996). Korean municipal orchestras have gained some limited information on 
their audience from the subscription system, but they have not linked the subscription 
system to any efforts to develop their future audience.
The Korean municipal orchestras were founded by local governments, and are still 
owned, managed, and entirely subsidised by these local governments. However, 
significantly higher personnel expenditure, low box office income, and restriction of 
outside funds affect the financial difficulties of Korean municipal orchestras. The 
employment of players, administrative staff, and conductor is dependant on the local 
government’s decision. Players are employed by open audition, with special 
appointments for principal players when there are vacancies: the duration of a contract 
is normally for two or three years, in line with local government regulations. The 
number of administrative staff varies, but fewer than ten staff generally work in 
orchestral offices: their contracts are also renewable every two or three years. The 
principal conductor is chosen by local government officials: the majority of municipal 
orchestras have a principal conductor and only a few orchestras such as Busan and 
Ulsan Symphony Orchestras also have a vice-principal conductor.
The selection criteria
In order to decide which specific Korean municipal orchestras should be researched, I 
put a priority on purposeful sampling, which would only involve those people who in my 
opinion were likely to have the required information. Although there are arguments for 
choosing both extreme examples and representative examples (see Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Maxwell, 1996), l felt that it was important to select representative 
examples from three groups that differed in their administratively governed structure. I 
decided, initially, to target six orchestras (two orchestras from each group), but access 
to two of the orchestras I originally contacted was no longer available during the 
second period of the fieldwork, because of serious conflict caused by the researcher’s 
use of the 'Korea Public Information Disclosure System’18 (see Difficulties relating to 
information access in p. 38). As a result, the three orchestras selected for this study 
were chosen one from each of the three groups, and represent the ‘low ground’, 
‘middle ground’ and ‘high ground’ position within the groups classified by overall
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18 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2006) [Online], Available at: 
http://www.open.go.kr/pa/html/eng main.htm [Accessed 20 January 2010],
reputation for level of performance, total numbers of regular concerts, and size of funds. 
The three municipal orchestras each possess an image of success, are reasonably 
wealthy, and programme a considerable number of regular performances with regular 
funding, but they differ in their budgets, their government structure, size, organisation 
and activities. They are Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, Busan Philharmonic 
Orchestra, and the KBS Symphony Orchestra.
Gaining access
The first part of my fieldwork involved gathering documents, visiting archives, and 
conducting interviews mainly with administrative staff working in the Changwon 
Philharmonic Orchestra as a ‘low ground’ orchestra. The CPO  was convenient for 
regular access due to its location. I had relatively easy access to the CPO due to my 
previous relationship with the orchestra; in my early years I performed a piano concerto 
with them. Furthermore, when I worked as an assistant to the Artistic Director for the 
opera Tosca produced by the Kyungnam Opera Company in 2004,1 built relations with 
administrative staff in the CPO. The orchestra manager and two administrative staff in 
the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra took MA degrees in arts management (two 
wrote theses related to orchestras; one wrote about the management of arts centres), 
so they were very interested in my research and willing to help. Thus, I had permission 
for unlimited access to the CPO. In my initial meetings, I explained the aims and 
necessary materials for this study and asked about the possibility of their participation, 
and if I could conduct interviews with the management team, with three or four players, 
civil servants, as well as with the conductor. I also asked about the possibility of 
attending relevant meetings and asked whether I could have access to archival and 
documentation related to this study. The orchestra manager and one administrative 
staff of the CPO agreed to these requests, apart from attendance at meetings as their 
schedule is fairly irregular and some are potentially sensitive in nature. From this, the 
aims of the first part of the fieldwork were to identify suitable orchestras for this study, 
to get to know the administrative staff of six orchestras that I had initially chosen, and to 
seek their favour in order to be introduced to players, civil servants, the executive 
directors, and to the conductors of the CPO and other orchestras19 that I targeted.
The second part of the fieldwork was to concentrate on gathering archival information, 
documentation and qualitative information from interviews with orchestra managers, 
players and civil servants in six orchestras.
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Data collection
I undertook fieldwork four times in Korea. From January 2007 to April 2007, I carried 
out many interviews across the orchestras to understand the basic mechanisms, the 
context, and the issues. My second fieldwork was done from May 2007 to July 2007 
with more focused questions, and there were two follow-up fieldwork sessions in 
February, May and June 2008.20
Preliminary fieldwork
The aim of the first stage of fieldwork was to identify the managerial, administrative, 
financial and cultural policy context of the Korean municipal orchestras and, in 
particular, problematic factors within them. In addition, although I had studied music 
(especially piano) for 20 years, I was quite ignorant of the basic facts about orchestral 
funding, its structure, operation, and activities, so another aim of the first fieldwork was 
to increase my understanding of the orchestras. Before starting, I sent an email 
message to two staff of the management team in the CPO, and asked if they could 
participate in my study and cooperate with me in carrying it out. With their consent, in 
March 2007, I began the semi-structured interviews with the CPO, and pilot tested the 
appropriateness of my research questions with the interviewees.
Initially two interviews were held with the Planning Manager and Orchestra Manager of 
the CPO. As I met them whenever I went back to Korea, I was able to develop a fairly 
close and trusting relationship. They were both former wind players and had finished 
their MAs in Arts Management, so they were naturally interested in my study and tried 
to help me as much as possible.
When all interviews with relevant people in the CPO had been scheduled, I planned the 
rest of my interviews with the other five orchestras. At first, I thought I might be able to 
contact relevant people without anyone else’s help, so I sent email messages, which 
explained my study and asked for permission from those I wanted to interview. It was 
relatively easy to obtain their official email addresses and telephone numbers through 
the websites and homepages of the city, the municipal arts centre, or the orchestra. 
However, the rate of response was very low and most of them were not willing to 
participate in my study, something I confirmed by telephone. Thus, I changed the way 
in which I accessed these potential interviewees: I contacted friends and 
acquaintances working in and around orchestras. Furthermore, at the end of each 
meeting I asked if the interviewee could suggest other relevant people in the other five 
orchestras. Using this snowballing technique and my personal relationship, it was 
relatively easy to contact and make appointments, and I started to interview relevant
20 Detailed interview dates are given in Table 2.8, Table 2.9, and Table 2.10.
people in other orchestras. At the end of March, I finished the interviews at the CPO. 
After completing my interviews with the CPO, I continued to visit the orchestra 
whenever I had time in order to collect relevant data and documents. Meanwhile, I 
began to interview players of the BPO during the first period of fieldwork. To pursue the 
aim of the preliminary fieldwork, I identified key issues for Korean municipal symphony 
orchestras, including typical management functions such as personnel, marketing and 
artistic systems which appeared significant to the orchestras.
The main question areas were as follows:
1. Personal information.
2. Job orientation and attitude.
3. Role, responsibility, and difficulties.
4. Process of decision making.
5. Orchestra government.
6. Conflicts.
7. Key issues around orchestra at the time of study.
8. Environmental changes.
Through this process I recorded the interviews for transcription and made notes during 
each interview. If an interviewee disagreed with the recording of the conversation, I 
tried to take notes as much as possible. A  small number of interviewees allowed neither 
note taking nor recording, so I made notes right after the interview of as much as I 
could remember. Interviews were mainly conducted in offices, cafés, and restaurants 
and were recorded by a digital voice recorder and then transcribed in Korean-English 
translation in the early period.21 Later, I changed entirely to using a tape recorder due 
to the technical faults of the digital recorder.
To increase my understanding of orchestras, I read and analysed relevant books, 
documents, and archives that I collected from newspapers, orchestra offices, municipal 
arts centres, the Arts Council Korea, the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, and the 
National Assembly Library. However, information on major issues that Korean 
orchestras are facing is very limited. Therefore, I continued to spend time with two of 
my key informants in the CPO  in order to understand the orchestra and the main issues 
it was facing. I was particularly keen to collect financial information, orchestra 
programmes, information on main activities, their history, the regulation of orchestras, 
papers on cultural policy and cultural industries of each city, and the cultural policy of 
local governments.
After the first fieldwork, I came back to UK in April 2007 for a month to report and 
discuss the outcome with my supervisor. Then I modified the semi-structured interview
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21 The first six interviews were recorded by digital voice recorder.
that I had used in the first fieldwork so that each questionnaire varied according to the 
participant’s willingness to be interviewed. Before going back to Korea for the second 
stage of fieldwork, I arranged some interview schedules with other orchestras by 
telephone and email.
Second fieldwork
With confidence gained through the first stage of fieldwork, the aim of the second stage 
was to acquire deeper information and to understand issues in specific orchestras as 
well as to conduct further interviews. During the second stage, I interviewed people 
working in a variety of roles in the Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, the Ulsan 
Philharmonic Orchestra, the KBS Symphony Orchestra, the Daejeon Philharmonic 
Orchestra, and the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, as well as three private orchestras: 
the Korean Symphony Orchestra, the Prime Philharmonic Orchestra and the Mostly 
Philharmonic Orchestra. Interviews with private orchestras were aimed at gaining a 
wide understanding of the current key issues facing Korean Orchestras.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with players, civil servants, orchestra 
managers, members of the management team, and conductors. Formal appointments 
were made mainly by telephone, and interviews were conducted in offices, restaurants, 
and cafés during their working time or after finishing work. Although all interviews were 
tape recorded, I took notes in case the recorder did not work or recording was not 
permitted by interviewees during the interview. The interviews lasted between 10 
minutes and 4 hours. The main difference between this and the first stage of fieldwork 
was that, due to the ease of location, I spent between 4 and 5 hours per day meeting 
the interviewees of the BPO, UPO, and DPO in May. The rest of the orchestras— the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra, the Korean Symphony Orchestra, the Seoul Philharmonic 
Orchestra, the Prime Philharmonic Orchestra, and the Mostly Philharmonic 
Orchestra— are all located in Seoul which takes approximately 5 hours to reach from 
my residence and, because of this, it was necessary for me to stay in Seoul for a 
month in June. There was an unexpected conflict with the UPO and DPO in accessing 
information about these orchestras (see p. 38). After finishing the second fieldwork, I 
decided on my final three case studies: the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, the 
Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, and the KBS Symphony Orchestra.
I used the snowball technique as well as a number of acquaintances to introduce me to 
relevant people in these orchestras. Once I had their contact details, I called them 
individually and made an appointment. After finishing preliminary fieldwork, I modified 
question areas and questions to maximize the aim of my second fieldwork. I added 
questions on orchestra structure, audition system, financial resources, and the 
musicians’ union, because I thought that each orchestras would have this information
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and it would be open to everyone, but it was not. Thus, I asked interviewees about who 
might be able to explain or provide appropriate information. In addition, I made more 
detailed questions on decision making areas, because most interviewees in the 
preliminary fieldwork did not know the intention of my questions, and could not answer 
properly. The section on difficulties and conflicts was also expanded, because 
interviewees revealed several publicly covered stories. This category was not applied 
rigidly, as many answers overlapped between difficulties and conflicts.
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The key question areas were as follows:
1. Personal information and job orientation.
2. Orchestra structure and the way of operation.
3. Role and responsibility.
4. Decision making areas, the process, and the degree and willingness of
participation.
5. The audition system.
6. Difficulties, threats and any important change surrounding the orchestra.
7. Main financial resources and status.
8. Relationships, conflicts and personal difficulties.
9. Musicians’ union (if appropriate).
10. Key issues around the orchestra at the time of study.
Although some question areas, such as orchestra structure, financial information and 
musicians’ union, may be considered to deal with factual information obtainable 
through documents or archives from each orchestra, the information was sometimes 
hard to find. Thus, I added these question areas after the first fieldwork had been done 
and also requested this information from the management team.
After conducting several interviews in the above question areas, I modified the key 
areas as follows:
1. Personal information and job orientation.
2. Orchestra structure and management.
3. Role, responsibility and task difficulties.
4. The audition system.
5. Main financial resources and status.
6. Musicians’ union (if appropriate).
7. Job satisfaction.
8. Conflicts and relationship.
9. Key issues around the orchestra at the time of study and changes (including
auditions).
In contrast to the beginning of the second fieldwork, the decision-making processes 
and the degree and willingness of participation were omitted because of lack of 
information and relative insignificance. Question areas one to six were used to provide 
general information concerning Korean municipal orchestras; seven and eight were 
expanded in order to investigate job satisfaction and conflict (identified as an internal
problem); and finally, question area nine was expanded so as to examine external 
problems faced by Korean municipal orchestras. Question areas two, five and nine 
seemed more or less straightforward to answer, but I had been struggling to obtain 
information right up to the end of my study, and it led me to conduct the fourth fieldwork.
Documents and archives were continuously collected through orchestra sites, central 
government institutions, city halls, and the National Assembly library.
The third and fourth fieldwork
The third and fourth fieldwork were conducted during a relatively short period, and 
could be seen as ‘follow up’ activity to update the information data, collect more 
documents and explore archives. I conducted interviews that I could not have done in 
previous periods and used a similar approach to that which I had adopted in the first 
and second fieldwork. Interviews and documentation were key sources of information 
in each period of fieldwork. After coming back to the UK, I continued to contact 
interviewees via email and telephone whenever I had a question and needed to confirm 
information. In particular, I required information from the orchestras’ management 
teams on local government regulations regarding municipal arts organisations.
Difficulties 
Technical difficulties
At the beginning of the first stage of fieldwork, I made a huge mistake with the digital 
voice recorder. The software of the recorder was not properly installed, and I could not 
download the voice data. I should have fixed the problem earlier, but during that period 
I was totally exhausted by tightly scheduled interviews in other cities. Changwon is 
close to my home but took approximately one hour’s travelling, whereas Busan took 
around two hours. When I finished the sixth interview, the battery of the recorder ran 
out and I used a tape recorder that I had prepared for emergencies. Although I 
replaced the new battery as soon as I arrived back home, the recorder did not switch 
on, so I went to the service centre to check the recorder the next day. The service 
centre reported that the recorder seemed seriously damaged and the data inside the 
recorder was most probably lost. As a result, I lost information from six interviews which 
contained information from difficult-to-access interviewees. I contacted these 
interviewees and explained what had happened, and then asked whether they would 
be prepared to answer the questions again via email (I did not have enough time to 
conduct it again and more importantly interviewees were not willing to do it again). Only 
half of interviewees replied to me with very short answers. It was an expensive lesson. 
After such a disaster, I began using a tape recorder and taking notes much more
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seriously.
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Interview difficulties
No matter how careful you are about setting up your interview and no matter 
how hard you try to do all the right things to establish good rapport with your 
respondent, there will always be someone who is difficult to interview.
(Keats, 2000: p. 136)
As Keats (2000) remarks, there can be difficulties with interviewees due to their 
'hostility, anxiety, and prejudicial attitudes to an interviewer’s gender, age and status’ 
(pp. 136-37).
I had an initial belief that musicians would generally be confident, superior, and self- 
conscious, so I was expecting them to be hostile respondents. However, as soon as I 
conducted interviews with players, I realised it was only an imaginary fear. Some 
interviewees had had a poor experience with a previous interview, because the people 
who had conducted the interview had stressed the negative side. As a result, they were 
reproached by the city authorities; therefore, I felt that they were now very wary about 
their answers and that, consequently, they worded their responses very carefully. To 
handle hostile respondents, I needed to be responsive to both the interviewee’s verbal 
and non-verbal signs, to create a friendly environment, and to prepare the interview 
schedule and appointment taking time into consideration. More importantly, I kept in 
mind that hostility should not be returned with hostility (Keats, 2000).
There are two signs of anxiety: some may not answer a question at all, whereas others 
are over excited, and keep talking (Keats, 2000: p. 138). In helping to reduce the 
respondent’s anxiety levels, I tried to take time to build a rapport; to make the purpose 
of the interview clear; to begin with the least threatening questions; to provide a calm, 
quiet environment, free of distractions; and not to rush the interviewee for responses 
(Keats, 2000: p. 138). Fortunately, the majority of the interviewees did not show their 
anxiety during the interview and most questions that I asked were answered. They 
sometimes did not want to answer sensitive questions such as those about their 
satisfaction with the working environment or their relationship with others. Despite my 
concerns, the answers eventually emerged either directly or indirectly during my 
second or further visit.
Among these three interview difficulties, prejudice was the most worrying factor before 
starting the fieldwork. Prejudice here is created through the respondent’s judgments on 
‘the interviewer’s age, gender, appearance or ethnic background’ (Keats, 2000: p. 139). 
As I was a 30-year-old female student, there seemed to be several prejudices about
me among the interviewees. The majority of interviewees who were older males 
ignored or lacked respect for me, because they perhaps considered me an 
inexperienced young female student. Although I could not change my age, gender, and 
ethnic background, I was able to reduce some prejudice, following Keats’s advice, ‘by 
avoiding extremes in dress style and personal appearance and by showing my own 
efficiency’ (Keats, 2000: p. 139). In spite of my efforts to avoid prejudice, however, I 
encountered several difficulties. Some interviewees ignored my academic background 
and status as a student by saying that: ‘you finished an MA in the UK that only takes a 
year? Is it useful?’22 ‘Have you ever worked before? If you only study and do not have 
practical experience, it’s useless;’ or, ‘doing a PhD in Korea is much more difficult than 
doing it overseas’. Although I was not pleased with such questions, I tried to my best to 
respond positively to them and made the kinds of agreeable responses that they 
wanted to hear from me.
Another difficulty related to my status was that some interviewees forgot my 
appointment. Once I had made an appointment, I normally sent a reminder and 
confirmation of the appointment at least one day before via telephone. On the way to 
the city, I called the interviewee again to confirm the place and time of the interview. 
However, one completely forgot and went to another city, and I needed to return 
another time. It was a complete waste of time and money, and the only thing I could do 
in this instance was to reschedule. Regarding ethnic issues, Korea is a racially 
homogeneous nation and all interviewees were Korean, so I did not need to worry 
about this aspect.
Ethical issues were one of the difficulties encountered in conducting interviews, 
especially in the case of players, administrative staff, and civil servants, who were 
adversely affected by participation in surveys undertaken by previous researchers. I 
paid great attention to ethical responsibility towards the interviewees’ confidentiality, as 
I was well aware that revealing personal information or contents of interviews might 
cause unnecessary burdens and problems to the interviewees. Thus, I continually 
checked myself during the process of the interview and assured the interviewees that 
confidential information would not be released without their permission, and the names 
of interviewees would not be identified unless they allowed me to use their name in this 
study. Furthermore, if interviewees were not comfortable with recording or in my taking 
notes, I respected their wishes. Transcription from the recorded interview and the 
coding process was entirely done by myself for confidentiality reasons.
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22 This question represents a kind of ignorance; he/she thinks I could not learn enough during a 
one year course because the master’s degree in Korea takes two years.
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Difficulties relating to information access
One of the hardest parts of carrying out this research was to find factual information on 
budgets and funding, activities, information on organisational structure within the 
orchestra and, particularly, information on the role of members in the management 
team. I initially thought collecting information would be one of the easiest tasks; I was 
wrong. For instance, I had been in regular contact with a female member of staff in an 
orchestral office through a combination of emails and telephone (sometimes she 
avoided my calls) and it took over seven months to receive the relevant information. 
Despite her constant promises, she gave me nothing. Instead of giving me the required 
information, she reprimanded me for the way in which I had formulated my request. 
She said I needed to more fully explain my study, the reasons why I needed such 
information and ask clear questions about it, although I had already explained this 
comprehensively in the first email and meeting. When I visited her during my fourth 
stage of fieldwork, she gave me another promise and asked me to wait a month, but 
nothing was forthcoming even after three months. Finally, I had recourse to the 'Korea 
Public Information Disclosure System’,23 something I least wanted to use.
The advantage of this system is that it has relatively easy access and there is a 100% 
certainty of getting a response. However, it does rely on people working in public 
organisations to submit the relevant information. Therefore, in some cases I might not 
receive any information, or only very limited information. In addition, the open 
information system, which seems highly bureaucratic, causes more unnecessary work 
to those who work in public organisations, so many do not like to deal with the 
information required through the system. In brief, the ‘Korea Public Information 
Disclosure System (KPIDS)’ can be risky and unhelpful. The KBS provided more 
information than I expected, but the staff in charge of handling email requests asked 
me to contact them personally, instead of using the system for my further questions. 
However, as my use of KPIDS had caused extra work for them, and this had an 
adverse effect; members of the management team and one civil servant in two 
orchestras (DPO and UPO) that I interviewed were very upset by my action in using the 
open information system, and did not want to participate further in my study. According 
to my contact in one orchestra, people in municipal organisations hate the open 
information system because it creates lots of extra work for them.
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23 It aims to ‘ensure the people's rights to know and to secure the people’s participation in state 
affairs and the transparency of the operation of state affairs by prescribing necessary matters 
concerning the people's claims for the disclosure of information and the obligations of public 
institutions to disclose their information in their possession’ (Republic of Korea, Ministry of 
Public Administration and Security, 2006: online).
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Data analysis
It has been acknowledged that analysing data is the most important part as well as the 
most difficult part of the process, although there has been limited discussion of analysis 
in spite of its usefulness and importance (Eisenhardt, 1989: p. 539).
After the period of data collection, there were various forms of material I used for 
analysis. At first, I transcribed them into Korean to better understand both the 
superficial and implicative meaning of texts, and then partly translated it into English. 
Meanwhile, I tried to keep the original words that the interviewees used as far as 
possible.
Once all the interview data was transcribed, I repeatedly and carefully read every 
interview to understand and familiarise myself with the context. Whenever I conducted 
this process of analysis, I asked myself: What are the main problems that the orchestra 
is facing? Why do they think ‘A ’ is a problem?; And how do the others think about ‘A ’? 
Do they agree or disagree with the same issue? The second task was to identify key 
concepts, themes, events and topical markers that had arisen in the three orchestras. 
To do so, I went through all the interview transcriptions. Similar problems that 
orchestras and individuals were facing were repeatedly mentioned across the 
orchestras. I made a first-level coding, which is a summarisation mechanism for data 
segments (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p. 69): The problematic issues included the role 
of the people working in the orchestras, relationships and conflicts, the success of the 
orchestra, the level of bureaucracy, the role of the musicians’ union, financial problems, 
the need for an independent orchestral office, government structure, decision making, 
the audition, and players' welfare. After the first-level coding, I turned to pattern coding, 
which groups issues into smaller themes (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p. 69): I made a 
note of where these issues were mentioned, and compared interview data to look for 
similarities and disparities. I then organised text chunks with the relevant narratives, 
under the problematic issues mentioned above. Moreover, I used a different coloured 
sticker for each issue: for example, whenever I found a reference to the musicians’ 
union, I wrote musicians’ union on top of the vocabulary card, and then put a small 
green sticker on the upper right-hand side. The text chunks were continuously 
organised and retrieved according to various categories. This process took 
considerable time before I derived my conclusions (Mason, 2002; Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; and Miles and Huberman, 1994).
So far, details of qualitative research methodology have been described; the following 
section explains the quantitative research methods adopted.
2.4 Quantitative research
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Survey strategy and research method
Survey is probably the most popular quantitative research strategy in the social 
sciences (Muijs, 2004: p. 34). Surveys can be divided into two types: structured 
interview and self-completion (or self-administered) questionnaire. A self-completion 
questionnaire with direct collection at the places of distribution was chosen in this 
survey rather than a mail or postal questionnaire with indirect collection, such as 
depositing completed questionnaires in a certain location or returning them by post.
Table 2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of surveys
Advantages Disadvantages
Empirical data
Wide and inclusive coverage— generalisability 
Cost and time
Tendency to empiricism
Lack of detail and depth of the data
Accuracy and honesty of responses
(Source: Denscombe, 2003: pp. 27-28)
As a part of methodological triangulation, questionnaire surveys concerning job 
satisfaction and conflict were conducted at the same time.
The aim of my survey was to conduct an exploratory investigation into job satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction, and the conflicts of orchestral life affecting players and 
administrative staff in Korean municipal orchestras.
Table 2.3 Overall response rate of the survey
CPO BPO KBS
Players Distributed copies 80 80 20 80
1s' collection 2na collection
Suitable copies 40 28 18 42
Unsuitable(uncontactable 
members) copies
3(16) 5 0 6
Response rate 66% 37% 90% 57%
Staff Distributed copies 6 9 6
Suitable copies 4 2 4
Unsuitable/uncontactable 
members) copies
1 7 2
Response rate 80% 100% 100%
The table above shows the overall collected response rate. The surveys on job 
satisfaction and conflict were composed broadly of five and four independent sections, 
respectively, and the sample numbers of each table are displayed in the attached CD.
Samples of 128 players are basically used throughout this study; and 40, 46 and 42 
samples are used when analysing the case of the CPO, BPO, and KSO, respectively.
The use of surveys in social research does not necessarily have to involve 
samples of 1,000 or 2,000 people or evens. Whatever the theoretical issues, the
simple fact is that surveys and sampling are frequently used in small-scale 
research involving between 30 and 250 cases.
(Denscombe, 2007: p. 28)
Roscoe (1975) also suggests that sample sizes between 30 and 500 are appropriate 
for most research: and sample sizes in the range of 30 to 50 are normally enough for 
exploratory or in-depth study (Nichols, 1991). Nichols (1991) also proposes the 
inclusion of ‘units from all subgroups of interest in the target population’ (p. 53).
Job satisfaction and demographic variables (sub-divisions include age, marital status, 
Gender, and tenure24) within a group of players (see Table 5.13); and within each group 
of players of the BPO (Table 5.14), CPO (Table 5.26), and KSO (Table 5.27) are 
analysed. In such a subgroup analysis, we need to have at least 30 people in each 
group (Fink, 1995: p. 43): sample numbers used in sub-division analysis for all group of 
players, players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO are as follows.
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Table 2.4 Sample number for JDI and demographic variables
JDI Work (n) Pay (n) Supervision (n) Promotion (n) Coworkers (n)
All players 123 123 123 123 123
Players of BPO 44 44 44 44 44
Players of CPO 39 39 39 39 39
Players of KSO 40 40 40 40 40
Another subgroup analysis was conducted between all players’ ROCI-I and 
demographic variables (see Table 6.12); and those of ROCI-II with peers and 
demographic variables (see Table 6.17). The sample numbers used for these analyses 
are also well above 30.
Table 2.5 Sample number for ROCI-I and ROCI-II
ROCI-I IP IG NG1 NG2 .
All players 117 117 117 78 -
ROCI-II with peers IN OB DO AV CO
All players 115 115 115 115 115
There is research supported by Harvard University and National Science Foundation 
aiming to investigate ‘how symphony orchestra players cope with the frustrations and 
disappointments of orchestra life’ by conducting a job satisfaction survey using two 
symphony orchestras (Mogelof and Rohrer, 2005). The total number of surveys 
received from two symphony orchestras was 68 (major symphony orchestra: 31; 
regional symphony orchestra: 3725), and the final sample was 29 and 37, respectively.
24 Sub-groups of the demographic variables regarding age and tenure were combined, where 
sample size of each sub-group seems very small.
25 The methodology comprised case studies of an elite and a non-elite orchestra in the USA, the 
former located in a major metropolitan area and the latter in a smaller city in the same region in
Using this sample size, Mogelof and Rohrer (2005) analysed correlations (including 
inter-correlations) and OLS regression to compare two symphony orchestras.
Therefore, the sample sizes used for analysis between JDI and demographic variables; 
ROCI-l and demographic variables; and ROCI-II with peers and demographic variables 
at the group of all players and each group of players are all above thirty, which gave 
me confidence in looking at the results for each analysis (Nichols, 1991; p. 54).
On the other hand, I have a limited sample size when it comes to administrative staff,26 
because most orchestral executive constitutions of Korean municipal orchestra have 
approximately one to six administrative staff. The CPO  and KSO had six administrative 
staff and the BPO had nine administrative staff at the time of the survey. The orchestral 
executive constitution of the BPO used to have six staff, including staff in charge of 
score and musical instruments, but merged with Busan Philharmonic Youth Orchestra 
in 2009, so that they now have nine administrative staff. It was very difficult to get 
access to staff of orchestral executive constitutions and gather questionnaires from 
them. They are overloaded with work, and also worry about some effects their answers 
may have when revealed. After various attempts to collect data from staff, I could 
include four samples (out of six in total) from the CPO and KSO: in the case of the 
CPO, one person was also a player of the CPO, so he was excluded, while the other 
missing person was someone not willing to participate in the questionnaire survey. 
Regarding the KSO, one member of staff was on holiday, and another was in hospital 
because of illness. Thus, I could not collect two samples from the orchestral executive 
constitution of either the CPO  or KSO. As for the BPO, the planning staff did not allow 
me access to either players nor staff, so I could not do anything except wait for the 
questionnaire collection day scheduled by the staff. The result was quite disappointing.
Obviously, there is a certain limitation on the sample size in staff (n = 10), thus, it is 
probably too small to present accurate results. However, according to Gomm (2008), if 
I have 85% respondents of all people in a population, I can be pretty certain that the 
pattern of the response will come close to mirroring that for the same category in the 
population as a whole (p. 148).
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order to find contrasting environments where the nature of the work was similar but the 
resources and contexts varied greatly (Mogelof and Rohrer, 2005: p. 97).
26 Due to small sample size of the staff group and each group of staff, JDI and demographic 
variables, ROCI-I and demographic variables, and ROCI-II and demographic variables are not 
analysed.
Figure 2.3 Response rate calculation
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Number o f usable questionnaires---------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  x 100
Total Sam p le-unsu itab le  or uncontactable members of the sample
(Source: Bryman, 2008: p. 181)
According to Bryman’s response rate calculation, I have 80%, 100%, and 100% 
response rates from each orchestral executive constitution, which represents a good 
response rate. In addition, despite some difficulties in getting access to the staff of the 
KSO, I did have relatively high level of cooperation from staff of the KSO and CPO.
Table 2.6 Response rate calculation of the staff of the BPO, CPO, and KSO
CPO KSO BPO
4
------x 100 = 80
6 -1 -------------------------
—  x 100 = 100
6 - 7
—  x 100 = 100 
_____ 9=2_________________
A small sample, properly managed and carefully analysed, is always better than 
a poorly supervised, large sample which is never fully analysed for lack of time 
(Nichols, 1991: p. 53)
In practice, the complexity of the competing factors of resources and accuracy 
means that the decision on sample size tends to be based on experience and 
good judgment rather than relying on a strict mathematical formula (Hoinville et 
a/., 1985: p. 73).
When I measured different types of conflicts using ROCI-I, I included a 95% confidence 
interval, which indicates that something occurring at least 95 times out of 100 reflects 
the true population characteristic (Sekaran, 2003: p. 288). Therefore, although sample 
size of the staff (n = 10) is relatively small, we can see certain degrees of tendency on 
job satisfaction and conflict sharing among staff, which are likely to reflect the rest of 
population, and the data should be accurate because of the high response rate 
generated by enthusiastic data collection and by the careful analysis of that data.
Non-response bias is the most common, and seems inevitable in a quantitative 
research survey. The omission of answers in this survey occurred especially in the 
case of players of the BPO,27 and non-response bias was examined. The responses 
from players of the BPO are divided into two groups according to the time of response, 
as in Dorsch et al. (1998): early respondents (spontaneous respondents) and late 
respondents (non-spontaneous respondents). To evaluate non-response bias, one-way 
analysis of variance was adopted. Table 2.7 presents the results of the test, showing
27 Armstrong and Overton (1977) define non-respondents as those who are not willing to 
participate in the questionnaire, or it takes a longer time to receive answers from them.
that there is one statistically significant difference found among 24 subscales between 
early and late responses, thus 95.9% of responses are free from non-response bias.
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Table 2.7 One-way ANOVA statistics for non-response bias check
Subscales______
Early respondents 
Late respondents
t_________________
Subscales
41.61
43.88
-0.840
3.71
5.75
^.567™
29.86
35.56
-1.609
9.87
10.62
-0.479
27.09
37.86
-3.506**
2.39
2.24
0.932
2.85
2.79
0.644
2.94
3.00
-0.505
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Early respondents 2.85 3.34 3.61 2.31 3.45 3.01 3.32 3.62
L a te  respondents 3.02 3.22 3.51 2.10 3.41 2.98 3.21 3.44
t_________________ -1.281 0.517 0.577 0.891 0.189 0,118** 0.448 0.996
Subscales 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Early respondents 2.15 3.47 3.00 3.57 3.58 2.55 3.74 3.50
Late respondents 2.04 3.48 2.95 3.69 3.66 2.20 3.79 3.53
T 0.513 -0.050 0.216JU -0.566 -0.505 1.376 -0.255 -0.135
Note: “  indicates p< 0.01; subscales: 1-5=JDI, 6-9=ROCI-l, 10-14=ROCI-II with previous 
conductor, 15-19=ROCI-ll with current conductor, 20-24=ROCI-II with peers.
Multicollinearity28 9301 was checked with all regression analyses used in this study, in order 
to avoid the problems of multicollinearity, which leads to unreliable and unstable results 
in regression coefficients (De Vaus, 2002). To detect a multicollinearity problem, a 
variance inflation factor (VIF) was used. All VIF values were less than 5, which was not 
considered to be a serious multicollinearity problem, and there was no multicollinearity 
problem found in the analysis.
Choice of sites
I conducted two surveys, job satisfaction and conflict, simultaneously. Although there 
are two independent surveys, the method for access, data collection, difficulties, and 
samples32 was the same except for data analysis, data handling, and its interpretation. 
As this quantitative survey forms an extension of the qualitative research, the sites are 
the same; Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, and the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra.
Gaining access and data collection
After deciding to conduct this survey, I e-mailed the orchestra manager and the former 
representative of players of the BPO, the representative of players of the KBS, and a 
member of staff of the CPO. However, nobody replied, so I contacted the former 
planning manager33 of the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra to ask the best way to
28 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
29 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
30 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
31 'The term multicollinearity (or collinearity) is used to describe the situation when a high 
correlation is detected between two or more predictor variables’ (Brace etal., 2006: p. 232)
32 Sample numbers indicate the same person in two surveys.
33 He is currently (in 2011) Managing Director of Gyeongnam Arts Center.
obtain a higher response rate from players and staff of the CPO, BPO, and KSO. As he 
strongly recommended me to return to Korea and conduct the survey, I contacted the 
representative of players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra (because this orchestra, for 
me, was the most difficult to access) asking whether he could help me inform the 
players and distribute questionnaires; and then I requested details of the rehearsal 
schedule. We agreed that I would visit the rehearsal place and display questionnaires 
on a desk with pens and small complimentary gifts. Although I expected a higher 
response rate, approximately half of the players returned questionnaires. The details of 
response rate are displayed in Table 2.3. I wanted to distribute questionnaires to 
players one more day, but the representative thought the response rate was quite high 
and that players were not likely to participate in the survey if I repeated it, thus I 
decided to conclude at this point with the KSO ’s players. Meanwhile, I met a friend’s 
father, who is a reporter of the KBS, in order to have help in distributing questionnaires 
to the administrative staff of the KBS Symphony Orchestra immediately before meeting 
the players’ representative. After collecting questionnaires from players, I met my 
friend’s father and one administrative staff member; however, the staff member told me 
that all administrative staff had decided to refuse to fill in the questionnaires because 
they thought it was ridiculous to judge their co-workers and they feared the results of 
the survey might cause negative influence on the administration department of the KBS 
Symphony Orchestra.34 Thus, I and my friend’s father decided to contact the Head of 
Division of Audience Relations and ask him to persuade the staff. Finally, four staff 
returned questionnaires via email.
In the case of the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, I made prior contact with two of 
the administrative staff and the representative of players via email and telephone. I 
arranged a visiting time with the representative and decided to visit two days during 
their practice time.35
I also displayed questionnaires on a table with pen and complimentary drinks and 
players returned completed questionnaires to the table or to the administrative office. 
With cooperation from administrative staff and the representative of players, I was able 
to collect forty questionnaires. The response rate was slightly disappointing, as I 
expected a much higher rate because staff and players were more cooperative. The 
low response rate was mainly due to many absences of string players, who were on 
holiday. On my final visit, four staff returned questionnaires.
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34 There were lots of articles (in 2008) comparing the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra and the
KBS Symphony Orchestra, which described the SPO  as a successful orchestra and the KBS as 
a regressed one.
35 Players practiced for four days: two day for string parts and two days for wind parts, and I 
visited one day for string players and one day for wind players.
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I also contacted a managing director of the BPO and the former representative of 
players, and obtained permission to visit them. I renewed contact with a managing 
director during the survey of the CPO; however, she suddenly changed her mind 
because she regarded the content of the questionnaire as too personal. So I asked her 
to explain, and I suspected that she was afraid of exposing the inner relationships of 
the orchestral office. Thus, she said that she could only give me an evasive answer 
rather than a proper answer. In addition, because of some friction between the 
orchestral executive office and players, my appointment with the former representative 
of players was cancelled. Instead, a managing director requested me to post 
questionnaires and prevented my direct distribution of questionnaires to players, 
although I had made the request several times. She said she would inform the players 
about the questionnaire and distribute it to them for a week, but told me not to expect 
too much because players are not cooperative. The response rate from the BPO 
players was low36 on the data collection date arranged by the orchestra manager. I 
expected and imagined that this might happen, and made an appointment with the 
former representative and had a lunch together. I explained the results, and asked for 
his help. During the lunch, I found out that the relationship between them was 
problematic: he thought I was very close to the orchestra manager (she implied that 
she knew me very well when the former representative asked permission to get access 
to players) because she told him that she would help me and he should no longer be 
involved in this matter; thus, he thought I would get enough help from her with the 
questionnaires. Finally, extra 18 questionnaires from the players of the BPO were 
added later.37 However, I could not obtain help with the data collection from the group 
of administrative staff at the BPO, although I asked the former orchestra manager to 
persuade them. Therefore, the total number of surveys received was 128 from player 
groups and 10 from administrative staff.
Difficulties
The greatest difficulty regarding this quantitative research was that of processing data. I 
needed to use the software SPSS, with which I was unfamiliar, so I asked a Korean 
analysis company and a PhD student at the school of mathematics, at the University of 
Leeds, to help to run the SPSS  programme. This did not progress as well as I expected, 
and I repeatedly needed to modify the content. Nevertheless, I chose which data I 
wanted to use, and made a table accordingly.
36 I collected 28 questionnaires from players out of approximately 80.
37 It was sent to me by mail delivery.
Another difficulty was collecting questionnaires from the BPO, as the orchestral 
manager did not allow me to directly contact players. So, I placed 80 questionnaires for 
players and staff in the reception of the residence of the orchestral executive 
constitution of the BPO, but the rate of respondents was disappointingly low. When I 
visited the residence of the BPO, the orchestral manager said, ‘You see? As I told you, 
players are not likely to participate in this stuff. But I could not see any chance of 
distributing questionnaires as she had promised me, since my questionnaires were 
placed in a box in the same state as I had first presented them.
The other difficulty was a fear of uncertainty, mainly caused by lack of preparation. 
Although the current representative of players of the KBS had promised to help me, I 
was very worried after talking to him in Seoul, because he could not guarantee how 
many players would participate in a survey, and said that it might be only five players. 
Moreover, after deciding to conduct the survey, I called the representative of players of 
the KBS, and he told me that they would only have enough time during the rehearsal 
taking place two days later. I did not expect to start the survey this soon, and I was 
unprepared. Just 16 hours after my arrival in Seoul, I had to distribute questionnaires to 
the KBS, and needed to prepare 80 questionnaire copies, each copy of which included 
approximately 14 pages. So it was hard to prepare and handle all these questionnaires, 
pens, and complimentary drinks on my own. Furthermore, I was careless with 
checking questionnaires: two items of the JDI on pay were missing, but I found out 
quite late, and could do nothing about it. Therefore, I decided that, in future, it would be 
better to bring questionnaires with me when I left the UK. Fortunately, I found an 
alternative way to interpret and analyse.
Data analysis
Coding the data was the first work in preparing for analysis. I first transferred marked 
data from questionnaires into Excel, in order to understand it more easily. I organised 
the data by grouping according to orchestra: Busan Philharmonic Orchestra was group 
number 1, Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra number 2, and the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra number 3. Demographic information, the ranking of the relative importance 
of facets of job satisfaction, the thoughts of job turnover, and each player’s and 
member of staff’s total scores for each of the five facets of job satisfaction were 
arranged as raw data. The same method of coding data was also used for conflict: 
each score regarding the intrapersonal, intragroup, intergroup 1 and 2 , 38 and 
interpersonal conflict of each player and staff member was measured according to the
38 In the case of player, intergroup conflict 1 was about administrative staff and 2 was about civil 
servants, while in the case of staff, intergroup conflict 1 was about players and 2 was about civil 
servants.
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manual of ROCI-I and II.
48
As mentioned in the previous section, I asked an analysis company and a PhD student 
to help in analysing data using the software package SPSS, due to my lack of technical 
skill in using SPSS. I produced lists and diagrams of what I wanted to discover, and the 
analysis company advised on the most suitable types of statistical tests that could be 
used. The running of SPSS with selecting appropriate statistic tests were conducted by 
the analysis company, and a PhD student conducted the same analyses to recheck the 
appropriateness of each statistic test (and the result) done by the company. The initial 
results of the analysis (the output) were then given to me. Therefore, the rest of the 
work, such as entering raw data into Excel and SPSS, selecting proper data from the 
initial results to make tables mainly in Chapter 5 and 6, data interpretation, and the data 
arrangement in appendices were all done by myself.
The statistic package for the social sciences (SPSS) 1639 was used for data analysis. 
The explanation of particular statistical techniques used throughout the quantitative 
analysis and the rationale for tables in Chapter 5 Gob satisfaction) and Chapter 6 
(conflict) is summarised in Table 2.14 and Table 2.15. Terminologies to explore job 
satisfaction, conflicts, job turnover, demographic variables, and these relationships in 
this study were as follows:
Terminology
• ANOVA: Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a set of parametric statistical tests which
assess whether the estimated variance between the groups or conditions differs 
significantly from the estimated variance within the groups (Bryman and Cramer, 
2009: p. 253): ANOVA is used when comparing the mean scores of more than 
two groups (Pallant, 2001: p. 186). However, it does not tell us which of the 
groups differ; and, for this, post-hoc tests need to be conducted (Howitt and 
Cramer, 2008: p. 186).
• Beta (standardized regression coefficient) is a measure of how strongly each
predictor variable influences the criterion variable, p is measured in units of 
standard deviation. For example, if p = 2.5, a change of one standard deviation in 
the predictor variable will result in a change of 2.5 standard deviation in the 
criterion variable. Thus, a higher p value indicates a greater impact of the 
predictor variable on the criterion variable. The unstandardised equivalent, B is 
also provided by SPSS (Brace etal., 2006: p. 231).
• Correlation: the strength and direction of a relationship between two variables
(Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 76). It can only take on values from -1 to +1. The 
sign in front indicates whether there is a positive correlation40 (as one variable 
increases, so does the other) or a negative correlation41 (as one variable
39 The language used for this statistic tests were mainly Korean, so I changed the results into 
English.
40 positive correlation is a relationship between two variables, whereby as the values of one 
variable increase, the values of the other variable increase (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p.355).
41 Negative correlation is a relationship between two variables, whereby as the values of one 
variable increase, the values of the other variable decrease (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 355).
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increases, the other decreases). The size of the absolute value (ignoring the 
sign) provides an indication of the strength of the relationship (Pallant, 2001: p. 
115). There are a number of different correlation coefficients. In general, the most 
common and most useful by far is the Pearson correlation coefficient (Howitt and 
Cramer, 2008: p. 76).
Confidence interval: the difference between two values that express the minimum 
and maximum likely values of an unknown measure of an aspect of a population. 
The confidence interval is inferred from sample data and allows the analyst to 
express the likelihood that a sample statistic will be found in the population 
(Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 355).
. 95% confidence interval for mean: these values define the range within 
which there is a 95% probability that the parameter will fall (Brace et al., 
2006: p. 370).
Crosstabulation: a joint frequency distribution of cases based on two or more 
categorical variables (Michael: online).
Frequencies: the number of times a particular event or value occurs (Brace et al., 
2009: p. 402).
Friedman test: a nonparametric equivalent of the one-way within-subjects ANOVA 
(Brace et al., 2009: p. 402).
Independent f-test: this test compares the performance of the participants in group 
A  with the performance of the participants in group B (Brace et al., 2006: p. 71).
Kruskal-Wallis Test: a nonparametric equivalent of the one-way between-subjects 
ANOVA (Brace et al., 2009: p. 404).
Mann-Whitney test: an inferential statistical test used to analyse nonparametric 
data from two-sample independent groups designs (Brace et al., 2009: p. 404).
Maximum (score): the value of the highest score in the data for a particular variable 
(Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 45).
Mean: a measure of central tendency that entails summing all values in a 
distribution of values and dividing the sum by the number of cases (Bryman and 
Cramer, 2009: p. 360).
Minimum (score): the value of the lowest score in the data for a particular variable. 
(Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 45).
Missing data: data which are missing or are unclear. (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 
360).
Multiple regression analysis (enter method): multiple regression is a family of 
techniques that can be used to explore the relationship between one continuous 
dependent variable42 and a number of independent variables43 or predictors. 
Multiple regression is based on correlation, but allows a more sophisticated 
exploration of the interrelationship among a set of variables (Pallant, 2001: p. 
134). There are a number of different types of multiple regression analyses. The 
three main types are:
1. Standard or simultaneous;
2. Hierarchical or sequential; and
3. Stepwise.
(Pallant, 2001: p. 135)
This study adopted ‘enter’ (standard) method which is the most commonly used 
(Pallant, 2001: p. 135), especially when there is relatively low numbers of cases.
Pearson’s correlation (r): an inferential statistical test of correlation used to analyse 
parametric data (Brace et al., 2006: p. 379).
Percentiles: the cut-off points for percentages of scores. Thus, the 90th percentile is
42 Independent variable (predictor) is the variable being used to make the prediction. It is also 
known as the predictor variable or the X-variable (Howitt and Cramer, 2008: p. 87).
43 Dependent variable is a variable that is affected by an independent variable (Bryman and 
Cramer, 2009: p. 367). It is also known as the criterion variable or the Y-variable (Howitt and 
Cramer, 2008: p. 87).
the score that cuts off the bottom 90% of scores in terms of size. (Howitt and 
Cramer, 2008: p. 44).
• Post-hoc test: a test for seeing whether two groups differ significantly when there is
no strong basis for expecting they will (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 362). There 
are different types of post-hoc multiple comparisons. LSD (Least Significant 
Difference) and Tukey’s HSD test are used in this study.
• R Square (R2) is the square of this measure of correlation and indicates the
proportion of the variance in the criterion variable which is accounted for by the 
model. (Brace et al., 2006: p. 231).
• Standard Deviation (SD): a measure that summarises the amount of dispersion in a
sample and is based on the amount of variation around the arithmetic mean 
(Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 360).
• Statistic significance (p): if a relationship or difference has an extreme probability of
occurring by chance then that relationship or difference is likely to be a real rather 
than a chance one (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 365).
• Two-tailed test: a test that assesses the statistical significance of a relationship or
difference in either direction (Bryman and Cramer, 2009: p. 365).
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Instruments
According to JDI and ROCI-I&II manuals, the content of any of the JDI or ROCI-I and II 
scales are not permitted to be published. However, readers can have access to these 
instruments from JDI Research Office at Bowling Green State University (phone: 419- 
372-8247; email: jdi ra@bgnet.bgsu.edu) for JDI; and Center for Advanced Studies in 
Management (phone and fax: 270-782-2601; email: mqt2000@aol.com1 for ROCI-I and 
II. Thus, only the interview instrument will be displayed in Appendix C.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has described the methodology used in this study. It explained the 
adapted methods along with the details of the choice of sites, data collection, difficulties, 
and the processes of data analysis were described in both the qualitative and 
quantitative studies.
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Table 2.8 Interview dates and approximate length during preliminary fieldwork
Job title Interview date Interview length
Planning Manager .09 March 2007 1 hour
Former conductor 12 March 2007 2 hours
Public relationship & advertisement department 13 March 2007 2 hours
Orchestra Manager 13 March 2007 2 hours
Orchestra Manager 14 March 2007 3 hour
Publicity 12 March 2007 30 mins
Civil Servant 13 March 2007 1 and half hour
Clarinetist 17 March 2007 3 hours
Civil Servant 19 March 2007 2 hours
Former president of Seong San Arts Centre, Changwon 
Current president of Daegu Cultural Centre
.20 March 2007 1 hour
Violist 21 March 2007 2 hours
Trumpeter 22 March 2007 1 hour
Violist 23 March 2007 40 mins
Public relationship advertisement 25 March 2007 2 hours
Horn player 26 March 2007 1 hour
Table 2.9 Interview dates and approximate length during second fieldwork
Job title Interview date Interview length
Civic Servant
Culture and Tourism Bureau
23 May 2007 30 mins
Clarinetist 25 May 2007 1 hour
Former Orchestra Manager
28 May 2007
29 May 2007
4 hours 
1 hour
Orchestra Manager 30 May 2007 20 mins
Civic Servant 
Busan Cultural Centre 
Performing Bureau
30 May 2007 10 mins
Former Orchestra Manager 31 May 2007 1 and half hour
Principal Trumpeter 08 June 2007 1 hour
Head of Audience Events Team 11 June 2007 1 hour
French Horn Player 
President of Musicians' Union
14 June 2007 1 hour
Principal Horn Player 14 June 2007 1 hour
Horn Player 14 June 2007 1 hour
"principal Horn Player 14 June 2007 1 hour
Former Head of Audience Events Team 16 June 2007 2 hours
Principal Conductor 21 June 2007 1 hour
Director of Artistic Administration 
/Education &Culture Project
22 June 2007 30 mins
"Assistant Principal Horn Player 23 June 2007 30 mins
Secretary General 25 June 2007 3 hours
General Director 26 June 2007 50 mins
Former Conductor (Second Principal Conductor) 26 June 2007 25 mins
Table 2.10 Interview dates and approximate length during the third and fourth 
__________________fieldwork and follow-up research __________________
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Job title Interview date Interview length
Tuba Player 24/25 March 2008 
Telephone
50 mins
Former player 09 May, 2008 
Telephone
20 mins
President of Seoul Arts Management On occasion 10 mins to 30 mins
Former Orchestra Manager 31 May 2008 1 hour
Orchestra Manager 22 May 2008 15 mins
Former Head of Audience Events Team 20 May 2008 40 mins
Table 2.11 The Correspondence table between survey and interview instruments
Survey Instruments Interview Instrument (Questionnaire)
Job Satisfaction (JDI) Section B, Section C, Section D, Section E, Section F, 
Section G, Section 1, Section J 
(Optional Section: Decision Makinq)
ROCI-I Section C, Section D, Section E, Section F, Section G,
Section H, Section 1
(Optional Section: Decision Makinq)
ROCI-II Section C, Section F. Section G, Section H
Job Turnover Section C, Section E, Section F, Section F, Section G, 
Section 1,Section J
answers across interview sections; 2. The Results of interview and survey help to explain each 
other; 3. Results of suivey mainly show empirical data: e.g. level of job satisfaction or level of 
conflict, while results of interview indicate causes and results of job satisfaction and conflicts- 
and different types of conflicts.
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Table 2.12 Players’ correlations
Variab les Turnover
JDI ROCI-I
ROCI-II
(with) Peer C urrent co n d u ctor P revious co n d u ctor
A B c D E F G H 1 J K L M N O P Q R S T U V w X
Turnover 1
W ork (A) - 1
Pay (B) 1
S u p erv is io n  (C) - 1
Prom otion (D) 1
C o-w orkers (E) - 1
Intrapersonal co n flic t (F) + - - 1
Intragroup co n flic t (G) 1
Intergroup co n flic t with staff (H) + 1
Intergroup co n flic t with civ il se rva n ts  (I) 1
(with) P e e rs Integrating sty le  (J) + + 1
O b lig in g  sty le  (K) + 1
D om inating  sty le  (L) - 1
A vo id in g  sty le  (M) 1
C o m p ro m is in g  style  (N) + 1
C urrent co n d u cto r Integrating sty le  (O) - 1
O b lig in g  sty le  (P) - - 1
D om inating  sty le  (Q) 1
A vo id in g  sty le  (R) - 1
C o m p ro m is in g  style  (S) 1
P rev io u s co n d u cto r Integrating sty le  (T) 1
O b lig in g  sty le  (U) - - - - 1
D om inating  sty le  (V) - 1
A vo id in g  sty le  (W) - 1
C o m p ro m is in g  style  (X) 1
Note: inter-correlation is excluded; + indicates a positive correlation, whereas -  indicates a negative correlation.
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Table 2.13 Staff correlations
V ariab les Turnover
JDI ROCI-I
ROCI-II
(with) Peer Current co n d u cto r Previous co n d u cto r
A B C D E F G H 1 J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V w X
Turnover 1
W ork (A) 1
Pay (B) - 1
Su pervis io n  (C) 1
Prom otion (D) 1
Co-w orkers (E) 1
intrapersonal co n flic t (F) 1
Intragroup c o n flic t  (G) 1
Intergroup co n flic t  with staff (H) 1
Intergroup co n flic t  with civ il se rva n ts  (I) 1
(with) P eers Integrating sty le  (J) 1
O b lig in g  sty le  (K) 1
D om in ating  style  (L) - - - - 1
A v o id in g  sty le  (M) 1
C o m p ro m is in g  style  (N) 1
Current c o n d u c to r Integrating sty le  (0) 1
O b lig in g  style  (P) 1
D om in ating  style  (Q) - 1
A v o id in g  sty le  (R) 1
C o m p ro m is in g  style  (S) - 1
A dm in istrative  su p e rv iso r Integrating sty le  (T) - 1
O b lig in g  style  (U) 1
D om inating  style  (V) - 1
A v o id in g  sty le  (W) 1
C o m p ro m is in g  style  (X) 1
Note: inter-correlation is excluded; -  indicates a negative correlation.
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Table 2.14 Reference for job satisfaction analysis
Table
N um ber Statistic Rationale
P urpose44
5.1 R eliab ility  A n a ly s is Reliability Info
5.2 Fre q u e n cie s P layers' D em oq raph ic  Information
5.3 Fre q u e n cie s Staff D em og raph ic  Information
5.4 C ro ssta b u la tio n  A n a ly s is D em og raph ic  Inform ation of the P layers o f the B PO , C P O  & K S O
5.5 C ro ssta b u la tio n  A n a ly s is D em og raph ic  Information of the Staff o f the BPO , C P O  & K S O
5.6 O ne-w ay A N O V A Leve l o f P layers' Jo b  Satisfaction Sub-objective 1
5.7 O ne-w ay A N O V A Leve l o f S ta ff J o b  Satisfaction
5.8 O ne-w ay A N O V A C o m p a riso n  betw een Players o f the B P O , C P O  & K S O  on  E a ch  Sca le  o f  J o b  Satisfaction Sub-objective 2
5.9 K ru ska l-W allis  T e st C o m p a riso n  betw een Staff o f the B P O , C P O  & K S O  on  E a ch  S ca le  o f J o b  Satisfaction
5.10 R epeated  m easures A N O V A C o m p a riso n  am ong Five S ca le s  o f J o b  Satisfaction  o f P layers Sub-objective 2
5.11 Frie d m a n  T e st C o m p a riso n  am ong F ive  S ca le s  of J o b  Satisfaction  of Staff
5.12 R epeated  m easu res A N O V A C o m p a riso n  between Five S ca le s  o f B P O  Players' J o b  Satisfaction Sub-objective 2
R epeated  m easures A N O V A C o m p a riso n  between Five S ca le s  o f C P O  Players' J o b  Satisfaction
R epeated  m easu res A N O V A C o m p a riso n  betw een Five S ca le s  o f K S O  Players' J o b  Satisfaction
5.13 O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een A g e  G ro u p  on  P layers' Jo b  Satisfaction
Sub-objective 3
t-test D ifference betw een Marital S tatus on  P layers' J o b  Satisfaction
t-test D ifference betw een G ender on  P layers' J o b  Satisfaction
O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een Tenure on P layers' J o b  Satisfaction
5.14 O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een A g e  G ro u p  on B P O  Players' J o b  Satisfaction
Sub-objective 3
t-test D ifference betw een Marital Status on  B P O  Players' J o b  Satisfaction
t-test D ifference betw een G en der o n  B P O  P layers' J o b  Satisfactio n
O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een Tenure on B P O  P layers' Jo b  Satisfaction
44 The details of these sub-objectives are stated on page 137.
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5.15 F re q u e n c ie s Relative ran k in gs on  P layers' J o b  Satisfaction Sub-objective 4
5.16 Fre q u e n c ie s Relative rankin gs on B P O  P layers' J o b  Satisfaction Sub-objective 4
F re q u e n cie s Relative rankin gs on C P O  P layers' J o b  Satisfaction
*
F re q u e n cie s Relative rankin gs on  K S O  P layers' J o b  Satisfaction
5.17 Fre q u e n cie s Relative rankin gs on  Staff Jo b  Satisfaction
5.18 C o rre la tio n Player. JD I+ JobTurnover Sub-objective 5
C o rre la tio n Staff: JD I+ JobTurnover
5.25 M ultip le  R eg ressio n JD I+ JobTurnover
5.26 O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een A g e  G roup  on  C P O  P layers' Jo b  Satisfactio n Sub-objective 3
t-test D ifference betw een Marital Status on C P O  Players' J o b  Satisfaction
t-test D ifference betw een G ender on C P O  P layers' Jo b  Satisfactio n
O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een Tenure on  C P O  P layers' Jo b  Satisfaction
5.27 O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een A g e  G roup  on K S O  P layers' Jo b  Satisfaction
Sub-objective 3
t-test D ifference betw een Marital Status on  K S O  Players' J o b  Satisfaction
t-test D ifference betw een G en der on  K S O  P layers' Jo b  Satisfactio n
O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een Tenure on  K S O  P layers' Jo b  Satisfactio n
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Table 2.15 Reference for conflict analysis
Table
N um ber S tatistics Rationale
P u rp o se ““
6.1 O ne-w ay A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference o f  Three P layer G rou p s on  Intrapersonal C o n flict Sub-objective1
6.2 K ru ska l-W allis  T e st C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference o f Three Staff G ro u p s on  Intrapersonal C o n flict
6.3 O ne-w ay A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference o f Three P layer G rou p s on  Intragroup C o nflict
6.4 K ru ska l-W allis  T e st C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference o f Three Staff G rou p s on Intragroup C o nflict
6.5 O ne-w ay A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference o f Three P layer G ro u p s o n  Intergroup C o n flic t with Staff
6.6 K ru ska l-W allis  Test C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference o f Three Staff G roup s on Intergroup C o nflict with P layers
6.7 O ne-w ay A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference o f Three P layer G rou p s on  Intergroup C o nflict w ith C iv il Servants
6.8 K ru ska l-W allis  T e st C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference o f  Three Staff G ro u p s on  Intergroup C o n flic t with C iv il Servants
6.10 R epeated  m easures A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een Fo u r C onflicts (ROCI-I) o f P layer G roup Sub-objective 2
Frie d m an  T e st C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een Four C o n flicts  (ROCI-I) o f Staff G roup
6.11 R epeated  m easu res A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference betw een Fo u r C o n flicts  (ROCI-I) o f the B P O  Players Sub-objective 2
R epeated  m easures A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een Fo u r C o n flicts  (ROCI-I) o f the C P O  P layers
R epeated  m easu res A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een Three C onflicts (ROCI-I) o f the K S O  Players
6.12 O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een age gro u p s on  ROCI-I Sub-objective 4
t-test D ifference betw een Marital Status on ROCI-I
t-test D ifference betw een G ender on ROCI-I
O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een Tenure on ROCI-I
6.13 R epeated  m ea su re s  A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een Players' Interpersonal C o n flict (ROCI-II) against P reviou s C o n du ctor Sub-objective 3
R epeated  m easu res A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een P layers' Interpersonal C o n flict (ROCI-II) against C urrent C o n d u cto r
R epeated  m ea su re s  A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een P layers' Interpersonal C o n flict (ROCI-II) against P eers
6.14 R epeated  m easu res A N O V A
C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een B P O  P layers' Interpersonal C o n flict (ROCI-II) against P revious  
C o n d u cto r
Sub-objective 3
R epeated  m easu res A N O V A
C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference betw een B P O  Players' Interpersonal C o nflict (ROCI-II) against C urrent 
C o n d u cto r
45 The details of these sub-objectives are stated on page 171.
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R epeated  m easu res A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference betw een B P O  Players' Interpersonal C o n flict (ROCI-II) aqainst P eers
R epeated m easures A N O V A
C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference between C P O  Players' Interpersonal C o n flic t (ROCI-ll) against P revious  
C o n d u cto r
R epeated m easu res A N O V A
C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference betw een C P O  Players’ Interpersonal C o n flic t (ROCI-II) against C urrent  
C o n d u cto r
R epeated m easu res A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference betw een C P O  Players' Interpersonal C o n flict (ROCI-II) aqainst P eers
R epeated  m easu res A N O V A
C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference between K S O  Players' Interpersonal C o nflict (ROCI-II) against P revious  
C o n d u cto r
C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference between K S O  Players' Interpersonal C o nflict (ROCI-II) against C urrent 
C o n d u cto r
R epeated  m easu res A N O V A C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference betw een K S O  Players' Interpersonal C o nflict (ROCI-II) against Peers
6.15 Friedm an  T e st C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference betw een Staff Interpersonal C o n flic t (ROCI-II) aga inst Previous C o n d u cto r Sub-objective 3
Friedm an  T e st C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference betw een Staff Interpersonal C o n flic t (ROCI-II) aga inst Current C o n d u cto r
Friedm an  T e st
C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference betw een Staff Interpersonal C o n flic t (ROCI-II) aga in st Adm inistrative  
S u p e rv iso r
Friedm an  T e st C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een Staff Interpersonal C o n flic t (ROCI-II) aga in st Peers
6.16 C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference between C P O sta ff Interpersonal C o nflict (ROCI-II) against P revious C o n du ctor Sub-objective 3
Friedm an  T e st C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een C P O sta ff Interpersonal C o nflict (ROCI-II) against C urrent C o n du ctor
Frie d m an  T e st
C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een C P O sta ff Interpersonal C o nflict (ROCI-II) against Adm inistrative  
S u p e rv iso r
Frie d m an  T e st C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een C P O sta ff Interpersonal C o nflict (ROCI-II) against Peers
C o m p a riso n  o f the D ifference betw een K S O  staff Interpersonal C o nflict (ROCI-II) against P revious  
C o n d u cto r
C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een K S O sta ff Interpersonal C o nflict (ROCI-II) against C urrent C o n du ctor
Frie d m a n  T e st
C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een K SO sta ff Interpersonal C o n flict (ROCi-ll) against A dm inistrative  
S u p e rv iso r
Frie d m an  T e st C o m p a riso n  o f  the D ifference betw een K S O sta ff Interpersonal C o nflict (ROCI-II) against Peers
6.17 O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een age gro ups on  ROCI-II against Peers Sub-objecfave 4
t-test D ifference betw een Marital Status on  ROCI-II against Peers
t-test D ifference betw een G e n d e r o n  ROCI-II aga inst Peers
O ne-w ay A N O V A D ifference betw een Tenure  on ROCI-II against Peers
6.18 C orre lation JDI & R O C M Sub-objective 5
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1 C o rre la tio n JDI & R O C I-ILP eers
C o rre la tio n JDI & R O C I-ll_Previous C o n d u cto r
C o rre latio n JDI &  RO CI-ll_Current C o n d u cto r
C o rre latio n ROCI-I & R O C I-ll_Previous C o n d u cto r
C o rre la tio n ROCI-I & RO CI-ll_Peers
C o rre la tio n ROCI-I & RO CI-ll_Current C o n d u cto r
C orre lation Jo b T u rn o v e r & ROCI-I
C o rre la tio n Jo b T u rn o v e r & ROCI-II _ Prev ious C o n d u cto r
C o rre la tio n Jo b T u rn o v e r & ROCI-II _Current C o n d u cto r
C o rre la tio n Jo b T u rn o v e r & ROCI-II _Peers
6.19 C o rre la tio n JDI & ROCI-I Sub-objective 5
C o rre latio n JDI & RO C I-ll_Peers
C o rre la tio n JDI & R O CI-ll_Adm inistrative S u p e rv iso r
C o rre la tio n JDI & RO CI-ll_Current C o n d u cto r
C o rre la tio n Jo b T u rn o v e r & R O C M
C o rre la tio n Jo b T u rn o v e r  &  ROCI-II _Peers
C o rre la tio n J o b T u m o v e r  &  ROCI-II _Adm in istrative  Supervisor
C o rre la tio n Jo b T u rn o v e r  &  ROCI-II _ C urrent C o n d u cto r
C o rre la tio n Jo b T u rn o v e r  &  R O C I-ll_Previous C o n d u cto r Sub-objective 5
C o rre la tio n ROCI-I & ROCI-II Peers
C o rre la tio n ROCI-I & R O C I-ll_Adm inistrative S u p e rv iso r
C o rre la tio n ROCI-I & ROCI-II C urrent C o n d u cto r
6.23 M ann-W hitney T e st C o m p a riso n  betw een P layers & Staff o n  Each  C o n flict o f  ROCI-I Sub-objective 1
t-test
6.24 M ann-W hitney T e st C o m p a riso n  betw een M usic-G raduated  Staff & N on-M usic-G raduated Staff on Each  C o nflict o f  ROCI-I
Sub-objective 1
t-test
6.25 P ercentile P layers' P ercentile  N orm s o f ROCI-I
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6.26 P ercentile B P O , C P O , and  K S O  P layers' Percentile  N orm s o f ROCI-I
6.27 P ercentile P layers' P ercentile  N orm s o f ROCI-II
6.28 P ercentile B P O  P layers' Percentile  N orm s o f ROCI-II
6.29 Percentile C P O  P layers' Percentile  N orm s o f ROCI-II
6.30 Percentile K S O  P layers ’ Percentile  N orm s o f ROCI-II
6.32 M ultip le  R e g ressio n R elationsh ip  betw een JDI & R O C I-IJntrapersonal conflict Sub-objective 5
6.33 M ultip le R e g ressio n R elationsh ip  betw een JDI & ROCI-ll_Peers_lntegrating Sty le
6.34 M ultip le  R eg ressio n R elationsh ip  betw een ROCI-I & ROCI-ll_Current C o n du ctor_ O b lig in g  Style
6.35 M ultip le  R e g ressio n R elationsh ip  betw een ROCI-I & ROCI-ll_Current C o n d u ctor_ A vo id in g  Style
6.36 M ultip le  R eg ressio n R elationsh ip  betw een ROCI-I & R O CI-ll_Previous C o n d u cto r_ A vo id in g  Style
6.37 M ultip le  R e g re ss io n R ela tion sh ip  betw een ROCI-I & Jo b T u rn o v e r
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Chapter 3 Korean cultural policy
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between Korean cultural policy and municipal 
symphony orchestras. I believe that the contemporary situation for Korean municipal 
orchestras cannot be understood fully without investigating Korean cultural policy. An 
understanding of the way that cultural policy is developed is significant, because that 
informs the thinking of key participants, and sets the patterns of their behaviour. For 
instance, if government is more concerned about social aspects, orchestras need to 
reflect this to run their orchestras. In addition, articulating key cultural policies through 
different political regimes may be useful in helping to predict the future direction of 
cultural policy. Thus, this chapter investigates 1) the way cultural policy has shaped 
Korean municipal orchestras and 2) Korean cultural policy’s impact on the future of 
these orchestras. This chapter presents four key themes of Korean cultural policy 
directed by central government, followed by decentralisation: the local autonomy 
system and the growth of a cultural industry.
3.2 National cultural policy of Korea
During the First and Second Republic (1948-60), the government’s role in culture and 
the arts was simply that of operating and managing public cultural organisations, 
mainly controlling and inspecting, supporting the activities of artists belonging to public 
organisations, and providing limited funds for those writing on the literature of the 
enlightenment against a backdrop of constant political confusion, economic exhaustion 
and social insecurity (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003: p. 33). 
With the spectacular economic growth of Korea, the Korean government had 
concentrated more on a huge expansion of cultural investment and the construction of 
large-scale cultural facilities all over the nation. After recognising its economic value, 
the culture industry became a main issue of Korean cultural policy, and was further 
boosted in 1994. With the changes in the republic, the governments’ priorities in 
cultural policy have been constantly changed whenever there was a new government.46 
However, an analysis of Korean cultural policy from the First and Second Republic 
(1948-60) to the Participant Government (2003-2008) reveals four key objectives 1) 
promotion of culture and arts, 2) cultural infrastructure and cultural welfare, 3) the
46 Since 1948, there have been 44 Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism by June 2009, but 
their average tenure is approximately one year, except the 17th Minister who had been working 
for four and seven months (and some for approximately two years) (Republic of Korea, Ministry 
of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2009b: online). Available at:
http://www.mcst.qo.kr/web/introCourt/minister/historvMinConts.isp?pPaae=1 [Accessed 07 June 
2009].
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enrichment of national culture and prestige, and 4) the globalisation of Korean culture. 
The following sections will be concerned with the impact of those objectives on Korean 
municipal orchestras.
Promotion of culture and arts
The first Republic of Korea was established in 1948 after the end of the US military rule, 
which had followed the liberation of Korea from Japan in 1945. Western culture, 
introduced to Korea from the late nineteenth century onwards, spread rapidly following 
the Korean War (1950). In particular, during the process of modernisation after the 
1960s, western popular culture, characterised by capitalist enterprise and 
commercialism, spread widely, greatly influencing the Korean life style. The young 
generation during that period was much more interested in western popular culture 
than Korean traditional culture.
Although the U.S. government’s policy related to culture and arts was somewhat 
restricted mainly due to lack of understanding of Korean culture and traditions, its 
influence on Korean symphony orchestras was significant in terms of expanding the 
classical music audience. Kyung Seong Broadcasting Company changed its name to 
Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) in 1946. The U.S. government helped the KBS’s 
development regarding its organisational operation, government structure, programme 
compilation, and production (Lee, 2006b). The government also gave more freedom to 
produce programmes, compared with the Japanese regime, and a western classical 
music programme was able to broadcast on radio. KBS has continuously been 
producing classical music programmes: 'KBS open concert’ is one of representative 
and successful classical music programmes, which well balances western traditional 
classical music and classical cross-over music, and contributes to enlarge the number 
of audience (Lee, 2006b: p. 80).
Despite the beneficial effect of western culture from the U.S. government on the field of 
Korean classical music, it was later to cause a considerable conflict between Korean 
traditional culture and western culture. One problem regarding the introduction of 
western popular culture in Korea was the vast difference between Korean traditional 
culture, based on Confucianism, and western culture, broadly characterised by 
individualism, materialism and commercialism. Therefore, it was inevitable that an 
element of confusion and conflict would grow between the two different cultures, and 
that the government's policy towards western popular culture was somewhat restrictive, 
due to a critical view of its contrary character when compared to Korean traditional 
culture.
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Promotion of culture and arts actually began when Park Jung-Hee’s military 
government (The Fourth Republic) made a law for the promotion of culture and arts in 
1972 (Park, 2009: p. 272) and the first systematic cultural plan designed for the long 
term, The First Five-Year Plan for the Promotion of Culture and Arts’ (Baek, 1991: 
p.31): these helped to establish a basis for Korean cultural policy,47 especially related 
to promotion of culture and arts. In 1972, there was a remarkable growth in music 
concerts (up to approximately 300 times in 1972, compared to 92 times in previous 
years). Although this achievement could be seen as the result of improvement of 
Koreans’ standard of living caused by economic development, the Ministry of Public 
Information (1979) believed that the increase of quantity of music concert was surely 
influenced by the Fourth Republic’s policy toward promotion of culture and arts (p. 231).
Another important government act to promote culture and arts was the foundation of 
the Korean National University of Arts in 1993. The government of Rho Tae-Woo 
(1988-93) embarked upon, and The Civilian Government (1993-98) completed, the 
opening of all six schools: drama, dance, music, film, TV and multimedia, visual arts, 
and Korean traditional arts. As the first music conservatory, its music department had 
the aim of training creative professional musicians without reference to age and 
academic background. Within 10 years, the music department of the Korean National 
University of Arts achieved significant results such as producing many winners from 
international music competitions: the winner of the 2006 Leeds International Piano 
Competition, Sun-wook Kim had no study experiences overseas, was from this school 
(after enjoying his career as a pianist, he wanted to be a conductor). Young graduates 
of this school become prominent musicians leading Korean classical music: especially 
when these outstanding young musicians play with symphony orchestras, more young 
audiences are pleased to attend concerts.
The Korean government did not recognise the importance of arts education until the 
early 1990s. However, arts education was included seriously in cultural policy in the 
Civilian Government (1993-98) as a means of promoting culture and arts: the 
government established the Korean National University of Arts and provided arts and 
culture related classes in selected local schools (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute 
and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: pp. 63-64). The People’s Government 
(1998-2003) continued to focus on supporting specialist arts schools (Korean culture 
and Tourism Institute, 2007: p. 64). In addition, the government operated fine arts 
classes among primary, middle and high school students in order to discover talented
47 It is not a basis for current Korean cultural policy but, rather, one that endured for the period 
of the Fourth Republic only.
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young children; and the Korea National University of Arts launched a Visiting arts 
performance’ to culturally excluded areas from 1999 (Korea Culture and Tourism 
Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: p. 65).
Emphasis on arts education influences orchestras’ programme and players’ activities. 
Due to the government’s priority over arts education, most Korean municipal orchestras 
have paid much attention on their educational work such as music outreach 
programmes over the last few years. Korean municipal orchestras started to change 
the way of access to their audience (orchestras started to visit audiences in different 
places rather than waiting them at their home venue such as the concert hall) and 
enlarged their public service to excluded social classes with various programmes for 
different social groups. In addition, as if a 'visiting arts performance’, local governments 
make a connection between local artists and schools, which seems to be influenced by 
central government's policy toward arts education, so the members of municipal 
orchestras regularly visit local schools to give a music instrumental lesson to young 
students. These have been become a key part of Korean municipal orchestral activities. 
Visiting schools, or expanding various programmes, are not only of benefit to people 
who are socially isolated but also to the Korean municipal orchestras themselves, as a 
mean of developing a future audience (NACCCE, 1999: p. 151; Kim, 2006a) and to 
orchestral players who can earn extra income from their arts activities (Lee, 2001: p. 
33; Jung, 2004: p. 73; Kim, 2006a).
The arts education of the Civilian Government (1993-98) and the People’s 
Government (1998-2003) was more or less a provider-focused policy, while the 
Participant Government (2003-2008) was a more consumer-focused policy (people not 
only as an audience, but also as active participants) that recognised the importance of 
arts education. Furthermore, the Participant Government (2003-2008) chose arts 
education as a key area of cultural policy in ‘Creative Korea’, developed in 2004 in 
order to suggest a new vision of culture in the twenty-first century: this government 
might have believed that people’s hostility or indifference to the arts was due to a lack 
of exposure from an early age, so that an overhaul in arts education by ‘cooperation 
between the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Ministry of Education in 2003’ was 
needed (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 
2007a), followed by establishment of a division of culture and arts education under the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 2004 along with laws for supporting culture and arts 
education in 2005 (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism, 2007a: p. 65). During the Participant’s Government (2003-2008), teachers 
who specialised in Korean traditional classical music, western classical music, drama,
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film, dance and animation were sent to primary and middle schools: 1,520 teachers to 
3,215 schools in 2005, and 1,431 teachers to 2,445 schools in 2006 (Korea Culture 
and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: pp. 65-66). Cultural 
policy focused on arts education, especially on youth education, is continuously 
maintained by the current Lee Myung-Park government (2008-present). Therefore, 
Korean municipal orchestras continue to provide an opportunity for school children to 
get involved in music, as well as to contribute to society.
Cultural infrastructure and cultural welfare
Park Jung-Hee’s military government (1961-79) was keen to pursue aggressive 
economic growth under a task-focused political regime. With the enormous economic 
growth48 of Korea since the 1960s came an increase in Korean's cultural demands and 
this had an impact on cultural policy, ensuring that people not only witnessed arts 
activities, but also had the opportunity to participate in such activities. Therefore, the 
government increased arts facilities and its subsidy to arts organisations and artists in 
order to satisfy the demand for culture.49
The Fourth Republic (1972-81) grant of nearly 48.5 billion won (£24.3m) was invested; 
much more than the total anticipated budget of 27 billion won (£13.5m) (Korean Culture 
and Arts Foundation, 1988a: p. 92), and provide cultural infrastructures. One of the 
most important cultural infrastructures was the establishment of the Korean Culture and 
Arts Foundation. The Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, whose aim was mainly 
promotional, was established in 1973. Part of its task since 1974 has been to help the 
activities of music organisations by providing funds (Arts Council Korea, 2005b: online).
Table 3.1 The subsidy for music performance 
_________ _________ _______ '_______________ (Unit: 1000 won)
Year 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
Subsidy 4,000
(£2,053)
10,000
(£5,135)
6,000
(£3,080)
“ 4,831
(£2,480)
9,587
(£4,923)
10,100
(£5,186)
Year 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
Subsidy 11,000
(£5,648)
19,100
(£9,805)
19,100
(£9,805)
14,300
(£7,342)
19,000
(£9,755)
21,000
(£10,780)
28,000
(£14,375)
Year 88 89 90 91 92 93 -
Subsidy 38,000
(£19,507)
44,950
(£23,075)
68,000
(£34,909)
76,000
(£39,016)
60,000
(£30,801)
" •
(Source: refer from Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1993a)
48 Per capita GNP was only 79,000 won (£40) in 1960, but 255,000 won (£125) in 1970, 
1,660,000 won (£533) in 1980, 6,303,000 won (£3,150) in 1990, and it exceeded 19,231,000 
won (£ 9,600) in 2008 (Bank of Korea, 2010).
49 Supporting the establishment of cultural infrastructure in Korea is mainly the task of the 
government, rather than private companies.
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The subsidy for music performance during the 18 years 1974-92 was gradually 
increased. Although subsidy from the Korean Culture and Arts Foundation is 
unavailable to municipal orchestras, we can gather from the above table that the 
orchestras’ activities could have benefited from this subsidy: ensemble groups of 
municipal orchestras are eligible to apply for restricted funds.
The objective of 1980s cultural policy was to provide the benefits of cultural 
development to all, regardless of area, social class or generation, so the Korean 
government began to support more cultural facilities, both in Seoul and in local cities. 
One of the barriers to national touring for major orchestras in Seoul was the lack of 
performing centres in local or regional areas. The people’s government emphasised, in 
particular, the establishment of the cultural infrastructure, which is evident from the 
following outcomes.
Table 3.2 Enlargement of the cultural infrastructure
Objects 1997 2002
Public library 370 462
Public museum 232 339
Reaional arts and cultural centres 79 113
Public library books (per person) 0.38 0.64
Foundation of one local national museum per province 
Nffw construction of the National Museum of Korea
(Source: Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 2004: p. 414)
With more cultural facilities, it was possible to provide more concerts in local areas. For 
instance, the KBS Symphony Orchestra gave 21 regional concerts from 1972 to 1979, 
52 concerts from 1980 to 1989, 58 concerts from 1990 to 1999, and 117 national 
concerts from 2000 to 2006 (KBS, 2006: pp. 171—384). There was a dramatic increase 
in national touring in the 1980s, compared to the 1970s, which was achieved by a 
growth in the number of performance venues in the provinces.
Although there is no direct evidence that the growth of cultural facilities led to the rapid 
formation of Korean orchestras, 13 public orchestras were established in the 1980s, 
compared to just three in the 1960s and 1970s.
Table 3.3 The annual establishment of Korean orchestras
1956-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-98 Total
Public Orchestra 2 3 3 13 10 31
Private Orchestra - - 2 5 16 23
"Total 2 3 5 18 26 54
(Source: Kang, 2000: p. 12)
With the increase of national touring from Seoul and the quantitative growth of regional 
orchestras, people outside Seoul had more access to orchestral concerts in the 1980s.
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In addition, in line with cultural welfare policy in the 1980s, the Seoul Arts Center, 
significantly relating to Korean orchestras was established in 1984. When the Seoul 
Arts Center’s auditorium was completed in 1988 (Seoul Arts Center, 2009: online), the
Centre planned a ‘Symphony Festival’ programme in 1989, to celebrate its first 
anniversary (Shin, 2001: p. 2).
The aim of the ‘Symphony Festival' was to invite orchestras throughout the nation to 
compete against each other under a specific theme, or to play contemporary music. It 
has been programmed continuously for 20 years since 1989, achieving the fame of a 
music festival with a long history (at least, compared to other festivals).
The ‘Symphony Festival’ has encouraged the foundation of local orchestras, removing 
the barrier between Seoul and other cities, and has increased the performing standard 
of Korean orchestras. This may lead to the enhancement of Korean arts. It is evident 
that 1980s cultural policy directly influenced the development of Korean orchestras, 
despite criticism that the programme for the ‘Symphony Festival’ was monotonous 
(Yonhap News, 1990; Lim, 1991; Shin, 1995; Shin, 2001).
In spite of continuous endeavour for enlarging cultural infrastructure and cultural 
welfare, the economic status of government influenced Korean municipal orchestras. 
The People’s Government (1998-2003), Korea’s economy was under the control of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1998. Financial difficulties in 1997 and 1998 also 
significantly affected Korean orchestras and classical music. Many classical music 
concerts planned before 1997 were cancelled, and festival sizes were reduced (Korean 
Culture and Arts Foundation, 1999: p. 763). For example, there were 3,193, 3,832, and 
3,934 concerts of western classical music in 1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively. 
Between 1996 and 1997 there was a 20% growth in total concert numbers, whereas 
there was only a 2.7% growth in 1998 (Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1997, 
1998 and 1999). Although the total number of western music concerts increased, the 
growth rate was rather low, compared to the previous year, and we may find the reason 
for this lower growth rate in the financial difficulties experienced in 1998.
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Total number of orchestral music concerts 442 486 603 524 566
Total number of foreign orchestral concerts
5 m  ir r p e 1 K n rp a n  H u lt iiro  a n rl Arte C m  ¡r.st~,t; .^*
58 88 91 30 43
As can be seen from the above table, there was a 13.1% decline in the total number of 
orchestral concerts between 1997 and 1998, whereas there was a growth of 24.1% 
between 1996 and 1997, and of 0.8% between 1998 and 1999. The decline in 1998 
has been directly influenced by the reduction of the number of foreign orchestral
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concerts from 91 concerts in 1997 to 30 concerts in 1998, which represents a drop of 
67%. Thus, the considerable decline in the total number of orchestral concerts in 1998 
can be seen as a result of financial difficulties, as the Korean central and regional 
governments could not afford the cost of inviting foreign orchestras.
The majority of Korean orchestras, including the two top orchestras, the KBS 
Symphony Orchestra and Seoul Symphony Orchestra, performed their seasonal 
concerts with guest conductors without having a principal conductor in 1998 (Korean 
Culture and Arts Foundation, 1999: p. 765). On the one hand, Korean orchestras could 
not afford the annual salary of a principal conductor, due to financial difficulties. On the 
other hand, this was because of the lack of availability of talented conductors in Korea 
(Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1999). In other words, many Korean orchestras 
generally did not have the option of choosing the right conductor for their orchestra, 
and had to manage without a principal conductor.
Nevertheless, the government’s total budget for culture gradually increased, along with 
the consistent economic growth of Korea up to 1998. Therefore, more orchestras 
participated in international tours in the 1990s, compared to the 1980s. For example, 
the KBS Symphony Orchestra went abroad twice in the 1980s, and 5 times in the 
1990s (KBS, 2006); the Busan Philharmonic Orchestra had its first international tour of 
four cities in the U.S. in 1997 after 35 years since its foundation in 1962. In addition, we 
can find continuous growth in government expenditure on culture and the arts after 
recovery from the financial crisis. The total subsidy for performing arts was 130 billion 
won (approximately £63m) in 2002, 156 billion won (£76m) in 2003, 196 billion won 
( £ 96m) in 2004, and 168 billion won (£91m) in 2005. The subsidy for music (both 
western classical music and Korean traditional classical music) was 7.6 billion won 
(£ 3.7m), 7.8 billion (£3.8m), 13.5 billion won (£6.6m), and 10.4 billion won (£5m) 
over the years from 2002 to 2005 (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 
2006: p. 332). Therefore, it can be seen that a nation’s economic status and its 
expenditure are closely related.
A national culture and prestige
Korean governments seem to believe that if a country does not have its own solid 
national culture in internationalised modern society, it might end up being a ‘cultural 
colony’ of the western developed countries. Therefore, one of the Korean governments’ 
tasks was to consider how to rebuild national culture, how to adapt effectively western 
popular culture, as well as how to successfully develop Korean traditional culture
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simultaneously. A national culture was one of top priorities in Korean cultural policy 
especially from the First Republic (1948-60) to the Fifth Republic (1981-88) (Park, 
2009: p. 274).
One of the most challenging issues for Korean cultural policy was the establishment of 
national culture (Park, 2009: p. 274): on the one hand, due to the assimilation policy 
under the Japanese rule between 1910 and 1945, Korea experienced difficulties in 
finding its unique cultural identity; on the other hand, because of the division of Korea 
into North and South, Korea suffered from the lack of decided cultural homogeneity as 
one people. Thus, the emphasis placed by the majority of Korean presidents on the 
importance of Korean traditional culture as the basis of national culture may be 
understood in this particular historical context.
After achieving independence from Japan in 1945, the most important task for Korean 
cultural policy was to recover the destroyed, dispersed and distorted Korean culture. 
Park Jeong-Hee (1961-79) was seen as one of the great Koreans50 who saved the 
country from a national crisis, as well as rediscovering its traditional culture. The 
government of Jeon Doo-Hwan (1980-88) established the independence of Korea by 
researching the history of independence movements and in intensifying educational 
works. The government of Rho Tae-Woo (1988-93) embarked on the restoration of 
Gyeongbok Palace, destroyed by Japan, and the government of Kim Young-Sam 
(1993-98) demolished the official building of the Japanese Governor General of 
Choseon. As we can see from these examples, the effort of each Korean government 
was to recover Korean national identity from the influence of Japanese rule. Korean 
governments tried to remove the remnants of Japanese culture and, at the same time, 
restrict the import of Japanese culture until the beginning of the government of Kim 
Dae-Joong (the People’s Government: 1998-2003). This government promoted cultural 
exchange with other countries (including Japan) for the development of a national 
culture, and started to successfully introduce Japanese culture from October 1998 to 
June 2000. Despite political and economic issues along with Koreans’ negative image 
of Japan, which were the reasons for prohibition against Japanese culture, introduction 
of Japanese culture was mainly achieved because of president, Kim Dae-Joong’s 
strong will and positive recognition of Japanese culture: he clarified his opinion on 
Japanese culture by saying that there is no need to be afraid of it (Kim, 2001).
Cultural policies of the 1970s that had the most influence on orchestras were those that
50 Although he was criticized for an authoritarian way of ruling and his long-term seizure of 
power.
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placed an emphasis on national culture. Because of this focus, orchestras began to 
play more pieces written by Korean composers, something which, at that time, directly 
or indirectly promoted national identity. The KBS Symphony Orchestra,51 for instance, 
played just two pieces written by Korean composers between 1956 and 1959, and 
thirteen pieces between 1960 and 1969. In contrast, there were forty-one pieces of 
music written by Korean composers played by the Korean Symphony Orchestra 
between 1970 and 1979, and forty-nine pieces between 1980 and 1989.
There was therefore a sharp increase in the number of performances of Korean 
compositions in the 1970s, compared to the 1950s (four years of programmes were 
analysed) and the 1960s. In addition, a concert titled ‘Night of the Korean Composer' 
was launched in 1974, so as to provide more opportunity to hear Korean composers' 
music. Another 1970s cultural policy was to increase national prestige through cultural 
activities. Although international tours were almost impossible, due to the economic 
situation and the financial situation of orchestras at that time, the Korean National 
Symphony Orchestra (the antecedent of Korean Symphony Orchestra) undertook its 
first American tour in 1979, for 50 days. This international tour happened thanks to the 
Korean government’s financial support, given in order to raise national prestige. As a 
result, the American media, especially the New York Times, recognised the ability of 
the Korean orchestra through its performances in Carnegie Hall, New York, the 
Kennedy Centre in Washington, and the Academy Hall in Philadelphia (National 
Theater of Korea, 1979: pp. 10-13). In addition, the Korean National Orchestra 
replaced the majority of its old musical instruments, upgrading to new ones, in order to 
contribute to the development of the orchestra by making improvements in sound (KBS, 
2006: p. 80).
Furthermore, to continue to heighten national culture and national prestige Korean 
governments use international sports events or active international exchanges of 
culture and arts. The influence of the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, 1988 Seoul Olympic 
Game, and 2002 World Cup Games on Korean symphony orchestras was notable. The 
Tenth Asian Games were held in Seoul, 1986, and a number of music concerts related 
to this sports event were organised. One of the most important musical events was the 
Seoul International Music Festival. The Korean Music Festival, which was launched in 
1975 to celebrate the 30th Independence Day, changed its name to the Seoul 
International Music Festival from 1986, in an attempt to broaden its appeal to every
51 Although there were two Korean orchestras in the 1950s: KBS Symphony Orchestra and 
Seoul Symphony Orchestra, I analysed only the programme of the KBS Symphony Orchestra 
from 1956 to 2006 because of a lack of programme information for the Seoul Symphony 
Orchestra.
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country in the world regardless of political ideology.
The Seoul International Music Festival invited the Tokyo Metropolitan Symphony 
Orchestra, and this was seen as a significant move as the government did not open 
Korea to Japan until the late 1990s, and the majority of Koreans (especially the older 
generation, who had suffered under the Japanese rule) were still apprehensive 
regarding anything Japanese. Another important issue was the inclusion of an 
orchestra from a communist country, the Budapest Radio Symphony Orchestra. With 
communist North Korea as a neighbour, democratic South Korea was wary of 
communist rule. The famous German orchestra, the Stuttgart Radio Symphony 
Orchestra, was also invited in this same year.
The 1986 Seoul Asian Games helped to establish a starting point for cultural exchange 
with Eastern European countries and Japan. This meant that more and more 
orchestras could come to Korea, and Korean musicians could have concerts overseas. 
As with the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, there were numerous music activities around the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Culture and Arts Festival. For example, there were 109 orchestral 
concerts in 1982, 175 in 1986, and 102 in 1987, but a remarkable 995 orchestral 
concerts in 1988, due to the Olympic Games (Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 
1983, 1987, 1988b and 1989). In addition, there were 406 concerts in 1990, 414 in 
1991, and 498 concerts in 1992, after the Olympic Games. We can therefore see a 
dramatic growth in the number of symphony orchestra concerts in 1988 compared to 
before and after 1988 (Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1991, 1992 and 1993b). 
The most impressive event for the Korean classical music audience was the Moscow 
Philharmonic Orchestra’s concert. It would have been almost impossible to invite this 
orchestra in early 1988 (The Korean government strictly closed the door to communist 
countries); however, the Bolshoi Ballet and the Moscow Philharmonic Orchestra visited 
Korea after accepting the invitation of Dong-A II Bo (one of the newspaper companies 
in Korea), which marked its first visit since Korean independence.
Because of the opportunity of holding the Seoul Olympics in 1988, the government held 
the 'Arts and Cultural Festival’, which included 30,000 artists from 80 countries. 
Throughout the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the most important experience for Korean 
orchestras was the cultural interchange with foreign countries, including communist 
countries such as Russia and China. There were limited foreign orchestral concerts 
before the Seoul Olympic Games, but the number of foreign orchestral concerts 
sharply increased after 1988. It might not have been entirely because of the effect of 
the Olympic Games, but also, in part, owing to Korean economic growth.
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Table 3.5 The number of foreign orchestral concerts
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Number of Concerts 8 16 18 27 42 62
(Sources: refer from Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1988b, 1989,1990,1991,1992 and 
1993b)
Although the previous two sports events had positive effects on Korean orchestras, the 
story of the 2002 World Cup was slightly different.
Won-Chul Park (2007), who was the former orchestra manager of the Busan 
Philharmonic Orchestra, claims, 'there is a cycle... many crises or opportunities might 
come according to social atmosphere or environment.... Most performances were not 
successful during the 2002 world cup season... everyone was just watching 
television...people went out at night for support on the street... we (Busan 
Philharmonic Orchestra) already expected (this situation) and hardly have concerts... 
people who planned concerts during the world cup period without taking such a side- 
effect into consideration were bankrupted... some concerts were cancelled...’
Table 3.6 Classical music concerts
Year___ ________ 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Western classical music 3832 3934 4168 4628 4957 4855
Instrumental music 1945 1963 2328 2597 2725 2747
Orchestral Music 603 524 566 660 707 661
2003)
According to this table, there was a 2.7%, 5.9%, 11% and 7.1% increase in the number 
of western classical music concerts (including instrumental music, vocal, opera and 
mixed genre) in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively, whereas there was a 2.1% 
decrease in 2002. In addition, there was a 0.8%, 16.6% and 7.1% increase in the 
number of orchestral music concerts in 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively, while there 
was a 13.1% and 1.7% decrease in 1998 and 2001. Moreover, the number of visits of 
foreign orchestras to Korea declined from 82 in 2000 to 45 in 2001 (Korean Culture and 
Arts Foundation, 2001 and 2002). This obvious decline makes it evident that western 
classical music and orchestral music were negatively influenced by the 2002 World 
Cup Games.
On the other hand, the number of instrumental music concerts (including recitals, 
orchestral music and ensembles) did not reduce from 1997 to 2001, even if the growth 
rate between 2001 and 2002 was a mere 4.9%. Compared to the growth of 0.9%, 18.6% 
and 11.6% in 1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively, this growth in 2001 seems tame.
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It could be conjectured that Koreans were so deeply enthused about the football games 
that classical music concerts were no longer a matter of concern in 2002. As a result, 
many traditional classical music concerts were cancelled or postponed. Although the 
2002 World Cup Games might have contributed to Korean national prestige, they 
clearly had a negative influence on the Korean classical music market.
Globalisation
The globalisation of Korean traditional culture, or international cultural exchange, was 
used to advertise the achievements of the government’s reign until the Fifth Republic 
(1981-1988). After that, the government of Rho Tae-Woo (1988-93) emphasised 
internationalisation/globalisation throughout the ‘10-Year Cultural Development Plan’ 
devised in 1990 (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003). Although 
the terms ‘internationalisation’ and ‘globalisation’ have different meanings, they are 
used synonymously in Korean cultural policy: internationalisation first emerged in the 
president of Doo-Hwan Jeon’s speech at the national convention in 1983, but 
globalisation became the more common word some 10 years later. Globalisation in 
Korean cultural policy means introducing Korean culture and arts and delivering a taste 
of Korean culture via various cultural exchanges with other countries of the world (Byun, 
2003: p. 45).
As a part of its policy, the government began an open-door cultural policy in the 1990s 
toward communist countries having hostile relations, after the 1988 Seoul Olympic 
Games (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003): the government 
opened up Korea to foreign culture, and started a cultural exchange. There are records 
of foreign orchestras visiting Korea in 1987 and 1989, and they show that foreign 
orchestras provided 8 and 18 performances in 1987 and 1989, respectively.
Table 3.7 The number of foreign orchestral performances
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total number 27 42 62 29 32 58 88 91 30 43 82
(Sources: Korean Cu ture and Arts Founda tion, 1991, 1992, 1993b, 1994, 1995 , 1996, 1997,
1998,1999, 2000 and 2001)
As we can see from the above table, there was a dramatic growth in the number of 
foreign orchestral performances in the 1990s, in spite of fluctuating trends, especially 
between 1997 and 1998, because of the Korean financial crisis (IMF era).
Although some might have felt concern about negative impacts from the increase in 
concerts provided by foreign orchestras to Korean orchestras, it did not adversely 
impact on Korean orchestras’ activities: there was, in fact, a steady increase in
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performances by Korean orchestras (see Table 3.8).
Table 3.8 The number of Korean orchestral performances
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total number 406 414 498 412 439 442 486 603 524 566 660
(Sources: Korean Culture and Arts 
1998,1999, 2000 and 2001)
eundation, 1991, 1992, 1993b, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,
The globalisation policy of Korean governments' also influenced the relationship with 
North Korea. After the division of Korea, anti-communism greatly influenced the cultural 
policy of the Republic of Korea (South Korea): The governments of Lee Seong-Man 
(1948-60), Park Jeong-Hee (1961-79), Jeon Doo-Hwan (1980-88), and Rho Tae-Woo 
(1988-93) all sought to emphasise anti-communism and democracy as a government 
ideology, so that arts activities related to socialism and communism were strictly 
prohibited until the late 1980s. However, focusing on anti-communism violated the 
freedom of expression of arts activities. Furthermore, there was no chance to meet or 
combine with the arts from North Korea as those were severely restricted in circulation 
in South Korea. At the end of the 1980s, the government from the republic launched a 
cultural policy for unification: the government of Rho Tae-Woo (1988-93) announced 
The 7.7. Special Declaration’, which opened the way for interchange and cooperation 
with the arts of North Korea in 1988. With the motto of the Civilian Government (1993— 
98), ‘a small but strong government moving towards globalisation, globalisation of 
Korean arts and culture52 was continuously encouraged (Republic of Korea, Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism, 2003; Park, 2006: p. 59): the government made a regulation that 
dealt with a social and cultural cooperation scheme with North Korea, and actively 
encouraged cultural exchange— although the actual exchange was very limited. Later 
(15 June 2000), the South Korean government announced 'the North-South Joint 
Declaration’, which stimulated cultural exchange between North and South Korea. The 
People’s Government (1998-2003) pursued a 'Sunshine Policy’ with the aim of 
reconciliation and peace between the North and South (Republic of Korea, Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism, 2003), and it might be seen as an extension of open-door policy 
of previous governments. As a result, ‘the North and South Korea corporative concert' 
in Seoul and Pyungyang was held in 2000 and 2001: KBS Symphony Orchestra was 
sent to the North. Symphony orchestras had an important role as cultural ambassadors 
representing Republic of Korean.
52 Specific plans were managing 'Korea House’, which was built in 1981 with the aim of 
'introducing Korean traditional culture and way of life’ (Korea Cultural Heritage Foundation, 2009: 
online), sending a Korean youth cultural service group overseas, appointing a Korean cultural 
ambassador resident overseas, and making Korean traditional classical music a ‘world music’ 
(Kim, 1995: p. 57).
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So far, we have been looking at national cultural policy of Korea based on four key 
objectives: promotion of culture and arts, cultural infrastructure and cultural welfare, 
national culture and prestige, and globalisation, which directly and indirectly affect to 
Korean symphony orchestras. However, these relationships or influences are not part 
of a Korean government’s cultural policy, but result from incidental effects: this is 
because Korean symphony orchestras are not the Korean government’s top 
consideration when making or revising cultural policies.
The following section examines the influences of decentralisation on Korean symphony 
orchestras in terms of the local autonomy system and cultural industry: local autonomy 
system positively affects these orchestras’ activities, while the cultural industry requires 
the orchestras to rethink their governance and operation.
3.3 Decentralisation
For years decentralisation and local autonomy have been treated as closely 
related concepts. Decentralisation in itself may not be a very meaningful 
concept, but it has become important because of an underlying assumption 
that it causes more local autonomy, and that this is inherently beneficial to 
citizens.
(Fleurke and Willemse, 2004: p. 523)
The Korean central government’s decentralisation policy boosts the local autonomy 
system, and local governments are required to provide appropriate cultural activities in 
order to satisfy the citizen’s demand and the local environment along with the 
promotion and development of local culture. The following section will investigate the 
impact of local autonomy system and cultural industry on Korean municipal orchestras. 
Even though the cultural industry is one of main concerns of the Korean central 
government’s cultural policy, I would like to place the cultural industry under category of 
decentralisation because of their close linkage: the Korean cultural industry seems to 
accelerate in tandem with decentralisation.
Local autonomy system
According to the theses of Choi (2008: p. 3) and Jang (2002: p. 2), there is very limited 
information on regional cultural policy for literature reviews and most research is done 
after the 1990s. That is, local government’s cultural policy received little regard from 
both central and local governments, nor did scholars pay attention to this matter.
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A  regional arts council was initially established in 1962 as a private foundation (Jang, 
2002: p. 65). The Fifth Republic (1981-88) started to reestablish regional arts councils 
aiming to advertise administration of government (p. 132), and the government of Rho 
Tae-Woo (1988-93) promoted regional arts council, local festival to revitalise local 
culture (Park, 2009: p. 156). Since then, arts funding for local culture and arts, the 
establishment of the law for promotion of regional arts council, and specialised cultural 
industry clusters were all endeavors of Korean governments to develop and promote
regional culture (Song, 2007: p. 16—9) in order to achieve balanced regional 
development.
As has happened in western countries, the decentralisation system in 1995 
regenerated regional cultural policy. Before 1995, cultural policy was mainly led by the 
central government, so that the local government paid it little attention.53 However, the 
local autonomy system, a part of the political process, provided a chance for the 
regional government to enhance its local cultural policy. The regional government 
gradually regarded culture or arts activities as a local development, and cultural policy 
enlarged its field, ranging from traditional local culture to cultural tourism and other 
cultural industries. In this way, regional governments showed that they recognised the 
economic value of culture and, as a consequence, non-profit organisations were 
gradually established to improve the effectiveness and rationalisation of arts and 
cultural administration. Although cultural policy making and administration transferred 
to local governments after embarking on the local autonomy system, the level of 
dependence on the finance and action plan from central government is still high (Jang, 
2002: p. 69).
With the launch of full-scale local self-government in 1995, local government wished to 
possess and manage its own performing arts groups and arts centre.54 As a result, 10 
public regional orchestras were founded in the 1990s (Kang, 2000: p. 12). With the 
growth of orchestra numbers in the region, along with the decentralisation system, 
which was fully launched in 1995, regional areas were able to have more concerts than 
Seoul.
53 However, the Korean central government did not play the central role for local culture due to 
the late recognition of its importance.
54 Local government cultural policy at this time was mainly focused on the establishment of 
cultural facilities, and there was lack of support and research about arts promotion to citizens; 
and networks and systematic connections between central government and local government 
for cultural promotion were insufficient (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism, 2007a: p. 69).
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Table 3.9 The number of Korean orchestral concerts
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Seoul 224 218 179 188 221 235 202 205
Regions 183 166 219 324 273 288 376 457
Total* 407 384 398 P  412 494 523 578 662
(Sources: Korean Culture and Arts Foundation, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 2001 and 
2002)
Note: *lt was excluded the number of foreign orchestral concerts.
Before the beginning of the decentralisation system in Korea in 1995, the total number 
of orchestra concerts in Seoul was vast, compared to the total number of regional 
orchestra concerts. However, the number of regional orchestra concerts had been 
gradually increasing since 1995 (except in 1998, owing to the serious financial crisis).
One of the reasons that the regions were able to have more orchestra concerts than 
Seoul was the increased number of local orchestras. Another reason may have been 
the national tours of major orchestras from Seoul due to the increased number of 
performance venues in the regions. Under the decentralisation system, the 
establishment of local cultural facilities and the spread of the arts into more and more 
communities has been the main task of cultural policy since the end of 1980s, when the 
activation of local culture was regarded as an important part of cultural policy by central 
government. In addition, central governments have been given more authority to local 
government in order to achieve a balanced regional development (Korea Culture and 
Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: pp. 72-73). As a result, 
there are a number of local festivals and events throughout Korea, called ‘Festival 
Republic' (Park, 2009: p. 204).
‘Daejeon Expo 93’ was the first international exposition held in a developing country 
appointed by Bureau International des Expositions in 1993. Because of this event, 
large-size culture and arts performances moved to Daejeon not only to venues inside 
the exposition park, but also to major culture and arts centres in Daejeon (Lee, 2006b: 
p. 80). Although Daejeon Philharmonic Orchestras was founded in 1984, this orchestra 
acquired their first principal conductor in 1991. Although there is no clear evidence, 
Daejeon Expo 93 may have influenced the appointment of the principal conductor of 
Daejeon Philharmonic Orchestra, in order to provide high level of classical music 
concerts and to allow the orchestra to be used to accompany expo events.
Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra could take an advantage the Tongyeong 
International Music Festival (TIMF), which is a yearly music festival, held in the city of 
Tongyeong near Changwon. Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra did not have its own 
musical characteristic features before accompanying this music festival. However, with
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the enthusiasm of principal conductor Yoon-Seong Chang, they started to build their 
image with contemporary music pieces and are now recognised as the main symphony 
orchestra of TIMF.
Cultural industry
Emphasis on cultural industry, which seems to pursue pragmatism, significantly 
influences Korean orchestral governance and the future way of operation, so that 
traditional culture and arts including municipal orchestras will be required to survive in 
the market place. The arts organisations in Britain had already experienced such a 
requirement. Cultural policy under Thatcher’s government could be more or less 
defined as a trial period. The basic idea of this government on cultural policy was that 
arts and culture should be placed in the free market, within the entertainment or leisure 
industries or business and tourism. The Thatcher government seemed to deny the 
ideology of national welfare that justified the cultural policy applied to high culture in the 
post war period. Thus, arts organisations were expected to be reorganised and “more 
market orientated than they had previously been" and the arts were no longer 
considered as a form of collective good because of the dominant public support, 
instead they needed to be more market dominated (Gray, 2000; p. 32). Finally, the 
statutory policy under the Thatcher government was to achieve ‘Value for money’, and 
it “entered the language of the arts, and then arts themselves [that they] were entering 
the period when they became ’cultural industries’” (Hewison, 1995: p. 256).
Justin O ’Connor (1999) provides a distinctive definition of cultural industries by 
including the ‘traditional art’ sector, which is generally excluded in cultural industries: 
cultural industries are those activities which deal primarily in symbolic goods—goods 
whose primary economic value is derived from their cultural value... This definition then 
includes what have been called the ‘classical’ cultural industries— broadcast media, film, 
publishing, recorded music, design, architecture, new media— and the ‘traditional 
arts’— visual art, crafts, theatre, music theatre, concerts and performance, literature, 
museums and galleries— all those activities which have been eligible for public funding 
as ‘art’ (O’Connor, 1999: p. 5). On the other hand, the definition of (Korean) cultural 
industries mentioned in the regulation of cultural industry promotion is those industries 
related to production, distribution, consumption of cultural products.55
55 Cultural product is defined as visible and invisible commodity that creates economic value, 
and includes film, recorded music and video, game, publishing, broadcast media, cultural 
properties, animation, design, advertisement, performance, traditional crafts, fine art, and new 
media (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2006).
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Korean governments made use of the cultural industries to alleviate the supposed 
negative effects of popular culture until 1980s, because they believed that western 
popular culture was more or less violent, indecent, hedonistic, and emphasised 
materialism, whereas Korean traditional culture was more focused on morality and a 
spirituality influenced by Confucianism (Kim, 2001; Lim, 2003). In order words, the 
cultural industries were represented as popular culture in Korea until the 1980s, and 
their role was to control popular culture; the restriction over Japanese culture56 is an 
example of that. The sixth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan 
formulated in 1986 recognised the economic importance of culture, and suggested a 
way of utilizing the cultural industries to improve people’s cultural life; however, it could 
not be put effectively into practice (Lim, 2003: p. 150). The Fifth Government was likely 
to use the cultural industry (mainly considered as a popular culture industry) to form a 
link between culture and people who were more familiar with popular culture (despite 
the government’s concerns about popular culture’s violent character).
The Korean cultural industry was boosted when the Cultural Industry Bureau was re­
organised in 1994. The Civilian Government’s (1993-98) ideas about the cultural 
industry had changed: the Fifth Republic (1981-88) and the government of Rho Tae- 
Woo (1988-93) focused on its link-function between cultural production and 
consumption, whereas the Civilian Government (1993-98) recognised its economic 
value; the previous two governments’ policies towards the cultural industry were 
designed to control, but this switched to support under the Civilian Government (1993- 
98) (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007b: p. 
11). In spite of the government’s ambitious plans, nothing practical was achieved due to 
lack of finance and of organisations to accomplish the plans (Korea Culture and 
Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007b: p. 16).
The Ministry of Culture and Gymnastics was abolished and the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism was organised in 1998 with the People’s Government (1998-2003), which 
aimed to deliver the ‘construction of a cultural country’, a ‘cultural president’, and to be 
‘a national government with a new cultural policy’ (Byun, 2003: p. 43). The term 
‘cultural president’ means a president who appreciates and understands the arts and 
culture, and implies someone willing to support the arts. Using this term (or that of 
‘cultural mayor’) has become popular in Korea since the days of the Dae-Jung Kim 
regime.
56 Japanese culture was a restricted subject before the People's Government's open policy to 
Japanese culture. Korean governments strictly controlled Japanese culture because of the 
history of the Japanese colonial period as well as its reputation for violence and obscenity (Lim, 
2003: p. 149).
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The government of Kim Dae-Joong (1998-2003), in particular, emphasised the need to 
develop a cultural industry, and the president announced that the cultural industry was 
a mainstay of the twenty-first century during the inauguration of president Kim, and 
Korean cultural policy opened its arms to the cultural industry along with information 
technology. The cultural industry’s budget, which used to be restricted to publications 
and films, was expanded to include funds for music, animation, character comic books 
(e.g. Hello Kitty), and games (Lim, 2003: pp. 120-21). The cultural industry was 
stimulated by an increase in financial support during the People's Government (1998- 
2003), and the economic benefits of the cultural industry won it legitimacy for public 
support. The government’s interest in the cultural industry resulted in several policies: 
the ‘Five-Year Plan for Cultural Industry Promotion' (1999), 'Cultural Industry Vision 21’ 
(2000), ‘Plan for Film Industry Promotion’ (2000), and ‘Contents Korea Vision 2T 
(2001 ).57 ‘Contents Korea Vision 21’ was an upgraded version of earlier plans. The 
‘Five-Year Plan for Cultural Industry Promotion’ and ‘Cultural Industry Vision 21’ both 
aimed to pursue the development of the cultural industry and promote solid cultural 
identity (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2001).
‘Cultural contents’, a term coined by the Korean government after the establishment of 
the ‘Korea Culture and Content Agency’ in 2001, refers to a cultural commodity creating 
economic value based on creativity; and the Korean government considers cultural 
contents58 to be an equivalent concept to cultural industry (especially in the 2008 White 
Paper on Cultural Industry).
The Participant Government’s (2003-2008) cultural industry enjoyed sharp growth in 
terms of quantity: its market size had consistently increased; its exports between 2003 
and 2005 increased by an approximate average of 40% each year; and the number of 
employees in the cultural industries had grown every year. The ‘Korean wave’,59 which 
was a typical type of overseas expansion of the Korean cultural industries, contributed 
to national branding as a result of positive ripple effects such as tourist attraction, and 
the manufacturing and service industry. For example, after airing The Great Jang 
Geum, a 2003 TV series produced by the Korean TV channel MBC in Taiwan (shown 
in 2004), LG Electronics’ PDP TV and washing machine first acquired a market share,
57 The objectives were to enhance the international competitive ability of the cultural industry 
and cultural identity, and the action plans were to modify laws and regulations, to educate 
people to become professionals in the cultural industry, and to expand the international side of 
Korean cultural industries through strategic marketing (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism, 2001).
58 In 2010, it includes film video-DVD, animation, music, game, character, cartoon, mobile 
contents, edutainment contents, copyright licensing, printing, broadcasting, advertisement, 
publication, digital communication and media, handicraft, performing arts, and design.
89 It refers to the growing popularity of (South) Korean culture and goods throughout East Asia, 
especially in China and Japan.
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and exports of Hyundai motors sharply increased (3,743 in 2002 and 18,527 in 2005) 
(Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007b: p. vi).
Thus, previously the role of the cultural industry was thought of as a medium between 
cultural product and consumption that would help to deliver cultural democratization 
(Lim, 2003: p. 150), then it was considered a value-added business. After the mid- 
1990s, culture and the arts were seen as an important resource to help encourage 
local development and its competitiveness, and central and local government started to 
emphasis on the economic importance of the cultural industry (Korea Culture and 
Tourism Institute and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007b: p. 11).
Central government’s cultural policy on the cultural industry and local culture is 
interlinked, and regional cultural industry clusters seem to be the outcome. However, 
when the cultural industry played an important part in cultural policy, the People’s 
Government (1998-2003) and Participation Government (2003-2008) particularly 
wanted cultural infrastructures such as cultural centres to be backed up by 
administrative professionalism in supporting the arts (Republic of Korea, Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism, 2003: pp. 33-34; Jeon and Oh, 2005: p. 36) in order to 
strengthen the supporting system for the promotion of culture and arts. This applied to 
two most famous Korean orchestras: Seoul Philharmonic Orchestras was one of 
performing company belonging to the city of Seoul, but the city gave the administrative 
authority to ‘Sejong Performing Arts Center’ in order to see more effective management 
and economic outcomes. Finally, SPO became a self-governing foundation in 2005, 
which might be considered an ideal model for a Korean municipal orchestra, and is 
entirely self-run. The KBS Symphony Orchestra also had to change their administrative 
authority several times (see Table 4.5), and the current authority body, the KBS, 
attempted to make their orchestra a foundation like SPO, but failed due to severe 
conflict with players.
Park Kwang-Moo (2009) predicts the future direction of Korean cultural policy based on 
his intensive research, and it is in accordance with current challenges that Korean 
municipal orchestras are facing. According to Park (2009), traditional culture and arts 
will actively combine with cultural industry (emphasis on economic benefits) regarding 
the promotion of culture and arts (p. 289); in addition, a number of cultural 
infrastructures have been established, but they depend too much on public subsidy, so 
the government will reduce their financial support for the culture and arts organisations 
in order to raise the financial self-support of those organisations (p. 290-91).
Thus, Korean governments’ emphases on economic importance of culture industry,
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marketization, and administrative professionalism have impacted on the future of 
Korean municipal orchestras. Local governments that own their orchestras would want 
their orchestras to address these issues and wish their orchestra to be independent. As 
a result, municipal orchestras were required to rethink their role, a more effective way 
of running the orchestra, earning more income, or how best to communicate with the 
audience. Professionals in Korean classical music have suggested that the formation of 
a foundation is the key solution to these challenges, and, as noted earlier, Seoul 
Philharmonic Orchestra changed its whole governance and now operates as a 
foundation: if SPO is considered a successful case, local governments will be willing to 
follow suit.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated how Korean cultural policy affects Korean municipal 
orchestras according to four key themes of central government, decentralisation, the 
local autonomy system and the cultural industry.
Korean cultural policy is, in the main, a powerful centralised model as in France. The 
basis of Korean cultural policy was established in the 1960s and early 1970s. Korean 
cultural policy, by the 1970s, was limited to Korean traditional culture, but the 
government processed cultural policy in support of creative arts activities and tried to 
increase access to the arts after the 1980s. Cultural policy in the 1990s expanded its 
field to cover arts development and cultural welfare, the cultural industry, culture and 
tourism, cultural information, and life-long arts education. Meanwhile, the focus of 
Korean cultural policy shifted gradually from high art to popular art, and from traditional 
culture to the cultural industries and media arts. The object of supporting the arts and 
culture moved from professional to amateur and the general public. Local culture and 
arts policy moved from central and metropolitan areas to local self-governing 
communities. The promotion of cultural policy was still carried out by central 
government, but the government increased its use of semi-governmental and private 
non-profit organisations. After the commencement of decentralisation, local people had 
more opportunities to get involved in arts and cultural activities.
There is no music policy made by central government. Municipal orchestras are in the 
charge of local governments, which founded, subsidised, controlled, and managed their 
municipal orchestras. Subsidising municipal orchestras is different from other cultural 
policy areas in Korea. Municipal orchestras sometimes seem to be placed second, 
after satisfaction with basic needs, and have to justify the importance of their existence
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to politicians who are generally ignorant about arts and culture. Their status is 
insecure60 because the amount of public funding can fluctuate depending on the mayor 
and economic situation. In addition, Korean cultural policies and environmental factors 
influencing Korean municipal orchestras happen automatically rather than intentionally; 
the cities do not have a clear direction, a big picture with a long term plan.
Local governments appear to observe how the top two Korean symphony orchestras 
are dealing with the current changing environment, and they imitate the changes of the 
orchestras without considering the situation of their own orchestra, or their performing 
capacity or budget.
Thus, it is evident that Korean municipal orchestras have been directly and indirectly 
impacted by Korean cultural policy and that the present cultural-industry thinking from 
the Korean central government sets a challenge for those orchestras. The following 
chapter will present the context of three Korean municipal orchestras: Changwon 
Philharmonic Orchestra (CPO), Busan Philharmonic Orchestra (BPO), and KBS 
Symphony Orchestra (KSO) in which this study is conducted.
60 Korean municipal orchestras, on the other hand, have a secure and steady position as they 
receive 100% funding from their city: thus, the main issue is the amount of money they receive.
Chapter 4 The context of Korean municipal orchestras: 
CPO, BPO, and KSO
4.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the context of three orchestras: Changwon Philharmonic 
Orchestra, Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, and KBS Symphony Orchestra, which are 
treated as three cases studies in this thesis. The following three sections discuss the 
organisational and environmental context, providing an overview and brief history, and 
outlining primary activities, repertoire, audience (including subscription if it is 
appropriate), finance, and governance structure.
4.2 Case study 1: Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra (CPO)
Overview and change
The Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra was founded in 1991 as a part of a cultural 
policy to develop culture and the arts in the city of Changwon. The initial objectives of 
the CPO were to improve the image of the industrial city, to cultivate the citizens’ 
cultural life, and to develop local culture and arts. The CPO is formed of young and 
talented musicians from the Kyungnam province, mainly from the cities of Busan and 
Daegu.
According to the municipal ordinance of the city of Changwon, the orchestra should 
provide eight seasonal concerts per year, and may have extra concerts when the 
Mayor of Changwon requires them. The orchestra might include a Principal Conductor, 
a Second Principal Conductor, an Orchestral Leader, an Orchestral Manager and 
musicians within its 80 people. The Vice-Mayor of Changwon has automatic 
responsibility as an Executive Director of this orchestra (as well as other arts 
organisations including a choir, dance troupe and youth choir).
From its inception in 1995, the CPO  consisted of approximately 60 musicians. The 
CPO  was able to extend its size and purchase special instruments such as a harp and 
celesta, financially supported by the city of Changwon, in order to play large scale, 
contemporary music.
With the foundation of the Tongyeong Contemporary Music Festival in 2000, to 
commemorate ‘l-Sang Yoon’, the foremost Korean contemporary composer born in the 
city of Tongyeong, the CPO gradually became an orchestra that specialised in 
contemporary classical music, and was the main orchestra to be showcased within the
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festival. The festival changed its name to the Tongyeong International Music Festival in 
2002.
Although the CPO was founded by the city of Changwon, it was a kind of ad hoc 
orchestra until 2001. Since 2002, however, the CPO  has been promoted as a 
permanent orchestra, as a result of its contribution to the city, along with an increase of 
the city’s wealth.
The principal conductor, Do-Ki Kim, the founder of the CPO, 
61 who had retained his position for 12 years, was forced to resign, as the city of 
Changwon wanted to appoint a young, talented conductor to develop the CPO  in 2003, 
once it had become a permanent orchestra. Not only did the principal conductor 
change, but also the majority of musicians. Although there used to be a regular audition 
for musicians to extend their contract with the CPO61 2 every two years (it changed to 
every three years from 2007 on) until early 2006, practically everyone could renew their 
contract with the CPO. However, with the promotion of the CPO ’s status, the City of 
Changwon wanted to see an instant improvement in the quality of performance, and 
musicians who did not reach the standard of audition, failed to extend their contracts in 
2002, so this caused a degree of conflict between the city and musicians. As a result, 
several players were dismissed under an agreement between the conductor and 
players. In 2003, a new principal conductor of the CPO, Yoon-Seong Chang, was 
appointed, and remained in post for 4 years. With the appointment of the new 
conductor, there arose a conflict between him and the players around the matters of 
audition, and a few players were forced to quit.63 He is considered to be one of top five 
conductors in Korea, and was well paid for his position. Generally, it is hard to appoint 
a talented, well-recognised conductor in a local orchestra, owing to lack of finance. The 
city of Changwon is a wealthy city in Korea, and can afford to pay a high salary. It was 
worth having a qualified principal conductor, because the CPO  could develop its 
performance quality and enlarge its repertoire within a short period, becoming famous 
for contemporary music performance, as the city of Changwon intended. Despite the 
artistic contribution of this principal conductor, he resigned at the end of 2007. Whether 
this was the decision of Yoon-Seong Chang (a principal conductor) or of the city was 
not stated, and the CPO  appointed a new principal conductor in 2008. Apart from these
61 Although the CPO  is a municipal orchestra, Do-Ki Kim was the first person who proposed to 
have a professional orchestra in the city of Changwon and gathered musicians from university 
graduates. He is a professor of the School of Music in the University of Changwon.
Most musicians of the municipal orchestras in Korea must have an audition every 1-3 years 
after being a formal player.
63 After his resignation, the players evaluated that Yoon-Seong Chang was misleading the 
orchestra, because he was somehow unfair when he rated players.
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artistic, structural and managerial changes, there was no significant change in this 
orchestra, or in its financial circumstances, as it was 100% subsidised by the city of 
Changwon.
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Primary activities
The CPO  is based in a city of Changwon, referred to as 'the Mecca of Korea’s Machine 
Industry’, in the Kyungnam province (Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009a: 
online64). As the main objective of this orchestra is to develop local culture and arts, as 
well as to provide an enterprise for the Changwon citizen, the majority of the CPO ’s 
work is based within the city of Changwon, having a residency at Seongsan Arts Hall 
since April 2000, and at cities in the area nearby.
Although the CPO  is supposed to provide 8 regular/subscription concerts in the city, 
according to the municipal ordinance of Changwon, it normally performs 5-7 concerts. 
As a public orchestra, the regular concerts of the CPO  are free. Special concerts are 
sometimes promoted by the city and elsewhere, and the performance fee is arranged 
differently according to the purpose. The CPO  has an average of 25 special concerts 
per year. Overall, the CPO had approximately 30 concerts in 2007,
Interestingly, these hired engagements are not profitable for the CPO  itself, as the 
ticket income is returned to the purpose of performance, such as arts management or 
charity, and a performance fee is given to individual players according to a musician's 
grade as decided by the city. The CPO does not have an educational programme, but 
these aims are sometimes achieved by means of a one-off concert, and certain parts of 
special concerts.
This orchestra rarely engages in national or international tours: there are on average 
3-4 concerts per year in other towns and cities in nearby areas; the first international 
concert of the CPO took place in Osaka, Japan 2008, the orchestra having been invited 
by UNESCO.
Repertoire65
In the early period, from 1991 to 1996, there was no focus on particular repertoire. As 
do most orchestras, the CPO  draws the majority of its music pieces from Classical and 
Romantic composers, especially Beethoven (9 pieces), Tchaikovsky (8 pieces), Dvorak 
(6 pieces) and Mozart (5 pieces). The CPO  had 24 seasonal performances between 
1991 and 1996, and provided an average of 4.5 performances per year. Three Korean
64
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composers’ works and approximately 11 pieces of contemporary composers were 
played during this period. Although contemporary music was a minor part of the whole 
repertoire of the CPO, this orchestra’s repertoire could be seen as progressive 
compared to other regional orchestras near Changwon, such as the Masan 
Philharmonic Orchestra and the Jinju Philharmonic Orchestra, which hardly played any 
contemporary western classical music or Korean composers’ music.
The trend of repertoire has not been changed in the recent period, from 2005 to 2008. 
The CPO had 23 seasonal performances: five in 2005, six in 2006, five in 2007, and 
seven in 2008, respectively. The works of Classical and Romantic composers were 
dominant: Beethoven (17 pieces), Mozart (7 pieces), Wagner (5 pieces), Tchaikovsky 
(4 pieces), J. Strauss (3 pieces), and Rachmaninoff (3 pieces), and contemporary 
composers' work was nearly excluded in seasonal concerts (Changwon Philharmonic 
Orchestra, 2009a: online)66
Audience
A  subscription system was started in 1992, but subscribers were limited to the local 
press and the heads of various organisations in this early period. The subscription is 
now more widely open to the general classical music admirer. Subscribers67 of the 
CPO  have gradually increased: (approximately) 1,200 subscribers in 2005, 1,300 in 
2006, 1,500 in 2007, 1,700 in 2008, and 1,900 in 2009 (Changwon Philharmonic 
Orchestra, 2009b), with basic information such as addresses and telephone numbers, 
instead of having a systematic customer relationship management. The target of the 
CPO  is to have 3,000 subscribers and to develop its audience data base. No 
characteristics of the subscribers are available for scrutiny.
Although all regular concerts given by the CPO  are free (except twice in the history of 
the CPO), the main audiences of the concerts are the majority of subscribers of the 
C P O 68
Finance
100% of the CPO ’s income comes from the public subsidy of the local city, as is the 
case with most public orchestras in Korea. Grants from the Arts Council of Korea 
exclude public orchestras, because they have already been supported by the local
66 A  piece of Ippolitov Ivanov (1859-1935) and two pieces of Joaquin Rodrigo Vidre (1901-99) 
were included and none of Korean composers' work was performed.
67 Unlike the BPO and KSO, the CPO  has no paid subscriber: joining in membership of the CPO 
is free.
68 CPO  gives 500 tickets to those who book their ticket through the CPO  homepage, and collect 
their ticket at the venue on the day. The remaining the tickets are given on a first come, first 
served basis. Regular concerts are mostly not full.
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government. There is no income from ticket selling, and donations69 70are also prohibited 
by the ordinances.
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Table 4.1 Breakdown of the CPO’s income and expenditure
2005 2006 2007
lu m i.
2008
Dimon won) 
2009Total
budget
2.2
(£1,076,590)
2.2
(£1,076,590)
2.2
(£1,076,590)
2.3
(£1,125,525)
2.3
(£1,125,525)Personnel
expenditure
2
(£978,718)
2
(£978,718)
2
(£978,718)
2.1
(£1,027,654)
2.1
( £ 1,027,654)Charitable
activities
expenditure
0.2
(£97,872)
0.2
(£97,872)
0.2
(£97,872)
0.2
(£97,872)
0.2
(£97,872)
(Source: Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009b)
Table 4.1 indicates that the budget of the CPO  is overwhelmingly taken up by 
personnel expenditure (91%) and only 9% of total budget is for actual expenditure on 
concert activities, such as hire of the hall, publicity or expenditure for guest soloists: the 
funding of Korean symphony orchestras in recent years has not been changed, 
compared to 10 years ago when Kang (2000) indicated this budget problem. Thus, the 
CPO  might experience shortage of funding for providing more charitable activities.
Governance structure
Figure 4.1 Governance structure of the CPO
The regulation of the city of Changwon (Changwon City Hall, 2009a: online70) states
69 Sponsorship and donations in form of restricted fund are partially possible but such 
sources are somehow unsustained due to complicated process of support '
70 Available at: http://law.changwon.ao.kr/ [Accessed 07 May 2009]
that the Vice-Mayor of Changwon is automatically the Executive Director of the CPO.71 
The Chief of the Welfare Bureau is the Deputy-Executive Director.
The board of the Changwon municipal arts organisation deals with basic plans, 
management and auditions. It consists of one chairman and eight members. The Vice- 
Mayor is appointed as the chairman, and the Chiefs of the Welfare Bureau, the General 
Affairs Bureau, and the Head of Culture and Tourism Division, together with the 
principal conductor, are automatically appointed as the members. A  city councilor, a 
member of the municipal arts organisation, and an individual recommended by the 
Mayor with a deep knowledge of arts are also board members. The latter’s 
membership as a board member is for two years (Changwon City Hall, 2009b: 
online).72 As the Vice-Mayor has the roles of both Executive Director and Chairman of 
the Board, the Principal Conductor’s position is lower than the Executive Director in this 
orchestra.
The CPO  has five administrative staff working in the Seongsan Arts Hall, but also two 
civil servants (including the Vice Executive Director, the Chief of the Welfare Bureau) in 
the department of culture and tourism in Changwon city hall are also involved with the 
orchestra’s administrative works as well as other municipal arts organisations’ works. 
The actual planning is done by the orchestral administrative staff, while the civil 
servants are in charge of the administrative process in arts organisations; therefore, the 
work process is sometimes complex, overlapping and time consuming, and the 
governance structure of the CPO is highly bureaucratic.
Human resources and general roles
Artistic personnel 
The Conductor
The CPO has had three principal conductors so far. Do-Ki Kim, the founder of the 
orchestra, who remained with them for 12 years. The financial and administrative 
situation was unstable during the early period; however, the conductor had more 
freedom in terms of managing the orchestra. The city of Changwon did not pay much 
attention to the orchestra, and financial support was very limited, so the principal 
conductor carried considerable authority. Conductor Kim’s role was varied; he 
participated in both administrative and artistic matters. His contribution was to organise 
and shape the basic frame of the CPO, to expand the repertoire and to help the CPO
71 The Vice-Mayor is also the Executive Director of the other public arts organisations (choir 
dance and youth choir) belonging to the city of Changwon.
72 This article added in 2007.
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become the permanent orchestra. Ironically, he was dismissed immediately after the 
CPO  did become a permanent orchestra. There might have been complex reasons for 
such a decision. One criticism of Kim was that he held his position for a long time and 
delayed the CPO becoming a permanent organisation due to the uncertainty of his 
position. Furthermore, some players strongly disagreed with the principal conductor 
having another job, such as a professor, because if the conductor has another stable 
income source, he might not fully concentrate on the orchestra. One player indirectly 
criticised him for his artistic ability, saying: ‘Players of the CPO  already have enough 
musical ability and much experience in playing symphonies, as we have been trained 
since we were very young...And the repertory for concerts is not much varied... But he 
wanted to repeatedly practice for himself as he could not conduct well... So we 
normally used to practice a symphonic piece for three months, whereas when the new 
conductor came to our orchestra we only needed to practice one piece for a week’.
It might be true that Kim was not Korea’s first-rank conductor, and needed more time to 
master a piece but, on the other hand, this might have been because of his personality, 
as some people considered him as a meticulous person. In addition, it could be the 
players’ conceit, since they are not themselves first-rank musicians in Korea. Although 
there have been some criticisms about Kim’s artistic and administrative ability, he 
founded the CPO when culture and the arts were not in mainstream in the city of 
Changwon, and he enthusiastically extended the repertoire of the CPO  to include 
contemporary music.
In 2003, Yoon-Seong Chang was appointed as the second principal conductor of the 
CPO. He studied composition at Seoul National University and had conducted in 
Vienna and Russia. As the second prize winner of symphonic conducting at the first 
International Prokofiev Competition in 1993, and trained by Valery Gergiev, he brought 
a new identity to the CPO: he extended the repertoire, especially regarding 
contemporary music, and increased the technical and artistic quality of performance. 
The contribution of Yoon-Seong Chang to this orchestra was to give it the firm identity 
of specialising in contemporary music, or l-Sang Yoon’s music.
He gave the first European performance of Krzysztof Penderecki’s Symphony No.5 and 
the first Korean performance of Arnold Schoenberg’s massive oratorio, Gurre-Lieder 
with the CPO  and Seoul Symphony Orchestra in 2004. Compared to the first principal 
conductor, Chang was less keen to take part in administrative matters. One reason 
may have been that he was not a resident in Changwon and was also busy conducting 
other orchestras (mainly in Seoul) as a guest conductor; thus, he had less time to
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spend on administration. Another reason may have been that he did not want to enter 
into conflict with administrative staff, especially with civil servants, who took charge of 
the orchestra. The final reason is, perhaps, that he simply did not think administrative 
matters were in his jurisdiction, and he only wanted to participate in specifically artistic 
matters. However, at the beginning of his appointment, he participated strongly in 
auditions, and some players spontaneously or involuntarily had to quit their job. This 
caused distrust among players against the conductor, and they formed a musicians’ 
union after the audition in 2003. He left the CPO in 2007, as the city of Changwon did 
not renew his contract.
Recently, the CPO has had a third principal conductor, Chi-Vong Chung, a Seoul 
National University and the Salzburg Mozarteum graduate, trained by Michael Gielen in 
Austria. He has been conducting various genres such as orchestral music, opera, and 
contemporary music as well as Korean traditional classical music. He is particularly 
passionate about popularising operatic works and the orchestral works of l-Sang Yoon. 
He was the principal conductor of the Wonju (municipal) Philharmonic Orchestra from 
1997 to 1999, and of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra from 1999 to 2001. He is 
currently a professor of the Korean National University of Arts, an honourary music 
director of the Wonju Philharmonic Orchestra, and he became the principal conductor 
of the CPO  in 2008. Current administrative staff would like this conductor to lead the 
CPO  in a more stable development, and to contribute to both art and administration.
M usicians
There are currently 73 full time players (Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009b).73 
A  player’s contract used to be renewed every two years until 2006, and it has been 
renewed every three years from 2007. When there is a vacancy, the city decides and 
announces the time of audition, whereas all present players have a regular audition at 
the beginning or end of every three years. The self governing committee makes some 
decisions about accepting engagements. Players may be unhappy about some 
engagements because they are concerned about lowering the reputation of the 
orchestra, or about the philosophical principle that their concerts should be open to the 
public. This committee may, though, be over-ruled by the city. In other words, if the city 
of Changwon forces the players, they normally have to leave some space for mediation. 
Overall, 95% of suggested hired engagements are arranged.
The union is a formal organisation representing the opinion of players (on matters such 
as players’ welfare or salary) to the city of Changwon, and it does not participate in 
matters related to concerts. Each municipal arts organisation had an independent
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73 There were 70 players in 2005, 76 in 2006, 73 in 2007, and 70 in 2008.
union, but the unions of dance, orchestra and choir were united in 2007. Apart from 
these two organisations, principal players hold an irregular meeting, and the members 
of this are 10 principal players and 7 sub-principals.
According to my follow-up research in April 2008, the self-government committee was 
disbanded in March 2007, and the principal player’s meeting replaced the role of the 
committee dealing with decisions about hired engagement, practice time, programme, 
and all discussions on artistic matters.
The salary of players is decided by their musical ability, not by age. According to a 
municipal ordinance revised in 2007, there are extra emoluments such as an allowance, 
an extra grant, compensation, travelling expenses, and a welfare pension within the 
budget. Musicians are generally satisfied with their current job as a member of 
orchestra through an open audition. It is a dream job and a long time wish, and a 
positive experience apart from financial difficulties.
Two male players indicated that their salary was comparatively low compared to other 
employers who had been working in a company over 12 or 13 years, and this kind of 
comparison made them depressed. However, according to a veteran player, salaries 
have been gradually increased, compared to the past, when the CPO  was an ad hoc 
orchestra, and financial satisfaction has been relatively raised. That is to say, in spite of 
lack of income (especially for married male players who are the head of family) 
compared to other kinds of professional occupation, they are enjoying being where 
they are, and players’ job satisfaction seems relatively high. Thus, we find a 
■ professional feature’ in a player’s attitude, which emphasises high standards and 
ability rather than material reward (Couch, 1989: p. 293).
Administrative staff
As has been mentioned, 5 administrative staff operate the CPO.74 All staff state that in 
considering the busy working of the CPO, the total number of administrative staff is not 
enough to cover the whole. Although their work is not clearly defined, each member of 
staff has a main role. All administrative staff of the CPO  are involved with instrumental 
music, and three of them studied for an MA in arts management. The contract of 
administrative staff is renewed every two years, and can be continued unless there is 
serious mistake during the contract period. The CPO  employs administrative staff only 
when there is a vacancy. In other words, there is no new employment until the current 
staff resign.
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74 The CPO  normally has five administrative staff, but one staff (planning 
the CPO  in the late 2008, and there are four staff In August 2011.
and P.R Manager) left
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Managing Director/Orchestra Manager
The Managing Director of the CPO studied tuba as an undergraduate, and arts 
management at postgraduate level. He has been working for the CPO since 1987, 
when it was a private chamber orchestra, and was appointed Managing Director in 
2002, when the CPO  became a permanent municipal symphony orchestra; thus, he is 
the longest serving employer in the history of the CPO.
His main tasks are to be responsible for all official works, to operate planning and 
arbitration, to make plans for concerts, orchestra management, and the long-term arts 
business, to make contracts for hired engagements, to liaise and contract with guest 
musicians, to deal with matters related to local culture and arts, and to cooperate with 
other public arts organisations (belonging to the city of Changwon). In sum, he is in 
charge of most administrative works.
Planning and P.R. Manager
With an academic background of arts management, planning and P.R., the Manager of 
the CPO  was a trumpet player of the Masan Philharmonic Orchestra in 1993, and 
started to work for the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra as a planning and P.R. 
Manager in 2002.
This main work within this position is the planning of programmes, analysing the result 
of hired engagements, writing reports related to planning, guiding visitors, taking care 
of the media and advertisements, subscribers, ticketing, supports and the CPO ’s 
homepage. He is also required to steward audiences in the concert hall and to 
cooperate in stage management, such as carrying and setting instruments in busy 
times before a concert.
M usic Librarian
The Music Librarian deals with all matters related to scores, such as their purchase or 
rent. He takes charge of scores, arrangements, modification of scores, and passes out 
and collects then from players. Apart from this main task, he also participates in 
handing out tickets, attaching posters, guiding audiences to seats, and cooperative 
works. He studied trombone as an undergraduate, and composition at postgraduate 
level, and has been employed since 1991.
Instruments and Stage Manager
The main role of this position is purchasing and repairing instruments, carrying and 
setting instruments, accounting, taking charge of fixtures belonging to the orchestra, 
and stage management for rehearsal and concert. In addition, he cooperates with the 
Music Librarian, attaching posters and handing out tickets. He also studied trombone
and has been employed since 1997.
94
Communication and Information Manager
The current communication and information manager has been working since 1997. 
The post mainly deals with civil affair documents for players, taking care of documents, 
photos, recordings, designing for posters, advertisement booklets and pamphlets, and 
the production of corporate identity. In addition, he cooperates in the work of carrying 
instruments, stage management, attaching posters and passing out tickets.
Thus far, we have been looking at the details of the works of the five administrative 
staff. Although each member of staff’s main work seems to be clearly divided, their 
work during the busy season overlaps due to a shortage of staff, and they can be 
overloaded. For example, the Planning and PR. Manager's work may be divided into 
programme planning, public relations, and orchestra development, such as caring of 
patrons and subscribers, as well as ticketing, information and communications 
technology, and international affairs.
4.3 Case study 2: Busan Philharmonic Orchestra (BPO)
Overview and change
Busan is located in the South East of the Korean peninsula. It emerged as a leading 
city of economic growth and democracy between the 1950s and 1980s, and became a 
metropolitan city in 1995. With a population of 3,615,101 in 2007, it is the second 
largest city in Korea after Seoul. Busan held the 2002 Asian Games, the 2002 FIFA 
World Cup, and APEC 2005 Korea.
According to Lim et al. (2006), the city of Busan has been politically intervening in 
culture and arts because of urban development. The important value of culture and arts 
can be found in two aspects: economic value and social value. The cultural industries 
are considered as 'a high value added industry which tends to lead to economic 
development of an urban area’, and the process of culture and arts enjoyment is 
contributing to social stability and unification as well as developing an individual’s 
creativity by providing a cultural norm and an opportunity to share the local identity (Lim 
et al., 2006: p. ii). The justification for culture and arts promotion can be found in the 
formation of urban development by raising a city’s creativity (Lim et al., 2006: p. i i ). The 
cultural policy of Busan in 2006 focuses on cultural popularisation, cultural 
industrialization, and cultural globalization. Cultural popularisation is a policy to 
promote a citizen’s cultural welfare through the expansion of the cultural infrastructure,
the enlargement in the variety of cultural activities on offer, and the increase in support 
for creative activities. Cultural industrialization is intended to contribute to promoting 
the local economy through film, developing the multimedia industry, nurturing the 
exhibition and convention industry, and revitalising the tourism industry through cultural 
events and festivals. Cultural globalization is intended to promote the image of a 
cultural city on an international level, and revitalise the exchange of national and 
international culture and arts performances (Lim et a!., 2006).
95
The policy objective of the Busan Culture and Tourism bureau in 2008, which is similar 
to the objective in 2007, is to improve the culture and tourism industries so as to make 
people want to visit, and there are seven main tasks for achieving this objective: 
improvement of cultural welfare and expansion of cultural facilities; promotion of live 
cultural events; developing the city’s image as the best promoter of film and visual 
content; construction of a solid policy for the revitalisation of local tourism; development 
of a unique tourism resource and enhancement of advertising; making Busan an 
international exchange city; and revitalising the exhibition and convention industry 
(Busan Administration of Culture and Education Committee, 2008: p.8).
To achieve the first task (which is more closely and directly related to performing arts), 
the improvement of cultural welfare and expansion of cultural facilities, there are four 
sub aims:
1. Expansion of cultural facilities: establishment of the Busan National Center for 
Korean Traditional Performing Arts (2004-2008), Youngdo Cultural Center and 
Youngdo Library (2004-2009), Haeundae New City Library (2005-2009), 
Jungguan Museum (2007-2010), temporary water memorial exhibition and 
educational institution (2008-11), and Arts Center (2008-2009), 15 public 
library renovations (2008-2009), and Busan Cultural Center renovation (2008- 
12).
2. Culture and arts promotion: the establishment of cultural foundations, 
subsidies for culture and arts organisations for their self growth, support for 
creative activities in the culture and arts fields, support for' specialized 
businesses in local culture such as Busan Arts Festival, cultural activities for 
excluded classes, and an arts programme for young people.
3. Preservation and transmission of traditional culture and heritage.
4. Expanding cultural service: management of cultural center, municipal museum, 
municipal museum of modern arts, Chungyeol Shine, and the citizen’s center.
(Busan Administration of Culture and Education Committee, 2008: pp.9-15)
There are different motivations and reasons for supporting the arts in developing 
countries and developed countries. The justification given by the government of the 
city of Busan for supporting arts and culture can be summarised by the city’s economic 
development, social stability and unification, as well as the development of an
individual’s creativity. Among numerous theories about the justification of public arts 
support, the government’s motivations in Busan are probably best explained by 
Richard Titmuss’s two government models (1968). The city of Busan seems to have 
adapted ‘the service model’ (‘making a cultural resource widely available and generally 
accessible means the arts become one of the public services’) and ‘the commercial 
model’ (‘rulers and governments may regard their cultural assets as saleable products, 
or as economic levers to commercial profit’) (Pick and Anderson, 1996: p. 65).75
Regarding the cultural policy of the city of Busan, cultural popularization seems to 
improve the cultural welfare of its citizens; cultural industrialization and globalization 
are likely to connect with urban regeneration particularly for benefits to the local 
economy. Although the city of Busan is trying to improve social welfare, which provides 
more cultural facilities for its citizens, it is more likely to give priority to cultural 
industrialization and globalization. Thus, it can be seen that municipal arts 
organisations including the Busan Philharmonic Orchestra do not play a significant part 
in influencing cultural objectives in the city of Busan. Busan’s cultural policy is still at 
the basic stage of preparing cultural facilities, so that citizens in Busan are not yet 
really participating in and enjoying the cultural activities.
The Busan Development Institute surveyed 500 Busan citizens aged between 20 and 
69 in August 2006. According to the results, the favourite cultural activity was watching 
movies (57.8%) followed by attending festivals (23%), and visiting visual arts 
exhibitions (16.8%). Only 7.5% of people in Busan had experienced western classical 
music76 (Lim et a/., 2006: p. 22). The cultural and arts events that Busan citizens would 
like to participate in if they had a chance in the future are movies (27.6%), Korean 
popular music concerts, entertainment (17.2%), and festivals (13.6%), while 8.4% 
preferred to participate in western classical music concerts (Lim et a/,, 2006: p. 23).
When the people in Busan participate in arts events, the most important factor is 
access followed by the quality and content of an arts performance, and the price and 
venue’s comfort (Lim et at., 2006: p. 24). The major barriers to participation in cultural 
and arts activities are price (30%), lack of information (28.6%), and lack of time (25%) 
(Lim et at., 2006: p. 26).
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75 Pick and Anderson (1996) outlined Richard Titmuss (1968)‘s seven government motivations- 
the glory model, the placebo model, the education model, the reward model, the service model 
the compensatory model, and the commercial model to support arts in the 'Commitment to 
Welfare’ (pp. 65-66).
76 But it is higher than Korean traditional classical music (3.4%) (Lim et at., 2006: p. 22)
Figure 4.2 Barriers to attendance at cultural and arts activities
97
32%
30%
28%
26%
24%
22%
Lack of time Lack of Price
information
d□ t z
Regarding the chance of participation in cultural and arts activities, 41.6% of citizens 
evaluated it as ‘Neither agree or disagree’ (Lim et al., 2006: p. 40).
Figure 4.3 The chance of participation in cultural and arts activities
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On the other hand, 51% of Busan citizens considered the level of cultural and arts 
activities as ‘fair’ (Lim et al., 2006: p. 40).
Figure 4.4 The evaluation of the level of cultural and arts activities
Finally, in terms of advertisements for cultural and arts events made by the city of 
Busan, the majority of people (48.8%) thought it was ‘fair’, 34% ‘not good’, and 14.6% 
‘good’ (Lim et al., 2006: p. 41).
It can be seen that western classical music is not a favourite cultural activity of Busan’s 
citizens, and the municipal arts organisations are not the main objective of the city’s 
cultural policy. People seem to prefer popular culture, following the general trend in 
Korea. People in Busan indicated lack of information as the main barrier that stops 
them participating in cultural activities. An evaluation carried out on advertisements for 
arts and cultural activities showed that 48.8% answered it was normal and 34% of 
people answered that the advertisement was not effective enough to recognise arts 
and cultural events. Thus, we can say that although people in Busan are generally 
satisfied with the quality and the quantity of the cultural and arts activities, they cannot 
fully enjoy cultural or arts activities due to the individual’s financial situation, life style, or 
the lack of information.
The culture and arts division, which falls under the Culture and Tourism Bureau, is the 
central part of the administrative structure of Busan’s culture and arts policy. This 
division is categorised in five parts: cultural policy, arts promotion, cultural industry, film 
and visual contents promotion, and cultural property. It has 39 staff (Busan 
Administration of Culture and Education Committee, 2008).
Under the culture and arts division, there are four cultural establishments: the Busan 
Cultural Center, Busan Museum, Busan Museum of Modern Art, Chungnyeol Shrine77 
(Busan Administration of Culture and Education Committee, 2008). Two essential 
organisations relate to culture and arts promotion: Busan Cultural Center and Busan 
Museum of Modern Art. Busan Cultural Center’s main role is to provide exhibition 
space for culture and arts activities, performing arts venues, and management of 
municipal arts organisations. The role of the Busan Museum of Modern Art is to provide 
exhibition space, provide a home to arts collections, and to lend art works. The 
collection and preservation of the arts can be understood as a business related to the
77 it is No. 7 of the city of Busan’s tangible cultural properties. Chungnyeol Shrine was made in 
memory of those who fought against the Japanese troops in the Japanese Invasion in 1592 
(Chungnyeol Shrine, 2009: online).
formation of local cultural identity and the revitalisation of creative activities (Lim et al., 
2006: p. 16).
The Busan Culture and Arts Promotion Institute is an organisation that, besides 
focusing on culture and arts promotion, investigates and considers basic policies and 
plans, fundraises, and considers applications for arts funding (Lim at al., 2006). There 
are a total of 115 cultural facilities: 39 performing venues, 10 museums, 3 galleries, 29 
libraries, 9 (foreign) councils, and 25 cinemas (Busan Administration of Culture and 
Education Committee, 2008). Regarding municipal arts organisations, Busan has a 
symphony orchestra, a choir, a dance group, a youth choir, a Korean traditional 
orchestra, a youth orchestra, a theatre, and a public information team.78
Busan Philharmonic Orchestra
Busan Philharmonic Orchestra (BPO) was founded in 1962. The BPO was the first 
local municipal orchestra and is the third oldest Korean symphony orchestra, after the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra and Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, which were founded in 
1956 and 1957. The BPO initially suffered from a lack of players, unsuitable 
instruments, and low wages (Ryu, 1993: p 13). The orchestra was not fully organised, 
especially regarding orchestration and player’s welfare. When the Busan Citizen’s Hall 
was completed in 1973, it served as a practice space and concert hall. The BPO 
enlarged its size in 1977 after 15 years of establishment, and players’ salaries were 
adjusted by an amendment to the regulations in 1977 in line with local government 
officials’ salaries (Busan Cultural Center, 1993). With the Busan Cultural Center’s 
establishment in 1988, the BPO acquired a high standard concert hall and players’ 
salaries were increased by further amendments of regulations.
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Primary activities
The BPO is resident in the city of Busan, the second biggest metropolitan city in Korea. 
It currently has 92 full-time members79 and nine administrative staff in the orchestra 
office (Busan Cultural Center, 2007a: online).80 As a municipal symphony orchestra, its 
main objective is to promote Busan’s cultural life as well as to activate local culture and 
arts. Its primary activities mostly consist of concert giving in its residency of the Busan 
Cultural Center. With a relatively long history compared to other local municipal 
orchestras, ‘the BPO currently provides approximately 50 concerts per year and has 
become a cultural delegation of an international city, Busan’ (Busan Cultural Center,
78 In order of the year of establishment.
79 The number of members was checked with administrative staff in the Busan Cultural Center 
in 2007.
80 Available at: http://bsculture.busan.kr/ [Accessed 10 May 2009]
2007b: online).
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The BPO ’s primary activities can be broadly divided into two parts: a regular concert 
series and special concerts. Regular-seasonal concerts are part of its residency in the 
Busan Cultural Center, whereas the special concerts can include special guest players 
or special programmes promoted by local authorities. The BPO provides 40 concerts 
per year (approximately 10 Regular concerts and 30 special concerts).81 The municipal 
ordinance of the city of Busan does not state the details of the number of performances 
that the BPO has to provide, which differs from the municipal ordinance of the CPO. 
This was due to public opinion that criticised the performance regulations as a sign or 
the self-complacency of the municipal administration, so the city of Busan eliminated 
them in 1991 (Kim, 2000: p. 29).
Special concerts include national touring concerts, concerts with special guest players, 
youth concerts including educational programmes, such as ‘classical music class’, ‘my 
friend, classical music’, and ‘youth concerto night’, visiting concerts, the Busan 
musician’s series,82 lunch time concerts, lobby concerts, and the Busan Phil String 
Ensemble and Wind Ensemble. Through these various concerts, the Busan 
Philharmonic Orchestra has been trying to pursue its objectives as a municipal 
symphony orchestra. As with most municipal orchestras in Korea, any ticket income 
goes back to the city of Busan and is not used for the BPO. However, it can be 
regarded as a positive achievement, and the city may look favourably upon the BPO ’s 
endeavour when estimating the budget for the following year.
Hired engagements are the most profitable for the individual players of the BPO who 
participate in these activities, whereas regular concerts, which are its own promotion, 
are generally not profitable, but are a duty of the BPO. The BPO deepened its 
experience during its international tour including ‘concerts in the United States, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, China and Japan’ (Busan Cultural Center, 2007b: 
online). Importantly, the BPO has been participating in the 'Asia(n) Friendly Concert’83 
held in the Sun Palace Hall or Acros Symphony Hall in Hukuoka every year, since 1991 
by sending 15-20 of its players to Japan.
With a relatively long history, the BPO ’s activities are more various and abundant, 
compared to other local municipal symphony orchestras. Thus, the BPO is more 
advanced in terms of quality and quantity of performance and orchestral management
81 According to the website of the BPO, it provides around 50 concerts per year but this seems 
to be overstated based on the recent total number of concerts.
82 The series is to provide opportunities to local artists in Busan.
83 The concert is performed by united players from different orchestras in Asia and the Oceania 
area.
than other local orchestras.
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Repertoire84
The repertoire of the BPO’s regular concert series can be divided into two periods: from 
1962 to 1990, and from 1991 to 2000.
There were a total of 128 regular concerts from 1962 to 1990 and the number of pieces 
the BPO played totalled 1,135: 472 concertos, 311 orchestral music, 308 overture and 
44 Korean composers’ works. Regarding concertos, Mozart’s works were played 95 
times followed by Beethoven (82), Mendelssohn (45) and Saint-Saëns (25) and Haydn 
(22). Among 311 pieces of orchestral music, Beethoven’s music was performed 98 
times, followed by Dvorak (42), Haydn (31), Tchaikovsky (27), and Mozart (26). During 
these periods, pieces from the Classic period and Romantic period were performed 
440 and 506 times respectively, whereas only 95 contemporary and national music 
pieces were played, and music from the Baroque period was not played at all. The 
repertoire of the BPO was overwhelmingly from the Romantic and Classic period, and 
the BPO ’s favourite composers were Mozart and Beethoven.
There were 129 regular concerts from 1991 to 2000 and the number of pieces the BPO 
played was 434. In that period, the number of pieces performed from the Romantic era, 
the Classical, contemporary, and Baroque periods were 245, 115, 72, and 2 
respectively. From the Romantic period, Tchaikovsky’s music was played 30 times, that 
of Brahms 22 times, and that of Dvorak 18 times. Regarding genres, 124 concertos, 
105 symphonic music, and 98 overtures were performed. Mozart concertos were the 
most popular (28 were played), followed by Beethoven (13) and Bruch (8).
In sum, the BPO has a tradition of performing symphonic repertoire, especially works 
by the Classical and Romantic composers, whereas Korean composers and 
contemporary works do not really form part of the main repertoire. A similar repertoire 
can be found in the case of American orchestras: according to the ‘Orchestra 
Repertoire Report’, between 1992 and 1993 the top five composers were Mozart, 
Beethoven, Tchaikovsky, Brahms, and Haydn.85 Even though there is no fixed way to 
programme repertoire, the BPO needs to carefully consider, develop and enlarge its 
repertoire, as it can be seen as key to the orchestra’s cultural role in a changing 
Korean society.
Audience
The executive constitution of the BPO does not regularly update its information on 
audiences, so there is very limited information. The subscription system of the BPO
84 The analysis of repertoire is derived from the BPO’s concert report.
85 This report was surveyed based on respondents of 11,366 subscription concerts from 1987- 
88 through 1991-92 (American Symphony Orchestra League, 1993: p. 18).
was launched in 1985, whereas all the other Busan municipal arts organisations started 
one in 1997. Currently, the Busan Cultural Center conducts subscriptions for all 
municipal arts organisations. There is no independent subscription just for the 
orchestra, and a subscriber of the Busan Cultural Center automatically becomes a 
member of the orchestra and all other arts organisations: the total number of (paid) 
subscribers has been gradually increased (see Table 4.2). There are four types of 
subscription: VIP membership, general membership, concession membership (the 
disabled, the elderly, and persons of merit), and youth membership. According to the 
staff in the orchestral constitution, they have never tried to research their audience. The 
application form for subscription is very simple: name, phone number, address, 
occupation, motivation for joining, interest, and frequency of attendance. Thus, it is 
difficult to have basic information about the characteristics of subscribers. The BPO 
had an audience of 16,961 in 2008, and 14,895 of that was paid audience: and majority 
of audience for BPO's regular concerts are non-subscribers of the Busan Cultural 
Center (see Table 4.2 and Table 4.3).
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Table 4.2 Number of subscribers
_______ ___________ ___________________(Unit: people)
Variables 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (up to June)
Subscriber 1,283 1,226 1,515 1,619 871
Free subscriber 2,955 1,401 3,164 2,261 666
Total 4,238 2,627 4,679 3,880 1,537
(Source: Busan Cultural Center, 2009)
Table 4.3 Audience numbers for regular concerts
_________ ___________ i___________i___________i________(Unit: people)
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (up to May)
Paid audience 12,306 16,758 15,303 14,895 7,576
Free rider 3,181 2,600 2,584 2,066 1.205
Total 15,487 19,358 17,887 16,961 8,781
(Source: Busan Cultural Center, 2009)
Finance
Similar to other municipal symphony orchestras, financial sources are limited.
The BPO ’s income is mainly supported by the city of Busan: 95% is spent on personnel 
expenses, and only 5% is used for performance (Park, 2007). Table 4.4 shows the 
income and expenditure of the BPO between 2005 and 2009: according to information 
of 2007, expenditure on charitable activities is (approximately) only 0.3% of total 
expenditure. Therefore, there might not be enough money for planning more 
performances. The details are as follows:
Table 4.4 Breakdown of the BPO’s income and expenditure
_______________________ _____________ _____________  (Unit: won)
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (up to 
May)
Total budget n/a n/a 3.7 billion n), 
(£1,850,000)
n/a n/a
Personnel 86expenditure
7.6 billion 
(£3,744,370)
8.1 billion 
(£3,976,928)
8.9 billion 
(£4,346,993)
8.6 billion 
(£4,196,516)
3.9 billion 
(£1,921,022)
Charitable
activities
expenditure
159 million 
(£78,156)
153 million 
( £ 74,774)
111 million 
( £ 54,450)
106 million 
(£51,990)
41 million 
(£20,053)
Charitable
activities
income
40 million 
(£19,778)
70 million 
(£37,116)
51 million 
(£24,893)
101 million 
(£49,488)
41 million 
(£20,300)
—iiv ":....  _ . •; ‘
(Sources: Busan Cultural Center, 2009; 11 Kim, 2008b)
Basically material support (especially financial) from outside is severely restricted in 
line with the municipal ordinance. However, the city of Busan added an ordinance in 
1991 stating that ‘each municipal arts organisation86 7 can establish extra operational 
funds separate from subsidy from the city, in order for the revitalisation of performance 
and the welfare of players’ (Busan Cultural Center, 2008). Therefore, the fundraising of 
the BPO could more flexible, compared to other municipal orchestras. Afterwards, the 
BPO was able to undertake its first international tour with the extra operational funds. 
Busan set a good example for the other cities with municipal orchestras, as it showed 
financial flexibility for activities.
Regarding finance, the government of Busan’s intervention in municipal arts 
organisations has advantages and disadvantages. As with most municipal orchestras, 
the BPO is entirely funded by the local authority and the BPO ’s funding is tightly 
controlled by the city of Busan.
With stable public subsidy from the city of Busan, the current funding level is enough to 
provide approximately 10 regular concerts, which has been the level at which the BPO 
has been operating at since the early days.
Governance structure
As previously mentioned, the governmental structure of the Culture and Tourism 
Bureau that is in charge of the BPO is highly bureaucratic. An organisational structure 
of the BPO is given in Figure 4.6.
86 The personnel expenses are for seven municipal arts organisations in the Busan Cultural 
Center.
87 Busan Philharmonic Orchestra, Busan Philharmonic Youth Orchestra, Busan Metropolitan 
Chorus, Busan Metropolitan Junior Chorus, Busan Metropolitan Traditional Music Orchestra 
Busan Metropolitan Dance Company, Busan Metropolitan Theatre Company.
Figure 4.6 Governance structure of the BPO
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A  Vice Mayor of the city of Busan automatically becomes the Executive Director of 
seven municipal arts organisations, and the president of the Busan Cultural Center is 
the Deputy Executive Director, in charge of operating the administration of the 
orchestra, as well as the six other arts organisations resident in the Busan Cultural 
Center. The Executive Director supervises seven arts organisations and directs players 
and staff, under the order of the Mayor. Interestingly, the city of Busan has a position 
for an Artistic Director, a person who supervises various operations of performance, but 
this has never been occupied. According to the former staff of the BPO, players believe 
that there might be some degree of disadvantage if an Artistic Director is not from their 
organisation, so players of each arts organisation disagree with appointing an Artistic 
Director from another organisation. On the other hand, if seven different Artistic 
Directors were appointed, this could potentially cause conflict with the Head of the Arts 
Centre, and high expenditure is required for the position. However, the Executive 
Director can require the principal conductor of the orchestra to act as an Artistic 
Director of six arts organisations, when necessary.88
According to the municipal ordinance, the Busan metropolitan orchestra committee was 
founded to listen to the opinions of professionals in different areas in terms of basic 
planning and management (Busan Cultural Center, 2008). The orchestral committee 
consists of 14 members: they are the Executive Director (President of Committee), the 
Deputy Executive Director (vice president of committee), and the Principal Conductor, 
and other professionals make up 10 members, related to arts and culture as an 
entrusted position for two years.89 The head of the performing department is appointed
88 This was a revised regulation of 1997.
89 The position is renewable.
as a governor to deal with administrative affairs (Busan Cultural Center, 2008). The 
main roles of the orchestra committee are basic concert planning, improving and 
developing schemes for management, deliberating over the appointment of the 
Principal Conductor, and selecting candidates for overseas study and training (Busan 
Cultural Center, 2008). Although the importance of the position of the orchestra 
committee has been indicated by several researchers (e.g. Judy, 1998; Hart, 1973); the 
BPO  does not draw great attention to the position.
Under the control of the Busan Cultural Center, the BPO has its own executive 
constitution which mainly carries out daily managerial works and assists in the Principal 
Conductor’s artistic decision making. The orchestral office is involved in the day-to-day 
running of the organisation, but has no actual power to make decisions at a lower 
governmental level. For example, even when the orchestral office needs to buy a 
teacup for a guest soloist, two to four steps are required to reach the decision.
Human resources and general roles
Artistic personnel 
Conductor
The principal conductor of the BPO has a great deal of power: the principal conductor 
has the authority of decision making on artistic matters and also participates in players’ 
auditions. The basic but foremost aim of his work is to organise a programme and 
repertoire within the orchestra office.
The BPO is already on its ninth principal conductor.90 The first principal conductor was 
Tad-Gyun Oh, and he was appointed from 1962 to 1972 (Kim, 2000: p. 17). In spite of 
the orchestra’s inadequate environment, the BPO, under the direction of Oh, provided 
concerts in several cities in Kyungnam province and invited guest conductors from 
overseas and Seoul (Ryu, 1993: p. 13). As a result, the BPO achieved the status of a 
top local municipal orchestra. The second principal conductor of the BPO was Byung- 
Ham Han, who was the Deputy conductor under the first principal conductor Oh, and 
appointed in 1972. He enlarged the orchestra from 50 players to 70 in 1972 and the 
BPO  had 80 players in 1975 (Busan Cultural Center, 1993: pp. 29-48). With the 
completion of Busan Citizen’s Hall, the BPO provided regular concerts as well as 
special concerts. In 1975, Han attempted to reorganise the players within the orchestra 
by organising a series of auditions. This backfired on him, and in 1979 he had to
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90 The Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra has had only three principal conductors throughout its 
19-year history.
resign due to a serious conflict with the current set of players (Ryu, 1993: p. 14).
After Han’s resignation in 1979, Ki-Hong Lee was appointed as the third principal 
conductor. To improve the technical ability of players, and to reset the orchestra, he 
had an audition for all members. Although he gave more local touring concerts and 
enlarged the repertoire, he resigned in 1981 because of a conflict with many of the 
players; meanwhile, the BPO was disbanded in June 1981 (Lee, 1991: p. 206). Five 
months later, the city of Busan re-formed the BPO with 52 players and appointed Jong- 
Hyek Park as the fourth principal conductor. The BPO built its name throughout Korea 
by giving concerts in Seoul, by touring locally, and by holding a series of concerts in 
universities (Busan Cultural Center, 1993). The BPO improved its musical level under 
the conductor Park. However, he failed to unite the players, and he had to resign in 
1988 as some players (especially young players) collected signatures campaigning for 
his resignation (Ryu, 1993: p. 15). After the fourth principal conductor's resignation, the 
position of principal conductor was vacant for one year and four months, and the BPO 
played with guest conductors (Ryu, 1993: p. 16).
As we can see, there were several conflicts between principal conductors and players. 
Therefore, the orchestral committee adapted the principle that ‘a successor (a principal 
conductor) should be a foreigner who does not have any connection such as academic 
and regional relations in Korea, in order to eliminate a deeply rooted factionalism and 
to annul conflicts related to a power grab’ (Busan Cultural Center, 1993). Therefore, 
the BPO appointed a Russian conductor, Mark Gorenstein, in 1989, and became the 
first municipal symphony orchestra to appoint a foreign conductor. He required perfect 
harmony among players, and his practice style was compared to the Spartan training 
described by the staff and players of BPO, so this changed players’ practice attitudes. 
At first, the players trusted the conductor to develop their music ability, but after two 
years, they began to rebel against his training style (Ryu, 1993: p. 16). In the meantime, 
the city of Busan in 1991 enlarged the size of the organisation of the BPO, and revised 
its regulation, adding to its portfolio the position of Artistic Director. This divided the 
orchestra into two parts: a principal conductor who concentrated on music, and an 
Artistic Director who had a responsibility for managing the organisation. Mark 
Gorenstein disagreed with this revision, and finally left in 1992 after the new regulation 
was announced. Although Gorenstein left, he increased the performing skill of the 
players and tried to develop the repertoire (Kim, 2000: p. 19).
Vladimir Kin was appointed in 1992 as the sixth principal conductor. His contribution 
was to increase the number of concerts.91 (He only worked in the position for three 
months, due to a conflict in the relationship between the players and the principal
91 The BPO provided approximately 24 concerts per year, but Vladimir Kin increased the 
number of concerts to 56.
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conductor.). After Kin, Vanco Cavdarski was appointed from 1993 to 1995, and he tried 
various repertoire, including 20th-century classical music (Busan Cultural Center, 1999).
Going against the BPO’s decision to appoint a Korean conductor, the organisation 
chose to appoint the Korean, Seong Kwak92 93in 1996 who had a great deal of authority 
and seemed to enjoy the power. His reign saw the BPO ’s first international tour in 1997, 
an East Asian concert tour in 2000, the development of various concert programmes 
and repertoire, and the development of the players’ performance level (Kim, 2002: 
p.26). As Judy (1995) mentioned, the excesses of authoritarian conductors contributed 
significantly to the development of the orchestra’s unionisation (p. 33), Kwak also 
contributed to the unionisation of the BPO ’s players who desperately wanted to stand 
against their conductor. He resigned in December 2003, due to serious conflict with 
players.
Right after Kwak’s resignation, the Russian conductor Alexander Anissimov was 
appointed in 2005, and is still in post. My interview with the players shows that they 
were involved fully in the decision to appoint Anissimov. Although the players are not 
one hundred percent satisfied with this foreign conductor, they respect his artistic ability. 
As there were always conflicts with Korean conductors, the city of Busan seems to 
have decided that giving the authority and power to the players to appoint a conductor, 
would eliminate many of the problems seen in the past.
The poor relationship between the conductor and players of the BPO was not caused 
by the technical ineptitude of the conductors, but by disrespect, a lack of reciprocity, 
and mistrust which will be illustrated in Chapter 6. These kinds of conflicts provided the 
BPO with several fundamental risks.
M usicians
The current member count of the BPO is 102 (Busan Cultural Center, 2009).83 The 
players in the BPO can be divided into five: a leader, a sub-leader, 13 principal players, 
and 13 sub-principals, and general players (Busan Cultural Center, 2008). Players’ 
contracts are typically for a period of three years, so players can renew their contracts 
by audition. In the case of the BPO, there is a representative committee meeting, which 
is organised with approximately 10 players appointed by players’ vote. The role of the 
representative meeting is to reflect players’ opinions regarding issues related to the 
orchestra (such as decisions concerning hired engagements), or to indicate problems 
or difficulties.
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92 He h a s  American citizenship, and some people think he is not a Korean.
93 There were 92 musicians from 2005 to 2007 and 102 musicians since 2008.
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Apart from the salary they receive, orchestral staff and players have a position 
allowance, a grant in aid of arts research, bounty for encouragement, meals, and traffic 
expenses, national holidays, and they receive constant education and development. 
The players’ welfare in the BPO seems much better than the CPO  in the way of 
estimated salary, extra grant, and the opportunity for self development.
The formal role of players in any kind of decision making in the BPO seems to be 
limited. They have some input into decisions about the acceptance of hired 
engagements, but cannot refuse to play if the city or cultural centre over-rules them. 
This tends to support Fogel’s more general view that 'it is not surprising that no role of 
importance has developed for musicians in the governance of orchestras'. One local 
exception is that the appointment of the latest principal conductor reflected the opinion 
of the players. The players want to be more involved, and their views will be presented 
later.
Administrative personnel
The BPO currently has its nine administrative staff in the orchestra's executive 
constitution (Busan Cultural Center, 2009). The number of staff has increased 
compared to 2007,94 as the orchestral constitution of the BPO has been in charge of 
the youth orchestra’s whole administrative works since 2008. In other words, the youth 
orchestra’s administrative team was disbanded, and its works were united with the 
constitution of the BPO based on the amendment of the operation regulation of the 
Busan municipal arts organisations on 26 December 2007. Thus, there are four staff in 
charge of planning, two for scores, two for caring for instruments, and one for 
advertising. The positions among the nine administrative staff at the BPO are basically 
equal. But administrative staff designate and treat an experienced member of staff at 
the planning stage as a Managing Director, in order to achieve effective operation.
The number of staff in this orchestra is approximately twice the size of the CPO. 
Although the BPO has more administrative personnel, it can be assumed that some 
work might be mixed, as in the case of the CPO, because according to former staff of 
the BPO, nine staff are insufficient to operate the whole BPO and youth orchestra. 
However, it is impossible to look at the overlapping work became the senior staff at 
planning department strongly refused to provide me with detailed information.
Managing Director/Orchestra Manager
Officially, there is no position of Managing Director in the BPO; however a Planning
94 There were seven administrative staff, and this increased to nine staff from 2008.
Manager95 fills the role of Managing Director. The current managing director of the 
BPO does not have an academic background in music and was promoted when the 
previous managing director moved on to another arts centre. As Fogel (2000) 
demonstrated, the managing director of the BPO acts as a mediator between 
conductor and players; conductor and the Busan Cultural Center; and the players and 
the Busan Cultural Center. She deals with daily matters as well as planning the 
programme with the conductor, and also deals with the players’ welfare along with 
other administrative staff in the orchestral constitution.
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4.4 Case Study 3: KBS Symphony Orchestra
Overview and changes
The KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) Symphony Orchestra is one of finest 
orchestras in Korea and resides in Seoul, the capital of Korea. The key aims of the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra are to contribute to improving the standard of arts and 
culture of Korea and to raise national prestige, based on the articles of the KBS Labour 
Association.
The KBS Symphony Orchestra was founded in September 1956. However, due to the 
influence of the 4.19 revolution in 1960 against the first government of South Korea, 
and an inexperienced management team, the Orchestra was disestablished and played 
only as a private orchestra for a short while. The Korean Symphony Orchestra (former 
KBS Symphony Orchestra) was then established in February 1961, and changed its 
name to KBS Symphony Orchestra in September 1961. In 1969, the orchestra’s 
management took over the running of the National Theatre and the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra became amalgamated into the arts companies which belonged to the 
Korean National Theatre. The orchestra also changed its name to the National 
Symphony Orchestra, and the KBS agreed to partly subsidise the National Orchestra 
which continuously played for the KBS broadcast performances. The authority of 
management of the National Symphony Orchestra and the orchestra’s name had been 
changed several times. Table 4.5 below shows the detailed changes.
After the disbandment of the National Symphony Orchestra, it was re-founded as the 
Korea Philharmonic Orchestra (current the KBS Symphony Orchestra) and introduced 
management regulations and an orchestral committee. With the slogan ‘an orchestra in 
the world’, it started with an enormous budget, an improvement of the player’s working 
environment, opportunities for overseas training, and the chance to work with first-class
95 According to a player, the planning manager and other administrative staff in the orchestra 
office of the BPO officially have same social position, but the previous planning manager who 
had been working in the BPO for a long time called himself the Head of the Planning 
Department and performed as Managing Director of the BPO.
conductors. It also introduced a robust administrative structure.
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Ta ble 4.5 The changes of orchestra name and the authority of managementYear English name Authority of manaaement1956 KBS Symphony Orchestra The KBS1961 Korea Symphony Orchestra (from February) 
KBS Symphony Orchestra (from SeDtemhert
Private 
The KBS1969 National Symphony Orchestra The National Theatre
1971 National Symphony Orchestra The KBS
1972 National Symphony Orchestra The National Theatre
1981 Korea Philharmonic Orchestra The KBS
1990 KBS Symphony Orchestra The KBS
Even though the interest generated by concerts that the KBS Symphony Orchestra 
provided was enormous, the standard of the KBS Symphony Orchestra's playing could 
not reach the expectations of the classical music enthusiasts. Furthermore, the basic 
elements for running an orchestra such as an administration, a stable pool of players 
and secure finances, were very limited in the early period. The administrative aspect of 
the KBS Symphony Orchestra was especially insecure.
More recently, it has suffered from conflicts between the company and players 
regarding the audition process, as the KBS believed that radical change was necessary 
to improve quality. Despite arguments regarding auditions, these began in 1982 for all 
orchestra members, and about 10 players taking the audition failed.96 After that, the 
company continued to hold further auditions in Korea and selected new players, then 
moved on and held third auditions in the U.S. and European countries, and chose 13 
players (KBS, 2006: p. 92).
This orchestra has received its entire budget from the KBS. However, the KBS 
company wanted the orchestra to be partly independent, due to the financial difficulties 
of the company itself since 2005. As a result, there have been arguments between the 
company and players about the orchestra's change of status, which is more serious 
than the conflicts of 1982.
The Seoul citizen’s common activities during weekdays are television watching (71.8%), 
taking a rest (37.2%), reading newspapers and books (21.2%), surfing the Internet 
(17.3%), followed by (observational) arts and cultural activities (1.7%) and participation 
in arts and culture (0.5%). On the other hand, spending time during weekends showed 
different trends: television watching (42.8%), taking a rest (40.4%), meeting friends 
(26.1%), physical exercise (17.0%), (observational) arts and cultural activities (5.2%)
^Although there were 98 existing players, only 70 of these took the 
out of 56 external candidates passed (KBS, 2006: p. 91)
audition: 60 of them and 32
and participation in arts and cultural creative activities (0.1%).97
Regarding the experiences of arts and cultural activities between January 2001 and 
December 2002, the Seoul citizen participated in cinema (64.2%), fine art exhibitions 
(15.9%), theatre (15.2%), and popular music concerts (10.6%); other activities 
including dance, literature, Korean traditional performance, and classical music are 
under 10% respectively.
The barriers to participation in arts and cultural activities are lack of time (39.8%), price 
(21.2%), lack of interesting performances (13.5%), and distance (11.9%). More 
specifically, there are different answers based on sex, age, and occupation: the main 
barriers to males are lack of time (45.5%) and lack of interesting performances (17.4%), 
whereas lack of time (34.2%), price (27.9%), and lack of information (13.5%) are the 
barriers to females; compared to other age groups, 20-somethings chose price and 
lack of interesting performances, 30- and 40-somethings chose lack of time, and 50- 
somethings chose lack of interesting performance as key barriers; lack of time and 
price are the barriers to people who have a job, and to housewives and students.
The arts and cultural events in which the Seoul citizen would like to participate in the 
future are movies (68.9%), theatre (49.3%), popular performing arts (22.3%), Korean 
traditional arts performance (17.6%), and classical music and opera (17.6%); both 
males and females prefer movies, theatre, and popular performing arts; the citizens in 
Seoul prefer movies and theatre regardless of income, whereas classical music and 
opera are particularly popular with the high income group.
The main sources of information about arts and culture for Seoul citizens are television 
(36%), newspapers (23%), personal communication (14%), and the Internet (11%). 
Other information comes from a poster or placard (6%), or booklet published by Seoul 
or district (4%). The usage of the Internet to get cultural information among 20- 
somethings is relatively higher (45.7%), compared to middle or upper age group (40- 
somethings (8.9%); 50-somethings (2.0%).
Therefore, it can be seen that either observation or participation in arts and cultural 
activities that include western classical music is not a favourite enterprise of Seoul 
citizens, but the future willingness for participation in those activities are much higher, 
compared to the current rate of participation. The people of Seoul indicated lack of time 
as the main barrier participating in arts and cultural activities, and females are more
97 All the statistical sources regarding cultural activities of the Seoul citizen given here are from 
the Seoul Development Institute (2002).
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likely to interest in those activities, compared with males. Although television and 
newspapers are the main means getting the information about arts and culture for 
Seoul citizens, the Internet is particularly popular for 20-somethings.
K B S  Sym phony Orchestra
As both a broadcasting orchestra and a public concert-giving orchestra, the KBS 
Symphony Orchestra has been the biggest provider of music in Korea since its 
founding in 1956. The Orchestra gives a variety of concerts throughout the year at the 
KBS Hall and the Seoul Arts Center’s Concert Hall. The Orchestra also plays special 
concerts for broadcast on KBS Radio and TV, and regularly records musical pieces for 
CDs. Up to 2009, the Orchestra had released 14 CD series including a recording of 
Alan Hovhaness’s symphonies. In spite of the early troubles, the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra was representative of Korean orchestras. It provided various concerts not 
only in Seoul and within the nation, but also overseas. In particular, it held a concert for 
the UN’s 50th foundation celebration and the 50th anniversary of the liberation of the 
UN assembly hall in October 1995, which was conducted by Myung-Whun Cheong. In 
addition, it held ‘the North and South Korea corporative concert’ in Seoul and 
Pyungyang98 in 2000 and 2001.
Currently, the KBS Symphony Orchestra has been suffering from serious conflicts 
between players and the company KBS, as KBS has been asking the orchestra to be a 
foundation since 2005.
Primary activities and repertoire
The current work pattern of the KBS Symphony orchestra is rather different from its 
inauguration in 1956 when there were more broadcasting activities. Although the KBS 
Symphony Orchestra is a broadcasting orchestra, its primary activities are public 
concerts. It currently provides approximately 80-90 concerts per year and its concert 
programme can be divided into six categories: regular concerts/subscription concerts, 
self-promotion concerts/hired concerts, special concerts, national touring concerts, 
broadcasting concerts, and international concerts. Apart from these six types of 
concerts, opera and ballet accompaniment and ensemble concerts are frequently in the 
fixed activities: the KBS Symphony Orchestra performed many opera and ballet 
accompaniments between 1957 and 1987; they began giving ensemble concerts in 
1973, and regularly gave concerts until 1988 (except in 1987).
Regu lar concerts (subscription concerts) are monthly public concerts of the KBS 
Sym phony Orchestra, and are key work. It currently provides between 20 and 30
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98 It is the capital of North Korea.
concerts. During its approximately 50 years history, the most frequently played piece 
was Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9.
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fable 4.6 The yearly total num ber of concerts 1956-2006)"
Year 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 I 1963 1964 1965
N um ber 20(1) 34(5) 25(5) 16(8) 26(7) 23(8) 35(10) 41(14) 39(12) 50(12)
Year 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
N um ber 43(7) 43(6) 24(3) 36(7) 41(15) 32(7) 26(8) 39(8) 74(11) 94(11)
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
N um ber 102(13) 86(15) 62(14) 79(14) 58(16) 62(14) 92(19) 90(22) 94(20) 88(22)
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
N um ber 94(17) 84(20) 91(16) 69(16) 56(15) 60(15) 89(32) 81(32) 83(30) 76(30)
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005/2006
N um ber 74(30) 59(24) 66(24) 73(24) 82(20) 85(22) 80(22) 84(22) 93(24) 86(24)784(28)
Note: ( ) is the number of subscription concerts.
Table 4.7 The number of repeat performances in regular concerts from 1956 to 2006
Composer Work Total number of performances
"Beethoven Symphony No 9 Opus 125 31
Brahms Symphony No1 Opus 68 24
Brahms Symphony No 2 Opus 73 20
Beethoven Overture to Egmont Op 84 18
Beethoven Symphony No 7 Opus 92 17
Beethoven Piano Concerto No 5 Opus 73 17
Beethoven Violin Concerto Opus 61 16
Beethoven Symphony No 3 Opus 55 16
Rachmaninoff Piano Concerto No 2 Opus 18 16
Dvorak Cello Concerto Opus 104 15
(Source: KBS, 2006: p. 151)
It is evident that the range of repertoire of the KBS Symphony Orchestra was not wide. 
According to a survey among its subscribers and music professionals between 1997 
and 2002 by a monthly magazine, audience, Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9 was the 
favourite piece followed by Beethoven’s Symphony No 5 and No 7 in second place, 
and Brahms Symphony No 4 in fifth place (Baek, 2002). Regarding concertos, 
Beethoven’s Piano Concerto No 5 was in first place, and Rachmaninoff’s Piano 
Concert No 2 and Dvorak’s Cello Concerto were in joint fifth place (KBS, 2006: p. 150). 
Therefore, it can be seen that the repertoire chosen by conductors of the KBS 
Symphony Orchestra showed a relationship to the classical music audience’s favourite 
pieces. In order words, the majority of conductors of the Orchestra considered and 
reflected the audience’s taste in its regular concert programme although there were 
some conductors insisting that their own repertoire was played, regardless of the 
audience’s taste.
Grieg’s Piano Concerto, Dvorak’s New World Symphony, Debussy’s La Mer, R. 
Strauss’s Don Juan and Ein Heldenleben, Rimsky-Korsakov’s Scheherazade, 
symphonies of Mahler, Bruckner, Shostakovich, Schumann, Schubert, Berlioz, and 9
99 The table is reproduced based on the book, The 50 Year History of the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra (KBS, 2006).
symphonies and concertos of Mendelssohn and Tchaikovsky are also favourite pieces. 
Apart from the familiar repertoire, the KBS Symphony Orchestra also attempted to 
expand its repertoire and contribute to improving the quality of performance: The 
Orchestra performed unfamiliar works of Mahler and Wagner in the late 1970s with the 
second principal conductor. One of the objectives of the Orchestra since 1981 was to 
play the role of a mediator for Korean composers’ creative works; however, it did not 
seem to fulfill this role when we look at the total number of Korean composers’ works 
played. For instance, the works of Korean composers were not often played except at 
special concerts, such as ‘the Korean Composer’s Night’. The pieces written by Korean 
composers were hardly played in the repertoire of regular concerts.
‘Double Concert’, which is a core programme of regular concerts and plays twice with 
same repertoire and in same place, was first planned in the 1960s (KBS, 2006: pp. 70- 
71). It could be done mainly became of the interest of audience in the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra’s performance. However, 'Double Concert’ had only existed for 4 years, 
before the orchestra’s regular concert was shifted to a single concert in 1966, as it was 
only popular among a small number of classical music enthusiasts. Despite several 
attempts to reinstate ‘Double Concert’ after 1966, it was resettled in 1992 and 
performed in two different venues (one in the south part of Seoul, and another in the 
north part of Seoul), in order to increase audience access to these venues.
Self-promotion concerts were started in 1984, and the purpose of this concert was to 
raise funds. Most Korean orchestras use self-promotion concerts and special concerts 
in the same term, although a special concert is a (non-profit) charitable public concert. 
Among various other programmes, ‘Campus Concert’ and ‘Children’s Concert’ are 
prominent. ‘Campus Concert’ started in 1986: it was a touring concert going out to 
universities with the aim of spreading arts and cultural activities. Children’s Concert 
began in 1998 and its aim was to reach under 8-year-olds who had not yet experienced 
classical music. It was successful and the orchestra now provides 5-7 concerts per 
year, and up to October 2006 had played 94 concerts (KBS, 2006: p. 118).
National touring started in 1972 and is an important part of the orchestra’s activities, 
even now. In 1981, the orchestra’s administration transferred from the National Theatre, 
and in that year, due to much restructuring, there was no national tour. Compared to 
other municipal orchestras, the KBS Symphony Orchestra was relatively ambitious in 
starting a national touring programme so early on, but it played an important part in 
developing people’s cultural enjoyment throughout the nation.
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In 1979 the orchestra embarked on its first American tour, playing in over 21 cities. The
aim of international concerts is basically to introduce Korean culture to overseas 
countries programming 3 pieces of three Korean composers’ works, 2 piano and violin 
concertos, 4 symphonic pieces, and 4 pieces by Wagner, and to increase the 
performance level of players.100 Thus, the purpose of international concerts of Korean 
symphony orchestras is different to orchestras in the western countries, where 
international tours are regularly undertaken in order to raise funds.
Apart from concert giving, another core activity is broadcasting.
At the beginning of its establishment, the majority of the Orchestra’s work involved 
broadcasting, especially from 1956 to 1957, but it stopped its recording activities 
between 1958 and 1980. After the authority of administration moved to the KBS, the 
Orchestra restarted its recording activities from 1981.
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Year 1956 1957 1958-80 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
J i / d b U l l l j
1986 1987
Number 19 21 None 10 35 2 1 13 17 29 33
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Number 25 25 11 5 7 16 20 13 16 11
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number 9 8 6 9 16 19 20 7 17 6
(Source: refer from KBS, 2006)
As we can see from the above chart, its broadcasting activity is very limited, and it 
seems hard to say that it is a broadcasting orchestra. In addition, there has been no 
regular broadcasting programme that the Orchestra has participated in through its non 
digital TV broadcast since 2000 (Sohn, 2006). That is, although the KBS has been the 
top orchestra in Korea, it could not maximise its potential under an insolvent orchestral 
administration.
Audience
Compared to the other orchestras, the KBS Symphony Orchestra has a deeply rooted 
subscription system. The total number in the audience at regular concerts was 84,414
in 2005, 69,523 in 2006, and 123,585 in 2008 (KBS, 2009).101
Subscription system102
The KBS Symphony Orchestra embarked on its subscription system in 1985. Although
™ S t b u d g e r 3" 0rcheslras canno' d° an international concert tour owing to lack of a
1011 requested total number of audience from 2005 to 2009 to the krc; hufiKas  ^ *u
information in 2007 and it is in process for 2009 audience numberKBS’ 6 *th V d° n0t havethe 
Different to CPO and BPO. there is no free subscriber system in KBS Symphony Orchestra.
the supporting association existed when the KBS Symphony Orchestra was named as 
the Korean Philharmonic Orchestra, it was not practically activated: it was only known 
to a few groups of musicians, and support was also arranged by a few companies that 
had a personal relationship with the KBS Symphony Orchestra (KBS, 2006: p. 165).
The subscription system can be divided into three periods: introductory period, 
transitional period, and stable period.103
Introductory period: the 1980s
When the KBS Symphony Orchestra104 was managed under the National Theatre, 
there used to be a membership system titled ‘supporting association', which was a kind 
of current subscription system. Then it was upgraded to a formal subscription system in 
1985 in terms of arts management (KBS, 2006: p. 165).
At the beginning, subscription was simply categorised into family membership and 
friend membership. Although the membership system was very basic, it was an 
effective way to enlarge the total number of members. In fact, it was quite popular 
(especially among classical music enthusiasts) and the members expressed their 
demands to the orchestra. With the success of its subscription members, the system 
changed to special membership and general membership in 1990, and then shifted to 
VIP membership, special membership, favourite membership and general membership 
in 1991.
The subscription began with 269 members in 1985, and built up to 554, 196, 303, 338 
members in 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989, respectively. Therefore, the total subscription 
numbers fluctuated between 1985 and 1989. Yet, in spite of instability of the total 
members, the trend of subscription also showed a positive potential for its future 
development.
Transitional period: the 1990s
The subscription grew over the period as a whole, but numbers dipped in the late 
1990s due to the Korean economic crisis.
The total number of Subscribers was 1,131 in 1990, and then 1,448, 2,050, 1,678, 
1,477, 1,566, 1,106, 967, 677, 980, and 1,559 members from 1991 to 2000. Although 
the number sharply increased compared to the 1980s, it also showed some degree of 
instability. That is, the Korean economy dramatically increased in the early 1990s, and 
led to the growth of the number of subscribers, whereas the economic situation was 
particularly bad in the late 1990s under the International Monetary Fund, and this is
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103 The statistical sources regarding subscription of the KBS Symphonv Orchestra era maini„
from ‘The 50 Year History of the KBS Symphony Orchestra ’ (KBS, 2006- pp 162-69) V 
Its official English name was the Korea Philharmonic Orchestra. ' PP' ‘
evident in the decrease in subscribers as people seemed, at first, to reduce their 
expenditure on culture or leisure activities.
Stable period: the 2000s
Along with the recovery of the Korean economy, the subscription scheme started to be 
stable from 2000. There were 1,559, 1,557, 1,705, 1,960, 1,650 (KBS, 2006: p. 169), 
1,396, 1,485, 1,506, and 1,418 (KBS, 2009) subscribers from 2000 to 2008.
Despite a fluctuation resulting from the stagnancy of the Korean economy in 2004, the 
overall subscription was stable and it helped the KBS Symphony Orchestra's income.
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Table 4.9 Yearly subscription income (out of total t cket income
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2005
Percentage 52.0% 53.2% 56.4% 63.0% 54.0% 54.0%
(Source: refer from KBS, 2006)
The KBS Symphony Orchestra is claiming that ‘the change of social cognition happens 
rapidly and the quality of the moderns’ life is increased, so that the number of classical 
music enthusiasts should definitely be increased' (KBS, 2006: p. 169): the orchestra 
believes a brighter future exists for its subscription system, but I do not think the future 
is as bright as the KBS Symphony orchestra believes, as there are many factors 
influencing its membership. One of threats might be the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra 
which is another fine orchestra in the same city and had an entire reform in terms of 
administration structure, financial support and players. The SPO  changed its whole 
organisation in 2005: it used to be managed, controlled, and supported by the Sejong 
Arts Center, but it became a foundation, and now it is an independent organisation with 
an enormous financial subsidy from the city of Seoul. Before this reform, the KBS 
Symphony Orchestra had a slightly higher position than the SPO  in terms of finance, 
administration structure, and the quality of performance,105 but the situation seems 
currently to be reversed. The SPO appointed a first-class principal conductor and has 
been praised for their performance and programming, while the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra has not had a principal conductor since 2004 due to a serious conflict with 
the KBS. This, in turn, has affected their performance which is now not as good as 
before, and the audience of the KBS are worried about the whole situation. I also think 
that the number of classical music enthusiasts will not be hugely increased: a certain 
loyal classical music audience always exists, while the number is very limited and 
subscribers are changeable, so we cannot expect a great deal of growth in terms of the 
total number of subscribers and classical music enthusiasts.
105 The SPO appointed Myung-Whun Cheong, who was the music director and principal 
conductor of I’Opera de la Bastille, as an Artistic Director and principal conductor in 2005.
The KBS subscription system mentioned above only explained the yearly number of 
subscribers and the type of subscription, and did not locate the characteristics of its 
audiences. Although I could not access information on its audience when I requested it 
to the KBS, as they did not have such information, I could receive the audience survey 
done in 2003 from former administrative staff (KBS, 2003).
The KBS in 2003 aimed to analyse the audience (both subscribers and non subscribers) 
attending the 549th subscription concert held on 27-28m February. According to the 
survey, approximately twice as many women (65.5%) as men (34.5%) claim to attend 
concerts. This trend addresses the general feature that women are more likely to 
attend arts and cultural activities in Korea. The KBS Symphony Orchestra mainly 
performs in two venues: the KBS hall and the Seoul Arts Center. The audience prefers 
to attend the venue near their residence. Those in the age ranges 40-49 (23.9%), 20- 
29 (23.8%), and 30-39 (20.7%) are the main attenders.
A  breakdown of audiences shows that 22.7% are students, 22.5% housewives, 17.1% 
professionals, and 16.3% are office workers. So, although generally classical music 
concert is considered to be for high class consumption, this concert could not be 
considered as exclusively the domain of the higher social groups, because the key 
attenders are students and housewives. There are many factors influencing arts 
attendance, however, and this phenomenon might be caused by a time factor. The 
concert was held on weekdays, so it might be hard to working people to attend. 
Although it is difficult to prove that price effects people’s decisions whether or not to 
buy or attend something, as people are most likely to give misleading answers, price 
does partly influence the decision making (Baker, 2000: p. 47). Yet, the ticket price of 
the KBS subscription concert is very low, so that the majority of students could attend 
the concert.
There is a close relationship between income levels and attendance (Verwey, 1988) 
particularly among those on the lowest income (Hill et a/., 2001), and income level is 
also closely related to social class. The proportion having a monthly income under 2 
million won (£1,000) is 40.7%, whereas the proportion of those who have a monthly 
income over 2 million won (£1,000) is 59.3%. The higher income group is therefore 
more likely to attend this concert.
20.4% of attenders consulted the KBS Symphony Orchestra’s subscription brochure 
and 16.7% the Internet as the primary source of information. By contrast, 10.9% cited 
broadcasting, 4.3% classical music magazine, and 3.4% newspaper. Press advertising 
is used slightly less than broadcast media (including television and radio). Different 
age groups used different information sources: the Internet is a main source among 
those aged 20-29; broadcasting to those 40-49; and newspapers to those 50-59.
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A  majority of attenders is generally satisfied with the conductor, soloist, performance 
level, repertoire, and ticket price: 85.5% are satisfied with the conductor, and only 1.1% 
dissatisfied; 80.6% are satisfied with the soloist; 81.3% are satisfied with the 
performance, 68.2% are satisfied with the repertoire; and 20% of attenders thought the 
ticket price was expensive, whereas 11.4% thought it was cheap and 68.7% thought it 
was reasonable.
The KBS researched its subscribers to gather basic information on 24-25,h August 
2006 (Kang, 2006). The proportion of women and men was 52.9% and 42.2%. 
Compared to research in 2003, the percentage between women and men was 
equalized (65.5% women vs 34.5% men). The main attendance group was 50- 
somethings (28.3%), followed by 40-somethings (17.4%), 60-somethings (16.8%), 30- 
somethings (14.3%), and 20-somethings (12.6%), but teenagers were only 3.1%. 
Therefore, the main attendance group among subscribers was 50-somethings, while 
20-somethings and 40-somethings were the main audience group in the survey in 2003 
(KBS, 2003)..
Regarding occupation, professionals were 28.9%, housewives 21.8%, and office 
workers 16.0%. It has slightly different features to the 2003 survey: the majority of 
attenders were students (22.7%) and housewives (22.5%), followed by professionals 
(17.1%).
The percentage of subscribers with a monthly income of under 2 million won (£  1000) 
is 17.6%, whereas over 2 million won (£1000) it is 74.8% (31.1% earn over 5 million 
won (£  2500) monthly income). Thus, a majority of subscribers has a higher income.
The primary sources of information among subscribed attenders are the subscription 
brochure (32.5%), followed by the Internet (17.1%), and radio and television 
advertisements (14.3%). Newspapers (7.3%) and classical music magazines (6.7%) 
are relatively less used.
Regarding age group, teenagers and 20-somethings cited the Internet as the primary 
source of information, whereas 30-somethings used pamphlets and the Internet equally, 
and the pamphlet is the main source of information to 40-somethings.
Subscribers think the price of subscription is fair (55.5%) or cheap (8.1%). 20.4%
considered it expensive and 16.0% did not answer. Similar to the 2003 survey, 
subscribed attenders are very satisfied or satisfied with the conductor (68%), soloist 
(57.4%), performance (56.1%), and repertoire (45.9%).
Finance
The KBS Symphony Orchestra is 100% subsidised by the KBS. The total budget of the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra had been highest amongst Korean orchestra until 2004. 
Then the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra's annual budget became twice the size of the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra with its new start as a foundation. Although the SPO is 
totally independent in terms of administration and operated by its own administration 
body, finance is still heavily dependent on the city of Seoul, despite incredible growth in 
its own income from music activities.
Table 4.10 Breakdown of the KBS Symphony Orchestra’s income and expenditure
120
(Unit: won)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total budget 8.1 billion 
(£4m)
8 billion 
(£3.9)
7.7 billion 
(£3.7)
7.5 billion 
(£3.6)
7.3 billion 
(£3.6)
Personnel
expenditure
6.2 billion 
( £ 3m)
6.2 billion 
(£3)
6 billion 
( £ 2.9m)
6.2 billion 
( £ 3m)
6 billion 
(£2.9m)
Charitable activities 
expenditure
1.7 billion 
( £ 830,045)
1.6 billion 
(£783,823)
1.6 billion 
£ 768,740)
1.1 billion 
£552,714
1.2 billion 
£601,369)
Income from 
charitable activities
1.2 billion 
( £ 583,853)
1.1 billion 
(£535,199)
1.6 billion 
(£778,471)
1.6 billion 
(£778,471)
0.9 billion 
(£437,890)
(Source: KBS, 2009)
Governance structure
The Executive Director of a Korean public orchestra is generally the Mayor or Deputy 
Mayor of the city, but currently there is no Chief Executive of the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra and the president of the KBS seems to have been the authority to appoint 
the Music Director and Principal Conductor since 1997, so we can say that the 
president of the KBS partly plays the role as a Chief Executive.
This orchestra has operated under various departments of the KBS, and has been 
managed by the Audience Business Team under the Audience Relations Division since 
2004. When the KBS changes its governance structure, the structure and title of the 
orchestra’s administrative team are likely to be changed. The staff in the Audience 
Business Team, which is in charge of administration of the orchestra, are consistently 
changed, as civil servants, who take charge of orchestra affairs of Korean public 
orchestras, are regularly rotated. Along with staff at orchestral executive constitution 
(the staff in the Audience Business Team), they are extra administrative personnel. The 
KBS contracts them as players but, in practice, they have charge of scores, 
instruments, and day-to-day managerial work.
Figure 4.7 Governance structure of the KSO
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Orchestra committee
When the authority of management shifted to the KBS in 1981, the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra was totally rearranged, with a new constitution. According to operation 
regulations, the KBS Symphony Orchestra should have a Chief Executive, a Principal 
Conductor, an Assistant Conductor, 123 players including a Leader, a Sub-Leader, a 
Principal, a Sub-Principal, a player’s representative, a Librarian, and a Stage Officer. 
The employment of players was done by open audition.
The orchestral committee is organised into 15 members: a President, Vice President, 
and 13 general members. Their main role is to consider the budget management and 
concert plan, to recommend and appoint a Chief Executive, to agree on the 
appointment of a conductor, and to evaluate the overall performance of the orchestra 
(KBS, 2008). The orchestral committee has regular and irregular meetings and 
members of committee serve a term of two years, which is renewable. Along with the 
orchestral committee, the KBS Symphony Orchestra has a personnel committee and 
the main roles are to examine players’ hiring and firing, players’ evaluation and reward 
and penalty, and personnel management (KBS, 2008).
Orchestral executive constitution
The KBS Symphony Orchestra does not have an orchestral executive constitution.
This orchestra is treated as a department of the KBS, and all administrative staff are 
employed as staff of the KBS and the company arranges the staffing of the orchestra. 
Therefore, the staff at the orchestra are more regularly changed, compared to the other 
public orchestra, which has an orchestral executive constitution. There are seven 
administrative staff: team leader, senior staff, and five staff under the Audience 
Business Team.106
Human resources and general roles
Artistic personnel 
Chief executive
A Chief Executive is appointed by the president of the KBS, recommended by the 
orchestral committee, and he or she should be a selected member of the committee. 
The role of a Chief Executive is to recommend musicians: a principal conductor, a 
guest conductor, a leader, a sub-leader, a principal player, a sub principal, and a 
representative of players; to make a concert and rehearsal plan, to make an invitation 
plan for guest conductors and players; to require consideration on players’ firing and 
hiring, evaluation, discipline, and all other affairs related to personnel management 
(KBS, 2006: p. 89). The contract is usually for two years, but it is renewable.
The KBS Symphony Orchestra had three Chief Executives. The first was Kang-Sook 
Lee, who was a professor at the school of music in Seoul National University and was 
appointed between 1981 and 1983. His contribution to the orchestra was to be a basis 
for future development and he increased the total number of concerts. He also opened 
up the entire audition process to all players in 1982 to raise performing levels. Man- 
Bok Kim was the second chief executive and he worked for seven years from 1983 to 
1990. His key contribution was to develop the programmes that visited various venues 
to provide concerts. The orchestra was looking for audiences in various places, instead 
of waiting for audiences to come to the concert hall. In addition, as Kim had been 
working for Seoul Symphony Orchestra for a long time, he sometimes conducted the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra. After Kim’s resignation, Dong-Seong Kim was appointed 
from 1991 to 1993. He had been a member of the orchestral committee since 1981 and 
was a Minister of Public Information (current by the Minister of Culture, Sports and 
Tourism). His contribution was to plan the ‘Double Concert’, which plays the same 
repertoire in different venues, and which helped people’s access to the venue as the 
orchestra played in both the south and north parts of Seoul. Furthermore, due to his 
endeavours, the total number of subscribers reached 2000 people. He also enhanced
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the KBS Symphony Orchestra’s image and its performance level nationally and 
internationally. The KBS has not appointed Chief Executive since 1993. According to 
former staff, it is because they could not find proper person for that position, and a 
principal conductor takes the place from 1994.
Conductor
The KBS Symphony Orchestra has had six principal conductors.
The first principal conductor appointed from 1956 to 1970, Won-Sik Lim, contributed to 
the organisation and management of the Orchestra from its establishment. Many 
players who were members of other orchestras joined the KBS Symphony Orchestra 
because of Lim. When this orchestra was disestablished, the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra continued to work as the Korea Symphony Orchestra, a private orchestra, 
because of Urn’s personal relationship in society. Therefore, if Lim had not established 
the Korea Symphony Orchestra, the KBS Symphony Orchestra might not exist today. 
After Lim’s resignation in 1970, the KBS Symphony Orchestra experienced difficulties 
in finding a proper conductor. The second principal conductor, Yeon-Tak Hong, had 
been appointed between 1972 and 1981. Hong improved the players’ working 
environment and welfare, enlarged the repertoire to include Mahler and Bruckner, 
developed programmes including a Youth Concert, Ensemble Concert, and Korean 
Composer’s Night, expanded the orchestra to full size, and started national touring. He 
also reformed the players’ position, which was decided by age rather than ability in 
1978 a year before its 50-day American tour concert, and the result was seen in the 
improvement of the performance level (KBS, 2006: pp. 75-80). All these achievements 
helped to upgrade the KBS Symphony Orchestra’s artistic quality. The KBS Symphony 
Orchestra appointed Kyung-Soo Won as its third principal conductor in 1986. He was 
keen to raise its value as a broadcasting orchestra, and created the 'FM Concert’, 
which drew great interest and is still representative of the KBS ’s broadcasting 
programme today. During Won’s period, there were many important national events, 
including the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, so the orchestra’s participation in various 
events resulted in fewer regular concerts compared to the previous year: the orchestra 
provided 20 regular concerts out of a total number of 84 concerts in 1987, whereas 16 
regular concerts out of 91 were given in 1988. A  German conductor, Othmar Maga, 
was appointed as the fourth principal conductor in 1992. Although he did not exercise a 
charismatic leadership, he harmonized with the players and showed diligence during 
his service until 1996.107
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107 The players and staff that I interviewed considered charismatic leadership as a significant 
factor for the principal conductor in Korea.
The fifth principal conductor was Myung-Whun Cheong, the most famous of Korean 
conductors. However, he worked for only four months, and left the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra due to a conflict, mainly caused by budget matters during the Korean 
financial crisis. In these four months, he only conducted one regular concert and 
programmed a youth concert, which seemed to promote his CD. Furthermore, he 
stayed in Korea for a very limited time, as he mainly lived in Paris. His salary may have 
been considerably higher than the fee he received from I’Opera de la Bastille, where he 
worked as an Artistic Director and Principal Conductor. The salary he received from the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra was equal to the amount of money that Riccardo Muti was 
paid in Paris for 32 concerts in 1990s. As a current principal conductor of the Seoul 
Philharmonic Orchestra, he also received a great amount of money from the city of 
Seoul for this position. Therefore, I feel that his name value is rather exaggerated in 
Korea, as he is the only top Korean conductor in the world. As a successor of Cheong, 
Russia’s famous conductor, Dmitry Kitaenko was appointed from 1999 to 2004. He 
spent 10 weeks per year in Korea and conducted many of the regular concerts, 
national tour concerts, broadcasting concerts, and recordings, so that he contributed to 
improving the orchestra’s performance level and the degree of recognition inside and 
outside Korea, and enlarged the audience. Although some criticised his repertoire for 
being too strongly dependent on Russian composers’ works, he was very popular with 
the Korean audience, and great interest was generated by his concerts.
According to the players that I interviewed, there is no serious conflict with its principal 
conductor as in the case of the BPO. It might be because the KBS was able to have 
top Korean conductors and foreign conductors since its foundation, unlike the other 
orchestras.
...A conductor should have both musical and administrative abilities.
[Player 1]
A  conductor should artistically lead (players)...but we should consider the 
conductor’s personal character as he will be a leader of group...A conductor 
should have musical knowledge and draw on players’ hidden musical ability. In 
addition, he also has to be able to harmonize players.
[Player 2]
Like the players in the other two orchestras, the players of the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra also prefer a principal conductor who mixes both artistic and managerial 
competencies. However, it seems difficult for a principal conductor to have both
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managerial and administrative authority under the system of the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra. The KBS Symphony Orchestra had a Chief Director, but the orchestral office, 
which is in charge of all administrative works, is a part of the department of the KBS 
and directly controlled by the KBS. Thus, the principal conductors of the KBS might 
have less administrative power compared to other public orchestras which generally do 
not have the position of Chief Director and are managed by an orchestral office that is 
not a department of the city or a cultural center.
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Apart from the principal conductors, the KBS Symphony Orchestra had a senior 
conductor, an assistant conductor, and a principal guest conductor. Therefore, when 
the position of principal conductor was vacant, the principal guest conductor or senior 
conductor took the role of principal conductor. The KBS Symphony Orchestra has not 
had a principal conductor for a long time due to the issue of the orchestra’s 
independence.
Table 4.11 The conductors of the KBS Symphony Orchestra
Principal conductors Principal guest conductors Senior conductor
Won-Sik Lim (1956-70) Walter Gilesen (1982-84) Nan-Sae Geum (1981-92)
Yeon-Tak Hong (1971-81) Moshe Atzmon( 1990-92)
Kvunq-Soo Won (1986-88) Vakhtang Jordania (1990-96)
Othmar Maqa (1992-96) Eun-Seong Park (2000-2002)
Mvunq-Whun Cheong (1998) Seung Gwak (2004-2006)
Dmitry Kitaenko (1999-2004)
(Source: refer from KBS, 2006)
M usicians
There are currently 89 players (KBS, 2009).108 The players’ contract with the KBS 
Symphony Orchestra is varied, ranging from 1, 2, 3, and 5 years to retirement age (61). 
Auditions are only held when KBS wants to improve the level of performance. Although 
all Korean public orchestras have a regular audition in every 2-3 year, the KBS 
Symphony Orchestra does not have regular auditions (KBS, 2008). The players have 
to perform and exercise for 6 hours per day during weekdays based on the orchestra 
regulation. The KBS Symphony Orchestra has a players’ representative committee and 
their union. I asked the KBS about the representative committee and the union, but 
they refused to give me an answer. I could obtain only limited information on the 
musicians’ union through the Internet information and the players.
Musicians’ union
The musicians’ union was founded to protect the players' rights in relation to the KBS. 
The players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra firstly organised a musicians’ union and
108 There were 107, 98, 93, and 89 players in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively.
joined with other KBS arts companies under the Federation of Korean Trade Unions in 
2001, and then formed an independent orchestra musicians’ union and joined with the 
National Union of Media workers in 2004. Currently 95% of players have joined the 
union, but not a few foreign players. However, the union does not have strong powers 
to insist on and represent the rights of players with the company when there are 
problematic issues.
The KBS disliked it (that players joined the KBS Labour Union)...it apparently 
does not show its emotion...but the company is irritated and the union is also 
unhappy (with players’ entry to the union)...the orchestra’s position is 
ambiguous...we (players) are not a favourable group to the union because they 
don’t know our salary and think players’ welfare is much better than them...they 
just guess players have similar salary or a bit less salary compared with them 
(staff of the KBS company)...sometimes we (players) only work in the morning 
and finish work, or we do not go to work and earn more money than them (staff 
of the KBS company) through music lessons in their point of view...But it is not 
true...it applies to only few players...the members of the union consider us 
(players) in that way, and it is quite hard to us...
[Player 3]
The player explained the ambiguous position of players, since most people do not 
consider players as labourers, but as artists. Whether an artist is a labourer or not is an 
arguable issue in Korea. The new president of Korea, Myung-Park Lee, said critically, 
‘How could musicians make a union?’ (here ‘musicians’ refers to the players of the 
Seoul Symphony Orchestra, and he was the former Mayor of the city of Seoul). The 
concept that the musician equals a labourer seems not to exist, according to Mr. Lee’s 
viewpoint. However, the majority of members of orchestras are employed and receive a 
salary, and it is natural that players should be recognised as labourers in terms of their 
identity, although some players do not think of their work as labour.
A big issue— the orchestra’s independence
The KBS Symphony Orchestra’s biggest concern is its status. The KBS has wanted its 
orchestra to move out, but the orchestra does not want to, so the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra has not been stable. The issue concerning the KBS Symphony Orchestra’s 
independence has been discussed, but the conflict between the KBS and the players is 
becoming serious, and it has resulted in a players’ demonstration, which took to the 
street in 2005 protesting against the decision of the KBS, inefficient management, and 
a vacancy of the Chief Director and Principal Conductor. Although the KBS held two
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conferences to explain and help the understanding of the orchestra’s foundation plan in 
2005, the company failed to make an agreement with the players. According to an 
announcement from the KBS in 2005, the orchestra should be shifted to a foundation 
from March 2006, however, it has not yet been accomplished.
The reason why the KBS wants its orchestra to be independent is that it is suffering 
from inefficient marketing, a lack of finance, and a non-professional government 
structure. To solve these problems, the KBS wants it to be a foundation (Lee, 2005a). 
Staff Member 7 claims that ‘the aim of independence is not to expel the orchestra...we 
want to manage the orchestra with a frame, like a foundation...(if we keep the 
orchestra) it is a loss...if the orchestra is a foundation, it is possible to be supported 
and patronized (by private resources) as well as public subsidies...the current trend (of 
Korean orchestras) is pursuing the system of foundation...so, orchestra could be 
rehabilitated by its own effort and be effectively managed...the reason players disagree 
with our plan is due to the fear of audition...I think the KBS Symphony Orchestra 
should be a foundation’.
The KBS continually insisted that the orchestra’s independence was totally for the 
orchestra’s development in financial and administrative aspects. However, the players 
of the KBS Symphony Orchestra were against the KBS’s standpoint:
The KBS had a serious deficit, and they thought the orchestra was one of 
reasons that led to its deficit...so the KBS wanted the orchestra to move 
out...But I disagree with the orchestra’s independence...Because the KBS does 
not make or prepare a basic plan for its orchestra’s independence...in addition, if 
the orchestra becomes a foundation, personnel expenses are not guaranteed.
[Player 2]
There was no preparation period (for the KBS Symphony Orchestra to be an 
independent foundation)...the preparation period was approximately three or four 
months...before this time, the KBS Symphony Orchestra asked a research 
agency to find a way out of the KBS Symphony Orchestra’s development, and 
there were many issues...to change the National Orchestra or to remain under 
the KBS and to be an independent foundation...But the KBS only paid attention 
to the orchestra’s problematic matters. Based on this negative aspect, staff of the 
KBS reported to the president of the KBS that the KBS Symphony Orchestra 
needed to transform to a foundation for the development of the orchestra.
[Player 3]
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Regarding the independence of the KBS Symphony Orchestra, it did not occur 
because of the president of the KBS, Hyun-Joon Jung’s rigid volition, but for 
accumulating his visible result...generally speaking, a government enterprise 
receives its budget from the National Assembly...And the Assembly started to 
mention that the KBS has spent too much money...It influences the president of 
the KBS, and he needs to show obvious contribution...He researched the way of 
restructuring the KBS like other companies, and then he pointed out the KBS 
Symphony Orchestra...The orchestra does not make a visible profit...we (players) 
don’t think we are a part of the KBS’s departments, but the company does...we 
are also a part of a department...to make a visible restructuring, they wanted the 
orchestra which does not make reasonable income to be removed from the 
KBS...Being an independent foundation is good in words, but it is just 
restructuring for the KBS.
[Player 4]
The KBS insists that the transformation of the KBS Symphony Orchestra into an 
independent foundation is to increase its competitiveness and to develop the orchestra, 
whereas the players think the plan is mainly due to having financial difficulties, and 
there is no long-term plan. Therefore, the KBS wants the orchestra to be separate. If 
an orchestra is to be an independent foundation as the KBS plans, it will cost a lot of 
money, as the total size of the organisation is bigger. Therefore, the orchestra cannot 
shift to being a foundation without money. On the other hand, the KBS’s plan is partly 
to subsidise its orchestra after independence: the KBS wants to support approximately 
half the total budget of the orchestra (the current budget is 8 billion won (£ 4 million) 
and is entirely supported by the KBS), and the orchestra needs to find the rest of the 
budget itself. Therefore, although the KBS Symphony Orchestra needs administrative 
and financial changes, it might be impossible to accomplish these plans unless firm 
financial support is guaranteed to the orchestra. Furthermore, as the players mentioned, 
it seems to be taking the deficit of the KBS out on its orchestra. When there was a 
serious deficit in 2005, the KBS asked the orchestra to be separate itself, and then 
when its financial situation was recovered in 2006, the plan was postponed and the 
same situation has continued to today without any changes. Therefore, it is evident that 
the KBS does not have a rigid long-term plan. More basically, it seems doubtful 
whether the KBS wanted to see the orchestra’s development, so the plan may have 
been designed to serve their own interest.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the social and economic context of three Korean municipal 
orchestras which represent all Korean municipal orchestras that this study is concerned 
with. It provides key features of orchestras as operational organisations. Although there 
are minor differences, such as size of public funding, orchestral executive constitution, 
and audience, or the existence of a musicians' union, the overall features of Korea 
municipal orchestras are more-or-less similar.
The next two chapters will examine job satisfaction and conflict using these three cases: 
the following chapter presents the results of qualitative (interview) and quantitative 
(survey) data collection on the job satisfaction of players and administrative staff in 
Korean municipal orchestras.
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Chapter 5 Job satisfaction
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the quantitative and qualitative research regarding 
job satisfaction within Korean municipal orchestras. First, various theories of job 
satisfaction are discussed, and then previous job satisfaction studies on orchestra 
players in Korea are briefly explained. Third, the instrument measuring job satisfaction 
is explained. Next, the results of the author’s quantitative analysis on job satisfaction 
and turnover are discussed and accessed by means of one-way analysis of variance 
and multi-regression analysis. Finally, the results of the qualitative research, which 
provide further insights by uncovering hidden intrinsic factors, are investigated. A brief 
conclusion follows.
5.2 Job satisfaction
There are many different definitions of the term ‘job satisfaction’ (Locke, 1976; Vroom, 
1964; Herzberg et a/., 1957; Scarpello and Campbell, 1983; Price and Mueller, 1986; 
and Hellriegel et al., 1998), and no single definition of job satisfaction with which 
everyone agrees. The definition of job satisfaction used in the Job Descriptive Index 
(JDI) is derived from Smith et al. (1969): ‘Job satisfactions are feelings or affective 
responses to facets of the situation’ (p. 6). According to Glick (1992):
Job satisfaction can be measured globally to establish a general level of 
satisfaction or dimensionally to determine the various facets or variables of job 
satisfaction. Job satisfaction variables that have been identified and measured 
with dimensional or facet-specific instruments are financial rewards, working 
conditions, supervisory practices, company policies, co-workers, opportunities for 
advancement, security, and content of the job (p. 626).
In a similar fashion, this study will examine job satisfaction by scrutinizing five specific 
facets: work, pay, supervision, promotion, and co-workers based on the definitions by 
Smith et al. (1969).
5.3 Theories of job satisfaction
Job satisfaction and job performance
Study of relationships between job satisfaction and work performance has drawn much 
attention from researchers.
The study of the relationship between job satisfaction and job performance is one 
of the most venerable research traditions in industrial-organisational psychology.
(Judge et al., 2001: p. 376)
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Job satisfaction/job performance relationship studies have ‘at least seven different 
ways in which the satisfaction-performance relationship has been specified’ (Judge et 
al., 2001: p. 377). The seven models are:
1. Job satisfaction causes job performance.
2. Job satisfaction and job performance are reciprocally related.
3. The relationship between job satisfaction and job performance is spurious.
4. The relationship between job satisfaction and job performance is moderated by 
other variables.
5. There is no relationship between job satisfaction and job performance.
6. Alternative conceptualizations of job satisfaction and/or job performance.
(Judge et a/., 2001: pp. 378-81)
Most researchers consider the first four models old fashioned, and either the fifth or the 
sixth models are used if job satisfaction and performance show little relationship (Judge 
et al., 2001: p. 383). Early studies were conducted by Brayfield and Crockett (1955), 
and Kornhauser and Sharp (1932) regarding ‘Gob) attitudes and productivity in an 
industrial setting’ (laffaldano and Muchinsky, 1985: p. 251). Brayfield and Crockett 
(1955), laffaldano and Muchinsky (1985), Doll and Gunderson (1969), Schriesheim and 
Murphy (1976), and Tharenou and Harker (1982) are more or less pessimistic on the 
correlations, while Herzberg et al. (1957), Bhagat (1982), Arvey and Gross (1977), 
Gould (1979), Locke (1965), and Porac et al. (1983), Petty et al. (1984) report more 
optimistic conclusions. Argyle (1989) concludes that the overall correlation between job 
satisfaction and work performance is at about +.15 (which is very low) and there is a 
higher correlation for white-collar workers. Thus, the relationship between job 
satisfaction and work performance might be different in each case. Although job 
satisfaction does not necessarily lead an individual to perform a specific task well, it is 
important for several reasons. Satisfaction represents an outcome of work experience, 
so high levels of dissatisfaction help managers identify organisational problems that 
need attention. In addition, job dissatisfaction is strongly linked to absenteeism, 
turnover, and physical and mental health problems.
Impact of demographic characteristics on job satisfaction
A representative study on job satisfaction and age was completed by Herzberg,
Mausner, Peterson and Capwell (1957), who explained that job satisfaction and age 
have a U-shaped relationship. At the beginning of employment, an employee has a 
higher job satisfaction, but then it goes down before beginning to rise once more. After 
experiencing these steps, the employee keeps a balance on job satisfaction. The 
reason for high job satisfaction at the early stage of employment is the newness and 
expectation of the job, then job satisfaction drops when the expectation is not met. With
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increasing experience and maturity, employees are likely to adjust their ambitions and 
expectations to a realistic level. When this adjusted expectation is pursued, job 
satisfaction increases again. However, Hulin and Smith (1965) did not find evidence of 
U-shaped relationships between age or tenure and job satisfaction, but did find positive 
and monotonic relationships between job satisfaction and age and work itself. Gibson 
and Klein (1970) also studied the relationship between job satisfaction and age and 
tenure, and they found a positive and linear relationship between job satisfaction and 
age, but a negative relationship between job satisfaction and tenure. Gibson and Klein 
argued that a U-shaped relationship is found between satisfaction and the combination 
of age and tenure. Furthermore, Hunt and Saul (1975) stated that 'the correlation 
between age and overall job satisfaction was found to be greatest among workers with 
less than 12 months tenure’ particularly with males, but ‘overall job satisfaction was 
found to be more strongly associated with age than with tenure for males’ and ‘there 
was, in fact, no evidence of a significant relationship of any kind between age and the 
overall job satisfaction of the females’ (p. 699). Studies of the relationship between job 
satisfaction and age were also done by Muchinsky (1978) on a negative relationship, 
Ronen (1978) on no significant relationship, and by Glenn, Taylor, and Weaver (1977) 
on a less-than-significant relationship.
Keller (1983) studied absence frequency and job satisfaction, revealing that marital 
status, as well as tenure, gender, and group cohesiveness, are 'significant predictors of 
absenteeism’ (p. 538); married employees have less absenteeism compared to 
unmarried employees. One might intuitively believe that absenteeism may relate to lack 
of job satisfaction; thus it might be implied that those who believe that Keller’s study is 
sufficient evidence concerning absenteeism may consider married employees to be 
more satisfied with their jobs. However, the studies of llgen and Hollenback (1977), 
Dittrich and Carrell (1979), Johns (1978), Cheloha and Farr (1980), Watson (1981), and 
Matrunola (1996) could find no important relationship between job satisfaction and 
absenteeism. Therefore, we cannot conclude that married employees are more 
satisfied with their jobs than unmarried employees. Shea, Paines and Spitz (1970) also 
stated that job satisfaction might not be much affected by marital status, as the same 
degree of satisfaction was found between married and unmarried women. Despite the 
negative relationship between marital status and job satisfaction, Wild (1970) found 
that single employees had more complaints about their jobs than married employees 
among 2,159 female employees and 236 female ex-employees of electronic 
companies.
There are several studies on the relationship between education and job satisfaction
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and the results are contradictory. Vollmer and Kinney (1955) found that better educated 
employees were more dissatisfied with their jobs: this is because higher educated 
individuals invest more money in education and expect a higher income, better working 
conditions and a more considerate supervisor. In contrast, less educated individuals 
expect less from the company and are ready to accept some inferior working conditions. 
Sulkin and Pranis (1967) found an inverse relationship between education and job 
satisfaction, as did Vollmer and Kinney (1955): higher educated workers had more 
dissatisfaction.
However, Gordon and Arvey (1975) studied education and job satisfaction among 259 
clerical and managerial employees of a leading manufacturer of building materials, and 
found that education does not significantly influence job satisfaction in the work itself, 
but ‘a significant inverse relationship was revealed on the practice of management 
factor’ (p. 889). That is, the more educated employees were less satisfied with the 
general management of the organisation compared to less educated employees, as the 
former were more cognizant about ‘effective and ineffective management techniques (p. 
890-91). Shinha and Sarma (1962) indicated that there was no significance in the 
relationship between education and job satisfaction among 100 workers in India. 
However, Gallup (1973) and Goodwin (1969) both found a significant relationship 
between education and job satisfaction.
Regarding tenure and job satisfaction, there are different results in different studies. 
Hulin and Smith (1965) explained positive, monotonic relationships between 
satisfaction with company tenure as well as pay, work, and age (as it is indicated 
earlier). In addition, Hunt and Saul (1975) found that overall job satisfaction with 
company tenure of white-collar male and female workers had significant, positive, 
linear relationships (p. 699), which reversed Herzberg’s U-shaped relationship 
hypothesis and also Gibson and Klein’s (1970) hypothesis of a negative and linear 
relationship: that, as the length of time working increases, job satisfaction decreases.
Job satisfaction and job decision latitude in Denmark by gender was presented in 
Measuring Job Satisfaction in Surveys: Comparative Analytical Report (European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007). If job 
decision latitude is high, men (89.5%) have higher job satisfaction than women (85%), 
but job decision latitude is above age, women (80.8%) have higher job satisfaction than 
men (77.3%); there is not much difference between the job satisfaction of men and 
women when the level of job decision latitude is below average or low. Varca et al. 
(1983) surveyed 200 male and 192 female workers ranging from low to high level
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occupations, and found that male workers were more satisfied with pay and promotion 
in the higher levels of occupation, although less satisfied in the lower levels, compared 
to female workers. However, Varca et at. (1983) did not control over pay, type of job, 
organisation, and tenure, and the results should be considered with caution (Summers 
and DeCotiis, 1988: p. 680). Smith and Plant (1982) studied the case of university 
professors, and concluded that no significant gender difference in job satisfaction was 
found.109 Summers and DeCotiis (1988) also studied gender difference in job 
satisfaction with a sample of 74 husband and wife teams. Although they found females 
were more satisfied with compensation and advancement than males, no evidence was 
found for the hypothesized gender difference in overall job satisfaction (p. 687).
Thus, it might be concluded that there is no absolute relationship between job 
satisfaction and demographic characteristics— age, tenure, gender, marital status, and 
education— but some degree of relationship cannot be denied.
Relationship between job satisfaction and turnover
Although job satisfaction and turnover seem to relate indirectly, most studies examine 
the direct relationship between them: Vroom (1964), Porter and Steers (1973), and 
Locke (1975) reported a negative relationship between job satisfaction and employee 
turnover, while Mobley (1977) explained the process of job dissatisfaction leading to 
turnover. Lee (1988: p. 263) summarised Mobley’s various stages of loss of job 
satisfaction:
1. To think about quitting, which may in turn lead that employee
2. To evaluate the expected utility of searching for another job and the costs 
associated with quitting the present job. From the evaluation,
3. An intention to search for alternative jobs may emerge, which in turn likely 
leads the employee
4. To the actual searching for alternative jobs and
5. To the evaluation of the acceptability of any identified alternatives. From that 
second evaluation, the employee would be likely
6. To compare those alternatives to the present job, which in tern can lead to
7. An intention to quit, and eventual employee turnover.
The following studies examined parts of the employee turnover decision process 
described by Mobley (1977). In his previous study, Job Satisfaction and Thinking of 
Quitting (1975), Mobley found ‘high negative correlations between satisfaction and 
frequency of thinking of quitting (Mobley, 1977: p. 239). Atkinson and Lefferts (1972) 
had already found a significant relationship between frequency of thinking of quitting 
and actual decision making. On the other hand, Irvine and Evans (1995) examined the
109 Income level was not controlled in the study of Smith and Plant (1982).
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relationships between job satisfaction and eventual turnover, which is the final stage of 
job dissatisfaction, among nurses, and found ‘a small negative relationship exists 
between job satisfaction and turnover’: job satisfaction increases, turnover decreases 
(P- 247).
This study will explore the relationship between job satisfaction resulting from the Job 
Descriptive Index’s five categories and thoughts of quitting among players and 
administrative staff in three Korean municipal orchestras. However, a limitation is that it 
does not examine the complete decision process of employee turnover as detailed by 
Mobley (1977), and it does not explore the actual results of turnover.
5.4 Job satisfaction studies of players of symphony orchestras 
in Korea
There are a number of studies of job satisfaction in Korea, but only two,110 both 
conducted by Master’s degree students, focus on orchestras: the first, conducted by 
Jung-Eun Lee (2001), concentrated on the professionalism of orchestral players in two 
private orchestras and two public orchestras, analysing ‘the occupational features of 
professionals as orchestra musicians through questionnaire research’ (p. 94) and, in 
part, describing players’ job satisfaction. Lee’s study investigated the professionalism of 
the orchestral player’s job111 based on the four professionalism scales devised by Hall 
(1968): ‘professional knowledge and sense of the field, belief in social contribution, 
belief in self-regulation, [and] autonomy’ (p. 95). She posed just one question related to 
job satisfaction, asking about the degree of general job satisfaction on a scale of five: 
very satisfied, satisfied, average, dissatisfied, very dissatisfied. If respondents 
answered ‘dissatisfied’ or 'very dissatisfied’, then they needed to give the reason for 
dissatisfaction. The reasons may be limited in scope, as she excluded answers from 
respondents who chose ‘average’, ‘satisfied’, and ‘very satisfied’. Players may be 
satisfied with one aspect of the job and considerably less satisfied with others 
(Hellriegel et al., 1998: p. 54), so this study on job satisfaction is inadequate. Moreover, 
information as to what extent players were satisfied and to which factor of the job they 
attributed their satisfaction was also excluded. Two items, satisfaction with co-workers 
and supervisor, were given with five scales, respectively, in order to investigate players’ 
professionalism. Thus, there is limited information on players’ job satisfaction.
Another study, conducted by Ki-Doo Nam (2003), focused on the satisfaction of players
110 Soo-Jin Jung (2004) also partly includes orchestral players’ job satisfaction in her master 
thesis, but I do not count her study because her main study is focusing on managerial 
improvement of the public orchestras in Korea.
111 it implies a ‘professional job attitude’ (Lee, 2001: p. 94).
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among four Korean private orchestras in metropolitan regions, in order to find a proper 
means of development. To measure the job satisfaction of players, he used four 
satisfaction categories: job consciousness and responsibility, professionalism, pay, and 
working conditions. However, he considered each satisfaction category using only 
simple and descriptive data, and ignored the relationship with demographic variables. 
The following section will explain the instrument measuring job satisfaction (JDI) used
in this study.
5.5 Job satisfaction: the Job Descriptive Index (JDI)
The most widely used method of assessing job satisfaction in an organisation is the
Job Descriptive Index (JDI) developed by Smith, Kendall, and Hulin (1969). There are 
two reasons for its popularity: one is that ‘the Job Descriptive Index is without a doubt 
the most carefully constructed measure of job satisfaction in existence today’ (Vroom, 
1964: p. 100),112 the second reason is that the JDI is likely to apply to a wide range of 
demographic characteristics (Golembiewski and Yeager, 1978). The 1997 revised 
version of the JDI was used to collect data about specific levels of job satisfaction 
among respondents.113 It is composed of five separate categories: work, pay, 
supervision, promotion, and co-workers. Internal reliability estimates for five subscales, 
and coefficient alpha114 estimates of reliability are presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Coefficient alpha values for the JDI
Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted Cronbach’s alpha N of items
Work 0.585
Pay 0.688
Supervision 0.670 0.679 5
Promotion 0.531
Co-workers 0.607
As Table 5.1 shows, the reliability of five subscales to measuring job satisfaction for this 
study is 0.679, which is considered to offer acceptable reliability.115
The 70-item instrument was designed to measure satisfaction scales covering five
112 Vroom’s comments on JDI are based on six unpublished manuscripts developed by Smith 
and her associates (Smith, 1963; Hulin, Smith, Kendall, and Locke, 1963; Macaulay, Smith, 
Locke, Kendall, and Hulin, 1963; Kendall, Smith, Hulin, and Locke, 1963; Locke, Smith Huiin 
and Kendall, 1963; Smith and Kendall, 1963).
1131 conducted another survey on conflict using ROCI-I &II (max. 138 items) at the same time, 
and thought too many questions would influence the rate of answer negatively. The Job in 
General (JIG) scale was excluded because the information it would provide would not affect the 
aim of this study.
114 Coefficient alpha is also called Cronbach’s alpha: a measure of the extent to which cases 
responds in a similar or consistent way on all the variables that go to make up a scale (Brace et 
a/., 2006: p. 331; Howittand Cramer, 2008: p. 363).
115 The value of more than 0.6 is acceptable in exploratory research (Hair et al., 1998).
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facets of the job: satisfaction with the work itself (18-items), pay (7-items),116 
supervision (18-items), promotion (9-items), and co-workers (18-items). The analytic 
techniques employed in this study are the .same as those used by Smith et at. Items 
are recorded as follows: Yes = 3 points, ? = 1 point, No = 0, and reversed items117 are 
recoded prior to analysis: for example, ‘Yes’ for positively phrased items and ‘No’ for 
negatively phrased items are given 3 points; ‘Yes’ to negatively phrased items and ’No’ 
to appositively phrased items have 0 points; and responses with a question mark have 
1 point. A  middle-range score of 27 can be used as a neutral point in interpreting 
absolute JDI scores for each scale according to the JDI user’s manual (Balzer and 
Smith, 1990), thus ‘scores well above 27 (i.e., 32 or above) indicate satisfaction, while 
those well below 27 (i.e., 22 or below) indicate dissatisfaction’ (Balzer and Smith, 1990, 
p. 23).
However, there is a possible highest score of 54 for work, supervision, and co-workers, 
21 for pay, and 27 for promotion, because there are two items for pay scale missing in 
this study, thus the middle-scale score can be around a score of 27 for work, 
supervision and co-workers, around a score of 10.5 for pay,118 and around a score of 
13.5 for promotion.
The relative importance of each of the five JDI facets was measured in the second 
section using a 5-point scale: 1) most important, 2) important, 3) average, 4) less 
important, and 5) least important. In order to investigate the relationship between job 
satisfaction and employee turnover, the final section measured the opinion 'thinking of 
quitting’ using the following 5-scales: 1) totally disagree, 2) disagree, 3) average, 4) 
agree, and 5) totally agree.
The subsidiary objectives of the job satisfaction research were:
1. To measure the each facet level of job satisfaction.
2. To determine if there is a difference in job satisfaction among the five scales.
3. To examine the relationship between job satisfaction and demographic 
characteristics.
4. To explore players’ and staff’s thoughts on the relative importance of 
determinants of job satisfaction.
5. To examine the relationship between job satisfaction and turnover.
6. To explore the reasons for the job satisfaction and dissatisfaction of players and 
staff.
116 Because of my technical mistake, survey questionnaires that I made only included 7 items in 
the pay scale instead of the original 9 items. Fortunately, after careful observation, two missing 
items have one positive and negative question each, and might not significantly influence the 
result of job satisfaction. Furthermore, I also consulted this matter with a JDI office manager, 
and he said that I could create my own neutral point in the way of original JDI score creates' 
(despite the best way is to use all 9-items and convert it to the 54 points)
117 Reverse scored items: Yes = 0, ? = 1, No = 3.
1181 contacted a JDI office manager, and the alternative neutral score for pay can be 10.5.
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5.6 Results of the quantitative research survey
Section I Profiles of samples119
Personal information of all players and administrative staff of three orchestras 
according to demographic characteristics— age, marital status, gender, education, and 
tenure—are summarised in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
Table 5.2 Personal information concerning players
Category Frequency Valid percentage
Age 21-25 3 2.40
26-30 13 10.60
31-35 23 18.70
36-40 21 17.10
Over 40 63 51.20
Marital status Married 85 69.10
Single 38 30.90
Gender Male 64 52.00
Female 59 48.00
Education High school graduated Ï 0.80
College 2 1.60
University 120 97.60
Tenure Less than 6 months 1 Ö.8Ö
6 months to 2 years 6 4.90
2—5 years 17 13.80
5—10 years 28 22.80
over 10 years 71 57.70
Alote: n = 123 ---------------- -
The majority of respondents (51.2%) are over 41 years of age, followed by the age 
group 31-35 (18.7%) and 36-40 (17.1%). 69.1% of respondents are married and 30.9% 
are single, so the rate of married respondents is twice that of single respondents. There 
is no major difference in gender: 52% are male and 48% are female. Players are well 
educated: 97.6% are university graduates; only 0.8% of respondents are high school 
graduates, and 1.6% are college graduate. 57.7% of players have worked more than 
10 years in their current orchestras, followed by 22.8% who have worked 5-10 years, 
and 13.8% who have worked 2-5 years— illustrating that most players work in one 
orchestra for a long time. This suggests that the rate of turnover of players might be low.
119 Total ®ample numtj>er of players measuring job satisfaction is 128, but five of them did not 
provide their personal information. All sample sizes (n) are listed in the attached CD
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Table 5.3 Persona) in fo rm atio n  co n c e rn in g  sta ff
Category Frequency Valid percentage
Age 21-25 0 0.0
26-30 2 20.0
31-35 2 20.0
36-40 1 10.0
Over 40 5 50.0
Marital status Married 7 70.0
Single 3 30.0
Gender Male 7 70.0
Female 3 30.0
Education High schooi graduated 0 0.0
College 0 0.0
University 10 100.0
Tenure Less than 6 months 1 11.1
6 months to 2 years 2 22.2
2—5 years 0 0.0
5-10 years 1 11.1
Over 10 years 5 55.6
Note: n - 10
If we look at the administrative staff's personal information, 50% of respondents are 
over 41 years of age, while those aged 26-30 and 31-35 are evenly proportioned at 20% 
for each category. Like the players, the group of staff is also mature. A large proportion 
of the sample, 70%, are married and 30% are single; 70% of respondents are male and 
30% are female; 100% are university graduates. 55.6% respondents have been 
working in their current orchestras for over 10 years, followed by 6 months to 2 years 
(22.2%) and 5-10 years (11.1%). Thus, respondents in both the players’ and staff’s 
Tables share a similarity in matters of age, marital status, education, and tenure, and 
the only statistic out of line concerns gender balance.
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Table 5.4 Personal information of players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO
BPO (n = 44) CPO (n = 39) KSO (n = 40)
Category Frequency Valid
percentage
Frequency Valid
percentage
Frequency Valid
percentage
Age 21-25
26-30
2
4
4.5
9.1 7 17.9
1
2
2.5
5.0
31-35 5 11.4 12 30.8 6 15.0
36-40 7 15.9 11 28.2 3 7.5
Over 40 26 59.1 9 23.1 28 70.0
Marital Married 33 75.0 19 48.7 33 82.5
Status Single 11 25.0 20 51.3 7 17.5
Gender Male 24 54.5 13 33.3 27 67.5
Female 20 45.5 26 66.7 13 32.5
Education
High school
graduated
College 1 2.3
- - 1
1
2.5
2.5
University 43 97.7 39 100.0 38 95.0
Tenure Less than 6 
months
- - - - 1 2.5
6 months to 
2 years 
2 -5  years 
5—10 years
5
3
8
11.4
6.8
18.2
13
7
33.3
17.9
1
1
13
2.5
2.5
32.5
Over 10 
years
28 63.6 19 48.7 24 60.0
As shown in Table 5.4, there is a composition of 44 BPO players, 39 CPO  players, and 
40 KSO players among the 123 respondents. There are similar tendencies in the BPO 
and KSO regarding age band, marital status, gender, and tenure, compared to the 
CPO: First, the BPO and KSO have more older players: 59.1% of the BPO and 70.0% 
of the KSO belong to the age group over 41, whereas only 23.1% of the CPO  are in 
this age group and the rates of other age bands are evenly spread. In other words, 
players of the CPO are relatively younger than those in the BPO and KSO. Second, 
married players are dominant in the BPO (75%) and KSO (82.5%), compared to the 
CPO  (48.7%). Next, there are more male players than female players in the BPO (male, 
54.5%) and KSO (male, 67.5%), contrary to the case of the CPO (male, 33.3%; female, 
66.7%). Finally, the rates of players working over 10 years are 63.6% (BPO) and 60% 
(KSO), followed by 5-10 years at 18.2% (BPO) and 32.5% (KSO), while 48.7% (CPO) 
have worked for over 10 years and 33.3% (CPO) have worked 2-5 years. This might 
be the consequence of the severe open audition of the CPO  in the year 2004, under a 
conductor, Yoon-Seong Chang, who aimed to improve the quality of performance.
141
Table 5.5 Personal information of staff of the BPO, CPO, and KSO
Category
BPO ( n' = 2) CPO (n = 4) KSO (n = 4)
Frequency Valid
percentage
Frequency Valid
percentage
Frequency Valid
percentage
Age 21-25 - - - - - -
26-30 1 50.0 - - 1 25.0
31-35 1 50.0 - - 1 25.0
36-40 - - 1 25.0 - -
Over 40 - - 3 75.0 2 50.0
Marital Married 1 50.0 4 100.0 2 50.0
status Single 1 50.0 - - 2 50.0
Gender Male - - 4 100.0 3 75.0
Female 2 100.0 - - 1 25.0
High
Education school - - - - -
graduated
College - - - - -
University 2 100.0 4 100.0 4 100.0
Tenure Less than 6 1 50.0
months
6 months . 2 66.7
to 2 years
2-5 years - - - - -
5-10 years - - 1 25.0 - -
Over 10 1 50.0 3 75.0 1 33.3years
The personal information of all staff of the three orchestras Is presented in Table 5.5. 
Administrative staff of the orchestral executive constitution of the BPO amount to 9, but 
only 2 of them (approximately 22%) returned questionnaires, thus the information 
regarding the BPO in Table 5.5 is less significant. 4 out of 6 staff (approximately 70%) 
in the CPO120 and KSO returned questionnaires. 75% of the respondents in the CPO  
have been in the orchestral executive constitution for more than 10 years and 25% 
have been in the orchestra for 5-10 years, whereas 66.7% in KSO have been in the 
orchestral executive constitution for 6 months to 2 years, followed by 33.3% for more 
than 10 years. It indicates that the orchestral executive constitution has no regular 
rotation and few opportunities for promotion except in the case of the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra. In addition, although most staff contracts are approximately for 2 -3  years, 
the average working period is much longer than the basic period of contract.121 Thus, 
the renewal of staff contracts may be relatively easy, unless the person involved makes 
huge mistakes.
120 Officially, there are 6 administrative staff in the orchestral executive constitution in CPO, but 
the staff responsible for scores did not return the questionnaire and the person responsible for 
instrument care and transportation is also a player, thus was not counted In this sample.
121 This situation can be found in most Korean municipal orchestras. However the staff of the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra are the staff of the KBS, thus there is no regular contract after being 
employed.
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Section  II Jo b  sa tis faction
Table 5.6 Players’ job satisfaction on JDI scales
______________________________________________________________________ ( M ± S D )
JDI scales M±SD Minimum Maximum Max. possible value
Work 41.5618.60 17 54 54
Pay 4.5814.36 0 21 21
Supervision 30.12112.27 6 54 54
Promotion 7.2215.13 0 21 27
Co-workers 31.74112.31 0 54 54
Table 5.6 lists means (M), standard deviations (SD), minimum and maximum scores, 
and maximum possible values on five facets of job satisfaction classified by group of 
players, in order to discover player’s job satisfaction on each of the five facets.
Group of players’ satisfaction score for work is 41.56, for pay 4.58, for supervision 
30.12, for promotion 7.22, and satisfaction with co-workers is 31.74. According to the 
absolute JDI scores, it can be interpreted that players are satisfied with work; and 
neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with supervision and co-workers, while the scores for 
promotion and pay are obviously below their neutral points, and players are dissatisfied 
by those two facets. As they said, they are happy with what they are doing and prone 
to less conflict between players. However, Table 5.6 does not show the comparative 
satisfaction between these five JDI scales. To compare players’ satisfaction among 
these, the average value for each scale is presented in the Table 5.10.
Pay can be the fundamental reason for working, when it is needed to maintain the 
everyday living costs of one’s family or oneself. Lawler (1973) defines job satisfaction 
on pay as the middle point between one’s present pay and demanded pay, and job 
dissatisfaction will occur if current pay is lower than expectation. A  player’s present 
salary might be less than their standard of pay. Maslow (1970) considers food, water, 
air, and shelter to be important factors in a needs hierarchy: and Szilagyi and Wallace 
(1980, p. 107) state that such needs are presented by concern for salary in the 
workplace. Thus, people work for money (salary) and are primarily concerned about 
physiological needs, as a result it is impossible to be satisfied if there is not sufficient 
money for physiological needs. However, Herzberg et at. (1993) and Szilagyi and 
Wallace (1980) disagreed about the importance of salary: they thought of salary as a 
‘hygiene factor’ which removes dissatisfaction but does not necessarily lead to an 
individual’s satisfaction.122
122 Herzberg’s two-factor theory will be described in Table 5.24.
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Table 5.7 Administrative staff job satisfaction on JDI scales
________________________________ ________________________(M±SD)
JDI scales M±SD Minimum Maximum Max. possible value
Work 39.39±9.83 19 • '53.78 54
Pay 6.60±6.52 1 21 21
Supervision 42.30±7.42 24 49 54
Promotion 4.40±3.53 0 11 27
Co-workers 38.60±10.36 17 51 54
Table 5.7 lists means (M), standard deviations (SD), minimum and maximum scores, 
and maximum possible values on five facets of job satisfaction classified by group of 
administrative staff, in order to discover staff job satisfaction on each of the five facets. 
The mean scores of staff satisfaction with work, supervision, and co-workers are all 
well above 32, showing that staff are quite satisfied with these three facets, compared 
to players, who are only clearly satisfied with work. The mean score for pay indicates 
staff are dissatisfied with their current pay (as the mean score was well below the 
middle scale value of 10.5). Staff are also clearly dissatisfied with promotion (because 
a mean score of 4.40 is 9.1 points below the middle-scale score of 13.5).
It can be concluded from Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 that both players and administrative 
staff are satisfied with what they are doing and dissatisfied with current pay.
Table 5.8 The players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO’ job satisfaction on JDI scales
(M±SD)
JDI scales BPO CPO KSO F-value
Work 42.50±8.92 39.2318.61 42.7717.97 2.20
Pay 4.51±3.93 4.0513.90 5.1515.18 0.66
Supervision 32.09±11.93 28.96112.25 29.06112.66 0.93
Promotion 10.17±5.13a 5.78l5.38b 5.35l3.09b 14.53***
Co-workers 31.30111.36 29.12111.21 34.70l13.87 2.19
Note: *** indicates p < 0.001; according to the results of Tukey's HSD test, different groups in 
homogeneous subsets are displayed as a and b.
Table 5.8 shows different levels of job satisfaction on five facets among the players in 
each orchestra; each group of players, however, is very satisfied with work (well above 
the middle score of 27). The players of the BPO are satisfied with supervision, but 
dissatisfied with pay and promotion, and neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with co­
workers; the players of the CPO  are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with supervision 
and co-workers, but clearly dissatisfied with pay and promotion; finally the KSO's 
players are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with supervision, satisfied with co-workers, 
and dissatisfied with pay and promotion.
When it comes to promotion (within the JDI’s five categories), a statistically significant
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difference is found among the different groups of players (F(2,125) = 14.53, p < 0.001): 
according to the result of Tukey’s HSD test, the players of the BPO are more satisfied 
with promotion, compared to those of the CPO  and KSO. According to former, 
administrative staff that I interviewed, there is a real chance of being promoted as a 
consequence of the regular audition in the case of the BPO, but not in the case of the 
CPO and KSO.
The positions of players in the CPO are mainly decided when they are newly employed, 
and they rarely have an opportunity to be promoted. However, their positions can be 
downgraded according to the results of the regular audition; thus, the CPO  is 
considering implementing a more flexible promotion system. In the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra, there is no regular audition and no promotion after employment.123 
Therefore, the players of the BPO are more satisfied with promotion, compared to 
those of the BPO and KSO.
Promotion, which Mondy et al. (1990) define as ‘advancement to a more responsible' 
job in the organisation’, (p. 288) is an important factor in job satisfaction. According to 
Gilmer and Van (1971), lack of opportunity for promotion is an important reason why 
employees dislike their work. In addition, quickly promoted employees have higher 
concentration on their work than slowly promoted employees (Bray et al., 1974). 
Players’ personnel promotion in symphony orchestras is different to promotion in other 
fields: advancement to a limited position within an orchestra, such as first or second 
principal player, requires superior performing ability rather than length of job tenure. 
Morris Stemp, who used to play as a rank and file second violinist in the Hallé, states 
his dislike of ’the lack of prospects for promotion’ and describes his job as ‘Boredom. 
The heavy workload. The hours. No promotion, office politics, feeling trapped’ in an 
interview with Anna Price (2006). Thus, the players of the BPO may well work harder 
than the players of the CPO  and KSO.
123 The players’ positions are mainly decided when they first join the orchestra.
145
Table 5.9 The administrative staff of the BPO, CPO, and KSO ’s job satisfaction on JDI
scales
(M iSD)
JDI scales M±SD124 X2
Work 39.39±9.83 0.67
Pay 6.60±6.52 2.97
Supervision 42.30±7.42 0.33
Promotion 4.40±3.53 1.43
Co-workers 38.60i10.36 2.08
Table 5.9 lists means (M), and standard deviations (SD) of five facets of job satisfaction 
classified by each group of staff, and the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test on five job 
facets are listed. Based on the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test, there is no statistically 
significant difference in each of the five job facets among the three groups of staff. 
Thus, the three different groups of staff share similar tendencies in job satisfaction 
regarding work, pay, supervision, promotion, and co-workers.
Table 5.10 P layers’ relative job satisfaction among the JDI sca les
_______ ________________________________________________________ (MiSD)
JDI scales M iSD Minimum Maximum Max. possible value
Work 2.31i0.48a 0.94 3.00 3.00
Pay 0.65i0.62c 0.00 3.00 3.00
Supervision 1.67i0.68b 0.33 3.00 3.00
Promotion 0.80i0.57c 0.00 2.33 3.00
Co-workers 1.76i0.68b 0.00 3.00 3.00
F-Value 236.77***
Note: *** indicates p < 0.001; according to LSD multiple comparison, different groups in
homogeneous subsets are displayed as ■
Table 5.10 shows means (M), standard deviations (SD), minimum and maximum 
scores, maximum possible value of group of players’ job satisfaction, and the results of 
repeated measures ANOVA (F) and of LSD multiple comparison,, in order to discover 
player’s relative job satisfaction among five facets.
As shown in Table 5.10, there is a statistic significant difference among five facets (F (4, 
508) = 236.77, p < 0.001). Based on LSD multiple comparison, players are most 
satisfied with their work (M = 2.31, SD = 0.48), followed by satisfaction with co-workers 
(M = 1.84, SD = 0.68) and supervision (M = 1.67, SD = 0.68); and promotion (M = 0.80, 
SD = 0.57) and pay (M = 0.65, SD = 0.62). Thus, players are most satisfied with work, 
whereas least satisfied with pay and promotion.
124 Due to small size of sample, each group of staff's mean score and standard deviation are not 
calculated.
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Table 5.11 Administrative staff relative job satisfaction among the JDI scales
______________________________________________________________(M±SD)
JDI scales M±SD Minimum Maximum Max. possible value
Work 2.19±0.55 1.06 2.99 3.00
Pay 0.94±0.93 0.14 3.00 3.00
Supervision 2.35±0.41 1.33 2.72 3.00
Promotion 0.49±0.39 0.00 1.22 3.00
Co-workers 2.14±0.58 0.94 2.83 3.00
X2 27.28” *
Note: *** indicates p < 0.001.
Table 5.11 shows means (M), standard deviations (SD), minimum and maximum 
scores, maximum possible value of group of staff’s job satisfaction, and the results of 
the Friedman’s test, in order to discover staff’s relative job satisfaction among five 
facets.
According to the result of the Friedman’s test, there is a statistic significant difference 
(X2 (df = 4) = 27.28, p = 0.000): although the Friedman’s test does not show where 
those differences occurred, it has a tendency that administrative staff are satisfied with 
supervision (M = 2.35, SD = 0.41), work (M = 2.19, SD = 0.55) and co-workers (M = 
2.14, SD = 0.58), but relatively less satisfied with pay (M = 0.94, SD = 0.93) and 
promotion (M = 0.49, SD = 0.39).
Table 5.12 The players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO ’s relative job satisfaction among the
JDI scales
(M±SD)
JDI scales BPO CPO KSO
Work 2.36±0.50a 2.18±0.48a 2.38±0.44a
Pay Q.64±0.56d 0.58±0.56c 0.74±0.74b
Supervision 1.78±0.66b 1.61±0.68b 1.61±0.70b
Promotion 1.13±0.57c 0.64±0.60c 0.59±0.34c
Co-workers 1.74±0.63b 1.62±0.62b 1.93±0.77b
F-value 84.35*” 90.04*** 81.80***
Note: *** indicates p < 0.001; according to the results of LSD multiple comparison, different 
groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed a s b'c,ord.
Table 5.12 shows means (M), standard deviations (SD) of each group of players, and 
the results of repeated measures ANOVA and LSD multiple comparison among five 
facets, in order to discover each group of players’ relative job satisfaction among those 
facets.
According to the result of the ANOVA, each group of players has a significant 
difference in five subscales of job satisfaction (BPO: F  (4,180) = 84.35, p = 0.000; CPO: 
F  (4,156)= 90.04, p = 0.000; KSO: F  (4,164) = 81.80 p = 0.000): although there are 
differences in the middle ranks of the five facets on job satisfaction, LSD multiple
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comparison shows that each group of players in the three orchestras is most satisfied 
with work.
Table 5.13 Analysis of demographic effects on the JDI category scores of all players
(MtSD)
Demographic
Variables
Work Pay Supervision Promotion Co-workers
Age 21-30 42.80±8.16 7.38±6.40a 35.82±14.06 9.0015.75 34.13112.79
31-35 42.46±6.51 4.83±5.04b 35.13±9.91 8.4414.84 34.09110.85
36-40 41.14±8.22 5.49±3.25b 29.28±9.99 5.6114.56 28.07110.08
Over 40 41.14±9.85 3.41±3.55c 27.47±12.80 6.9615.29 31.75113.62
F-value 0.25 4.22** 3.56* 1.80 1.07
Marital Married 42.59±8.55 4.29±4.25 30.54±11.65 7.6315.07 32.76112.21
Status Single 39.41±8.94 5.11±4.83 29.77±14.16 6.4715.48 29.88113.09
t-value 1.88 -0..94 0.32 1.14 1.18
Gender Male 41.16±9.96 3.78±4.10 29.18l13.55 7.0615.31 31.16114.03
Female 42.09±7.29 5.37±4.66 31.52111.05 7.5015.13 32.64110.67
t-value -0.59125 -2.02* -1.05126 -0.46 -0.66127
Tenure
Less than 5 
years
5—10 years
43.27±7.19
39.05±9.36
7.13±6.32a
3.69±3.24b
34.94113.56
31.56112.93
8.5015.70
6.5614.74
34.33l11.55
29.36112.88
Over
10years
42.05±8.89 4.01±3.77b 28.23111.48 7.1315.21 32.03112.65
F-value 1.74 5.48** 2.89 0.95 1.04
Note: * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01; according to the results of Tukey’s HSD test, 
different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as a,b,orc.
Table 5.13 shows means (M), standard deviations (SD), and F-value and f-value of the 
group of players’ five subscales of job satisfaction and demographic variables, in order 
to find the relationship between the subscales and demographic variables. According to 
one-way analysis of variance (F), there are statistically significant differences found in 
the demographic variables of age with pay (F(3,119) = 4.22, p < 0.01) and supervision 
(F(3,119) = 3.56, p < 0.05); the results of Tukey’s HSD test indicate that players in the 
age group 21-30 are more satisfied with pay than the others. Older players have more 
family responsibilities, and may be less satisfied with pay. Pay as a factor of job 
satisfaction does not apply to Herzberg’s U-shaped relationship, nor to Hulin and 
Smith’s (1965) and Gibson and Klein’s (1970) positive relationship, but does apply to 
Muchinsky’s (1978) negative relationship between job satisfaction and age among a 
group of players in a Korean symphony orchestra. Regarding supervision, Tukey’s 
HSD test did not differ significantly between different age groups.
125 Levene's test indicates unequal variances.
126 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
127 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
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There is a statistically significant difference between gender and pay (f = -2.02, p <
0.05): according to t-test, female players are more satisfied with their pay than male 
players. This applies to Varca et a/. (1983)’s study regarding the relationship between 
gender and pay in the lower levels of occupation.
Another significant difference is found when linking tenure and pay (F(2,120) = 5.48, p 
< 0.01): according to Tukey’s HSD test, more satisfaction is found among players with 
less than 5 years on the job, than for those with 5-10 years and with over 10 years on 
the job. Although Herzberg et at. (1993) and Blum and Naylor (1968) believed in a 
positive relationship between age and tenure— that job satisfaction increased by length 
of work— it does not happen in the case of the players’ group in the three Korean 
municipal orchestras (BPO, CPO, and KSO). Although much research studies the 
relationship between job satisfaction and demographic characteristics (see pp. 1 S I -  
34)— age, marital status, gender, education, and tenure— no significant relationship 
was found between job satisfaction and marital status in the present study.
Thus, the results of the Table 5.13 show that age, gender, and tenure are significantly 
related to pay in the case of the players of Korean municipal orchestras.
Demographic effects on the five facets of job satisfaction among the players in three 
different orchestras were analysed, and significant differences were found in the case 
of the BPO (Table 5.14), the CPO  (Table 5.26), and the KSO (Table 5.27).128
128 Tables 5.26 and 5.27 are displayed at the end of this chapter.
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Table 5.14 Analysis of demographic effects on the JDI category scores of the BPO’s
players
(M±SD)
uemograpmc
Variables
Work Pay Supervision • Promotion Co-workers
Age 21-30 45.14±8.89 7.50±6.22 44.78±10.56a 10.1713.82 40.3317.74
31-35 48.43+3.26 6.0014.95 42.60±9.40b 14.00i3.74 39.80-17.46
36-40 44.43±7.39 5.86±2.67 31.07±6.58ab 8.6814.28 26.91i8.83
over 40 40.51±9.84 3.19±3.09 28.15±10.97c 10.1115.76 29.15112.02
F-value 1.45 2.86* 6.13** 1.10 3.20*
Marital Married 43.4318.61 4.00±3.61 30.90110.62 10.9315.12 30.63111.53
status Single 40.36±10.40 6.0914.93 37.42114.61 8.5215.19 34.22l11.60
t-value 0.97 -1.52 -1.37129 1.35 -0.89
Gender Male 40.38±10.15 3.33±3.14 29.34112.90 9.7015.64 29.17112.84
Female 45.40±6.83 5.95±4.55 36.3519.55 11.0914.62 34.36i9.23
t-value -1.95130 -2.25* -2.01 -0.88 -1.51
Less than 
5 years
45.00±7.58 7.00±5.76 38.63112.35 9.3814.60 39.88l8.29
Tenure
5-10
years
42.50±10.68 4.00±4.00 36.21115.09 11.4215.03 30.63110.27
over 10 
vears
42.04±9.18 3.96±3.28 29.73110.20 10.2915.49 29.40111.85
F-value 0.32 1.94 2.34 0.30 2.83
Note: * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01; according to the results of Tukey's HSD test 
different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed a s a,abib,oro.
Table 5.14 shows means (M), standard deviations (SD), and F-value and f-value of the 
players of the BPO, in order to find the relationship between the subscales of job 
satisfaction and demographic variables.
The results of one-way analysis of variance (F) linking age with supervision (F(3,40) = 
6.13, p < 0.01) and co-workers (F(3,40) = 3.20, p < 0.05) reveal significant differences: 
according to Tukey’s HSD test, the age group 21-30 is more satisfied with supervision 
than the age group of those 31-35 and over 41. Scanlan (1976) explains that an 
essential factor in job satisfaction is supervision: Vroom (1964), Badin (1974), and 
Szilagyi (1977) point out the positive relationship between supervision and job 
satisfaction. Moreover, Fleishman and Harris’s (1962) study showed that satisfaction 
with supervision could reduce turnover rates and complaints. Thus, according to these 
scholars, the players of the BPO who are 21-30 years of age may have fewer turnover 
wishes and complaints about the job than the other age groups.
Based on an independent f-test, the next significant differences are found linking 
gender with pay (t = -2.25, p < 0.05): the female players of the BPO (M = 5.95, SD =
129 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
130 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
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4.55) are more satisfied with pay and supervision than the male players (M = 3.33, SD 
= 3.14). The female players of the BPO may have less financial responsibility than 
male players for living costs.131
The results of Table 5.14 show the statistically significant differences between age and 
supervision and between gender and pay.
The only significant difference among the players of the CPO (F(3,35) = 3.38, p < 0.05, 
see Table 5.26) is found when coupling age with work satisfaction: Tukey’s HSD test 
shows that those 21-30 years of age are more satisfied with their present work than 
the over 41 age group. On the other hand, there are two significant relationships found 
in the demographic variables of tenure with pay (F(2,37) = 10.91, p < 0.001) and 
promotion (F(2,37) = 4.15, p < 0.05): the age group of 5-10 years and over 10 years 
are less satisfied with pay and promotion than those of less than 5 years, in the case of 
the players of the KSO (see Table 5.27).
Section HI The relative importance of the five JDI components
To measure the relative importance of the five JDI components, a 5-point scale was
used: 1 for most important, 2 for important, 3 for average, 4 for less important, and 5 for 
least important.
Table 5.15 Players’ relative influential rankings regarding job satisfaction
Ranking Work 
N (%)
Supervision 
N (%)
Pay 
N (%)
Promotion 
N (%)
Co-workers 
N (%)
1. Most important 69 (57.5) 5(4.2) 39 (32.5) 1 (0.8) 6 (5.0)
2. Important 22(18.3) 12(10.0) 60 (50.0) 6 (5.0) 20(16.7)
3. Average 15(12.5) 21 (17.5) 11 (9.2) 13(10.8) 60 (50.0)
4. Less important 10(8.3) 47 (39.2) 9(7.5) 33 (27.5) 21 (17.5)
5. Least important 4(3.3) 35 (29.2) 1 (0.8) 67 (55.8) 13(10.8)
Table 5.15 shows that 57.5% of the players consider that work is the most important 
facet (influencing job satisfaction) and 18.3% consider work as a second important 
facet among the JDI’s five categories. 82.5% of the players indicate that pay is a more 
than average category contributing to job satisfaction. Although Scanlan (1976) said 
supervision is an essential factor in job satisfaction, supervision seems far from 
essential to job satisfaction in the case of Korean orchestral players: 68.4% of players 
chose supervision as a less than average category that contributed to job satisfaction 
(this contradicts Scanlan’s (1976) assumptions). This leads to the conclusion that 
promotion, supervision, and co-workers are not important influences on job satisfaction.
131A male player said in interview that working in a symphony orchestra was like a hobby for 
women, and a way of escaping from family life.
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50% of respondents rank co-workers as the third important facet; the fourth important 
category is supervision (about 39%) and the least important aspect is promotion. A  
similar tendency is found among players in the BPO, CPO, and KSO. This is shown in 
Table 5.16.
Table 5.16 The players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO’s relative in flu en tia l rankings
BPO
Ranking Work 
N (%)
Supervision 
N (%)
Pay 
N (%)
Promotion 
N (%)
Co-workers 
N (%)
1. Most important
2. Important
3. Average
4. Less important
5. Least important
21 (51.2) 
8(19.5) 
6(14.6) 
5(12.2)
1 (24)
2 (4.9)
1 (2.4) 
10(24.4) 
10(24.4) 
18(43.9)
15(36.6)
21 (51.2)
1 (2.4) 
3(7.3)
1 (2-4)___
0
3 (7.3)
4 (9.8) 
16(39.0) 
18(43.9)
3(7.3) 
8(19.5) 
20 (48.8) 
7(17.1) 
3(7.3)
CPO '— 1—
Ranking Work 
N (%)
Supervision 
N (%)
Pay 
N (%)
Promotion 
N (%)
Co-workers 
N (%)
1. Most important
2. Important
3. Average
4. Less important
5. Least important
21 (55.3) 
8(21.1) 
5(13.2) 
2 (5.3)
2 (S-3)
2 (5.3) 
8(21.1)
3 (7.9) 
16(42.1) 
9 (23.7)
13(34.2) 
16(42.1) 
6(15.8) 
3 (7.9)
0
1 (2.6)
1 (2.6) 
5(13.2) 
10(26.3) 
21 (55.3)
1 (2.6) 
5(13.2) 
19(50.0) 
7(18.4) 
6(15.8)
KSO --------------------------- -------‘-----
Ranking Work 
N (%)
Supervision 
N (%)
Pay 
N (%)
Promotion 
N (%)
Co-workers 
N (%)
1. Most important
2. Important
3. Average
4. Less important
5. Least important
27(65.9)
6(14.6)
4(9.8)
3(7.3)
1 (2-0
1 (2.4) 
3(7.3) 
8(19.5) 
21 (51.2) 
8(19.5)
11 (26.8) 
23 (56.1) 
4 (9.8)
3 (7.3)
0
0
2 (4.9) 
4(9.8) 
7(17.1)
28 (68.3)
2(4.9) 
7(17.1) 
21 (51.2) 
7(17.1) 
4(9.8)
Table 5.16 shows that the most important job aspect among the five categories of the 
JDI is work, followed by pay and co-workers in the BPO, CPO  and KSO. The fourth 
and fifth important job aspects are supervision and promotion in the CPO  and KSO, 
whereas promotion is ranked fourth and promotion and supervision are ranked equally 
as the least important facet132 in the case of the BPO. Thus, the relative importance of 
each of the given JDI components is similar among the groups of players in the three 
orchestras.
Table 5.17 Administrative staff
Ranking Work 
N (%)
1. Most important 8(80)
2. Important 1(10)
3. Average 1 (10)
4. Less important 0
5. Least important 0
relative in flu en tia l rankings regarding job satisfaction
Supervision 
N (%)
Pay 
N (%)
Promotion 
N (%)
Co-workers 
N (%)
0
0
1 ( 10) 
5(50) 
4(40)
1 ( 10) 
5(50) 
3(30) 
1 ( 10) 
0
1 (10) 
1 (10) 
3(30) 
0
5(50)
0
3(30)
2 (20)
4(40)
K10)
132 This result reverses Scanlan's (1976) study on the importance 
job satisfaction. of supervision in producing
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Table 5.17 shows that job importance in the group of administrative staff is slightly 
different to those of players: the most important job aspect is work (80%), the second is 
pay (50%), the third is both pay and promotion, the fourth is supervision, and the least 
important is promotion. Co-workers are excluded as the respondents in this sample 
spread them fairly evenly across the range of possible responses. Like the players, 90% 
of respondents consider that work is a more than average category that contributes to 
job satisfaction, while 90% of respondents rank supervision as less, and least important 
to them.133 Thus, it could be concluded that both groups of players and administrative 
staff consider work and pay significant aspects contributing to job satisfaction, while 
promotion is the least important aspect among the five categories of the JDI.
Section IV The correlations and multiple regression analyses
This section presents correlations between job satisfaction and turnover, along with
inter-correlations of the JDI with multiple regression analyses where applicable. The 
total sample numbers of each subscale in the following correlation table are varied due 
to missing values.
Table 5.18 Summary of correlations among JDI and turnover
Variables
JDI
Turnover
Work Pay Supervision Promotion Co-workers
Work 1.000 0.206* 0.480*** 0.273** 0.420*** -0.391***
Pav -0.288 1.000 0303*** 0.154 0.167 -0.134
Suoervision 0.817** 0.170 1.000 0.361*** 0.472*** -0.308**
Promotion 0.020 0.654* 0.270 1.000 0.206* -0.113
Co-workers 0.378 0.367 0.467 0.226 1.000 -0.416***
Turnover 0.066 -0.635* -0.204 -0.378 -0.570 1.000
Note: Players’ correlations c 
0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01, *
enote as Italic, Staff’s corre 
** indicates p < 0.001.
ations denote as normal; * indicates p <
Players’ correlation between JDI and job turnover
The results of Pearson’s correlation between players’ job turnover and the five 
subscales of job satisfaction show that there are significant negative correlations 
between turnover and work (r = -0.391, p < 0.001), supervision (r = -0.308, p < 0.01), 
and co-workers (r = -0.416, p < 0.001), respectively (see Table 5.18).
Satisfaction with supervision is significantly inter-related to satisfaction with work (r =
0.480, p < 0.001) and pay (r = 0.303, p < 0.001): players who are satisfied with 
supervision are likely to be satisfied with work and pay; satisfaction with promotion is 
inter-correlated to satisfaction with work (r = 0.273, p < 0.01) and supervision (r = 0.361,
133 Once more, the result of Table 5.17 shows that supervision seems far from essential to job 
satisfaction, in this case of the satisfaction of administrative staff.
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p < 0.001), whereas satisfaction with promotion is unrelated to satisfaction with pay (r =
0.154, p > 0.05); satisfaction with co-workers is significantly related to satisfaction with 
work (r‘= 0.420, p < 0.001), supervision (r = 0.472, p < 0.001), and promotion (r = 0.206, 
p < 0.05). Finally, work and pay (r = 0.206, p < 0.05) are significantly associated. Thus, 
inter-correlations for job satisfaction have significant positive relationships.
The result of multiple regression analysis using the enter method shows that the overall 
relationship between players’ turnover (dependent variable) and the five subscales of 
job satisfaction (predictors) is significant (R2= 0.203, F(5,116) = 7.147, p < 0.001): work 
(|3 = -0.249, p = 0.010) and co-workers (3 = -0.290, p = 0.003) are negatively significant 
predictors of players’ job turnover: if players are satisfied with work and co-workers, 
they are unlikely to think of job turnover; however, pay, supervision, and promotion do 
not have statistical significance (see Table 5.25).
Staff correlation between JDI and job turnover
The results of correlation between staff job turnover and the five subscales of job 
satisfaction show that there is only one strong negative correlation, that between 
turnover and satisfaction with pay (r = -0.635, p < 0.05) (see Table 5.18): if staff are 
unsatisfied with pay, they are likely to think of job turnover.
Regarding the inter-correlation of job satisfaction, satisfaction with supervision and 
satisfaction with work (r = 0.817, p < 0.01); and satisfaction with promotion and 
satisfaction with pay (r = 0.654, p < 0.05) have strong positive inter-correlation, 
respectively, whereas satisfaction with supervision is unrelated to satisfaction with pay 
(r = 0.170, p > 0.05), promotion (r = 0.270, p > 0.05), and co-workers (r = 0.467, p > 
0.05) (see Table 5.18).
Summary of survey findings
So far, the results of survey on job satisfaction and its relationship with demographic 
characteristics and turnover were investigated, and this section summarises the 
findings.
Each facet level of job satisfaction
players were satisfied with work, dissatisfied with pay and promotion, and neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied with co-workers and supervision, while staff were satisfied with 
work, supervision, and co-workers, and dissatisfied with pay and promotion (see Table 
5.6 and Table 5.7).
Regarding each group of players’ job satisfaction on five facets, promotion has the only
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statistically significant difference: the players of the BPO are more satisfied with 
promotion, compared to those of the CPO  and KSO, because the BPO's audition offers 
a real chance to be promoted (see Table 5.8).
According to the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test, there was no significant difference in 
the each five subscales of job satisfaction among each group of administrative staff, 
and each group of staff showed similar tendencies (see Table 5.9).
D if fe r e n c e  in  j o b  s a t is f a c t io n  a m o n g  th e  f iv e  s c a le s
The following table 5.19 (rearranged from Table 5.10) indicates the different job 
satisfaction of players related to five facets: players are most satisfied with work and 
least satisfied with pay.
Ranking of job satisfaction Players
1 Work
2 Co-workers
3 Supervision
4 Promotion
5 Pay
According to Table 5.20 (rearranged from Table 5.12), players of the BPO, CPO, and 
KSO are most satisfied with work and those of the BPO and CPO  are least satisfied 
with promotion and pay: the salary of players in the KSO is higher than the BPO and 
CPO; but players of the KSO are the least satisfied with promotion, because they have 
very little chance of being promoted once employed.
Table 5.20 Relative ranking of a ctu a l job satisfaction among players of the BPO CPO
and KSO
Ranking of 
job satisfaction
BPO CPO KSO
1 Work Work Work
2 Co-workers Co-workers Co-workers
Supervision
Pay
3 Supervision Supervision
4 Promotion Promotion
5 Pay Pay Promotion
T h e  r e la t io n s h ip  b e t w e e n  j o b  s a t is f a c t io n  a n d  d e m o g r a p h ic  c h a r a c t e r is t ic s
An overall relation between players’ job satisfaction and demographic characteristics is 
not generally associated: among 20 relations, four have statistically significant 
differences: satisfaction with pay and age, with supervision and age, with pay and 
tenure, and with pay and gender. However, there is no significant difference between 
marital status and the five subscales of the Job satisfaction. Generally speaking, the
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younger age group is more satisfied with pay and supervision; those with short tenure 
are more satisfied with pay than those with long tenure (see Table 5.13); in addition, 
female players are more satisfied with pay than male players. Players classified by all 
demographic variables are satisfied with work based on the JDI absolute score, but the 
other four facets show more variety.
As for the players of the BPO, there was a significant difference between age and 
supervision: the results of Tukey’s HSD test showed that satisfaction with supervision 
was higher in age group 21-30, and lower in the age groups 31-35 and over 41. 
According to the result of independent f-test, female players of the BPO are more 
satisfied with pay than are male players (see Table 5.14).
P la y e r s  a n d  s t a f f ’s  t h o u g h t s  o n  th e  re la t iv e  im p o r t a n c e  o f  d if fe r e n t  fa c e t s  o f  j o b  
s a t is f a c t io n
Table 5.21 Relative important facets influencing job satisfaction of players and staff
Ranking Players Staff
1 Work (57.5%) Work (80%)
2 Pay (50%) Pay (50%)
3 Co-workers (50%) Pay (30%)/ Promotion (30%)
4 Supervision (39.2%) Supervision (50%)
5 Promotion (55.8%) Promotion (50%)
Note: 1 = most satisfaction, 5 = least satisfaction.
According to Table 5.21, players choose work as the most important facet influencing 
job satisfaction, followed by pay, co-workers, supervision, and promotion.
In comparison to players, staff are keener on promotion. Although there is rarely 
chance to be promoted within the orchestral executive constitution, they may desire the 
opportunity to work in an organisation with higher authority (such as an arts centre) that 
systematically controls orchestras. Staff did not rank co-workers as an important facet 
in job satisfaction, so that 50% of staff considered that co-workers were a less-than- 
average category contributing to job satisfaction (see Table 5.17).
Thus, it can be concluded from Table 5.21 that players and staff consider work to be 
the most important facet influencing job satisfaction, and promotion the least important.
Table 5.19 and Table 5.21 show that there is a large gap between players’ actual job 
satisfaction and important facets influencing job satisfaction: players ranked pay as the 
second most important facet influencing job satisfaction, but their actual satisfaction 
with pay was ranked lower than work, co-workers, and supervision. Thus, players are 
obviously dissatisfied with their present pay, and pay could negatively influence players' 
job satisfaction. Meanwhile, promotion may be an important facet in job satisfaction.
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According to Gilmer and Van (1971), few opportunities for promotion are an important 
reason that employees dislike their work. In addition, rapidly promoted employees have 
higher concentration on their work than slowly promoted employees (Bray et al., 1974). 
However, this does not seem to affect the players of Korean municipal orchestras: 
although they are dissatisfied with promotion, it is apparently not a problem, because it 
is not an important facet influencing their job satisfaction.
Table 5.22 Relative important facets influencing job satisfaction among players of the
BPO, CPO, and KSO
Ranking BPO CPO KSO
1 Work (51.2%) Work (55.3%) Work (65.9%)
2 Pav (51.2%) Pav (42.1%) Pav (56.1%)
3 Co-workers (48.8%) Co-workers (50.0%) Co-workers (51.2%)
4 Promotion (39.0%) Supervision (42.1%) Supervision (51.2%)
5 Supervision (43.9%) 
Promotion (43.9%)
Promotion (55.3%) Promotion (68.3%)
Note: 1= most important, 5= least important
Table 5.22 shows that each group of players ranked similarly for job satisfaction, with 
the exception of promotion: the players of the BPO chose promotion as the fourth 
important facet influencing job satisfaction and supervision as the fifth, because they 
have a practical chance of being promoted, a result that leads to an increase of pay 
and better orchestral position.
With the exception of pay, there is no contradictory relation between actual satisfaction 
(see Table 5.20) and important facets influencing job satisfaction among players of the 
BPO, CPO, and KSO (see Table 5.22). All groups of players had a big difference 
between facets actual and influencing job satisfaction regarding pay, and each group of 
players also showed the same tendency: thus, pay is a predominantly negative facet in 
each group of players’ job satisfaction.
T h e  r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  j o b  s a t is f a c t io n  a n d  t u r n o v e r
Players’ job satisfaction is associated with turnover: turnover with work, with 
supervision, and with co-workers have negative correlations, respectively; regarding 
the inter-correlation of players’ five subscales of job satisfaction, 7 out of 10 inter­
correlations are significantly associated. The result of multiple regression analysis 
indicates that if players are less satisfied or dissatisfied with work and co-workers, they 
are more likely to think of turnover (see Table 5.25).
On the other hand, regarding the correlation between staff job satisfaction and turnover, 
pay is negatively associated with turnover: if players are dissatisfied with, or less 
satisfied with pay, they are likely to think of job turnover. Among 10 inter-correlations of
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staff’s five subscales of job satisfaction, two inter-correlations are significant.
The following section will discuss players’ and staff job satisfaction from the results of 
interview.
5.7 Results of qualitative research interviews
Players’ job satisfaction and dissatisfaction
From (mainly) one to one in-depth interviews, I was able to gather some factors of 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction from players and staff in the BPO, CPO, and KSO. I will 
explain the reasons for job satisfaction and dissatisfaction of players first, and then 
move on to those of staff.
Orchestral musicians are highly trained artists who have devoted years of practice and 
personal sacrifice towards a career in the orchestra (McManus, 2010: online). Several 
players that I interviewed said that becoming a member of an orchestra through an 
open audition was a dream job and a long-held ambition, and they were positive about 
their current job. Players’ desired jobs before becoming a member of an orchestra134 
were to be an orchestral player (47.5%), followed by a professor in university (37.7%) 
and a soloist (8.8%) (Lee, 2001: p. 51). Lee (2001) stated that approximately 63% of 
players responded that they are satisfied or very satisfied with their job, while 5.6% 
responded that he/she was somewhat dissatisfied with the current job because of low 
salary and over-interference of supervisors (p. 49).135 A  similar survey was conducted 
by Jung (2004)136 as a part of her Master’s thesis managerial development o f the public 
orchestras in Korea: an orchestral player (49%) is the most desired job 49%, followed 
by a processor in university (26%) and soloist (12%) (p. 61); in addition, 56% of 
respondents are somehow satisfied with their present job and 29% were very satisfied, 
whereas 7% were somehow dissatisfied with job (p. 63). The result of this study also 
reveals that players have the highest actual satisfaction with work, and 57.5% of 
respondents think that work is the most important facet influencing job satisfaction. 
Thus, it can be concluded that orchestral players are generally satisfied with what they 
are doing.
As we have seen in Tables 5.10, players are relatively satisfied with co-workers. The 
finding is supported by Lee’s (2001) thesis Analysis of Orchestra Musicians from the
134 Although Lee's samples of orchestras are two municipal orchestras and two private 
orchestras from the Seoul and Kyunggi areas, I only used Information from the two municipal 
orchestras for purpose of this study.
135 A  supervisor, here, is a Music Director or Conductor.
136 Jung surveyed 130 players of Bucheon municipal orchestra and Suwon municipal orchestra.
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viewpoint of Sociology of Occupation: 62.5% of respondents are satisfied with co­
workers, 31.9% choose average, and 5.6% are dissatisfied with co-workers. Further 
dissatisfaction with co-workers will be described in relation to conflict in Chapter 6.
Players barely mention promotion in interviews: it may be because they accept the 
limitations of promotion and can do nothing, so they do not think about it: according to 
the results of the survey, promotion is a low-satisfaction facet among players (see Table 
5.10) and 55.8% of players think promotion as the least important facet influencing job 
satisfaction (see Table 5.15).
As there are only one or two principals and vice-principals in each orchestral section, 
there is a limited opportunity for promotion, and limited promotion opportunities and job 
insecurity may be facets in players’ low satisfaction.137
Despite the players’ general satisfaction with their work and co-workers, they indicate a 
reason for dissatisfaction: a lack of control over work activities.138 Levine and Levine 
(1996) stated that orchestra musicians’ internal motivation is higher than any of the 
other groups, [but] their level of general job satisfaction is quite low, below that of 
federal prison guards...This dissatisfaction is due to the levels of stress they 
experience and [...] much of this stress is due to their lack of control over their working 
environment’ (p. 16). Most musicians are not involved in organising rehearsal, 
producing music, orchestral operations, and decision making (American Symphony 
Orchestra League, 1993: p. 70), although Cahn (1992) believes that players in 
symphony orchestras have a certain amount of control over the interpretation of music 
(p. 34). Nevertheless, a player’s role in an orchestra is very limited, and they hardly 
ever participate in decision making. Therefore, players feel they are controlled by the 
orchestral executive constitution off stage and by the conductor both on and off stage.
As players do not like control over their work (especially from the conductor), they are 
neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with supervision of senior players (see Table 5.6): yet it 
might be interpreted that senior players (e.g. principal players) are also their co­
workers, thus encouraging fellow feeling and the maintenance of a harmonious working 
environment. On the other hand, it is an unwritten rule that players have to obey the 
principal players’ musical instructions during rehearsals or concerts, thus players may
137 Players are generally against the regular audition, which closely related to promotion or 
salary, held by the city, and it causes a bad relationship with administrative staff and civil 
servants as well as the conductor.
138 It might be related to the over-interference of supervisors mentioned in Lee’s (2001) thesis.
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become used to following musical requirements from principal players. Because the 
senior player’s supervision mainly concerns music, there are not many things that lead 
to problematic relationships among them.139 However, satisfaction with a supervisor in 
the JDI’s five scales in this chapter was not fully explored as ‘supervisors’ meant 'senior 
players’ (e.g. first principal, second principal). The relationship between players and 
conductor will be further discussed in relation to conflict in Chapter 6.
Another major factor was that every player I interviewed complained about financial 
difficulties.
...Although families of musicians are (generally) rich, they are keen on salary...
[Civil Servant 1]
Although Civil Servant 1 believed that most players are affluent, the financial situation 
of each player can vary. The salary from an orchestra is the main income for the 
players’ living expenses, and it is natural that players are keen on it. As orchestral 
players seem dissatisfied with their salary, they seek extra income from private lessons 
and performing activities. Lee (2001: p. 33) notes the poor salary of orchestral players 
in her Master’s thesis: some players’ income from extra activities is considerably higher 
than that from the orchestra (she did not offer detailed information about how many 
players are in this situation). According to Jung’s survey (2004), 100% of players in two 
municipal orchestras fill their lack of salary from extra activities (excluding orchestral 
activities) (p. 73) and the reason for job dissatisfaction is mainly because of inadequate 
salary (p. 63).140 The financial difficulty experienced by players in symphony orchestras 
was the substance of a complaint by British orchestral musicians: Anna Price (2006) 
wrote an article describing the despair of orchestral musicians, commenting, ‘of the 600 
or so orchestral string players in full-time work across the country, few earn more than 
£ 25,000 a year. Many are on much less’. A former player of the London Symphony 
Orchestra who had worked for 20 years told her that music was a fantastic hobby but 
difficult to do every day for a living. Despite the low salary, players are continuously 
working as orchestral players. One of reasons I found from interview is that holding the 
position of an orchestral player helps towards generating extra income, especially from 
private lessons: it signifies that students can trust the musical ability of their teacher if 
they are members of an orchestra, and orchestral players are more likely to have 
private lessons, compared to those teachers who are not, although this also depends 
on the particular musical instrument (as Civil Servant 1 remarks). Players’ financial
139 The conductor’s supervision in Korea is not only related to music but also to administration, 
thus it may cause dissatisfaction and conflict between conductor and players.
140 10 out 11 choose pay as the reason of dissatisfaction (Jung, 2004: p. 63).
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difficulties are supported by the information from the results of survey on job 
satisfaction (see Table 5.6 and Table 5.10).
Staff job satisfaction and dissatisfaction
The majority of staff in orchestral executive constitutions that I interviewed said that 
they were satisfied overall with what they were doing, because of the nature of the 
work141 and the feelings of achievement,142 but they were dissatisfied with their working 
conditions and salaries.
I am satisfied with where I am...doing this job because I like it and feel a sense 
of duty, compared to past times...working conditions were very poor...work 
with a sense of duty, without any salary...then the orchestra has a relative solid 
management system with professional staff... salaries are gradually 
increased...! will choose this job if I could begin again...this job (orchestra 
manager) is the objective and destiny of my life.
[Staff Member 1]
...Although l am not an orchestra player anymore, 1 am generally satisfied with 
my job, because I can hear music everyday and stay near an orchestra...when 
I first joined the orchestral executive constitution, my satisfaction was very 
high...the degree of satisfaction now is less than that time...but I would love to 
work as staff again...it is not only limited to orchestra managerial work. I want 
to work anywhere related to arts and culture.
[Staff Member 2]
As their words explain, the administrative staff that I interviewed were comprised of 
both music graduates and former members of orchestras, and they liked to work in an 
orchestral office. It is supported by the information from Tables 5.7, which show that 
staff are satisfied with work. Although staff are satisfied with what they are doing, there 
are some barriers reducing their job satisfaction.
The first barrier to disturb the job satisfaction of administrative staff is low pay, which 
was given very low (actual) satisfaction mean score in Table 5.7, and the second 
important facet influencing job satisfaction (see Table 5.17), followed by promotion. 
Staff complaints about bad pay are as follows:
...I wanted to leave because of financial difficulty...but I couldn’t leave my 
current job due to some reasons...if I get another chance to choose my job, I 
will definitely choose a different life...
[Staff Member 3]
...Because of financial aspects, I find it very hard...when I think of the fact I’ve 
been working in the same place for years, it makes me a bit depressed
141 Staff love classical music and the main reason for job satisfaction is that they can always 
listen to classical music.
142 Staff of the orchestral executive constitution feel a great satisfaction when a concert is 
successfully finished.
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(because of the very slow growth of salary)...
[Staff Member 2]
Staff of the orchestral executive constitution think their salary is lower compared to the 
salaries of other jobs and the years they have worked. The position of staff might be 
defined as a semi civil servant and their ranks are similar to the eight ranks of local 
government officials.143 They work from 9am to 6pm based on the regulation of local 
government officials, but their salaries are slightly lower than those of government 
officials.
Another barrier to staff job satisfaction is promotion, which had the lowest satisfaction 
mean score when work, pay, supervision, and co-workers were all considered (see 
Table 5.11). As veteran staff employee Staff Member 1 remarked, ‘rotation can be 
needed for (development of) individuals ... if there is a promotion of position, it would 
be better’. In his case, he had been working almost 17 years, but his job position had 
remained the same and the work was repetitive. The only change during his 17 years 
was that the CPO had more staff compared to the beginning. Other staff have to keep 
their current positions, too, as there is no promotion in practical terms unless the 
managing director resigns. This means that the current government structure within the 
orchestral office may lead to a lack of motivation in work.
At the beginning of working as a member of the administrative staff in the 
orchestral executive constitution, it was so challenging, and I felt a huge 
responsibility and worked hard...then I got used to my work and gained know­
how... so I am sometimes lazy...If staff are promoted to the position of 
orchestral manager (which is the top position within the orchestral executive 
constitution) and have nowhere to be promoted further, staff should quit after 
some years of becoming an orchestral manager...Outsiders think it is a good 
job, but it is very tough...
[Staff Member 4]
In addition to the above comments, Staff Member 4 admitted that he was sometimes 
lazy because there was nothing new to challenge him in his role. Other administrative 
staff reported feeling bored at work as they felt their roles to be repetitive. This is 
evident in Robbins (1988, p. 47) and Hellriegel et al. (1998)’s statements on job 
rotation, which mainly aims to reduce boredom of workers (p. 47).
143 Korean local government ranking ranges from one to nine (one being the highest rank).
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Table 5.23 Rotation of the orchestral executive constitutions of the BPO, CPO and KSO
Name of orchestra KSO BPO CPO
Frequency of Rotation 1-2.5 year Fixation Fixation
The way of employment Personal preference among 
experienced staff of the KBS
When there is a 
vacancy
When there is a 
vacancy
Year of contract - 3 2
Average year of working* 4.33 7.66 5.66
Note: * referred from Park, 2004.
As we can see, the orchestral executive constitution has no rotation except in the case 
of the KBS Symphony Orchestra. In addition, there are few opportunities for promotion, 
so that positions within the orchestral executive constitution appear to be highly rigid. 
Thus, such issues as boring and repetitive work may influence job satisfaction.
In spite of several criticisms of Herzberg’s ‘two factor theory’— for instance, that it only 
explains the degree of job satisfaction and ignores external influences and limits 
‘application to manual workers’ (Mullins, 1989: p. 263), the Herzberg theory is widely 
used in organisations because it is ‘easy to appreciate and readily applicable’ 
(Kakabadse et al., 2005: p. 61). Crainer and Dearlove (2001) remark, ‘Herzberg’s work 
has had a considerable effect on the rewards and remuneration packages offered by 
corporations’ (p. 361). Herzberg’s theory could address administrative staff’s job 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction.
Table 5.24 Herzberc ’s two-factor theory
Hvqiene factors (dissatisfiers) Motivators (satisfiers)
Company policy and administration Achievement
Supervision Recognition
Salary Nature of the work
Interpersonal relations Responsibility
Working conditions Growth and advancement
(Source: Herzberg et al., 2003)
Herzberg called the dissatisfiers ‘hygiene factors’ and the satisfiers ‘motivators' 
(Herzberg et a/., 2003). Hygiene factors serve to prevent dissatisfaction and poor job 
performance, which is not directly related to positive motivation to work (Herzberg et al., 
2003), and draw the motivation up to a ‘zero point’ (Szilagyi and Wallace, 1980: p. 112), 
whereas motivators will affect feelings of satisfaction or no satisfaction, but not 
dissatisfaction (Herzberg et al., 2003). The idea seems to be quite confused that the 
opposite of dissatisfaction is no dissatisfaction, instead of satisfaction (Mullins, 1989: p. 
261). That is, if hygiene factors are removed, the individual has no dissatisfaction, 
which does not mean the individual will be satisfied. Thus, staff in orchestral executive 
constitutions will have no dissatisfaction as long as staff dissatisfiers— salary and poor 
working conditions— disappear and leave motivation in a zero state.
Among the five motivators, achievement and work itself are recognised and satisfy staff
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in the orchestral executive constitution, whereas responsibility and growth and 
advancement, which relate to personnel promotion (Mondy et al., 1990: p. 288) and job 
rotation, are negative parts of staff job satisfaction. To improve the work of the 
orchestral executive constitution, the city or Executive Director could consider giving 
appropriate attention to staff (such as job rotation144) and encouraging their positive 
endeavours in terms of objectives or goals of the orchestra itself, or individual projects, 
in order to motivate them.
Regarding satisfaction with co-workers, staff that I interviewed did not deny that there 
was an uncomfortable relationship with co-workers, but they did not indicate any 
specific conflict. It might be because they wish to avoid awkward situations. The conflict 
handling style of staff towards co-workers will be described in Chapter 6.
In contrast to the group of players, the actual staff satisfaction mean score for 
supervision is highest among the five JDI scales145 (see Table 5.11); this finding 
supports by the hypothesis of Scanlan (1976) that supervision is the first determinant of 
job satisfaction.146 Like the players, staff think they are all in the same boat and would 
like to help and cooperate each other. Otherwise, staff try to keep a peaceful working 
environment and avoid an embarrassing relationship as they have to work together 
everyday. None of the administrative staff mentioned problems with senior staff, and it 
may imply that staff do not think seriously about the nature of supervision. The staff’s 
style of conflict management will be explained in Chapter 6, and the deeper 
relationship between staff satisfaction and conflicts will also be dealt with.
Summary of interview findings
T h e  j o b  s a t is fa c t io n  a n d  d is s a t is f a c t io n  o f  p la y e r s  a n d  s t a f f  a n d  it s  r e a s o n s
According to the results of interviews, players and staff are very satisfied with their 
work, because it is what they want to do. The reason for players’ dissatisfaction is lack 
of control over work, even though players fully recognise the orchestral hierarchy: 
players have to accept the musical opinions of the principal or deputy principal players, 
leader, or conductor. Players refuse to use the term subordinate or supervisor to 
indicate other players, and consider all players as colleagues.
144 Job rotation in the orchestral executive constitution could have the desired effect, because all 
the tasks are rarely similar (although it is more or less routine) (Hellriegel et a/., 1998: p. 474).
145 However, it does not mean that staff are more satisfied with supervision than work or co­
workers, even though there is a tendency that they are satisfied with supervision, followed by 
work and co-workers based on mean score.
146 The result of the administrative staff’s relative rankings of the influences on job satisfaction 
challenges the assumption that the staff choose supervision as the least important factor (see 
Table 5.17).
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The second source of players’ dissatisfaction was salary: although players occupy a 
position in Korean municipal orchestras that is half civil servant, and have a monthly 
salary based on the city’s regulations, their regular income is not enough to cover their 
family’s living expenses, and they need to fill the gap with extra activities.
Staff pointed out similar sources of dissatisfaction— salary and work conditions— but 
they were more keen on promotion than were players: there is only one position 
(Managing Director) to be promoted to within the orchestral executive constitution,147 
and it causes frustration.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the results of quantitative research and qualitative research 
on job satisfaction, along with relevant theories. Before analysing the data, the 
response rate, non-response bias check, and multicollinearity were checked.
The results of the quantitative research showed players’ and staff’s demographic 
characteristics, the trend of job satisfaction regarding work, pay, supervision, promotion, 
and co-workers, their thoughts about relative importance among the five subscales, 
and thoughts of job turnover. The result also showed the relationship between job 
satisfaction and demographic characteristics, job satisfaction and turnover, and 
turnover and demographic characteristics using Pearson’s correlation and multiple 
regression analysis. The results of the qualitative research, on the other hand, showed 
the sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, along with personal narratives.
Players and administrative staff are both actually satisfied with work, but dissatisfied 
with promotion. Players and administrative staff both chose work as the most important 
facet influencing for job satisfaction, and promotion as the least important facet (see 
Table 5.15 and 5.17). Thus, it can be concluded that they are enjoying their jobs, 
despite their disappointment with promotion and pay.
The players’ and staff job satisfaction is not generally associated with their 
demographic variables; the players’ job satisfaction is generally associated with 
turnover; there is no overall significant relationship found between staff job satisfaction 
and turnover.
The next chapter presents an analysis of the results of qualitative (interview) and
147 Staff could only have smaller yearly promotion in pay grade during every three year contract: 
their salary increases in accordance with pay grade and tenure— 15,000 won ( £ 7.5) for 
Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra and 35,000 won ( £ 17.5) for Busan Philharmonic Orchestra.
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quantitative (survey) data collection on conflict in Korean municipal orchestras.
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Tables of data used in Chapter 5: from Table 5.25 to Table 5.27
Table 5.25 Players’ multiple regression analysis of the JDI and job turnover
Unstandardized Standardized
Predictors _____Coefficients_______ Coefficients t Sig. __
Collinearity
Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant)
Work
5.050
-0.036
0.502
0.014 -0.249
10.060
-2.605
0.000
0.010* 0.721 1.387
Pay -0.004 0.024 -0.015 -0.175 0.861 0.898 1.114
Supervision -0.007 0.011 -0.066 -0.633 0.528 0.610 1.638
Promotion 0.010 0.022 0.040 0.455 0.650 0.843 1.186
Co-workers -0.029 0.010 -0.290 -3.061 0.003** 0.736 1.358
R2 = .203, F = 7.147, P = .000***
Note: dependent: turnover; * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01, *** indicates p < 0.001.
Table 5.26 Analysis of demographic effects on JDI category scores of the CPO’s players
(MiSD)
Categories Work Pay Supervision Promotion Co-workers
Age 1) 21-30 44.14±6.09a 5.43±5.88 31,00±16.18 8.0017.48 29.29116.02
31-35 39.87±6.08ab 3.58±3.40 35.26±7.77 6.9314.26 34.08l8.24
36-40 40.91±8.13ab 5.48±3.93 26.84±12.42 3.5514.30 25.64i10.20
Over 41 32.22±10.87b 1.78±1.56 21.44±11.23 5.1116.11 26.34111.57
F-value 3.38* 1.95 2.59 1.25 1.32
Marital Married 39.53±8.16 3.86±4.17 29.54±11.36 6.4315.52 29.74110.01
status Single 38.82±9.40 4.20±3.83 28.35±13.60 5.1015.45 28.40i12.72
t-value 0.25 -0.27 0.30 0.76 0.37
gender Male 35.85±11.72 3.15±3.18 24.69±14.28 6.3817.14 29.16i12.01
Female 40.82±6.39 4.47±4.27 31.05±11.05 5.4314.51 29.00111.25
t-value -1.43148 -0.98 -1.54 0.44149 0.04
Less than 5 
years
41.57±7.00 5.15±4.56 32.78±14.72 7.6216.44 30.92113.24
Tenure 5-10 years 33.29±8.14 4.04±3.38 30.86113.75 3.7713.24 24.4318.60
Over 10 
years
39.68±9.35 3.26±3.71 25.59l9.67 5.2015.22 29.48i10.93
F-value 2.27 0.88 1.43 1.34 0.76
Note: * indicates p < 0.05; according to the result of Tukey’s HSD test, different groups in 
homogeneous subsets are displayed a s a'ab'b.
148 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
149 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
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Table 5.27 Analysis of demographic effects on JDI category scores of the KSO’s players
(M±SD)
Categories Work Pay Supervision Promotion Co-workers
Age 21-30 35.00±8.72 11.67±8.08 29.1515.45 9.0016.00 33.00l10.39
31-35 42.67±6.71 6.33±7.69 28.67l11.08 6.8313.54 29.33116.26
36-40 34.33±8.62 4.67±2.31 34.0014.36 6.0012.00 39.6714.73
Over 41 44.59±7.67 4.13±4.23 28.78114.60 4.6212.47 35.91114.77
F-value 2.77 2.15 0.14 2.70 0.47
Marital Married 43.50±8.54 4.84±4.90 30.75113.03 5.0112.22 36.62113.29
status Single 39.57±5.47 6.14±7.15 21.78110.31 7.1415.67 27.29116.41
t-value 1.16 -0.59 1.71 -0.98150 1.62
Gender Male 44.40±7.77 4.4815.13 31.19113.76 5.0412.40 33.89115.86
Female 39.52±8.29 6.2915.57 25.00110.32 6.1114.26 37.2719.70
t-value 1.82 -1.02 1.44 -0.84151 -0.83152
Less than 
5years 46.00±7.55 16.00l8.663 34.48114.02 10.00l6.253 34.3316.66
Tenure 5—10 years 40.02±8.33 3.3112.87b 29.08111.27 5.0812.81b 31.23116.00
Over 10 
years
43.93±8.06 4.65l4.35b 28.58l14.03 4.98l2.42b 37.11113.70
F-value 1.23 10.91*** 0.27 4.15* 0.72
Note: * indicates p < 0.05, *** indicates p < 0.001; according to the results of Tukey’s HSD test, 
different groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed a s aorb.
150 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
151 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
152 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
Chapter 6 Conflict
6.1 Introduction
Conflict was at one time thought to be bad, and was viewed negatively in the 
arguments which dominated in 1930s and 1940s. 
153 The traditional view aims to eliminate conflict by designing mechanistic or 
bureaucratic organisation structures (Rahim, 1986: p. 9) such as planning an elaborate 
bureaucracy, framing an efficient task plan, hiring appropriate people, and clear rules 
and regulations for every contingency (Chung, 2008: p. 10). From the late 1940s to the 
mid-1970s, conflict has been considered both negative and essential for organisational 
efficiency, because it is an inevitable phenomenon (Robbins, 2005: p. 194): thus, 
conflict is recognised and accepted, but people still try to ‘eliminate it by improving the 
social system of the organisation’ (Rahim, 1986: p. 9). Since the 1980s, conflict has 
been ‘considered as legitimate, inevitable, and even a positive indicator of effective 
organisational management’ and conflict could even be ‘essential to productivity’ under 
‘certain limits’ (Rahim, 1986: p. 7): this modern view of conflict aims to use conflict 
actively.
The definition of conflict varies, and is ambiguous in nature. Although Rahim (1986) 
argues that ‘the term conflict has no single clear meaning’ (p. 12), he later defines 
conflict as ‘an interactive process manifested in incompatibility, disagreement, or 
dissonance within or between social entities’ (Rahim, 2004: p. 7). There are various 
aspects of conflict, and they can be classified in three different ways: sources of conflict 
(affective conflict, conflict of interest, conflict of values, cognitive conflict, goal conflict, 
and substantive conflict); the basis of the levels of conflict (e.g. individual, group);153 54 
and the styles of handling conflicts (integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding, and 
compromising).
Although different periods have emphasised different views of conflict, I believe that 
conflict is a natural and inevitable phenomenon, and can have positive, as well as 
negative outcomes. In order to discover levels and sources of conflicts, and the styles 
of handling conflicts within Korean symphony orchestras, this study adopts the Rahim 
Organisational Conflict Inventory (ROCI)-I, dealing with the levels and sources of 
conflicts; and ROCI-II, dealing with the styles of handling conflicts. Managing Conflict in
153 Frederic W. Taylor, Elton Mayo, and Henri Fayol are representative of this viewpoint.
154 Various numbers of levels of conflict have been presented by different researchers such as 
March and Simon (1958): individual conflict, organisational conflict, and interorganisatinal 
conflict; Robbins (1983): interpersonal conflict, intergroup conflict, and intragroup conflict; 
Stoner (1978), Schermerhorn (1985), and Hellriegel ef a/. (1998): interpersonal conflict, 
intergroup conflict, and interorganisational conflict.
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Organisations (1986) and Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventories: Professional 
Manual (2004), written by M. Afzalur Rahim are much used in this chapter.
This chapter presents the results of quantitative and qualitative research regarding 
various conflicts occurring within Korean municipal orchestras. First, the introduction of 
two instruments measuring conflict is explained. Second, the results of the quantitative 
research survey form the basis for examining the conflicts through the Rahim 
Organisational Conflict Inventory (ROCI)-I and II: ROCI-I contains three independent 
scales to measure three types of organisational conflict: intrapersonal, intragroup, and 
intergroup; ROCI-II contains five styles of handling interpersonal conflict: integrating, 
obliging, dominating, avoiding, and compromising. Each description of this taxonomy is 
explained, and the conflicts are investigated together with the source of each conflict. 
Third, as an extension of second section, the results of correlation and multiple 
regression analysis among ROCI-I, ROCI-II, JDI, and turnover will be given. Fourth, the 
result of the qualitative research interview regarding conflict will be presented, and a 
brief conclusion will then follow.
6.2 Conflict
To measure types and handling styles of conflict among players and administrative staff 
of Korean municipal orchestras, I adopted the Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventory 
(ROCI-I and II), which were devised by M. Afzalur Rahim.
ROCI-I
Conflicts on the basis of levels were discussed by Kahn et al. (1964) and Rizzo et a i 
(1970) regarding role conflict and ambiguity (within interpersonal conflict level), and by 
Corwin (1969) and Walton and Dutton (1969) regarding interpersonal and intergroup 
conflicts (Rahim, 1983a: pp. 189-90). Compared to other instruments, ROCI-I, which 
includes three types of organisational conflict, was developed with considerable care 
(Rahim, 1983a: p. 197). The initial instrument of ROCI-I was revised following the 
critiques of four management professors,155 and Rahim made ‘the items free from 
social desirability response bias’ (Rahim, 2004: p. 25). Retest and internal consistency 
reliabilities of the ROCI-l’s subscales are both satisfactory. ROCI-I is therefore a 
reliable instrument for measuring different types of conflict.
It has in total 21 items: 7 for intrapersonal conflict, 8 for intragroup conflict, and 6 for 
intergroup conflict, based on a 5-point Likert scale (‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly 
disagree’), as well as personal information such as tenure, age, gender, educational
‘ 169
155 They thought the items of the initial ROCI-I were difficult, ambiguous, or inconsistent (Rahim, 
1983a: p. 191).
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background.156 Scoring is relatively easy. For each subscale, you need to add all 
scores of respondents marked, then divide it into the number of items, and missing 
items are excluded after this division. For example, if a respondent ranked only 4 of the 
8 items of intragroup conflict, the total score for intragroup conflict should be divided by 
4 (not 8). However, it is important that before adding scores, some scales of items are 
reversed: for example, changing the value of 1 to 5, 2 to 4, 4 to 2, and 5 to 1. ‘A  higher 
score represents greater amount of one type of conflict’ (Rahim, 2004: p. 7).
ROCI-II
While ROCI-I is designed to measure different types of conflict: intrapersonal (IP), 
intragroup (IG), and intergroup (NG), ROCI-ll deals with five styles of handling 
interpersonal conflict with supervisors, subordinates157 and peers.
There are several five-conflict instruments: the Hall Conflict Management Survey 
(1969), the Thomas-Kilmann conflict MODE Survey (1974), the Putnam-Wilson 
Organisational Communication Conflict Instrument (1982), the Ross-DeWine Conflict 
Management Message Style (1982), and the Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventory-ll 
(1983b). ROCI-II appears to measure the five styles of handling interpersonal conflict 
based on Blake and Mouton (1964): domination, confrontation, smoothing, avoidance, 
and compromising, and Thomas (1976): avoidance, competition, cooperation, 
accommodation, and compromise. In spite of some weaknesses, I finally decided to 
choose Rahim’s instruments. Womack (1988a) summarised the positive and negative 
points of these five conflict instruments. The strengths of ROCI-II are that it is carefully 
developed and tested with a large sample (Rahim, 2004; Hatfield, 1988; and Womack, 
1988a). Several reports estimate the reliability of ROCI-II questionnaire using 
Cronbach alpha coefficients of internal consistency. Although dominating, obliging, and 
compromising (the terms used in ROCI-II) are below Nunnally’s (1978) suggested 
minimum standard of 0.80 for internal consistency (Womack, 1988b; King and Miles, 
1990), Rahim insists (2004) that the reliability coefficients of internal consistency are 
satisfactory and ‘the test-retest and internal consistency reliability coefficients compare 
quite favorably with those of other existing instruments’ (p. 43). Furthermore, ROCI-II is 
able to measure conflict for different targets such as supervisor, subordinate, and peer. 
Another advantage is, ‘researchers can obtain information about the appropriateness 
or effectiveness of each style for particular situations’ (Hatfield, 1988: p. 351). On the 
other hand, the weaknesses of ROCI-II are that it is more difficult to score than Hall’s 
CMS or Thomas-Kilmann’s MODE; and specific communication is excluded. These two
156 Although I included demographic information at the end of ROCI-I (in case the respondent 
did not give it in the JDI), I did not use much information from ROCI-I, as the questionnaire of 
JDI already contained such information.
157 Subordinates are excluded from this study.
weaknesses did not interrupt this study; just because the scoring of ROCI-II is more 
complicated than the other instruments does not mean that it is difficult: in practice, it is 
fairly easy to score. In addition, this study combines qualitative research interviews, so 
that lack of explicit communication was not a problem.
ROCI-II includes 28 items: 7 for integrating style, 6 for obliging style, 5 for dominating 
style, 6 for avoiding style, and 4 for compromising style on a 5-point Liker scale ranging 
from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. ROCI-II has three forms that differ only in 
reference to conflict with supervisor (Form A), subordinate (Form B),158 and peer (Form 
C) (Rahim, 1983b: p. 370; Hatfield, 1988: p. 368). In contrast to ROCI-I, scoring of 
ROCI-II does not need values of each item to be reversed, but the rest is the same as 
for ROCI-I: for example, the requirement to simply add all values of integrating style, 
and then divide the total by the number of items.159
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The secondary objectives of the conflict research were:
1. To ascertain the level of intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and 
intergroup conflict: a) among players and staff of the BPO, CPO, and KSO, 
respectively; b) between players and staff.
2. To ascertain the relative level of intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and 
intergroup conflict (with two variables): a) within all groups of players and staff, 
respectively; b) within each group of players.
3. To ascertain the styles of handling conflict with the previous conductor, current 
conductor, and peers (the administrative supervisor is added for staff).
4. To examine the link between types of conflicts and demographic characteristics, 
and styles of handling conflict together with demographic characteristics.
5. To examine the relationship between: a) JDI and ROCI-I; b) JDI and ROCI-II
with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers (and the
administrative supervisor in the case of staff); c) ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers, 
current conductor, and previous conductor (and the administrative supervisor 
in the case of staff; d) job turnover and ROCI-I; and e) job turnover and ROCI-II 
with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers (and the
administrative supervisor in the case of staff).
6. To explore the sources of conflict occurring in Korean municipal orchestras.
6.3 Results of the quantitative research survey160
This section presents intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup conflict
with their sources, and the results of the case studies of the Korean municipal
orchestras, followed by five styles of handling interpersonal conflict.
158 Although I asked questions regarding subordinates, I finally decided to exclude it, as players 
dislike the term ‘subordinate’ (I also thought ROCI-II: Form B was not appropriate to an 
orchestra) and most administrative staff do not have subordinates.
159 As with ROCI-I, ‘a higher score represents greater use of a conflict style’ (Rahim, 1983b: p. 
370; Rahim, 2004: p. 9).
160 The respondents' characteristics are the same as in the survey on job satisfaction, and are 
omitted in this chapter.
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Intrapersonal conflict
Intrapersonal conflict occurs when a person is required to perform a task which 
does not match his or her expertise, interests, goals, and values. Such conflict 
also occurs when the role a person expects to perform and the role that is 
demanded of him by the organisation are incongruent.
(Rahim, 1986: pp. 114-17)
It is not easy to define the terms of a role, because ‘any individual’s role is a 
combination of the role expectations that the members of the role set have of the focal 
roles’ (Handy, 1999: p. 62). However, the most common definition of a role is ‘the set of 
prescriptions defining what the behaviour of a position member should be’ (Biddle and 
Thomas, 1966: p. 29). A careful review of the definitions of a role by Biddle and 
Thomas (1966) has revealed that the concept is connected with the behaviours of 
particular persons.
According to Gross, Mason, and McEachern (1966), literature on role conflict has 
different meanings to different social scientists: some have used it to denote 
incompatible expectation situations to which an actor is exposed, whether he is aware 
of the conflict or not, whereas others use role conflict to refer to situations in which the 
actor perceives incompatible expectations (p. 287). In addition, Huczynski and 
Buchanan (2001) have defined role conflict as being the simultaneous existence of two 
or more sets of role expectations on a focal person161 in such a way that compliance 
with one makes it difficult to comply with the others (p. 474). Here, role conflict results 
from the necessity for one person to carry out two or more roles in the same situation 
(Handy, 1999: p. 65).
Role ambiguity is closely related to the concept of role conflict (Rahim, 1986: p. 45). If 
the focal person or the members of the role set have some uncertainty as to their role 
and the conception of one person’s role is different from the expectation from others 
within the role set, it leads to role ambiguity, although this ambiguity also provides a 
sense of there being freedom to shape one’s own role (Handy, 1999). The following 
section investigates intrapersonal conflict around Korean municipal orchestras, 
especially related to role conflict,162 which Rahim (1986) considers as part of 
intrapersonal conflict and role ambiguity.
161 The focal person is the specific individual concerned with the analysis of any situation (Handy, 
1 9 9 9 ).
162 Here, role conflict implies a mismatch between the expected role and the role that needs to 
be performed.
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Table 6.1 Players’ intrapersonal conflict
Variables N M SD F 95% Confidence interval for mean
1.12 Lower bound Upper bound
BPO 44 2.33 0.54 2.17 2.50
CPO 35 2.37 0.60 2.16 2.57
KSO 41 2.19 0.49 2.04 2.35
TOTAL 120 2.29 0.54 2.20 2.39
Table 6.1 lists the sample size (N), mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of
intrapersonal conflict classified by the players in the Busan Philharmonic Orchestra 
(BPO), the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra (CPO), and the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra (KSO), and the results of one-way analysis of variance (F) along with 95% 
confidence interval for mean. According to the result of the F-test, there is no 
statistically significant difference in intrapersonal conflict among each group of players. 
The percentile norms of the players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO will be shown in Table 
6.26, respectively. The percentile score of an individual shows each player’s relative 
position on intrapersonal conflict scale compared with other members.
Table 6.2 Staff intrapersonal conflict
Variables N M SD X ' 95% Confidence interval for mean
1.113 Lower bound Upper bound
BPO 2 2.72 0.40 -0.91 6.34
CPO 4 2.39 0.58 1.47 3.31
KSO 3 2.81 0.30 2.07 3.54
TOTAL 9 2.60 0.46 2.25 2.95
Table 6.2 shows the sample size (N), mean (M), and standard deviation (SD), classified 
by staff of three orchestras, and the results of Kruskal-Wallis test (Chi-square) along 
with 95% confidence interval for mean. There is no significant difference among them, 
according to the results of a Kruskal-Wallis test: H (df = 2) = 1.113, p = 0.573.
According to the results of the Mest and the Mann-Whitney test, no statistic significant 
difference is found in intrapersonal conflict (t = -1.67, p = 0.098; U = 342.00, p = 0.066, 
see Table 6.23) between the group of players and staff: that is, players and staff may 
have a similar degree of intrapersonal conflict.
One of main sources of intrapersonal conflict is that of organisational structure, which 
significantly influences role conflict (Rahim, 1986: pp. 49-50). Korean municipal 
orchestras have an organisational structure with ‘multiple lines of authority’, which is 
closely related to role conflict and organisational inefficiency (Evan, 1962; Kaplan, 
1959). There is no formal important role for administrative staff and players in decision 
making within Korean municipal orchestras, and it is also a potential source of 
intrapersonal conflict (Morris et a!., 1979): for instance, some degree of intrapersonal
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conflict among the players might be caused by reluctance to give a performance that a 
city requires them to give. A further source of intrapersonal conflict in Korean municipal 
orchestras is that of position. According to Rosen (1970), the middle position suffers 
between supervisors and subordinates because of incompatible demands, and this 
position is more exposed to role conflict: the role of the orchestral executive 
constitution in Korea is that of a medium position between players and conductor or 
orchestra (including players and a conductor) and the city. More contact with the 
outside is likely to lead to more role conflict: the Korean orchestral executive 
constitution has ‘boundary-spanning activities’ (Kahn et al., 1964). Therefore, it may be 
concluded that administrative staff are more exposed to role conflict, which is a part of 
intrapersonal conflict, but the result of one-way analysis of variance does not show a 
statistically significant difference between the group of players and the group of staff. 
Furthermore, the position of the Executive Director is automatically given to the Mayor 
or Deputy Mayor of the city, and the Conductor has the role of Music Director, who has 
a certain administrative authority. The mayor is unlikely to have an ‘appropriate 
expertise, aptitude, and commitment’, which can lead to undesirable frustration (Rahim, 
1986: p. 49) in orchestral operation. Conductors, Executive Director, and administrative 
staff may experience role conflict, as they have to perform more than one role at the 
same time: Conductor as well as Music Director, Executive Director as well as Mayor or 
Deputy Mayor. These roles may overlap with those of administrative staff due to staff 
shortages, and indeed, most small-sized arts organisations have people in multiple 
roles.
Intragroup conflict
Intragroup refers to conflict among the members of a group, or between two or 
more subgroups within a group regarding its goals, tasks, and policies, and so on. 
Such a conflict may also occur as a result of incompatibilities, disagreements, or 
inconsistencies between some or all the members of a group and its leader(s).
(Rahim, 2004: p. 8)
This section explains the overall intragroup conflict of players and staff, and conflict 
related to leadership and the composition of orchestra members.
Table 6.3 Players’ intragroup conflict
Variables
N M SD F 95% Confidence interval for mean
2.51 Lower bound Upper bound
BPO 44 2.83 0.31 2.73 2.92
CPO 35 2.65 0.44 2.50 2.80
KSO 41 2.66 0.45 2.51 2.80
Total 120 2.72 0.41 2.64 2.79
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Variables
BPO
CPO
KSO
Total
N
2
4
3
9
SD X*' 95% Confidence
__________ 0.276 Lower bound
Table 6.4 Staff intragroup conflict_____
3.00 0.35 -0.18
2.97 0.12 2.78
3.09 0.32 2.30
3.01 0.22 2.85
interval for mean 
Upper bound 
6.18 
3.16 
3.87 
3.19
Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show the sample size (N), mean (M), standard deviation (SD) 
of intragroup conflict classified by the group of players and staff, and the results of one­
way analyses of variance (F) and a Kruskal-Wallis test (Chi-square) along with 95% 
confidence interval for mean, respectively. The percentile norms of the players of the 
BPO, CPO, and KSO are shown in Table 6.26. The percentile score of an individual 
shows each player’s relative position on the intragroup conflict scale compared with 
others.
According to the result of the F-test, there is no statistically significant difference in 
intragroup conflict among each group of players (F (2,117) = 2.51, p > 0.05). The 
results of a Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that there is no significant difference in 
intragroup conflict among each group of staff, H (df = 2) = 0.276, p = 0.871.
Meanwhile, there is a statistically significant difference between the group of players 
and staff (t = -2.16, p = 0.033; U = 295.00, p = 0.023, see Table 6.23) based on the 
result of an independent Mest and Mann-Whitney test: it can be interpreted that staff 
have a higher intragroup conflict than players. Thus, it may be seen that staff have 
more ‘incompatibilities, disagreements, or inconsistencies' between themselves and 
their conductor or the city (Rahim, 2004: p. 8) than the group of players.
Rahim (1986)163 indicates six sources of intragroup conflict: leadership style, task 
structure, group composition, size, cohesiveness and groupthink, and external threats, 
and three sources of intragroup conflict are found within Korean municipal orchestras.
The first source of intragroup conflict is that of leadership style. Maier and Verser (1982: 
p. 153) have explained three situational sources of intragroup conflict related to 
leadership style. The first situation (see Figure 6.1) occurs when the leader (conductor) 
treats group members differently: players that I interviewed talked of their conductor's 
discrimination based on his personal favour. If the player is on conductor’s side, he/she 
could obtain a kind of advantage, especially related to audition. A  male player cynically 
explained that some female players’ behaviour supported their conductor, but that this
163 These details are not mentioned in Rahim 2004, so I used Rahim’s 1986. Rahim's 
2004 works are different, although both are about conflict.
1986 and
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was merely to take advantage of him.
Figure 6.1 Situation A
The second situation (see Situation B in Figure 6.2) occurs when the group members 
are against the leader, which increases intragroup conflict. This might happen among 
players of the BPO and CPO when they have an audition,164 65 because the result of the 
audition can change the orchestral position, and remove some privileges.166 However, 
the CPO  does not implement practical changes based on the results of the audition, 
and the KSO does not have regular auditions. Korean municipal orchestras have 
regular auditions (generally every three years) because the cities believe that auditions 
are a way of improving the artistic standard of their orchestras: the idea is that players 
will be unduly relaxed if there is no audition, but will practice in order to prepare for the 
audition.167
Regular auditions are held by local cities, which players in my interviews generally 
consider to be an unfair and unfavourable in the way regular auditions are run. They 
are thus an external threat, and another source of intragroup conflict. When this 
happens, players put aside their differences and unite against the common enemy (it 
can be the city or conductor) (Sherif, 1958), and conflicts among players are 
significantly reduced. When the players of the BPO had serious conflict with their 
previous conductor, this phenomenon occurred and players tried to expel him. In other 
words, even though the group is disunited, it becomes a unified community for common 
interest, profit, and aim (Adorno, 1976: p. 116-17).
164 L in Figure 6.1 stands for leader.
165 The conductor has a great influence on the result of the audition.
166 Thus, some players that I interviewed feel insecure in their job positions.
167 However, the efficiency of regular auditions is still debatable.
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Figure 6.2 Situation B and Situation C
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Situation B Situation C
(Source: Maier and Verser, 1982: p. 153)168
The third situation (see Situation C in Figure 6.2) occurs when group members have 
different status and work interests, and show conflict between them and the leader. 
Orchestral players are likely to favour players in the same instrumental section or within 
a similar age group.
The third source of intragroup conflict to be found in Korean municipal orchestras is 
that of group composition. According to Kelly (1974), a change of group membership 
can intensify conflict (p. 565), because a newcomer may negatively influence group 
stability as he/she has ‘different attitudes, backgrounds, and experiences’ (Rahim, 1986: 
p. 88). The players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra have uncomfortable feelings about 
new members: if they go to a rehearsal venue and find a new player sitting beside 
them, they feel uncomfortable. Namely, the orchestral executive constitution of the 
KSO hires new players without giving any notice to current players. It also takes them 
some time to be unified with newcomers, and they prefer to play with old members.
Intergroup conflict
Intergroup conflict refers to disagreements, differences, or incompatibilities 
between the members or their representatives of two or more groups. This 
conflict is often caused by task interdependence, jurisdictional ambiguities, 
cultural differences.
To measure intergroup conflict, which is regarded as an 'inevitable part of 
organisational life’ (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1986: p. 42), I modified Rahim’s intergroup 
conflict: in the case of players, I asked about their intergroup conflict with administrative
(Rahim, 2004: p. 9)
168 L stands for leader.
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staff and civil servants; in the case of staff, I asked about their intergroup conflict 
towards players and civil servants.
Table 6.5 Players’ intergroup conflict with staff
Variables
N M SD F 95% Confidence interval for mean
4.83* Lower bound Upper bound
BPO 44 2.97a 0.34 2.86 3.07
CPO 35 2.95a 0.56 2.76 3.14
KSO 41 2.66b 0.59 2.47 2.84
Total 120 2.86 0.52 2.76 2.95
Note: * indicates p < 0.05; according to the results of Tukey’s HSD test, different groups in
homogeneous subsets are displayed as
Table 6.6 Staff intergroup conflict with players
Variables
N M SD X" 95% Confidence interval for mean
0.861 Lower bound Upper bound
BPO 2 2.92 0.59 -2.36 8.19
CPO 4 2.63 0.72 1.48 3.77
KSO 3 3.17 0.67 1.52 4.82
Total 9 2.87 0.64 2.38 3.36
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the sample size (N), mean (M), and standard deviation (SD), 
F-value, Chi-square of the Kruskal-Wallis test, and 95% confidence interval for the 
mean of intergroup conflict, classified by the players and staff of the three orchestras, 
respectively. The result of the one-way analysis of variance (F) shows that there is a 
significant difference in the intergroup conflict with staff among groups of players (F 
(2,117) = 4.83, p < 0.05): according to Tukey’s HSD test, players of the BPO (M = 2.97, 
SD  = 0.34) and the CPO  (M = 2.95, SD = 0.56) have higher intergroup conflict with 
their administrative staff, compared to those of the KSO (M = 2.66, SD = 0.59). The 
percentile norms of the players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO are shown in Table 6.26. 
The percentile score of an individual shows individual players’ relative position on this 
intergroup conflict scale compared with other members.
Unlike groups of players, there is no statistically significant difference to be found in the 
intergroup conflict with players among groups of staff: H (df = 2) = 0.861, p = 0.650.
The result of the f-test and the Mann-Whitney test shows that there is no significant 
difference between the groups of players and staff (t = -0.08, p = 0.937; U = 515.00, p 
= 0.816, see Table 6.23) in intergroup conflict as to staff and players.
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Table 6.7 Players’ intergroup conflict with civil servants
Variables
N M SD F 95% Confidence interval for mean
3.82 Lower bound Upper bound
BPO 44 2.92 0.43 2.79 3.05
CPO 35 2.68 0.64 2.46 2.90
KSO169 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Total 79 2.81 0.54 2.69 2.93
Table 6.8 Staff intergroup conflict with civil servants 
or> v n c o /  öTTTTTTTTTTI
Variables
N M SD x 2--------- 95% Confidence interval for mean
0.151 Lower bound Upper bound
BPO 2 2.92 0.59 -2.36 8.19
CPO 4 2.83 0.83 1.52 4.15
KSO 3 3.06 0.51 1.79 4.32
Total 9 2.93 0.61 2.45 3.40
Tables 6.7 and Table 6.8 show the sample size (N), mean (M), standard deviation (SD), 
F-value and Chi-square of the Kruskal-Wallis test, and 95% confidence interval for the 
mean of intergroup conflict with civil servants, classified by the players and staff of the 
three orchestras, respectively. According to the result of the f-test and Kruskal-Wallis 
test, there is no significant difference in the intergroup conflict with civil servants among 
the groups of players (F (1,77) = 3.82, p > 0.05) and groups of staff (H (df = 2) = 0.151, 
p = 0.927). The percentile norms of the players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO regarding 
intragroup conflict with civil servants are demonstrated in Table 6.26.
Based on the result of the f-test and Mann-Whitney test, there is no significant 
difference in intergroup conflict with civil servants between the group of players and 
staff (f = -0.59, p = 0.558; U = 307.50, p = 0.507, see Table 6.23): the group of players 
and staff might have a similar degree of perception on intergroup conflict with civil 
servants.
The sources of intergroup conflict indicated by Rahim (1986; pp. 102-105) are system 
differentiation, task interdependence, dependence on scarce resources, jurisdictional 
ambiguity, and socio-cultural differences, and I found two sources of intergroup conflict. 
Regarding system differentiation, intergroup hostility is directly caused by ‘the number 
of differences between the groups’ (Manheim, 1960: p. 426) and difficulties of 
communication. Different interests and goals, and different levels of perceptions cause 
interlevel conflict (Smith, 1966).
Communication difficulty and different perceptions are often mentioned by players, staff, 
and civil servants (especially between the players and civil servants): generally
169 Questions regarding the KSO players’ intergroup conflict against civil servant are omitted, 
because the orchestral executive constitution of the KBS Symphony Orchestra is a part of the 
KBS: players consider the staff of the KBS equal to the administrative staff of the KBS 
orchestral executive constitution, as they are also staff of the KBS.
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speaking, cities emphasise managerial issues and organisational goals, whereas 
orchestras emphasise creative ideas and artistic goals. This view is supported by 
Castaner (1997), who distinguishes basic differences between artistic and managerial 
work based on Chiapello’s (1994) analysis of artist-management conflict. Several 
features mentioned below could be the reasons of conflict between city (management) 
and orchestra (arts).
Table 6.9 Differences between artistic and managerial discourses
Artistic
" i M i i w y t u a i  uiaitu rs s
Managerial
Task features Risk Calculation
Innovation Standardisation
Exploration Exploitation
Low value if it can be planned High value if it can be planned
Cannot be absolutely assessed Everything can be measured
Money is not the only measure Money is the universal measure
Actors Sensitive Judicious
Intuitive Rational
Bohemian Conformist
Unpredictable Predictable
(Source: Castafier, 1997: p. 390)
The details of communication difficulty and different perceptions will be shown in the 
section on intergroup conflict in qualitative research.
A  further source of intergroup conflict is that of socio-cultural differences, which result 
from differences between the personality and demographics of the leaders (see Walton 
and McKersie on leadership, 1965). Although orchestral players dislike using the term 
leader or supervisor,170 players show their intergroup conflict through age: if the 
principal, sub-principal player, or leader is younger than the general players, this 
causes some degree of conflict among them. A  specific example will be shown in the 
section on intergroup conflict resulting from qualitative research.
Relative levels of conflict
So far, intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict with staff (or players) 
and civil servants have been discussed along with the different degree of these 
conflicts among groups of players and staff, respectively, and comparisons made 
between the group of players and the group of staff. The following two tables show 
relative levels of conflict within player and staff group, respectively; and within each 
group of players in the three orchestras, respectively.
170 Although there is a difference in personnel Dosition bptvuoon nana,. i i 
£ £ £ * " * *  Player' ° ' leader’ PlayerS are likely ,0 C0nslder »  p é e ï orrinCiPal
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Table 6.10 Relative levels of conflict among groups of players and staff
Variables Group of player (n = 79) Group of staff (n = 9)
M SD F M SD X"
Intrapersonal conflict 2.35c 0.56 30.91*** 2.60 0.46 6.77
Intragroup conflict 2.75° 0.38 3.01 0.22
Intergroup conflict with staff (player) 2.96a 0.45 2.87 0.64
Interqroup conflict with civil servants 2.81& 0.54 2.93 0.61
Note: *** indicates p < 0.001; according to the results of LSD multiple comparison, different 
groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as a'b,0fC.
As Table 6.10 shows, there is a statistically significant difference among four facets (F 
(3,234) = 30.91, p < 0.001) regarding group of player: and LSD test indicates that 
players have more intergroup conflict with staff, compared to intergroup conflict with 
civil servants, intragroup conflict, and intrapersonal conflict, whereas the Firedman’s 
Chi-square shows that the group of staff has no significant difference among four facets 
(X2 (df = 3) = 6.77, p = 0.080). The percentile norms of player group are presented in 
Table 6.25.
Table 6.11 Relative level of conflicts in each player group of the BPO, CPO, and KSO
Variables BPQ (n = 44) CPO (n = 35) KSQ (n = 41)
M SD F M SD F M SD F
Intrapersonal
conflict
2.33d 0.54 25.55*** 2.37° 0.60 9.63*** 2.19° 0.49 12.04***
Intragroup conflict 2.83a 0.31 2.65° 0.44 2.66a 0.45
Intergroup conflict 
With staff
2.97a 0.34 2.95a 0.56 2.66a 0.59
Intergroup conflict 
With civil servants
2.92a 0.43 2.68b 0.64 n/a n/a n/a
Note: *** indicates p < 0.001; according to the results of LSD multiple comparison, different 
groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as aorb.
According to the results of repeated measures ANOVA, each player group has a 
significant difference among four facets (BPO: F  (3,129) = 25.55, p < 0.001; KSO: F  
(2,80) = 12.04, p < 0.001; CPO: F  (3,102) = 9.63, p < 0.001): LSD test indicates that 
the players of the BPO have less intrapersonal conflict, compared to intergroup conflict 
with civil servants and staff (respectively) and intragroup conflict; the players of the 
KSO also have less intrapersonal conflict, compared to intragroup conflict and 
intergroup conflict with staff; on the other hand, players of the CPO  have higher 
intergroup conflict with staff, compared to intergroup conflict with civil servants, 
intragroup conflict, and intrapersonal conflict. Thus, each player group has relatively 
higher degree of intergroup conflict with their staff. The percentile norms of each player 
group are presented in Table 6.26.
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Table 6.12 Players’ demographic variables and the ROCI-I subscales 171
Variables
IP IG NG1 NG2 •
M±SD M±SD M±SD M iSD
‘ 21-30 2.21±0.72 2.68±0.45 2.65±0.55 2.7210.32
31-35 2.31±0.45 2.67±0.38 2.9U0.39 2.6310.39
Age
a 36-40 2.23±0.64 2.69±0.43 2.93±0.51 2.7010.74
Over 40 2.33±0.52 2.76±0.41 2.89±0.53 2.9810.51
F-value 0.28 0.38 0.94 2.14
Marital Married 2.30±0.50 2.75±0.41 2.87±0.50 2.8310.57
status single 2.28±0.66 2.66±0.42 2.89±0.52 2.7610.49
t-value 0.151'2 1.05 -0.19 0.60
Male 2.40±0.55 2.71±0.39 2.99±0.48 3.0110.59
Gender
Female 2.18±0.52 2.73±0.43 2.74±0.51 2.6310.43
t-value 2.22* -0.27 2.69** 3.26**17 273 17456
Less than 5 2.28±0.69 2.76±0.36 2.9410.51 2.8810.42
years
Tenure 5—10  years 2.39±0.48 2.73±0.45 2.8710.45 2.7410.52
Over 10 2.26±0.53 2.71±0.41 2.8610.53 2.8010.60
years
F-value 0.48 0.13 0.21 0.28
/Vv(v7> w— — — r  ’i ......—
conflict, NG1 = intergroup conflict with staff, NG2 = intergroup conflict with civil servants.
Table 6.12 shows the mean (M), and standard deviation (SD) of intrapersonal, 
intragroup, and intergroup conflict (with two variations) shown by players’ demographic 
characteristics and the results of one-way analysis of variance (F) and t value. 
According to the result of the f-test, there is a statistically significant difference between 
gender and intrapersonal conflict (f = 2.22, p < 0.05): male players (M = 2.40, SD = 
0.55) have higher intrapersonal conflict, compared to female players (M = 2.18, SD = 
0.52). According to Rahim (1986), intrapersonal conflict is closely related to job 
dissatisfaction,174 and female players who have less intrapersonal conflict should have 
more satisfaction; but the result shows that job satisfaction regarding five categories 
(work, pay, supervision, promotion, and co-workers) between male and female players 
has no statistically significant difference, except pay (see Table 5.13). The reason for 
this may be that players simply do not have much intrapersonal conflict,175 because 
they have the same ‘expertise, interests, goals, and values’176 for their job. Thus, it may
171 The staff demographic variables and the subscales of ROCI-I were omitted, due to a limited 
sample size.
172 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
173 Levene’s test indicates unequal variances.
174 More intrapersonal conflict leads to job dissatisfaction.
175 There was no specific example on intrapersonal conflict of players in the results of qualitative 
research.
176 These are regarded as sources of intrapersonal conflict by Rahim (1986).
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be concluded that Rahim’s (1986) theory of the relationship between intrapersonal 
conflict and job dissatisfaction does not apply to the players of Korean municipal 
orchestras, except job satisfaction with pay. Based on the results of the independent t- 
test, there are another significant differences in the perception of intergroup conflict 
with staff and civil servants between gender (t = 2.69, p < 0.01; t = 3.26, p < 0.01): 
male players’ intergroup conflict with administrative staff (M = 2.99, SD = 0.48) and civil 
servants (M = 3.01, SD = 0.60) are higher than female players (M = 2.74, SD = 0.51; M 
= 2.63, SD = 0.43, respectively). The reason may be that most male players are 
members of musicians’ union and are likely to become a representative of players, and 
have more opportunity to meet and communicate with staff and civil servants.177
Thus far, three types of organisational conflict— intrapersonal, intragroup, and 
intergroup conflicts— have been explained with case studies of players and staff of 
Korean municipal orchestras. The next section explores players’ and staff’s styles of 
handling interpersonal conflict.
Interpersonal conflict
ROCI-II was designed to measure five styles of handling interpersonal conflicts: 
integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding, and compromising, based on the basis of 
lengthy and repeated feedback from the subjects and factor analyses of various fields 
of studies (Rahim, 1983b: p. 370).
Rahim and Bonoma (1979) provide ‘combination of the two dimensions results in five 
styles of handling interpersonal conflict’ (Rahim, 2004: p. 10), and it is shown in Figure 
6.3.
177 The civil servants in this study include both male and female. Gender may not have much 
impact on players intergroup conflict toward civil servants, because the players that I 
interviewed had similar difficulties.
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Figure 6.3 The dual-concern model of the styles of handling interpersonal conflict
CONCERN FOR SELF 
High Low
V)CÍU
£H oí 
O x
U.
o
z
C£U
U S
Z  o 
O - 1
u
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The specific description of five subscales is as follows:
1. Integrating: this style involves high concern for self, as well as the other party 
involved in conflict. It is concerned with collaboration between parties, i.e., 
openness, exchange of information, and examination of differences to reach a 
solution acceptable to both parties.
2. Obliging: this involves low concern for self and high concern for the other party 
involved in conflict. An obliging person attempts to play down the differences 
and emphasise commonalities to satisfy the concern of the other party.
3. Dominating: this style involves high concern for self and low concern for the 
other party. Dominating may mean standing up for one's rights and/ or 
defending a position that the other party believes to be correct.
4. Avoiding: this involves low concern for self, as well as for the other party. This 
has been associated with withdrawal, passing-the-buck, sidestepping, or ‘see 
no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil’ situation.
5. Compromising: this style involves moderate concern for the self as well as the 
other party. This is associated with give-and-take or sharing, whereby both 
parties give up something to make a mutually acceptable decision. A 
compromising party gives up more than a dominating but less than an obliging 
party.
(Rahim, 2004: pp. 10-11)
Although an integrating style is traditionally preferred, Rahim (1984: p. 63) indicates 
that all the five styles of handling conflict are useful, depending on situations, and the 
styles of handling interpersonal conflict where they are appropriate or inappropriate will 
be shown in Table 6.31. Although following normative data (as well as percentile norms) 
is useful in determining whether the members of an organisation are making too little, 
too much, or moderate use of each style of handling interpersonal conflict, it cannot 
indicate whether the styles are properly used to deal with different situations (Rahim, 
1986: pp. 67-68). The following section presents players' and staff's five styles of
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handling conflict with their previous conductor, current conductor, and peers, 
respectively.178
Table 6.13 Players’ styles of handling interpersonal conflict
Variables
Integrating Obliging Dominating Avoiding Compromising
F
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Previous
conductor 3.55b 0.71 3.85a 0.57 2.44d 0.83 3.68b 0.68 3.25° 0.82 95.56***
Current
Cnpriii^ tnr
3.28b 0.70 3.64a 0.56 2.24d 0.67 3.52® 0.67 2.97° 0.69 72.90***
Peers 3.82a 0.66 3.70b 0.59 2.49° 0.86 3.84a 0.58 3.69b 0.72 118.07***
Note: *** indicates p < 0.001; according to the result of LSD multiple comparison, different 
groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed as 8'b'c’ ord.
Table 6.13 lists the mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of the five styles of handling 
interpersonal conflict classified by group of players, and F-value. The results of 
repeated measures ANOVA show that there are significant differences in styles of 
handling interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor (F (4,460) = 95.56, p < 
0.001), current conductor179 (F (4,300) = 72.90, p < 0.001) and peers (F (4,468) = 
118.07, p < 0.001), respectively: according to LSD multiple comparison, players 
preferred to use obliging style when handling interpersonal conflict with their previous 
conductor; regarding the current conductor, they prefer to use obliging and avoiding 
styles, followed by integrating, compromising, and dominating styles; players equally 
use avoiding and integrating, then obliging and compromising styles when handling 
conflict with peers, whereas they use the dominating style less.
Table 6.27 shows the percentile norms of players. The percentile score of an individual 
shows each player’s relative position on one of the five scales of the styles of handling 
interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor, current conductor, and peers, 
compared to other members.
178 In the case of staff, five styles of handling interpersonal conflict with administrative supervisor 
is added (See Table 6.15).
179 The players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra experienced the same interpersonal conflict 
with regard to the previous conductor and current conductor, owing to the vacancy of the 
conductor position.
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Table 6.14 Players of the BPO, CPO, and KSO’s styles of handling interpersonal 
____________________________ conflict_______________________________
Players of the BPO
Variables Integrating Obliging______ Dominating Avoiding Compromising
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Previous
conductor
3.26a 0.69 3.56a 0.54 2.26c 0.73 3.45a 0.70 3.00b 0.60 32.26***
Current
conductor
3.26a 0.73 3.54a 0.56 2.13C 0.64 3.50a 0.69 2.98b 0.60 42.51***
Peers 3.62a 0.63 3.61a 0.54 2.42b 0.81 3.76a 0.59 3.51“ 0.64 42.15***
Players of the CPO
Variables Integrating Obliging Dominating Avoiding Compromising F
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Previous
conductor
3.40a 0.61 3.81a 0.58 2.44b 0.64 3.60a 0.66 3.13* 0.81 30.39***
Current
conductor
3.29a 0.67 3.76a 0.55 2.38c 0.68 3.55* 0.64 2.95b 0.80 31.17***
Peers 3.72a 0.66 3.60a 0.59 2.45b 0.73 3.86* 0.54 3.60* 0.78 44.50***
Players of the KSO
Variables Integrating Obliging Dominating Avoiding Compromising P
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Previous
conductor
3.97b 0.60 4.20a 0.42 2.62d 1.03 3.98b 0.60 3.62°
3.95*
0.90 33.82***
Peers 4.12a 0.61 3.87a 0.61 2.61b 1.02 3.90* 0.61 0.69 36.76***
Note: *** indicates p < 0.001; according to the result of LSD multiple comparison, different 
groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed a s a b,c,ord.
Table 6.14 shows the results of repeated measured ANOVA, and there are statistic 
significant differences in each group player’s styles of handling interpersonal conflict 
with their previous conductor, current conductor, and peers, respectively.
LSD multiple comparison shows that the players of the BPO prefer to use an 
integrating, obliging, and avoiding styles rather than a compromising or dominating 
style to deal interpersonal conflict with their previous and current conductors, whereas 
they clearly use the dominating style less, compared to the other four styles in dealing 
with their interpersonal conflict with peers. The players of the KSO prefer to use an 
obliging style to manage interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor, meanwhile 
they have the same tendency as those of the BPO and CPO regarding styles of 
handling interpersonal conflict with peers. On the other hand, the players of the CPO 
prefer to use obliging, avoiding, integrating, and compromising, while they use 
dominating style less, in order to handle their interpersonal conflict with their previous 
conductor. They also use dominating style less compared to the other four styles when 
handling interpersonal conflict with their conductors. Their style of handling 
interpersonal conflict with peers is the same as the players of the BPO and KSO. The 
percentile norms of each group player’s styles of handling interpersonal conflict are 
presented in Tables 6.28, 6.29, and 6.30.
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Although this study was not designed to collect comments on the instruments of ROCI-I 
and II from the respondents, spontaneous comments were written on the paper of the 
survey. Some said that the questions180 of the ROCI-II (form A) regarding the styles of 
handling interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor and current conductor 
were inappropriate, so they took notes and suggested that I needed to study more 
about the orchestra before making this questionnaire because they (players) have 
almost no power/authority to decide on any matters, and to handle relationship with 
conductor, and they usually have to follow the decision of their conductor. This unequal 
relationship between players and conductors, and the limited role of the players, are 
frequently mentioned topics in orchestral studies: this tends to support the view of 
Levine and Levine (1996) on the power of the conductor as ‘omniscience’ (p. 19). Thus, 
it might be concluded that orchestral players in Korean municipal orchestras are using 
an obliging style, by which concern for other parties (conductors) is higher than that for 
themselves, and using a dominating style less,181 in order to handle their interpersonal 
conflict with conductors.
_____________ Table 6.15 Staff styles of handling interpersonal conflict____________
Integrating Obliging______ Dominating Avoiding______ Compromising
variables
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
A
Previous
conductor
3.86 0.61 3.17 0.47 2.30 0.42 3.00 0.24 3.00 0.71 7.05
Current
conductor
3.93 0.38 3.83 0.71 2.73 0.48 3.47 0.53 3.63 0.59 15.26“
Administrative
supervisor
3.91 0.32 3.80 0.56 2.88 0.65 3.58 0.42 3.75 0.58 13.86“
Peers 3.96 0.47 3.53 0.44 2.48 0.82 3.65 0.43 3.73 0.62 19.28“
Note: * indicates p < 0.05, “  indicates p < 0.01, *“  indicates p < 0.001.
Table 6.15 shows the mean (M), and standard deviation (SD) of the interpersonal 
conflict classified by group of staff, and the results of Friedman test. The results of the 
Friedman test show that there are statistic significant differences in staff’s interpersonal 
conflict with current conductor (X2 (df = 4) = 15.26, p = 0.004), administrative 
supervisor (X2 (df = 4) = 13.86, p = 0.008), and peers (X2 (df = 4) = 19.28, p = 0.001), 
respectively, whereas no statistic significant difference is found in staff's interpersonal 
conflict with previous conductor^2 (df = 4) = 7.05, p = 0.133). The Friedman test 
shows an overall significant difference in handling interpersonal conflict, but does not 
report where those differences occurred. However, it might be assumed based on the 
mean score that staff are likely to use a dominating style less, compared to the other
180 Such as 'I use my authority to make a decision in my favour’, or 'I often go along with the 
suggestions of my supervisor’.
181 The dominating style would mean their concerns for other parties were lower than those for 
themselves.
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four styles when dealing their interpersonal conflict with their previous conductor, 
current conductor, administrative supervisors, and peers.
Table 6.16 Staff of the CPO and KSO’s styles of handling interpersonal conflict162
Staff of the CPO
Variables Integrating Obliging Dominating Avoiding Compromising X2
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Current
conductor 3.89 0.14 4.17 0.56 2.95 0.38 3.71 0.48 3.94 0.13 10.19*
Administrative
Supervisor 3.86 0.12 4.08 0.62 3.05 0.47 3.67 0.47 4.00 0.00 9.47*
Peers 3.89 0.49 3.71 0.25 2.70 0.62 3.63 0.50 3.94 0.24 7.34
Staff of the KSO
Variables Integrating Obliging Dominating Avoiding Compromising X2
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Administrative
Supervisor 3.93 0.25 3.83 0.33 3.00 0.85 3.79 0.08 3.88 0.60 3.29
Peers 4.00 0.65 3.46 0.60 2.45 1.06 3.79 0.46 3.75 0.84 10.64*
Note: * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01; values of are from the result of Friedman test.
Table 6.16 shows the mean (M), and standard deviation (SD) of the five styles of 
handling interpersonal conflict, classified by staff of the CPO  and KSO, and the results 
of Friedman test. The results of the Friedman test show that there are statistically 
significant differences in handing styles of interpersonal conflict with their current 
conductor (X2 (df = 4) = 10.19, p = 0.037) and administrative supervisor (X2 (df = 4) = 
9.47, p = 0.050) in the case of the CPO: although the Fried man test does not indicate 
where those differences occurred, the staff of the CPO have a tendency that they use a 
dominating style less than an integrating, obliging, avoiding, or compromising style, in 
order to deal with interpersonal conflict with their current conductor.
There is no statistically significant difference in the case of staff of the KSO when 
handling their conflict with the administrative supervisor (X2 (df = 4) = 3.29, p = 0.510), 
while there is statistically significant difference in handing styles of interpersonal conflict 
with peers (X2 (df = 4) = 10.64, p = 0.031): there is a tendency that dominating style 
uses less, compared to the other four styles in dealing with their interpersonal conflict 
with peers. 182
182 Due to a limited sample number (n = 2), one-way analysis of variance was not conducted in 
the case of the BPO.
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Table 6.17 Players’ demographic variables and the subscales of ROCI-II with peers
Variables
IN OB DO AV CO
M± SD M± SD M l SD . ' M l SD M l SD
Age 21-30 3.65±0.58 3.63±0.49 2.4010.69 3.6310.41 3.6810.55
31-35 3.76+0.58 3.75±0.64 2.5210.95 3.8310.69 3.4410.77
36-40 3.66±0.75 3.6110.65 2.7610.66 3.8410.44 3.5610.68
Over 40 3.94±0.68 3.7310.59 2.3810.90 3.9110.60 3.8110.76
F-value 1.44 0.30 1.02 0.97 1.58
Marital Married 3.83±0.70 3.6810.60 2.4710.83 3.8010.57 3.6710.76
Status Single 3.82+0.60 3.7410.59 2.4810.91 3.9710.59 3.7310.68
t-value 0.06 -0.49 -0.08 -1.51 -0.41
Gender Male 3.98±0.66 3.7710.58 2.4610.84 3.8810.56 3.9310.68
Female 3.65+0.64 3.6310.60 2.4810.86 3.8110.60 3.4210.70
t-value 2.74** 1.25 -0.16 0.66 3.90***
Tenure less than 3.77±0.56 3.7510.62 2.5210.91 3.7510.56 3.6310.74
5 years
5-10 3.77±0.73 3.6510.59 2.6810.80 3.8110.65 3.8010.73
years
Over 10 3.86±0.69 3.7010.59 2.3810.84 3.9010.55 3.6610.74
years
F-value 0.29
_ r» rn ***
0.14 1.23 0.65 0.42
Note: ** indicates p < 0.01, *** indicates p < 0.001; IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, 
DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style.
Table 6.17 shows the mean score (M), and standard deviation (SD) of five styles of 
handling conflict with peers, and f-value and F-value, classified by demographic 
variables of players. Based on the independent f-test, there are statistically significant 
differences between the demographic variables of gender and integrating style (/ = 2.74, 
p < 0.01) and compromising style (t = 3.90, p < 0.001), respectively: male players are 
more likely to use an integrating style and compromising style than female players 
when handing conflict with peers.
Correlations (including inter-correlations) and multiple regression 
analyses
The following section presents correlations and multiple regression analyses related to 
job satisfaction, turnover, ROCI-I, and ROCI-II, classified by players and staff. The total 
sample numbers of each subscale are varied due to missing values.
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Table 6.18 Players’ correlations
Variables Turnover
JDI ROCI-I ROCI-II with peer
W P S Pr C o IP IG NG1 NG2 IN O B DO AV
ROCI-I
IP 0.231* -0.380*** -0.186* -0.176 -0.001 -0.130 1.000 \ \ \ \ \ \ \
IG -0.048 -0.107 -0.101 0.029 -0.051 0.037 0.188* 1.000 \ \ \ \ \ \
NG1 0.308** -0.107 -0.109 -0.064 -0.053 -0.150 0.212* 0.049 1.000 \ \ \ \ \
NG2 0.111 -0.214 -0.082 -0.199 -0.028 -0.012 0.227* 0.279* 0.600*** 1.000 \ \ \ \
ROCI-II
Peer
IN -0.068 0.185* -0.031 0.101 -0.090 0.305** -0.072 -0.151 0.053 0.008 1.000 \ \ \
O B -0.127 0.124 0.040 0.083 0.019 0.294** -0.070 -0.162 -0.007 -0.039 0.721*** 1.000 \ \
DO 0.102 0.070 0.083 -0.025 0.049 -0.003 0.058 -0.222* -0.020 0.091 0.097 -0.034 1.000 \
A V -0.033 0.022 -0.075 0.016 -0.141 0.131 0.021 0.005 0.079 -0.091 0.525*** 0.515*** -0.086 1.000
C O 0.021 0.124 -0.046 -0.008 -0.049 0.235* -0.049 -0.174 0.174 0.136 0.696*** 0.564*** 0.155 0.459***
ROCI-II
Current
conductor
IN 0.059 0.057 0.065 0.093 -0.018 -0.064 -0.002 -0.190 -0.127 -0.232* ROCI-II with Current c o n d u cto r
O B 0.169 -0.129 -0.157 -0.004 -0.162 -0.191 -0.189 -0.270* -0.123 -0.378** 0.444*** 1.000 \ \
D O -0.080 0.024 0.068 0.030 0.096 0.060 0.092 -0.110 -0.202 -0.041 0.206 -0.064 1.000 \
AV 0.041 -0.140 -0.058 -0.004 -0.059 -0.045 0.010 -0.410*** 0.033 -0.128 0.308** 0.531*** -0.066 1.000
C O 0.017 0.130 0.076 0.104 0.189 0.148 0.015 -0.027 0.018 0.146 0.576*** 0.050 0.431*** 0.063
ROCI-II
Previous
conductor
IN 0.048 0.122 0.060 0.088 -0.175 0.046 -0.167 -0.140 -0.064 -0.188 ROCI-II with Previous co n d u cto r
O B 0.097 -0.087 -0.078 -0.004 -0.249** 0.055 -0.226* -0.116 -0.193* -0.234* 0.510*** 1.000 \ \
D O 0.085 0.037 0.194* -0.003 0.061 -0.047 -0.023 -0.279** -0.031 -0.040 0.291** -0.058 1.000 \
A V 0.031 -0.071 -0.066 -0.023 -0.206* 0.081 -0.070 -0.143 -0.054 -0.127 0.340*** 0.551*** -0.096 1.000
C O 0.031 0.136 0.031 0.092 -0.070 0.147 -0.092 -0.058 0.077 0.095 0.659*** 0.150 0.446*** 0.109
Note: * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01, *** indicates p < 0.001.
Work (W), Pay (P), Supervision (S), Promotion (Pr), Co-workers (Co)
IP = intrapersonal conflict, IG = intragroup conflict, NG 1 = intergroup conflict with staff, NG 2 = intergroup conflict with civil servants 
IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style
Table 6.19 Staff correlations
V ariab les Turnover
JDI ROCI-I ROCI-II with peer
W P S Pr C o IP IG NG1 NG2 IN O B DO A V
ROC1-I
IP 0.083 0.297 0.557 0.410 0.217 0.274 1.000
IG 0.577 -0.246 -0.130 -0.346 0.033 -0.519 0.173 1.000
NG1 0.553 0.387 0.000 0.364 0.179 -0.147 0.674* 0.693* 1.000
NG2 0.534 0.368 -0.039 0.270 -0.160 -0.160 0.595 0.644 0.887** 1.000
ROCI-II
Peer
IN -0.216 -0.214 0.505 -0.096 0.059 0.480 0.578 -0.196 -0.022 0.036 1.000
O B -0.326 0.295 0.403 0.351 0.387 0.610 0.080 -0.603 -0.249 -0.138 0458 1.000
D O -0.395 -0.155 0.324 0.076 0.449 0.091 -0.717* -0.724* -0.809** -0.805** -0.171 0.542 1.000
AV -0.175 0.315 0.489 0.496 0.271 0.411 0.646 -0.420 0.167 0.214 0.682* 0.722* 0.119 1.000
C O -0.372 -0.064 0.391 -0.016 0.196 0.428 0.052 -0.569 -0.432 -0.327 0.704 0.812** 0.379 0.707*
ROCI-II
Adm inistrative
S u p erv isor
IN -0.226 0.246 0.112 0.437 -0.150 0.529 0.102 -0.677* -0.246 -0.249 ROCI-II with Adm inistrative su p e rv iso r
O B 0.171 0.009 0.006 -0.118 -0.245 -0.095 0.168 -0.197 -0.071 0.168 0.384 1.000
DO -0.607 0.071 0.498 0.264 0.599 0.261 -0.276 -0.786* -0.624 -0.599 0.205 0.180 1.000
A V 0.309 -0.215 0.074 -0.232 -0.111 -0.463 0.147 0.172 0.145 0.274 0.157 0.856** 0.040 1.000
C O -0.321 0.082 0.148 0.052 0.123 0.130 -0.064 -0.608 -0.449 -0.375 0.498 0.745* 0.632* 0.566
ROCI-II
Current
co n d u cto r
IN 0.145 0.342 -0.437 0.552 -0.310 0.438 -0.053 -0.790 -0.118 -0.153 ROCI-II with Current co n d u cto r
O B 0.685 0.086 -0.549 -0.088 -0.304 -0.521 0.079 -0.064 0.098 0.305 0.283 1.000
DO -0.267 0.304 -0.903* 0.146 0.425 -0.155 -0.649 -0.692 -0.568 -0.548 0.217 0.272 1.000
AV 0.810 -0.154 -0.492 -0.306 -0.221 -0.697 0.097 0.078 0.071 0.198 0.177 0.946** 0.173 1.000
C O 0.330 0.057 -0.902* -0.097 -0.015 -0.498 -0.419 -0.492 -0.401 -0.276 0.400 0.804 0 7 3 9 0.762
ROCI-II
Previous
co n d u cto r
IN \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ROCI-II with Previous co n d u cto r
O B \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 1.000
DO \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 1.000
A V \ \ \ \ \ \ V \ \ \ \ \ \ 1.000
C O \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
Note: * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01, *** indicates p < 0.001; it is impossible to conduct Pearson's correlation, due to low sample numbers of staff 
regarding ROCI-II against previous conductor.
Work (W), Pay (P), Supervision (S), Promotion (Pr), Co-workers (Co)
IP = intrapersonal conflict, IG = intragroup conflict, NG 1 = intergroup conflict with players, NG 2 = intergroup conflict with civil servants 
IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style
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Players’ correlation
Players’ correlation between JDI and ROCI-I183
The players’ Pearson correlation between the subscales of JDI and ROCI-I and the 
significance of each correlation coefficient are tested (see Table 6.18184).
There are two negatively significant correlations between job satisfaction and ROCI-I 
among 20 correlations: intrapersonal conflict and satisfaction with work (r = -0.380, p < 
0.001) and pay (r = -0.186, p < 0.05), respectively. Thus, these indicate that job 
satisfaction is not generally associated with the subscales of ROCI-I (see Table 6.18).
According to the result of the correlation, it was assumed that there might be a 
significant relationship between satisfaction with work and intrapersonal conflict and 
intergroup conflict, respectively. The results of multiple regression analysis, using 
subscales of JDI as predictors an intrapersonal conflict of ROCI-I as a dependent 
variable, shows that the overall relationship is significant (R2 = 0.087, F = 2.494, p = 
0.038), but there is only one negative significant relationship found, that of players' 
intrapersonal conflict being negatively related to work ((5 = -0.371, p = 0.008), which 
could mean that if player is satisfied with work, he/she has less perception of 
intrapersonal conflict.
P layers’ correlation between job satisfaction and ROCI-II with peers
The statistical result shows that although players’ job satisfaction is not generally 
associated with five styles of handling conflict with peers,185 there are four positive 
correlations between the players’ satisfaction with co-workers and integrating (r = 0.305 
p < 0.01), obliging (r = 0.294, p < 0.01), and compromising styles (r = 0.235, p < 0.05);' 
and the players’ satisfaction with work and integrating (r= 0.185, p < 0.05) when 
handling interpersonal conflict with their peers (see Table 6.18).
The overall result of multiple regression analysis between the players’ job satisfaction 
(predictors) and integrating style when handling interpersonal conflict with peers 
(dependent variable) is significantly related (R2= 0.094, F  = 3.433, p = 0.006): players' 
integrating style handling interpersonal conflict with peers is positively related to co­
workers (p = 0.306, p = 0.004), and it may be interpreted that players, who use a 
integrating style more in order to deal with their interpersonal conflict with their peers, 
are more satisfied with co-workers.
183 All results of multiple regression analysis are presented from Table 6.32 to Table 6.37 in the 
attached CD.
184 Adequate distinct validity is demonstrated and the Table also indicates whether or not each 
ROCI-I is significantly inter-related (see Table 6.18).
185 Among the 25 correlations, only four are significant.
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Players’ correlation between job satisfaction and ROCI-II with previous 
conductor
There are one positive and two negative correlations between the players’ job 
satisfaction and ROCI-II with their previous conductor: pay and dominating style (r = 
0.194, p < 0.05), promotion and obliging style (r = -0.249, p < 0.01), and promotion and 
avoiding style (r = -0.206, p < 0.05): if players are satisfied with their pay, they prefer to 
use dominating style to handle their interpersonal conflict with previous conductor; 
meanwhile, if players are satisfied with promotion, they use obliging and avoiding style 
less.
Players’ correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers
The players’ correlation between conflict styles and conflict handling styles with peers 
shows that there is a weak negative correlation between dominating style and 
intragroup conflict (r = -0.222, p < 0.05) (see Table 6.18). The remaining correlations 
are marginal, with no significance.
Players’ correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with current conductor
According to the players’ correlations between the four subscales of conflict (ROCI-I) 
and the styles of handling conflict with their current conductor (see Table 6.18), there 
are four correlations. Intragroup conflict and obliging style (r = -0.270, p < 0.05), 
intragroup conflict and avoiding style (r = -0.410, p < 0.001), intergroup conflict with civil 
servants and integrating style (r = -0.232, p < 0.05), and intergroup conflict with civil 
servants and obliging style (r = -0.378, p < 0.01) are negatively correlated. It could be 
interpreted that if players have more intragroup conflict, they use obliging and avoiding 
style less when handing interpersonal conflict with their current conductor. Furthermore, 
If players have more intergroup conflict with civil servants, they use integrating and 
obliging style less against their current conductor.
Multiple regression analyses were conducted regarding players’ different types of 
conflict (ROCI-I) and styles of handling interpersonal conflict with their current 
conductor. The first result of the analysis shows that there is an overall significant 
relationship between the players’ obliging style handing interpersonal conflict with their 
current conductor (dependent variable) and the four conflicts of ROCI-I (predictors) (R2 
= 0.144, F  = 4.116, p = 0.005). Players' intergroup conflict with civil servants is a 
negative predict or of obliging style (p = -0.397, p = 0.007): if players have more 
perception of intrapersonal conflict, they use less of an obliging style in dealing with 
interpersonal conflict with the conductor.
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In addition, there is a significant overall relationship between the players’ avoiding style 
when handing interpersonal conflict with the current conductor (dependent variable) 
and four conflicts of ROCI-I (predictors) (R2= 0.132, F = 3.803, p = 0.007) and players’ 
intragroup conflict is negatively related to avoiding style ((B = -0.389, p = 0.001). if 
players have more perception of intragroup conflict, players use an avoiding style less 
when handing interpersonal conflict with the current conductor.
Players’ correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with previous conductor
The results of the players’ correlations between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with previous 
conductor indicate four negative correlations: obliging style and intrapersonal conflict (r 
= -0.226, p < 0.05), intergroup conflict with staff (r = -0.193, p < 0.05), intergroup 
conflict with civil servants (r = -0.234, p < 0.05), respectively, as well as dominating 
style and intragroup conflict (r = -0.279, p < 0.01). The result of multiple regression 
analysis reveal the overall relationship between avoiding style (dependent variable) 
and four conflicts of ROCI-I (predictors) is significant (R2 = 0.114, F=  3.389, p = 0.014): 
there are negative significant relationship found, that of players’ intragroup conflict 
being negatively related to avoiding style ((3 = -0.335, p = 0.006), which could mean 
that if players have higher perception of intragroup conflict, he/she is unlikely to use an 
avoiding style when handling interpersonal conflict with the previous conductor.
Players’ correlation between job turnover and ROCI-I
There are positive correlations between the players’ job turnover and intrapersonal 
conflict (r = 0.231, p < 0.05) and intergroup conflict with administrative staff (r = 0.308, 
p  < 0.01) at the orchestral executive constitution: if players have higher intrapersonal 
conflict or intergroup conflict with the staff, they are likely to think of turnover (see Table 
6.18).
As is expected from the result of Pearson’s correlation between job turnover and ROCI- 
I, the result of this multiple regression analysis does produce an overall significance 
between job turnover (dependent variable) and ROCI-I (predictors) (R2= 0.114, F = 
3.421, p = 0.013), and job turnover is positively related to intergroup conflict (p = 0.368, 
p  = 0.010): if players have a perception of intergroup conflict, they are more often 
thinking of job turnover.
Players’ inter-correlation: ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers, current and previous 
conductor
Regarding the subscales of ROCI-I, intrapersonal conflict has a weak positive inter­
correlation with intragroup conflict (r = 0.188, p < 0.05), intergroup conflict with staff (r =
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0.212, p < 0.05), and intergroup conflict with civil servants (r = 0.227, p < 0.05), 
respectively. Intergroup conflict with civil servants is significantly related to intragroup 
conflict (r = 0.279, p < 0.05) and intergroup conflict with staff (r = 0.600, p < 0.001), 
respectively (see Table 6.18).
ROCI-II with peers has six significant inter-correlations (see Table 6.18). The inter­
correlations range between -0.086 and 0.721: players’ integrating style has strong 
positive relations with obliging style (r = 0.721, p < 0.001), compromising style (r = 
0.696, p < 0.001), and avoiding style (r= 0.525, p< 0.001), respectively; another strong 
positive inter-correlations are found between obliging style and avoiding style (r = 0.515, 
p < 0.001) and between obliging style and compromising style (r = 0.564, p < 0.001); 
finally, avoiding style and compromising style also have a positive inter-correlation (r = 
0.459, p < 0.001).
Table 18 also shows five inter-correlations of styles of handling interpersonal conflict 
with their current conductor. The inter-correlations range between -0.066 and 0.576: 
Integrating style and obliging style (r = 0.444, p < 0.001), integrating style and avoiding 
style (r = 0.308, p < 0.01), dominating style and compromising style (r = 0.431, p < 
0.001) have positive inter-correlations. In addition, integrating style and compromising 
style (r = 0.576, p < 0.001) and obliging style and avoiding style (r = 0.531, p < 0.001) 
have strong positive inter-correlations.
There are notable inter-correlations of the ROCI-II with previous conductor (see Table 
6.18), and the tendency is very similar to those of their current conductor. The inter­
correlations range between -0.960 and 0.659: Integrating style has a positive inter­
correlation with dominating style (r = 0.291, p < 0.01) and avoiding style (r = 0.340, p < 
0.001), respectively, and dominating style and compromising one (r = 0.446, p <0.001); 
in addition, integrating style has a strong positive inter-correlation with compromising 
style (r = 0.659, p < 0.001) and obliging style (r = 0.510, p < 0.001). Another strong 
positive inter-correlation is found between an obliging style and an avoiding style (r = 
0.551, p <  0.001).
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Staff’s correlation between JDI and ROCI-II with current conductor187
The staff’s Pearson correlation between the subscales of the JDI and ROCI-II with 
current conductor and the significance of each correlation coefficient is tested.
The result of Pearson’s correlation shows two strong negative correlations between 
pay and dominating style (r = -0.903, p < 0.05); and pay and compromising style (r = - 
0.902, p < 0.05): if staff are satisfied with current pay, they use dominating style and 
compromising style less when handling interpersonal conflict with current conductor.
Staff correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with the administrative supervisor188
The statistic result indicates that staff subscales of ROCI-I are not generally associated 
with the five styles of handling conflict (ROCI-II) with regard to their administrative 
supervisor, as only two correlations out of 20 are significant: and intragroup conflict 
have strong negative correlations with integrating style (r = -0.677, p < 0.05) and 
dominating style (r = -0.786, p < 0.05) (see Table 6.19).
Staff’s correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers
Staff’s ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers have four strong negative correlations: ROCI-II 
with peers and intrapersonal conflict (r = -0.717, p < 0.05), intragroup conflict (r = - 
0.724, p < 0.05), intergroup conflict with players (r = -0.809, p < 0.01), and intergroup 
conflict with civil servants (r = -0.805, p < 0.01), respectively (see Table 6.19). It can be 
interpreted that if staff have less interpersonal conflict with peers, they have more 
perception of intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict with players, 
and intergroup conflict with civil servants.
Staff’s inter-correlation: ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers, current and 
administrative supervisor
There are three significant inter-correlations of ROCI-I (see Table 6. 19): the result of 
Pearson correlation shows strong positive inter-correlations between intergroup conflict 
with players and intrapersonal conflict (r = 0.674, p < 0.05) and intragroup conflict (r = 
0.693, p < 0.05), respectively. In particular, intergroup conflict with players and 
intergroup conflict with civil servants have a very strong positive relationship (r = 0.887, 
p < 0.01): a member of the administrative staff who has a perception of intergroup 
conflict with regard to civil servants might have the same for intergroup conflict with the
186 Multiple regression analysis for staff is not conducted, due to the limited size of the sample.
187 Staff’s Job satisfaction (JDI) is not associated with ROCI-I, ROCI-II with peers, and ROCI-II 
with administrative supervisors. In addition, there is no significant correlation between staff’s job 
turnover and ROCI-I, ROCI-II with peers, ROCI-II with administrative supervisors, and ROCI-II 
with current conductor, respectively.
188 There is no correlation between ROCI-I and ROCI-II of staff with the current conductor
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players.
Regarding staff’s inter-correlations of ROCI-II with peers, there are four strong positive 
inter-correlations: obliging style and avoiding style (r = 0.722, p < 0.05), obliging style 
and compromising style (r = 0.812, p < 0.01), avoiding style and compromising style (r 
= 0.707, p < 0.05), and integrating style and avoiding style (r = 0.682, p < 0.05) 
respectively.
A  very strong positive inter-correlation of ROCI-II with current conductor is found 
between obliging style and avoiding style (r = 0.946, p < 0.01) (see Table 6.19): if staff 
prefer to use an obliging style to deal the conflict with their current conductor, they were 
also likely to use an avoiding style.
Three strong positive inter-correlations of ROCI-II with administrative supervisor are 
found between obliging style and avoiding style (r = 0.856, p < 0.01), obliging style and 
compromising style (r = 0.745, p < 0.05), and dominating style and compromising style 
(r = 0.632, p < 0.05) (see Table 6.19).
Thus, there is no correlation between job turnover and any form of ROCI-II (with 
previous conductor, current conductor, and peers189 in the cases of both players and 
staff.
Summary of survey findings
So far, the results of quantitative research have been given: three types of 
organisational conflict— intrapersonal, intragroup, and intergroup (with two variables), 
five styles of handling interpersonal conflict with their previous, current conductor, and 
peers (and administrative supervisor was added for staff), and its relationship with 
demographic characteristics were examined, along with correlation and multiple 
regression. This section summarises all the key findings.
The level of intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup conflict
Intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict classified by players and 
staff of three orchestras, and comparisons among players and staff and between 
players and staff were presented. The results of one-way analysis of variance (F) 
indicated each group of players and staff had no significant difference in intrapersonal 
conflict, intragroup conflict, or intergroup conflict with civil servants. However, in the 
case of each group of players, there was a statistically significant difference in
139 As well as administrative supervisor in the case of the staff.
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intergroup conflict with administrative staff: the players of the BPO and CPO  had a 
higher perception of intergroup conflict with their administrative staff, whereas those of 
the KSO had a lower perception of such conflict (see Table 6.5).
On the other hand, in the case of staff, there was no statistically significant difference in 
intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict with players, and intergroup 
conflict with civil servants (see Table 6.2, Table 6.4, Table 6.6, and Table 6.8).
Between groups of players and staff, there was no statistically significant difference 
found in intrapersonal conflict, intergroup conflict with staff (players), or intergroup 
conflict with civil servants, but staff had a higher perception of intragroup conflict than 
players (see Table 6.23).
The relative level of intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup 
conflict (with two variables)
Among intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict with staff, and 
intergroup conflict with civil servants, the players of Korean municipal orchestras had 
different levels of these conflicts: they had more perception of intergroup conflict with 
staff than intergroup conflict with civil servants, intragroup conflict, and intrapersonal 
conflict (see Table 6.10). On the other hand, staff show no significant difference among 
these four facets (see Table 6.10).
Regarding each group of players, each group had a statistically significant difference 
among four facets based on the result of F-test. According to the LSD test, the players 
of the BPO and KSO had less perception of intrapersonal conflict than the other facets, 
while those of the CPO  had more perception of intergroup conflict with staff compared 
to intergroup conflict with civil servants, intragroup conflict, and intrapersonal conflict 
(see Table 6.11): thus, the CPO  needs to pay attention to the sources of the conflict 
between players and staff in order to improve the relationship.
The styles of handling conflict with the previous conductor, current conductor, 
and peers (the administrative supervisor is added for staff)
Regarding the styles of handling interpersonal conflict, groups of players prefer to use 
an obliging style when handing conflict with the previous conductor and current 
conductor, whereas they prefer to use integrating and avoiding style when handing 
conflict with peers. Interestingly, players are prefer not to use a dominating style—  
which implies selfishness—to handle interpersonal conflict with conductors and peers 
(see Table 6.13).
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Players of the BPO and CPO preferred to use an obliging, avoiding, and integrating 
style, while players of the KSO preferred to use an obliging style to deal with 
interpersonal conflict with the previous conductor and current conductor. Except for 
dominating style, the other four handling styles were adopted to deal with players’ 
interpersonal conflict with peers (see Table 6.14).
Each group of players chose an obliging style— which implies self-sacrifice—to deal 
with interpersonal conflict with conductors, and it implied an unequal position between 
players and conductor. Korean municipal orchestras have a hierarchical structure that 
facilitates the conductor’s and supervisor’s wishes, and the conductor holds a position 
of great authority. Thus, orchestral players have to obey the conductor without 
complaint or challenge, as it is a rule of the orchestra (although they are sometimes 
frustrated by this relationship).
Because of frequent critical talk about the previous conductor among players of the 
BPO, different styles of handling conflict between the previous conductor and current 
conductor were expected, but players chose the same way of dealing with their conflict 
with conductors (see Table 6.14): whether or not the conductor was severe and 
arrogant, the conductor was superior to the players and they had to accept the 
conductor’s musical direction.
The link between players’ types of conflicts and demographic characteristics, 
and styles of handling conflict together with demographic characteristics
The players’ demographic variables and the subscales of ROCI-I were analysed by 
one-way variance (F), independent f-test, and three statistically significant differences 
were found: between gender and intrapersonal conflict; and between gender and 
intergroup conflict with staff and civil servants, respectively. It could be interpreted that 
male players have a higher perception of intrapersonal conflict and intergroup conflicts 
than female players (see Table 6.12).
Meanwhile, players’ demographic variables and styles of handling conflict (ROCI-II) 
with peers had two significant differences: male players preferred to use an integrating 
style and compromising style in order to deal with interpersonal conflict with peers, 
compared to female players (see Table 6.17).
The relationship between job satisfaction, ROCI-I, ROCI-II, and turnover
Players’ inter-correlations of ROCI-I are positively associated: among the 6 inter­
correlations, 5 are significant (see Table 6.18). The inter-correlations of ROCI-II (with 
the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers, respectively) are generally 
associated: ROCI-II with peers and with previous conductor have 6 positive
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significances out of 10, while ROCI-II with current conductor has 5 positive 
significances (see Table 6.18).
The overall result of multiple regression analysis indicates that players’ job satisfaction 
and ROCI-I are significantly associated: players’ work has a negative relationship with 
intrapersonal conflict190; there is also an overall relationship between players’ job 
satisfaction with co-worker and ROCI-II with peers; players’ ROCI-I is significantly 
associated with interpersonal conflict against the current conductor; in addition, there is 
overall significance in the result of multiple regression analysis regarding turnover and 
intergroup conflict of ROCI-I, whereas turnover and ROCI-II with the previous 
conductor, current conductor, and peers (see Table 6.18) do not have any correlation, 
and multiple regression analysis was not conducted. The summary of those relations 
is given in Table 6.20.
Table 6.20 Players’ relations to job satisfaction, ROCI-I, ROC|-||. and turnover— ------------- .--—'--------' WWI "M «mu m mvvpi
Overall relation of multiple regression analysis
Job satisfaction and ROCI-I Significant
Work and IP: neaative
Job satisfaction and ROCI-II with peers Significant
Co-worker and IN: positive
Turnover and ROCI-I Not significant
ROCI-I and ROCI-II with current conductor Significant
NG2 and OB: negative 
IG and AV: negative
Note: IP = intrapersonal conflict, IG = intragroup conflict, NG2 = intergroup conflict with civil 
servants; IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, AV = avoiding style.
The staff’s inter-correlation of ROCI-I is generally associated (among 6 inter­
correlations, 3 have a strong positive relations); inter-correlation of ROCI-II with peers 
(4 inter-correlation out of 10) and with administrative supervisors (3 inter-correlation out 
of 10) are generally associated, but the inter-correlation of ROCI-II with the current 
conductor are not generally associated (only one inter-correlation out of 10).
Staff job satisfaction and ROCI-II with current conductor have two negative correlations; 
staff ROCI-I and ROCI-II with peers have four negative correlations; and ROCI-I and 
ROCI-II with administrative supervisor have two negative correlations. However, staff 
job satisfaction and ROCI-I, job satisfaction and ROCI-II with peer, job satisfaction and 
administrative supervisors, turnover and ROCI-II with peer, with administrative 
supervisors, and with current conductor have no correlation.
6.4 Results of qualitative research interviews
This section presents the results of interviews, classified according to intrapersonal
190 Rahim (2004) states that intrapersonal conflict seems to create dissatisfaction 
this applies in the case for players of Korean municipal orchestras.
with work, and
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conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup conflict, from the point of view of players, 
administrative staff, and civil servants.
Intrapersonal conflict
All the orchestras (under consideration) have two powerful management structures191: 
the orchestral executive constitution and the city hall are the managerial bodies for the 
CPO  and BPO, while the Audience Business Team192 and the KBS undertake those 
roles for the KBS Symphony Orchestra. The orchestral executive constitution is a core 
management team, in charge of most managerial work, ranging from mailings to 
annual concert plans, and is a confident supporter of the orchestra. It also acts as a 
mediator among civil servants, conductors and players. Although some Korean 
researchers have criticised the non-existence of an independent orchestral executive 
constitution and of non-professional staff, which could maintain stable administrative 
practice, it seems that the criticism no longer applies to the current situation facing 
Korean orchestras. The majority of Korean municipal orchestras have an executive 
constitution with differing numbers of support staff. It is difficult to define the term 
‘professional staff’. However, professional staff,193 to most Korean researchers, means 
staff who have knowledge or experience in music or arts administration. According to 
Won-Chul Park’s survey in 2004,194 46.22% of staff are music graduates, while 16.8% 
work in administration, 6% in accounting, and 4% in marketing (p. 42).
I was the only member of the administrative staff of the Changwon 
Philharmonic Orchestra in 1987 when it was a private symphony 
orchestra...without salary, I worked with pride...But now, there are specialised 
position (within the orchestral executive constitution) and salaries have been 
increased...the achievement of the Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra has 
been increased, and job satisfaction too...
[Staff Member 1]
As the above narrative indicates, the role and organisational structure of the orchestral 
executive constitution was trivial in the early period. The orchestral executive 
constitution of Korean symphony orchestras did not exist from the beginning. It has 
gradually emerged because of the complexity of running an orchestra.
191 This study considers this dual management structure as a source of intrapersonal conflict, 
but it could also be a source of intergroup conflict, in terms of the task interdependence of the 
dual management structure of Korean municipal orchestras.
192 It plays a role as an orchestral executive constitution, and is considered a part of 
departments of the KBS company.
193 100% of the staff of the orchestral executive constitution of the CPO are music graduates, 
and approximately 60% of the BPO are music graduates, whereas the KBS has no music 
graduates.
’94 He surveyed the academic background of orchestral executive constitution's staff among 
nine Korean orchestras in 2004.
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Table 6.21 The year of format on of the current organisational structure
Name of orchestra KBS Seoul Suwon Daegu Ulsan Busan Changwon
Foundation 1956 1945 1982 1964 1990 1962 1991
Current structure 1981 1988 2002 1987 1996 1992 1997
(Source: Park, 2004: p. 40)
With the formation of the organisational structure of Korean symphony orchestras, the 
total number of administrative staff has gradually increased. Therefore, it may be seen 
that there has been a growth in the orchestral executive constitutions of Korean 
symphony orchestras, regardless of their effectiveness.
Table 6.22 The number of administrative staff in the orchestral executive constitution
Year 19931 2000* 20043 2009
Busan Philharmonic Orchestra 4 6 7 9
Chanawon Philharmonic Orchestra 1 5
KBS Symphony Orchestra4 10 12 15 -
458-59)
The orchestral executive office does a lot of things... making a budget plan, 
applying for a budget, setting the yearly schedule of players, planning for the 
concert schedule, selecting a guest player, making a contract, publicity, 
checking the presence and absence of players, arranging auditions, purchasing 
scores and music instruments...everything (related to the matters of orchestral 
management) is handled by the orchestral executive office...
[Staff Member 5]
It is evident that the orchestral executive constitutions of Korean orchestras have 
gradually changed in visible aspects (such as size, name, or task). Despite self­
development and the importance of the role of the orchestral executive constitution, its 
deficiencies have not changed. The orchestral executive constitution is at the centre of 
the management of the whole orchestra, but the administrative authority of Korean 
municipal orchestras lies with the city and its staff, and the orchestral executive 
constitution can only decide on limited matters. The following narratives explain the 
multiple lines of authority, which cause a lack of authority in the executive constitution.
[There is] no authority for decision making regarding whole tasks...If I make a 
pamphlet or placard, all final decisions are up to the city hall...
[Staff Member 3]
If the orchestra needs to buy an instrument or music score, I prepare 
everything to get permission from the Executive Director...the process of 
buying something is very complicated.
[Staff Member 4]
The orchestral executive constitution has much work to do; meanwhile there is 
nothing that can be done (by the orchestral executive constitution)...No 
authority of decision making...when a conductor wants to choose a soloist for 
5 million won (£2,500), we need to get a permit from a civil servant...if civil 
servant says, ‘no, there is no money’, then we cannot invite that soloist...the
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administrative system of the orchestra is a duality... there is an orchestral 
manager (in the executive constitution)...he/she does not seem to take charge 
of orchestra management...it’s like winding up (civil servant’s affairs) not 
managing the orchestra's managerial affairs...
[Staff Member 6]
These narratives explain some lack of decision making, along with the highly 
bureaucratic structures and dual management figures. On the one hand, the role of the 
orchestral executive constitution is significant in orchestral management; on the other, 
all final artistic decisions are made by the conductor and the city,195 and financial and 
personnel decisions are made by the city. Although other parties give their input, the 
final say always lies with the city (and the KBS for the KBS Symphony Orchestra). This 
is different to traditionally structured western orchestras, in which managers play a key 
role in the running of an orchestra, in decision making processes and final decision 
making: the board of orchestral management, working with others, acts as a decision 
maker and implementer.196 Thus, the dual management figures of Korean municipal 
orchestras, which are the main cause of lack of authority, can be seen as a problem 
which is likely to lead to managerial inefficiency.
Regarding intrapersonal conflict among administrative staff, I asked Staff Member 2 
several times whether or not administrative staff have conflicting relationships, and he 
always replied ‘no’. Then, after several informal meetings, unexpected conflicting 
relationships between administrative staff were mentioned, whereby staff suffered from 
communication difficulties with colleagues related to work: in particular, shortages of 
staff appear to influence the relationship between them. According to the statistical 
result on intrapersonal conflict of administrative staff (see Table 6.2), it could be 
concluded that each group of staff has experienced a similar level of intrapersonal 
conflict related to these orchestral government structures.
Intragroup conflict 
Players’ intragroup conflict
There are deeply rooted relationship conflicts and a good deal of distrust between 
players and principal conductors, and this has been evidenced by the frequent changes 
of principal conductor197 throughout the history of Korean municipal orchestras.
195 The role of the city in all artistic matters is a formal process of decision making, and the 
conductor has the entire influence on artistic matters.
196 However, there are different models, where the balance of power between Executive Director 
and the senior managers depends on a number of factors.
197 Although the final say always lies with the city, players’ opinion is partly reflected in the 
conductor’s contract renewal: if the cities want to extend the contract, they may consider the 
opinion of players.
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Our previous conductor was so personal (it might be inferred as selfishness) 
and likely to ignore players...he would like to appeal to others, especially 
government officials...he showed himself off...but he never cared about the 
player’s poor welfare, particularly regarding salary... I admitted that the player’s 
performing ability might not reach the expectation of the principal 
conductor...(however) he commented on such a thing (player’s performance) 
in an extremely irritating way...‘You cannot play such a easy thing! If I were 
you, I would disembowel myself’....So, some players got very angry at the 
conductor, and left...if a player’s performance is so bad, (I understand) he can 
say so, but the way of speaking...if the conductor requests how they should 
play, then players can understand that they are not fools, but he (conductor) 
always speaks in that way...this situation was (repeatedly) over and over 
again...
[Player 5]
Player 5 describes the rudeness of the conductor’s attitude toward players and the 
limitations of the player’s actions against the conductor. When Player 5 told me about 
this, he could not contain his emotions, and he still harboured negative feelings 
towards his previous conductor.
Player 2 also described a similar attitude on the part of the conductor in the following 
narrative.
Yes, we had a problem with a previous conductor, especially due to the 
conductor s arbitrariness and complacency. Our previous conductor went to the 
city hall and complained that the players’ salaries were too high, whereas his 
salary was too low. He used violent language, and indulged in personal 
remarks to players...And concerts were for himself (to show off) ...In addition, 
he did not take part with the players...therefore, (it can be said that) players 
were almost attacked by the conductor...but there was not much that the 
players could do when they were personally insulted by the conductor in the 
middle of a rehearsal...practically, there is an audition which is related to a 
conductor...so it is difficult to talk or fight back with a conductor, unless a 
player wants to quit the orchestra...the only thing players can do is leave the 
place...the players' action is very passive...(because) stronger action can be a 
problem (as it may be reported to the city or the orchestral office), and players 
control themselves...He made a conflicting relationship with players in every 
orchestra he worked...when a city needed to dismiss problematic players, then 
cities employed 'XXXX’198...that is, municipal orchestras only employ him when 
they need a rearrangement of the orchestra...199
[Player 2]
Player 2 indicated similar points to Player 5, stating that the previous conductor treated 
players unfairly, and without any respect, whilst creating unequal relationships. As 
Levine and Levine (1996) explained, challenging the conductor’s position was seen as 
taboo, and musicians and conductors pretended that the conductor stood on the 
podium by divine right, in order to prevent things from degenerating into chaos, thus 
internalising behavioural norms and taboos and protecting that authority from any 
challenge (p. 19). Therefore, it can be seen that there are not many things that
198 The conductor mentioned by the player is not named for ethical reasons.
199 His comments on the conductor seem exaggerated.
musicians can do against the wishes of the conductor, as the conductor has complete 
authority and controlling power over them. Visible conflict, such as assertive verbal 
attacks could be seen as having relatively high conflict intensity (see Figure 6.4). As 
Levine and Levine (1996) say, this might be one of the reasons why the players in 
symphony orchestras are not smiling.
Conflicts between players and conductor could be seen on different occasions. In the 
current government system, the principal conductor has complete authority in terms of 
artistic decisions, and he has a certain power in auditioning players. Therefore, the 
conflict of players with the conductor is partly caused by auditions, because players 
believe that a conductor judges a player not only by his/her musical ability, but also by 
their private relationship. One interviewee explained an episode which showed a 
conductor’s partial judgment of players.
Once, a principal conductor asked us to have individual interviews right after 
his appointment. He said, ‘ok, you are grade F, because your performance is 
good but your personality does not fit in with an orchestra... you are grade A  
because you are diligent and have a good relationship with other players’. In 
addition, the conductor has the authority to choose examiners for audition, and 
the examiners are generally appointed 3 or 4 days before the audition and they 
almost decide the result of the audition in advance based on the conductor's 
opinion of the players. As a result, 5 or 6 players quit their job, either before the 
audition or after the audition.
[Player 3]
A  conductor in Korea is like a family member, and players need to follow the 
conductor’s schedule.... Conductors looks at a player as an individual 
(probably this means that the conductor builds up personal friendship with 
players who are in his side), whereas a conductor in Germany is like an invited 
guest and he/she gives consideration to the players’ schedule.200
[Player 4]
According to Player 5, Player 2 and Player 3, an audition judged by the conductor 
cannot readily be objective if the conductor has a personal relationship with players. In 
addition, it seems that conductors in Korea have the power to control players in terms 
of auditions, and the relationship between the player and conductor cannot be equaled. 
This might result from the government structure of most Korean municipal orchestras, 
as there is no position which can control and compete with the conductor.
As Player 2 said, players cannot do many things against a mighty conductor. However, 
when the players’ conflict reaches the top, they can unite and show strong reaction 
against conductors, such as a signature collecting campaign to expel their conductor, 
or putting in place a concert boycott. Even though there is contradictory opinion among
205
200 This may not address every orchestra in Germany.
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players regarding a concert boycott, players occasionally show their unhappy feelings 
about some decisions to the principal conductor by boycotting certain concerts. Some 
players prefer to solve the conflict through a conversation rather than this, because 
they believe that their main role is to provide concerts for people, and boycotting 
concerts leads to the reduction of concerts which contradicts this aim. On the other 
hand, some players are probably against boycotting concerts because it means losing 
their extra income.
From the above narratives, auditions which could be an external threat (Rahim, 1986) 
or a territorial violation201 seem another source of conflict; the following examples show 
varying opinions on audition.
I don’t think auditioning is a burden. Only players who do not have enough 
musical ability as an orchestra member say that...In fact, the orchestra hardly 
dismisses players, and there is nearly no player dismissal unless he/she loses 
his fingers! ...So orchestral auditions should open the door to every part (not 
only be open to the vacant position).
[Player 5]
To improve orchestra’s performance level, auditions should be open to all 
positions...the current audition system doesn't work properly... (players are) 
hardly being fired because of the audition in practice...(but) players have the 
burden of a grade decided by audition result...
[Civil Servant 1]
Although Player 5 and Civil Servant 1 think auditions are needed for the artistic 
development of the orchestra, most players are against having a regular audition, due 
to its ineffectiveness and their pride:
...if auditions are a really useful and effective way to improve the performance 
level of the orchestra, Korean orchestras should be the world’s top orchestras by 
now, as we have had auditions every 2-3  years...
[Player 6]
While auditions are not a source of conflict to Player 5 and Civil Servant 1, they are to 
Player 6. This opposite view on conflict is supported by Robbins (2001) that ‘Conflict 
must be perceived by the parties to it; whether or not conflict exists is a perception 
issue’ (p. 383).
So far, we have been looking at various relationship conflicts between players and 
conductor: the main source of conflict was derived from the conductor’s obstinate 
attitudes, and the authority structure, which gives enormous authority to the principal 
conductor. Thus, the intragroup conflict between players and conductor, from the
201 Handy (1999: p. 304) explains a territorial violation thus: 'If in one’s job, territory is either 
taken away or infringed upon by another group, there will be retaliation and conflict’.
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players’ point of view, could reach a relatively high intensity level, according to the 
following Figure.
Figure 6.4 Conflict intensity continuum
Annihilatory
Conflict — — Overt efforts to destroy the other party
— Aggressive physical attacks
— Threats and ultimatums
— Assertive verbal attacks
— Overt questioning or challenging of others
— Minor disagreements or misunderstandings
No conflict —
(Source: Robbins, 2001: p. 391)
Intergroup conflict
The results of interviews show that Korean municipal orchestras have more episodes 
related to intergroup conflict, compared to the other two conflicts. This section presents 
players’ intergroup conflict with civil servants and the orchestral executive constitution, 
and the intergroup conflict of administrative staff at orchestral executive constitution 
with players and conductors. Civil servants’ intergroup conflict with player, conductor, 
and administrative staff will be explained, along with different sources of intergroup 
conflict.
Players’ intergroup conflict with civil servants
Generally speaking, players hardly have chance to have any direct contact with a civil 
servant. However, they have a strong prejudice against civil servants, believing they 
are ignorant of the arts (especially referring to music), and cannot or do not want to 
understand the arts and musicians. A  player in the CPO  who holds a position of the 
Regional Head of the labour union and often liaises between civil servants and players 
gives one example of how civil servants think of players and the work of the orchestra:
When I talked about salaries with a civil servant, he told me, ‘players’ working 
is different to us... we start work at 9am and finish it at 6pm. But players only 
work a very short time compared to us’. However, you know... even though we 
don’t play, it does not mean that we are not practicing...this kind of thought 
makes a conflict with the civil servant... the civil servant thinks that the 
orchestra is not a productive organisation as there is no product (it probably 
refers to the fact that the orchestra does not provide a visible result)...it is such 
a communistic idea... but what we (players) provide is a cultural product...And 
if we appeal in terms of what we are producing, civil servants cannot 
understand, as they are not experts (especially about music) and do not want 
to listen to what we are saying...The way of thinking is quite different... The 
city reduced the number of concerts due to a lack of money, and then blamed 
us for not playing and having free time. Frankly speaking, we (players) do not
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complain about having more concerts, because playing is our job.
[Player 10]
As a representative of the players, I sometimes meet civil servants to speak for 
our players...But I cannot communicate with them...so I often argue...
[Player 5]
...musicians...they have a convenient job where they only have to work for 4 
hours...then they complain about their salary. The players in our orchestra work 
from 10am to 1pm...the salary, based on 3-4 hour daily activity, is not little.
[Civil Servant 1]
The above comments show how players distrust civil servants and the relationships 
that exist between them. Player 10's remarks indicate the differences in the perceptions 
of civil servants, regarding ‘working time’ and ‘orchestras'. Working time, to players, 
includes official attendance time, as well as free time (because they are also practicing 
or give lessons that relate to music activities), whereas civil servants calculate players’ 
working time based on official attendance time from 10:00 to 17:00.202As Civil Servant 
1 mentioned, civil servants think players’ salaries are too high, compared to themselves, 
while players consider their visible working time to be only a part of their working time. 
There is another different perception with regard to orchestras: civil servants think that 
an orchestra is a non productive organisation, as music is invisible, while players firmly 
believe that orchestras provide a cultural product. Differences in perception as a 
potential source of organisational conflict are mentioned by Smith (1966) and Mullins 
(2007). Meanwhile, Player 5 describes the experience of communication difficulty and 
a lack of communication with civil servants. Robbins (2001) and Handy (1999) saw 
poor communication as a potential source of conflict and Robbins (2001) argued that 
‘the potential for conflict increases when either too little or too much communication 
takes place’ (p. 386).
From the above narrative we can see two key sources of intergroup conflicts between 
players and civil servants: differences in perception and poor communication between 
players and civil servants.
Players’ intergroup conflict with the staff at the orchestral executive constitution
There are different degrees of conflict in the relationships between players and the
orchestral executive constitution in different orchestras. According to the results of 
interviews among players and administrative staff, the CPO, BPO and KBS Symphony 
Orchestras share common relationship conflicts: players complain about the 
unpleasant attitudes of the administrative staff and misunderstandings related to 
auditions or orchestra regulations. Along with these matters, the unique relationship
202 This is official working time to players in most municipal orchestras, whereas actual working 
time is generally from 10am to 1pm.
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conflict within the KBS Symphony Orchestra was derived from significant issues in 
terms of the orchestra’s independence from the KBS. The players and administrative 
staff of the BPO and CPO mentioned each other’s positive and negative points, 
whereas those of the KBS Symphony Orchestra (KSO) merely complained about the 
others. Both players and administrative staff said that if staff were music graduates, it 
was better for the operation of the orchestra, and also helped in understanding each 
other, and might reduce conflict. Thus, according to the results of the interviews 
conducted, it appears that the BPO and CPO  have fewer degrees of relationship 
conflict, compared to the KSO. However, my expectation as to the degree of 
intergroup conflict between players and staff was wrong, based on the results of 
quantitative research: among the three municipal orchestras, the players of the BPO 
and CPO have the higher perception of intergroup conflict with their administrative 
staff, and the players of the KSO have the lower perception of conflict (with statistical 
significance, see Table 6.5): it can be interpreted that the players of the KSO are more 
likely to understand their administrative staff (otherwise, the players simply hide their 
real feelings in order to avoid the problematic situation produced by their answer). On 
the other hand, there is no statistically significant difference found among staff of the 
BPO, CPO, and KSO: each group of staff of the three orchestras has a similar degree 
of intergroup conflict with their players (see Table 6.6).
Apart from analysing all staff’s intergroup conflict with players, I also divided the group 
of staff into two parts: music graduate and non-music-graduate group; and the results 
of the f-test and the Mann-Whitney test showed that there was no statistically 
significant difference between them regarding intergroup conflict with players (t = 1.03, 
p = 0.339; U = 6.50, p = 0.381) (see Table 6.24); thus, it can be concluded that 
whether or not the member of administrative staff is a music graduate does not affect 
their intergroup conflict with their players.
Players generally believe that the orchestral administration office should help players 
both physically and mentally; administrative staff should provide a comfortable practice 
environment, both in the home residence and in external venues, in order for them to 
play without any disturbance; and the administrative office should represent the 
situation of the players and should have a role as a mediator, connecting players and 
the city. However, some players feel that administrative staff have more regard for the 
city’s opinion than for that of the players, and do not deliver the opinion of players to 
the city; thus such an attitude on the part of the administrative office indirectly helps to 
create unpleasant decisions (such as unwanted concert engagements).
...the orchestral executive constitution has to represent player’s standpoints,
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instead of just reading the city’s countenance...Administrative staff should look 
at players from a musical point of view, not as part of a superior and inferior 
relationship...
[Player 11]
This interviewee was discontented with the attitude of the administrative staff towards 
the players, because of a feeling that administrative staff look down on them.
There was no serious conflict relationship with administrative staff. However, 
one conductor believed and trusted the staff who were in charge of planning, 
so that he named himself as chief of planning203 and acted as if he had 
power...(but) the orchestra office did not have him under its thumb, although I 
don’t know what it looked like from outside, and what he wanted to do with the 
B P O ...Anyway, he could not greatly influence the players...also the 
administrative staff tended to be on the side of (our previous) conductor and 
the city, so the conflict between players and administrative staff was becoming 
worse.
[Player 5]
The two remarks above show that conflict between players and the administrative staff 
is caused by unpleasant attitudes toward players. Mullins (2007), Rahim (1986), and 
Reynecke and Fourie (2001) support the idea that attitudes can be a potential source 
of organisational conflict. Although Player 5 dislikes the attitude of one administrative 
staff member, the conflict intensity seems moderate. On other hand, the players of the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra express great anger toward the Audience Business Team, 
with no positive evaluation of the managerial affairs of the KBS Audience Business 
Team.
We have so many conflicts with the Audience Business Team 204 ...The 
Audience Business Team can be seen as a representative of the KBS...the 
team leader only forces the idea of the KBS onto us (regardless of our 
opinion)...
[Player 12]
There was a ‘KBS 80th Anniversary Concert’...it could be a very important 
event for the KBS...awful plan and an accompaniment for a (popular music) 
singer...the programme for that concert was not decided even a week before... 
haphazard and time consuming are the ways they work...
[Player 3]
...we don’t have a serious conflict with administrative staff, but we feel very 
bad when the preparation for performance is not well planned...
[Player 13]
Player 12 and Player 3 are dissatisfied with the Audience Business Team, owing to that 
team’s inefficient work: Player 3 is especially disappointed that the KBS did not give
203 A  Planning Chief in the BPO is practically in charge of the orchestral office, and the 
Orchestral Manager or Managing Director is another job title that other orchestras use
204 The Audience Business Team of the KBS Symphony Orchestra acts as an orchestral 
executive constitution.
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them an important task in an important ceremony, and gave the role of accompanist to 
popular music singers. Although players dislike the result, they do not reveal this 
conflict through their behaviour. Player 13 also indicated that there was disorganised 
concert preparation. Due to this, she might think that administrative staff are uncaring 
with regard to players. Again, players do not take any action over this inefficient 
preparation of work by the orchestral executive constitution: players have to see the 
staff everyday, and sometimes they need help from the orchestra office. Moreover, 
administrative staff observe players’ everyday life in order to record players’ journals 
(which is reflected slightly in the marks of auditions), so that players may not reveal 
their angry feelings, as long as they can tolerate the situation.
The orchestral executive constitutions of the CPO and BPO play roles as mediators 
between players and the city, whereas the KBS Symphony Orchestra’s Audience 
Business Team does not act like this, as it is a direct department of the KBS, and the 
team represents the idea of the KBS. Thus, because of this mediator role, I anticipated 
that the players of the KBS Symphony Orchestra would have higher intergroup conflict 
with their administrative staff than those of the BPO and CPO, but the results are 
reversed: as was indicated earlier, the players of the KSO have the less intergroup 
conflict with administrative staff, whereas the players of the BPO and CPO  have the 
higher (see Table 6.5).
Thus far, we have been looking at the relationship between players and the orchestral 
executive constitution, mainly from players’ viewpoints. There is a different story of 
intergroup conflict from the viewpoint of administrative staff of the orchestral executive 
constitution.
Intergroup conflict of administrative staff
There is another example of intergroup conflict due to different perceptions about the 
task of the orchestral executive constitution. According to the administrative staff, the 
orchestral office was given the authority to control and supervise the players. Therefore, 
administrative staff warn or legally restrain players. They know that players see these 
actions negatively. There is a regulation concerning the outside activities of players, 
which means the players’ time needs to be checked with the office’s schedule in 
advance. If a player has an external ensemble or concerts, it could be a plus point to 
his/her audition, as a part of the player's duties, but players consider the regulation as 
a way for the administrative staff to restrict the player’s freedom. Thus, on the one hand, 
the regulation can be a controlling tool over players; on the other hand, it could be a 
useful tool, if players report their external activities to their office; in addition, the 
regulation can be recognised as a conflict for players, not but for administrative staff (or
civil servants) (Robbins, 2001).
There are many misunderstandings and miscommunications between administrative 
staff and players in terms of auditions. One administrative member of staff insisted that 
although they did not have any power to influence audition results, some current 
players considered administrative staff as spies, reporting their everyday life to a 
conductor or a city. However, players who have an audition for a vacancy 
misunderstand the role of administrative staff. As auditions are a sensitive matter, the 
orchestra needs to open its audition process, and the results of this, so as to reduce 
miscommunication and to avoid unpleasant experiences.
Relatively high conflict occurred in relation to the CPO's audition in 2006, as it led to a 
few players’ resignations. The staff of the CPO  described it as follows:
...there was an audition last year (2006) and we had a conflict with a few 
players. The principal conductor, orchestra leader and myself participated in 
the interview, but the players disliked my attendance [...] my role was to 
confirm the attendance of players, not to discover someone’s fault [...] it was a 
pretty hard experience during which I was attacked by players through internet 
slander related to the audition...
[Staff Member 1]
an unpleasant relationship with players relating to an audition made it difficult 
to devote myself to the orchestra...and these relationships made me worried 
about my ability as a staff.
[Staff Member 2]
This conflict was due to the audition in 2006. An audition is a most sensitive matter to 
the players, and an audition as a kind of environmental change is a source of conflict, 
leading to communication difficulties and misunderstandings between players and 
administrative staff. The players who attacked Staff Member 1 showed their intergroup 
conflict through Internet slander and distrust.
Players, conductors, the city, and the orchestral executive constitution all have different 
perceptions regarding auditions: players regard an audition as a tool of control, 
whereas others think of it as a chance to develop the performance level of the 
orchestra. Thus, one may suppose that there will always be such relationship conflict 
between orchestras (as employers) and players (as employees) so long as the current 
system of audition and different perceptions exist.
Although Player 11 and Player 5 previously indicated the unfair and superior attitude of 
administrative staff towards the players, the administrative staff that I interviewed 
understand the role of the administrative office as a supporter for players and mediator 
between musicians and the city. However, administrative staff found that some players
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were more demanding than others. If these demands were not met, then some degree 
of conflict arose.
...players...should understand the Audience Business Team and the KBS 
through communication...there is misunderstanding and conflict...players only 
insist on some points which only benefit themselves...the KBS also tries its 
best to help as much as it can...players should partly concede (their 
demands)...not just request...
[Staff Member 7]
When there is a conflicting relationship with players, it makes me feel things 
are very difficult...another difficulty is the relationship with a conductor, if he 
insists on inviting a guest soloist sole due to his personal taste (he did not 
mention the details, but some conductors in Korea want to invite a guest 
soloist based on his personal relationship related to school, nepotism, or 
region).
[Staff Member 1]
As the position of musicians and administrative staff is different, conflict relationships 
are naturally understandable. However, players and staff should consider each other, 
instead of insisting on their own rights or ideas: they may firstly try to remove mistrust 
and prejudice between them, and try to cooperate with each other.
Meanwhile, staff gave their opinions on conductors: many conductors in Korea abuse 
their power to pursue private benefits, as the current government structure allows them 
strong control, both administratively and artistically. It would appear that schem es need 
to be put in place to control the current authority of the principal conductor.
Civil servants’ Intergroup conflict
Despite my concerns that civil servants do not show their real opinions because of their 
position, one of the interviewees in the civil servant group gave me an unexpected 
account of his thoughts on m usicians.205
...and art is a creative activity...because of non-music graduates, my 
understanding of art is very limited... Musicians, to me, seem very stubborn... 
they think they are best, and don’t care about others...for example, as a 
municipal orchestra, we have to play even though we don’t want to do. But 
whether there is an element of pride, playing ‘high art’ music or not, musicians 
are not likely to play popular music...that is, they can’t play popular music... so 
I am skeptical about musicians who think of themselves as the privileged 
classes...in my opinion, orchestras should not be only for a minority 
class...Although families of musicians are generally rich, they are keen on 
salary...
[Civil Servant 2]
205 Musicians include players and conductors.
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He first admitted his lack of ability to understand music,206 which players and staff in the 
orchestral executive constitution consistently mention, then he delivered some negative 
impressions and prejudices about players. It might be true that some players pretend to 
belong to the privileged class. However, his idea that musicians are born into rich 
families and because of this, are rich, appears dubious.207 Whether he/she is rich or not 
is a totally separate matter. They are in charge of their family’s living, and it is a natural 
thing that they are keen to make money for themselves. Therefore, the idea of Civil 
Servant 2 on players’ living expenses seems a little one-sided.
Lead players and the deputy conductor refused to communicate with me...they 
have a prejudice against an administrator, such as the fact that they are too 
serious, bureaucratic and such...I could hear lots of negative stories about civil 
servants...! really want to help musicians, but they refuse...if we can talk and 
communicate, I can explain what we (city) can support and we can’t, and can 
solve (problems)...communication is interrupted, and there is no 
communication at all...for example, a string quartet was disorganised when 
one of the members left the group...in this case...in my opinion, anyone from 
the orchestra could have taken the place, and they could continue to play...but 
the three remaining players said 'no, it is impossible’....the reason is that 
making an ensemble takes around 3-4 years...but what I asked them for was 
just playing background music or creating a good mood...music is not the main 
thing...that is, the thing is the background of an event, not the highest quality 
of classical performance...
[Civil Servant 2]
According to Civil Servant 2, players express their disagreeable relationship with civil 
servants by avoiding communication. He continued to explain the opposite idea 
concerning performance. Players and civil servants have different perceptions on 
performance. Thus, lack of communication between civil servants and players, civil 
servants’ prejudice about players, and players’ prejudice about civil servants could be 
seen as potential sources of conflicts. If, as Civil Servant 2 said, the orchestra is a 
municipal orchestra designed to give pleasure to its citizens, the first thing players 
should think of is the initial objective of the orchestra.
...the role of the Managing Director in the orchestral executive constitution is 
one of dissatisfaction...the administrative ability of the administrative staff in 
the orchestral executive constitution is very poor...especially, they don’t have 
any idea about money...taxes are not their money...they have no idea how to 
save money...regarding the execution of the budget, excessive execution of 
the budget is carried out...there is also a lack of responsibility related to 
performance...for example, they spend 50 million won (£25,000) or 60 million 
won (£30,000) on producing a concert...if the concert fails, they lay blame 
upon the lack of the citizen’s cultural level and also a lack of publicity from the 
administration department of the cultural centre [...] In the case of the
206 Rahim (1986) considers lack of ability as a source of intrapersonal conflict.
207 In Korea, generally speaking, the children of parents generally inherit their parents’ fortune 
and children are not financially independent after entering university or even after marriage.
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Managing Director, his administrative ability, the use and choice of vocabulary 
are very limited...he (managing director) holds fast to his opinion on the title of 
a concert or on administrative matters.
[Civil Servant 2]
Civil Servant 2 shows his mistrust of the administrative capacity of staff in the 
orchestral executive constitution and complains about the lack of responsibility of the 
managing director. It might be true that the administrative capacity of the managing 
director is not as good as a civil servant, since the majority of managing directors of 
Korean municipal orchestras have previously been orchestral players, who have no 
administrative training, and learn managerial skills through their experiences in work. 
However, it may not be true that administrative staff do not have a good sense of 
management: a member of the staff said that they possess a certain know-how through 
working experience and more staff learn arts management or administration at 
university. The mistrust of civil servants toward administrative staff could be caused by 
a lack of communication and their prejudice against civil servants. Thus, both civil 
servants and administrative staff in the orchestral executive constitution need to open 
their minds to each other.
Civil Servant 2 gives an example of a conductor’s unreasonable decision making 
related to choosing guest players or soloists. The following example demonstrates a 
source of intergroup conflict: that of an unethical attitude.
...in the case of the conductor, he chose a soloist from those with whom he 
has an academic relationship (alumnus, his teacher or student), is related to, or, 
worst case, his wife, and asked for top guarantee...! can’t understand...if (the' 
soloist) graduated from a good university and performance is reasonable...it 
could be understandable...otherwise...really can’t understand...they are 
financially secure, but much too keen on money... as I am a civil servant who 
is responsible for the orchestral administration, I often meet a conductor...but 
it’s so difficult. And if I disagree with his opinion or decision, he tells me that he 
wants to talk directly with the mayor...
[Civil Servant 2]
Just as administrative staff have previously indicated the principal conductor's abuse of 
power, civil servants also complain about similar matters, and there needs to be an 
alternative way to control the principal conductor’s behaviour, or to ask for responsibility 
over artistic decisions.
Interpersonal conflict
This section presents the relationship conflicts among players due to personality, age 
and gender and the task conflicts between players and conductors, and among players. 
Because age and gender could be indirect sources of intergroup conflict— a part of
socio-cultural differences, I consider both of them as sources of interpersonal conflict.
Although a few interviewees in the players group said that there was no conflicting 
relationship among players, conflicts do exist. Examples are as follows:
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...there is a conflict, but it is very personal thing. [Player 3]
There is a conflict among the players...generally speaking, there is only 
insignificant conflict...among them...because players have high tension when 
they play, and they scatter right after performance?...they (players) don't have 
unity...like a grain of sand...no one attends a house of mourning or wedding 
ceremony (of other players)...they are absolutely individualists.
[Staff Member 8]
Players don’t have any conflict at all. [Player 6]
We hardly have conflict between us...there are conflicts with conductors or 
among players in the artistic aspect...but almost no conflict amongst players.
[Player 5]
The features and individualism of players are described by a former administrative staff 
member, Staff Member 8. A  low degree of conflict is indicated by both Player 3 and 
Staff Member 8, which indicates that some players may identify a conflict, whereas 
others may not: players may want to hide any conflict from outsiders, as ‘it is common 
that people within a professional group do not criticise their colleagues to outsiders’ 
(Koivunen, 2003: p 105). An orchestra’s in-group unification against outsider and 
especially critics is indicated by Adorno (1976, p: 116). Otherwise, these opposing 
views on conflict among the group of players are caused by different perceptions of the 
term conflict.
Generally speaking, players are timid and very sensitive...so when their pride 
is hurt or when there is arguable issue, players don’t easily forget about it, then 
it also influences music (when the uncomfortable things exist) in the long 
term...if players are men, we can solve these problems after boozing 
up...working with female players is harder (than with male players)...they 
harbour bad feelings for a long time...When there is a problem, sometimes 
they avoid conversation...! often see players’ selfish sides and self­
consideration... Approximately 90% of male players are members of the 
musicians’ union. But junior players, especially female players say, ‘I can’t 
join...because I only want to focus on music’, or ‘I will be scolded by patents’...
[Player 7]
Player 7 explained the personal thoughts of players and the hardship of the 
relationships with players, and he found the main cause of relationship conflict in 
gender. According to Player 7, it is hard to deal with problematic relationships with 
women, due to their personality. Player 7 used the word ‘avoid conversation’, which 
shows the female player’s conflict handling intentions. But the result of the survey does 
not support this opinion that female players are more likely to use an avoiding style with 
peers than male players. According to the result of the survey, there is no statistical
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significant difference between male (M = 3.88, SD = 0.56) and female players (M = 
3.81, SD = 0.60) using avoiding style when handling interpersonal conflict with peers; 
and it is reasonable to interpret that it is not true that female players prefer to use more 
avoiding style in order to handling interpersonal conflict with peers, compared to male 
players (see Table 6.17).
The following narratives illustrate players’ interpersonal conflict due to age.
I feel things are quite difficult because of conflict relationships with other 
players...For example, people who act without manner or consideration...What 
I cannot understand is that some players speak to me thoughtlessly (without 
consideration) simply because I am younger than them...in terms of (my 
private) life...not my performance...In my opinion, audiences or outside people 
judge us by our performing ability, whereas the inside of the orchestra 
considers the relationship with other players as a matter of judgment...I don’t 
want to booze, but I need to join in...when senior players speak to me in a very 
bad manner, I can do nothing...My age is younger than the other male 
players...as they have seen me since I was a undergraduate...So (senior 
players) treat me like a student, not a colleague...
[Player 9]
The worst relationship is (among players)...Why the relationship among 
players is so conflict is that as players get older, a principal player moves 
his/her position to a second principal, and then a general player...Changwon 
Philharmonic Orchestra, Masan Philharmonic Orchestra, and Ulsan 
Philharmonic Orchestra have a relatively short history (so that they do not have 
this problem), whereas Busan philharmonic Orchestra has approximately 50 
years history, and a student player can be the principal player in the BPO and 
a teacher can be a general player...Players have to follow their principal 
player’s artistic decision including bowing...Similarly, a principal player is only 
25 or 26 years old, and has had training under a famous teacher overseas 
right after high school graduation, whereas a general player is 40 years old...in 
orchestras if a player has talent and skill, then he can be a principal player 
regardless of his age...Therefore, the relationship cannot be good...
[Staff Member 5]
Player 9 explained the young player’s hardship with elder players due to age. His 
uncomfortable feelings might be caused by the age gap, as younger generations and 
older generations have a different way of building a friendship: old players prefer to do 
it by boozing together, whereas young players prefer things another way. On the other 
hand, Staff Member 5 illustrated a further relationship conflict caused by age. The age 
problem might be specific to Korean orchestras because Korea is a country which has 
been significantly influenced by Confucianism for a long time. The general Confucian 
idea is that a junior needs to respect and obey a senior’s opinion. Therefore, if the 
principal player Is younger than the general players, this might create an awkward 
situation. As a result, the relation of age to the Chinese philosophical system could be 
seen as another source of interpersonal conflict between junior and senior players, 
which might not happen in western orchestras.
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The following three examples illustrate task conflicts between players and conductors 
and among players.
...In terms of music...beat or sign is important...this conductor really 
penetrates into music, and then conducts, and that conductor likes music, so 
that he conducts differently...he said he will be slightly tenuto, but he conducts 
in original tempo...he asked us to do so, but he didn’t...it’s strange...then he 
passes the buck to us...a principal conductor should lead the orchestra with 
excellent ears...it’s really a basic matter in music...but we don’t have many 
qualified conductors in Korea...Our conductor repeats a lot...makes music 
through repetition...so players tend to look down on our conductor...he lost our 
(players) trust...he is really an excellent pianist, but not a conductor...
[Player 14]
A principal conductor could lose the trust of the players when his musical ability does 
not reach players’ expectations, and lose the confidence of his orchestral executive 
constitution and the civil servants when he makes injudicious decisions.
It is obvious that the conductor of Player 14’s orchestra lost trust from players due to 
his lack of skill. It is currently a popular trend that famous pianists attempt to conduct 
an orchestra in Korea. However, the pianist’s debut as a principal conductor is 
generally not successful, because their conducting skill, without any relevant training, is 
poor. The principal conductor of Player 14’s orchestra fits this case. A conductor who 
was formerly a pianist might not have charismatic leadership, due to his lack of 
conducting technique: or it might be that he has charismatic leadership, but simply not 
the technical skills needed to transmit his wishes to the players. As a consequence, 
when the principal conductor does not fulfill his task role, players may have a task 
conflict against the conductor, which can then lead to a fundamental crisis in the 
orchestra’s existence, as the orchestra’s initial objective is to provide co-ordinated and 
synchronized music.
When we have a rehearsal, players who make a mistake or whose performing 
ability is lower than average make me so annoyed...it is a visible thing...but I 
can’t tell them directly...if I think someone is annoying (by mistakes), then 
others also feel the same...
[Player 7]
...players understand each other and try to cover technical mistakes during 
rehearsals or concerts as anyone can in that situation. Such conflicts among 
players can be found anywhere in social life.
[Player 9]
Player 7 notes that he is annoyed by other players who make mistakes. This may be a 
potential source of conflict. He used ‘annoyed’ when he explained his emotion; 
however he cannot show this to the others. Instead, he pretends and hides his conflict 
toward other players, because they share similar experiences: it is evident from the
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survey result that players prefer to use an avoiding style of interpersonal conflict with 
peers (see Table 6.13). As a result, there are not likely to be any visible outcomes from 
this task conflict. Even though it is arguable whether this is a task conflict or not, I 
would like to conclude that it could be seen as a task conflict: ‘When one party blocks 
the means to a goal of another, a conflict state exists’ (Robbins, 1988: p. 153).
Summary of interview findings
The sources of conflict occurring in Korean municipal orchestras
The results of the interviews on conflict revealed the sources within and between
players, conductor, staff, and civil servants.
Players did not give much information about intrapersonal conflict, but cited change 
and attitude as the sources of intragroup conflict. They cited different perception, 
prejudice, and communication difficulty as the sources of intergroup conflict, and 
gender, age, and task capability as the sources of interpersonal conflict.
On the other hand, staff indicate multiple lines of authority, and dual management 
system for the sources of intrapersonal conflict, environmental change for the sources 
of intragroup conflict, and different perception and distrust (misunderstandings and 
miscommunication) as the sources of intergroup conflict.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the results of quantitative and qualitative analysis in order 
to investigate existing conflicts and ways of handling conflicts. The sample size used in 
the results of the survey is varied, due to missing values in each subscale of ROCI-I: 
intrapersonal, intragroup, and intergroup conflict (with two variables), and ROCI-II: five 
styles of handling interpersonal conflict. Before analysing the data, the response rate, 
non-response bias check, and multicollinearity were checked, and there was no serious 
bias identified in the collected data.
There are different types and styles of handling conflict that exist around Korean 
municipal orchestras, and this chapter categorised these conflicts into four parts based 
on Rahim’s ROCI-I and ROCI-II: intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup 
conflict, and interpersonal conflict, and these conflicts are used both in the section of 
the results of the quantitative research survey and the qualitative research interviews, 
respectively.
Each of the four conflicts has its sources, related to either relationship or task, or both: 
the quantitative analysis showed the degree of the four conflicts classified by players
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and staff of three Korean municipal orchestras; the comparison between players and 
staff; and players’ and staff’s preferred styles of handling interpersonal conflict, along 
with brief identification of each conflict’s source. The results of the survey analysis also 
revealed the relationships between conflict types, conflict handling styles, job 
satisfaction and turnover, using one-way analysis of variance (F and f-test), repeated 
measures ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis test, Friedman test, Pearson’s correlation, and 
multiple regression analysis, in order to identify the inner problems of Korean municipal 
orchestras related to conflict. Meanwhile, the analysis of the results of the interviews 
has been more concentrated on showing the sources of each of the four conflicts via 
narratives.
The following chapter will investigate new challenges for Korean municipal orchestras 
and their responses, together with reflections on the case of the Seoul Philharmonic 
Orchestra.
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Tables of data used in Chapter 6: from Table 6.23 to Table 6.31
Table 6.23 Comparisons of subscales of ROCI-l between players and staff
Types of conflict N M SD t U
Intrapersonal Conflict
Player 120 2.29 0.54
-1.67Staff 9 2.60 0.46 342.000
Intragroup Conflict Player 120 2.72 0.41 -2.16*Staff 9 3.01 0.22 295.000
Intergroup Conflict with staff 
Intergroup Conflict with players
Player 120 2.86 0.52
-0.08Staff 9 2.87 0.64 515.000
Intergroup Conflict with civil servant
Player 79 2.81 0.54
-0.59Staff 9 2.93 0.61 307.500
Note: * indicates p < 0.05.
Table 6.24 Non-music-graduated and music-graduated staff degree of conflict
Types of conflict N M SD 7 U
Intrapersonal Conflict 1 5 2.77 0.30 1.292 4 2.39 0.58 6.000
Intragroup Conflict
1 5 3.05 0.29
0.57*2 4 2.97 0.12 8.500
Intergroup Conflict with players 1 5 3.07 0.57 1.032 4 2.63 0.72 6.500
Intergroup Conflict with civil servant
1 5 3.00 0.47
0.382 4 2.83 0.83 9.000
Note: 1 indicates non-music-graduated staff; 2 indicates music-graduated staff;a Levene’s test 
indicates unequal variances.
Table 6.25 All players’ percentile norms of intrapersonal, 
conflict with staff and civil servants
intragroup, and intergroup
Mean _______________
Scores Intrapersonal
Conflict
5.00
4.85
4.70
4.55
4.40
4.25
4.10
3.95
3.80
3.65 99
3.50 98
3.35 96
3.20 92
3.05 88
2.90 83
2.75 81
2.60 74
2.45 68
2.30 63
2.15 55
2.00 36
1.85 24
1.70 16
1.55 4
1.40 3
1.25
1.10
1.00 1
Note: IP = intrapersonal conflict, IG = 
with civil servants.
Intragroup
Conflict
Percentiles_______________________________
Intergroup conflict Intergroup conflict
______with staff____________ with civil servants
Mean
Scores
99
98
97
95
99 94
97 87
96 80
81 74
69 56
57 44
47 43
26 33
22 23
12 14
9 11
4 8
1 4
3
2
1
Intragroup conflict. NG1 = intergroup
5.00
4.85
4.70
4.55
99 4.40
98 4.25
4.10
97 3.95
96 3.80
93 3.65
87 3.50
86 3.35
80 3.20
72 3.05
65 2.90
49 2.75
34 2.60
33 2.45
22 2.30
15 2.15
8 2.00
3 1.85
1 1.70
1.55
1.40
1.25
1.10
1.00
with staff, NG2 = intergroup conflict
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Table 6.26 Players’ percentile norms of the three types of conflict
Mean
Scores
Percentiles Mean
BPO CPO KSO Scores
IP IG NG1 NG2 IP IG NG1 NG2 IP IG NG1
5.00 5.00
4.85 4.85
4.70 4.70
4.55 4.55
4.40 99 99 4.40
4.25 96 96 4.25
4.10 94 94 4.10
3.95 99 93 93 3.95
3.80 95 99 92 92 3.80
3.65 99 99 91 96 91 86 99 3.65
3.50 97 99 93 88 95 88 85 99 95 3.50
3.35 94 96 88 87 93 99 78 83 95 91 3.35
3.20 90 92 78 78 85 88 70 81 99 85 90 3.20
3.05, 87 83 70 67 84 82 59 77 91 77 88 3.05
2.90 83 65 52 54 76 70 46 76 88 70 70 2.90
2.75 81 51 32 37 73 63 40 65 87 58 61 2.75
2.60 69 24 24 26 66 41 29 46 86 45 49 2.60
2.45 63 17 13 13 64 30 19 38 76 35 45 2.45
2.30 60 10 11 11 61 28 16 27 67 29 23 2.30
2.15 51 1 8 1 55 20 11 22 57 20 21 2.15
2.00 28 6 44 11 1 19 35 16 19 2.00
1.85 22 22 5 6 24 9 11 1.85
1.70 15 11 1 1 21 1 10 1.70
1.55 4 8 7 8 1.55
1.40 1 4 5 6 1.40
1.25 1 4 4 1.25
1.10 4 3 3 1.10
1.00 1 1 1 1.00
Note: IP = intrapersonal conflict, IG = intragroup conflict, NG1 = intergroup conflict with staff, NG2 = intergroup conflict
with civil servants.
Table 6.27 All groups of players’ percentile norms of 
conflict with the previous conductor, current conductor,
styles of handling interpersonal 
and peers______
Mean
Scores
Percentiles
Previous Conductor Current Conductor Peers
Mean
Scores
IN OB DO AV CO IN OB DO AV CO IN OB DO AV CO
5.00 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 5.00
4.85 96 96 96 98 96 97 97 99 91 97 96 91 4.85
4.70 94 91 95 97 94 92 96 97 89 96 95 90 4.70
4.55 92 88 99 92 96 93 88 92 96 84 88 88 86 4.55
4.40 88 87 98 88 91 90 87 99 88 92 77 85 84 84 4.40
4.25 82 75 97 77 89 83 76 98 77 90 76 80 71 8 4.25
4.10 72 74 96 72 84 82 67 97 72 86 74 78 99 66 79 4.10
3.95 69 55 94 60 83 72 56 94 58 85 63 68 98 53 78 3.95
3.80 67 54 93 59 73 66 55 93 52 77 46 55 96 52 61 3.80
3.65 57 45 91 50 70 57 36 92 50 74 39 53 95 43 60 3.65
3.50 54 33 88 41 69 53 34 88 42 73 30 42 89 31 47 3.50
3.35 48 22 87 33 55 44 23 87 34 72 24 32 84 26 32 3.35
3.20 36 14 84 24 54 38 14 85 25 59 22 25 82 25 21 3.20
3.05 26 13 82 21 48 32 13 84 20 58 20 19 76 15 20 3.05
2.90 18 11 72 20 47 22 11 74 19 51 19 18 68 4 10 2.90
2.75 14 10 66 13 30 18 10 73 13 50 15 6 58 3 9 2.75
2.60 8 3 64 10 29 13 5 68 12 31 14 5 57 2 6 2.60
2.45 7 2 57 9 27 11 4 62 11 30 5 3 51 1 4 2.45
2.30 4 1 48 8 26 4 2 53 8 27 4 2 44 2.30
2.15 3 47 6 16 3 1 52 7 26 3 1 35 3 2.15
2.00 1 34 5 15 1 40 5 17 2 34 2 2.00
1.85 26 2 8 39 2 9 1 25 1.85
1.70 21 1 7 27 1 8 16 1.70
1.55 16 3 22 5 15 1.55
1.40 15 2 16 4 12 1 1.40
1.25 14 1 15 3 9 1.25
1.10 7 8 2 8 1.10
1.00 1 1 1 1 1.00
Note: IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style.
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Table 6.28 The players of the BPO’s percentile norms of styles of handling interpersonal
conflict with the previous conductor, current co nd uctor, and peers_______________
Mean Percentiles Mean
Scores Previous Conductor Current Conductor Peers Scores
IN OB DO AV CO IN OB DO AV CO ■ IN OB DO AV CO
5.00 99 99 99 99 99 99 5.00
4.85 97 97 96 99 95 96 94 4.85
4.70 95 96 95 97 90 99 95 93 4.70
4.55 91 95 99 99 94 96 99 99 88 91 89 92 4.55
4.40 90 94 96 97 93 95 94 97 87 89 85 91 4.40
4.25 88 92 83 89 94 80 96 86 87 99 78 90 4.25
4.10 86 83 76 96 81 85 76 95 78 83 97 76 89 4.10
3.95 82 76 99 71 92 76 71 69 92 76 74 96 55 76 3.95
3.80 78 67 97 67 91 74 62 67 91 64 61 95 44 75 3.80
3.65 72 51 60 90 71 53 65 90 50 44 94 35 62 3.65
3.50 69 48 58 88 64 48 99 53 88 43 41 89 33 60 3.50
3.35 64 35 96 44 70 59 37 97 42 75 36 37 88 30 38 3.35
3.20 50 24 94 34 61 57 26 96 35 64 29 31 86 25 30 3.20
3.05 40 19 91 33 60 50 19 95 29 62 26 24 82 23 27 3.05
2.90 26 8 76 20 37 31 11 83 17 35 25 23 64 6 6 2.90
2.75 22 7 68 19 35 24 10 81 15 33 6 4 58 4 5 2.75
2.60 17 6 65 13 27 22 9 79 13 27 5 3 55 1 2.60
2.45 12 5 59 12 19 16 5 68 11 21 4 2 52 2.45
2.30 8 1 52 11 17 6 4 64 9 20 1 1 48 4 2.30
2.15 7 39 5 6 5 1 46 6 6 39 2.15
2.00 1 37 4 5 1 44 4 5 37 2.00
1.85 35 3 4 38 3 1 31 1.85
1.70 34 1 3 34 1 20 1.70
1.55 23 1 23 13 3 1.55
1.40 20 20 12 2 1.40
1.25 11 11 10 1 1.25
1.10 10 10 8 1.10
1.00 1 1 1 1.00
Note: IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style,"CO = compromising style.
Table 6.29 The players of the CPO’s percentile norms of styles of handling interpersonal 
conflict with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers
" M e a n ____________________ Percentiles____________________________________ _ Mean
Scores Previous Conductor Current Conductor__________________ Peers Scores
IN OB DO AV CO IN OB DO AV CO IN OB DO AV CO
5.00 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 5.00
4.85 97 93 95 97 96 96 96 95 90 4.85
4.70 96 92 91 96 94 94 94 99 92 86 4.70
4.55 95 84 90 99 95 88 91 99 86 90 85 84 4.55
4.40 94 82 99 89 90 94 87 90 93 83 87 84 83 4.40
4.25 91 79 97 85 86 91 79 87 89 82 85 77 82 4.25
4.10 80 74 96 83 82 88 74 82 87 72 82 99 68 81 4.10
3.95 77 55 95 74 72 80 66 71 83 66 71 97 55 63 3.95
3.80 71 47 94 55 71 77 47 59 82 52 61 94 44 62 3.80
3.65 68 44 93 47 70 71 46 55 81 44 53 91 41 49 3.65
3.50 65 41 92 44 69 68 44 99 52 80 35 50 90 36 48 3.50
3.35 57 31 91 36 65 51 31 91 42 73 23 33 85 22 37 3.35
3.20 43 17 90 30 61 43 14 90 31 66 20 26 83 10 30 3.20
3.05 32 1 89 20 59 40 12 89 23 65 12 20 80 9 27 3.05
2.90 23 85 16 41 31 5 82 19 46 11 12 78 1 21 2.90
2.75 17 77 15 40 26 3 74 17 44 9 7 66 19 2.75
2.60 8 75 10 39 17 1 72 7 40 8 6 63 12 2.60
2.45 1 65 5 19 15 70 5 22 7 4 56 8 2.45
2.30 46 1 17 6 49 1 20 6 3 46 5 2.30
2.15 30 10 4 38 13 5 1 30 4 2.15
2.00 27 1 1 36 11 4 27 1 2.00
1.85 12 15 8 3 20 1.85
1.70 8 13 7 1 13 1.70
1.55 7 10 6 10 1.55
1.40 1 8 5 9 1.40
1.25 5 4 7 1.25
1.10 3 3 6 1.10
1.00 ______________________________________ 1 1 1 1.00
Note: IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style.
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Table 6.30 The players of the KSO’s percentile norms of styles of handling interpersonal
conflict with the previous conductor, current conductor, and peers
M e a n _______________________________________P e r c e n t i l e s _________________Mean
Scores Previous Conductor Current Conductor Peers Scores
IN OB DO AV CO IN OB DO AV CO IN OB DO AV CO
5.00 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 5.00
4.85 95 95 94 92 95 95 94 92 81 93 94 87 4.85
4.70 90 90 99 93 91 90 90 99 93 91 76 88 93 83 4.70
4.55 83 83 95 86 90 83 83 95 86 90 71 82 99 89 81 4.55
4.40 73 73 94 77 85 73 73 94 77 85 61 77 97 82 78 4.40
4.25 68 68 93 62 82 68 68 93 62 82 57 68 93 58 76 4 25
4.10 53 53 91 58 72 53 53 91 58 72 56 67 92 54 65 4.10
3.95 45 45 90 36 58 45 45 90 36 58 47 59 91 52 45 3.95
3.80 36 36 88 31 57 36 36 88 31 57 23 45 90 47 43 3.80
3.65 31 12 86 22 48 31 12 86 22 48 22 38 83 45 32 3.65
3.50 29 1 74 20 46 29 1 74 20 46 14 35 82 26 31 3.50
3.35 23 68 17 30 23 68 17 30 12 26 75 21 22 3.35
3.20 16 66 10 26 16 66 10 26 10 19 73 13 21 3.20
3.05 7 64 8 25 7 64 8 25 6 13 67 12 10 3.05
2.90 6 57 7 17 6 57 7 17 1 1 61 6 8 2.90
2.75 5 53 6 16 5 53 6 16 54 5 7 2.75
2.60 4 51 5 15 4 51 5 15 52 4 6 2.60
2.45 3 47 4 14 3 47 4 14 46 3 5 2.45
2.30 1 45 1 13 1 45 1 13 39 1 4 2.30
2.15 38 11 38 11 38 2 2.15
2.00 36 9 36 9 35 1 2.00
1.85 30 6 30 6 24 1.85
1.70 21 5 21 5 19 1.70
1.55 16 4 16 4 18 1.55
1.40 14 3 14 3 16 1.40
1.25 11 1 11 1 12 1.25
1.10 10 10 11 1.10
1.00 1 1 1 1.00
Note: IN = integrating style, OB = obliging style, DO = dominating style, AV = avoiding style, CO = compromising style.
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Table 6.31 Styles of handling interpersonal conflict and the situations where they are
appropriate or inappropriate
C o n flict style S ituations where appropriate S ituations w here inappropriate
Integrating 1. Issues are complex. 1.
2. Synthesis of ideas is needed to 2.
come up with better solutions. 3.
3. Commitment is needed from other 
Parties for successful implementation. 4.
4. Time is available for problem solving.
5. One party alone cannot solve the problem
6. Resources possessed by different parties 
are needed to solve their common 
problems.
Obliging 1. You believe that you may be wrong. 1.
2. Issue is more important to the other party.
3. You are willing to give up something in 3. 
exchange for something from the
other party in the future.
4. You are dealing from a position of 
weakness.
5. Preserving relationship is important.
Dominating 1. Issue is trivial. 1.
2. Speedy decision is needed. 2.
3. Unpopular course of action is 3.
implemented.
4. Necessary to overcome assertive 4. 
subordinates.
5. Unfavorable decision by the other 5. 
party may be costly to you.
6. Subordinates lack expertise to make 
technical decisions.
7. Issue is important to you.
Avoiding 1. Issue is trivial. 1.
2. Potential dysfunctional effect of 2.
confronting the other party outweighs 
benefits of resolution. 3.
3. Cooling off period is needed.
4.
Compromisingl. Goals of parties are mutually exclusive. 1
2. Parties are equally powerful. 2.
3. Consensus cannot be reached.
4. Integrating or dominating style 
is not successful.
5. Temporary solution to a complex
problem is needed.___________________
Task or problem is simple. 
Immediate decision is required. 
Other parties are unconcerned 
about outcome.
Other parties do not have 
problem-solving skills.
Issue is important to you.
2. You believe that you are right. 
The other party is wrong or 
unethical.
Issue is complex.
Issue is not important to you. 
Both parties are equally 
powerful.
Decision does not have to be 
made quickly.
Subordinates possess high 
degree of competence.
Issue is important to you.
It is your responsibility to 
make decision.
Parties are unwilling to defer, 
issue must be resolved. 
Prompt attention is needed. 
One party is more powerful. 
Problem is complex enough 
needing problem-solving 
approach.
(Source: Rahim, 2004: p. 60)
Chapter 7 Korean municipal orchestras’ response to 
new challenges
7.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the justification for public support of municipal orchestras, and 
outlines their features as a public service in Korea. Then, using the case of the Seoul 
Philharmonic Orchestra as an example, I investigate the restricted public funding, and 
attitudes towards the challenges that Korean municipal orchestras are facing.
Three examples of municipal orchestras that are representative of all types of Korean 
municipal orchestras were given in Chapter 4: the purpose of this chapter is to provide 
information about their background and working environment, in order to help the 
reader’s contextual understanding of Korean municipal orchestras and to explain 
findings that are revealed by my analysis of interviews and survey questionnaires.
Other municipal orchestras share similarities in organisational factors, but a significant 
change in the history of Korean symphony orchestras was made by the Seoul 
Philharmonic Orchestra (SPO) in 2005: the SPO  has been the only Korean orchestra to 
address the current challenges, by adapting the model of organisational structure 
established by western symphony orchestras— that is, a for-profit corporation 
208— w-,th enormous financial support from the city of Seoul. As such, the SPO  aims to 
be a world-class, symphony orchestra that is representative of Korea. The newly 
founded SPO is totally different from other municipal orchestras and it is therefore the 
sole case study of Chapter 7. The other orchestras were based on a particular 
organisational structure (including the size of the executive constitution), the process of 
managerial work, the scale of finance, the aims and objectives, the programmes, the 
nature of the musicians’ contract, audition, salary, working hours, and the performing 
level of the players. If this transformation is seen as successful, other local cities will 
want to follow this change for their orchestras. However, this does not in itself imply 
that other local governments will be willing to provide sufficient funding to support such 
a transformation, or indeed, to support their orchestras in the same way that the city of 
Seoul has done. Most local cities seem to have limited comprehension of the changes 
potentially required: an entire organisational such as that of the SPO  can only be 
achieved with sufficient financial support; yet local cities merely focus on the fact that 
they no longer need to continuously provide 100% of public funding if the status of an 208
208 Korean researchers and experts insist that the organisational structure of the western 
symphony orchestra is the ideal model for Korean symphony orchestras (see Jung 2004' Park 
2004).
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orchestra is a profit corporation. This implies that orchestras need to be ‘free-standing’. 
Given the reasoning above, the purpose of Chapter 7 is to examine the success of the 
SPO, and to ask whether it could be a model for other municipal orchestras, helping 
them to address the challenges currently being faced.
The distinctness of the SPO has the disadvantage of making comparisons difficult, but 
it has the advantage of serving as a future model that is more artistically and financially 
successful.
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7.2 Public support for Korean municipal orchestras
Justification for government support for arts in Korea may be summarised under five
headings: economic character, citizens’ welfare, artistic diversity, maintaining quality, 
and future generations. Local government support for municipal orchestras is derived 
from both welfare state ideology and political motivation.
Korean local governments have been providing relatively generous support for their 
municipal arts organisations, compared to the U.S. and Britain, where orchestras are 
more aware of commercial dimensions. The view of the U.S. and Britain regarding 
symphony orchestras has not prevailed in Korea for a long time, because municipal 
orchestras are supported in order to provide arts and cultural activities to local citizens. 
However, Korean local governments are asking their municipal orchestras to find 
audiences and business sponsors who will pay, which entails marketing and linking 
with cultural industries. Thus, Korean municipal orchestras need to develop the 
organisational, managerial, and administrative capacity to deal with government 
requests and to prepare for a reduction in public subsidy.
Many of these orchestras exist in large or medium size cities, and the majority of them 
can be considered as mediocre in terms of musical excellence, calibre of musicianship, 
wage, government structure, or number of musicians. The KBS Symphony Orchestra 
and the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra are the top orchestras in Korea, although the 
performing level of these two orchestras was not internationally admired until recent 
years.
Korean municipal symphony orchestras may be referred to as public services, due to 
their essential features: first of all, their legal status is supported and controlled by local 
government, and they are administratively and financially operated by the city in 
association with an orchestral executive constitution that has limited autonomy. Thus, 
local politicians are the main decision makers, and the amount of subsidy for 
orchestras is decided by the financial status of the city.
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Second, the amount of local subsidy for these orchestras is relatively high, as cities 
cover 100% of their total budget, Only 4% of the total orchestra budget in the U.S. and 
20% in Japan is usual (Kurabayashi and Matsuda, 1987: p. 69).
Third, the objectives of Korean municipal orchestras are very similar because the 
regulations of municipal arts organisations within all local cities are based on the 
regulations of the KBS Symphony Orchestra. There are no objectives for orchestras in 
themselves, so I investigated the local regulations of municipal arts organisations. The 
objectives of local regulations on municipal arts organisations among 28 cities,209 
where there is at least one municipal arts organisation, are exactly the same, except for 
the city of Chuncheon. The objectives are to cultivate citizens’ arts and cultural 
sensibility, and to promote local arts and culture. Chuncheon adds one more objective, 
namely to enlarge the base of local arts. Therefore, we can see that municipal 
orchestras do not pay much attention to financial considerations. Instead, they focus on 
providing music performances to local citizens as much as possible, to raise the 
standard of performances, and to improve the image of cities (this applies to a few 
orchestras only).
Finally, the status of musicians in the municipal symphony orchestras is similar to civil 
servants. Some orchestras have a musicians’ union to protect them, especially 
regarding salary, although the power of the musicians’ unions is weak, and does not 
normally influence the decision making. There is no national musicians’ union, and 
each union of an orchestra works independently, sharing no information of their 
hardships. Cities dislike the presence of musicians’ unions within their orchestras. 
Players’ positions within municipal symphony orchestras are quite stable, in spite of the 
regular auditions, which are used as a way of determining a player’s position within the 
orchestra, as well as a means of raising the standard of orchestral musicians, rather 
than as an excuse to dismiss musicians.210
Therefore, these orchestras have been little concerned with economic and commercial 
aspects, as they can rely on support from the city. In other words, Korean municipal 
symphony orchestras adhere to a status of stable stagnation in terms of finance and 
administration, relying on consistent public support. Local governments also support
209 These include Ulsan, Daejeon, Gwangju, Incheon, Daegu, Busan, Suwon, Seongnam, 
Uijeongbu, Anyang, Changwon, Masan, Jinju, Yangsan, Gumi, Kimcheon, Pohang, Yeosoo, 
Sooncheon, Mokpo, Jeongeup, Iksan, Gunsan, Jeonjoo, cheonan, Cheongju, Gangneung, 
Chuncheon and exclude Seoul, although the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra is supported as an 
independent trust.
210 Regular audition is a matter of debate, but considered a necessary evil.
orchestras in terms of cultural policy related to political motivation. Zimmer and Toepler 
(1999) explain that public support for the production and consumption of the arts and 
culture is closely related to national history in most continental European countries, so 
government support today is given because of former policies, not because of market 
failures that draw attention to government support for arts and culture. To explain 
further, although Korean local government support for culture and the arts still seems to 
be mainly situated within welfare state doctrine, the support of local governments for 
their municipal orchestras may be considered as the consequence of former policies.
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A Mayor for the city is elected by citizens...the preferred role for the Mayor in 
the 1980s and the 1990s was to build apartments and bridges...culture and 
arts are the main thing in 2000s...the trademark is to be a cultural president or 
mayor...how can I (candidate of president or mayor) make culture appeal to 
citizens...the success of Mr. Lee (Myung-Park) is...he made a cultural square 
in Cheonggyecheon. Who could imagine such a change?[...] To investigate and 
to develop culture is the work of the mayor and local governments...for 
example, if I were a Mayor or President, and I took a municipal orchestra 
away...it would follows me forever. Namely, I removed the root of 
culture...there are so many artists outside...as a result, I would become a 
notorious mayor [...] None of the mayors in the local cities attempted 
elimination of the municipal arts organisations...(They) want to be cultural 
mayors...the only way that they can survive is culture... (therefore) mayors 
protect the arts to survive without any trouble...Myung-Park Lee could process 
cultural projects aggressively...his dream was not to be a mayor but a 
president...if he tried to be reelected as a mayor, he couldn’t do that... he fired 
the members of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, and many people are 
against him...but he didn’t plan to be a mayor again...This is why every mayor 
protects municipal arts organisations...their role is simply protection...
[Staff Member 5]
Staff Member 5 goes on to explain the changing priority of the mayor’s public service 
from construction to culture, and states that the current big issue is culture. Regardless 
of the value or use of municipal arts organisations, local governments might subsidise 
them in order to use them as a political tool. Politicians give attention to culture and arts 
as it is one of the voters’ preferences: more Koreans are interested in arts and cultural 
activities in accordance with economic growth, the introduction of the five-day week 
system, increasing numbers of people in higher education, and demands for enjoyment 
of life, as well as a high quality of life. If a mayor were to scrap an arts organisation, he 
would lose significant political standing. Many local governments simply support arts 
and culture as a means of being reelected, with little consideration for the art form itself.
7.3 Restricted public support
Municipal symphony orchestras remain the responsibility of local government. On the 
one hand, it might be concluded that local governments support their orchestras for two
reasons: welfare state doctrine and political calculation. On the other hand, despite 
receiving almost 100% public funding from local governments, financial support for 
orchestras has barely covered minimum operating costs, which merely maintain the 
orchestra and allow them to provide a limited performance schedule each year. For 
instance, 3 out of 31 municipal orchestras provide over 60 concerts per year, and the 
majority of them do less than 20 concerts, with 7 of them providing less than 10 
concerts per year in 2000 (Korea Culture Information Service, 2008b: online).211
Local governments are well aware of the importance of arts and culture, although most 
municipal performing arts organisations have neglected the issue, rather than focusing 
on it. Thus, the total budget of municipal orchestras is restricted. I would argue that 
there are three reasons behind this limited funding of orchestras: the central 
government’s indifference, the citizen’s indifference, and the orchestra’s inefficient role.
Although arts and culture may provide economic benefits and have broad commercial 
dimensions, an orchestra is neither a core part of the cultural industries nor of cultural 
policy in Korea but, rather, a nonprofit organisation, which will never recoup all its costs. 
Measuring the economic impact of artistic genres has become part of the strategy of 
the cultural industries. Different classifications of creative and cultural industries have 
been summarised by Comunian (2007).
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211 Available at:
http://www.art.go.kr/encyclopedia/directory/DirectoryView_sum.jsp?ar_vvm_cd_seq=7423 
[Accessed 03 July 2009].
Table 7.1 Indexes of cultural industries
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Creative Industries 
DCMS (1998, 2000)
Cultural Industries, 
O'Connor (1999)
Creative Industries 
Caves (2000)
Cultural Industries 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2002)
Advertising Advertising and 
Marketing
Architecture Architecture
Arts & Antiques
Crafts Crafts
Design Design
Fashion Fashion
Film Film Cinema Film Industries
Interactive Leisure 
Software
New Media Internet Industry
Music Music Theatre 
Recorded Music
Sound Recordings Music Industry 
(including live 
performance)
Performing Arts Theatre, Concerts 
And Performance
Performing Arts 
(Theatre, Opera, 
Concerts, Dance)
Publishing Literature, Publishing Book and Magazine 
Publishing
Print and Electronic 
Publishing
Software Design Internet Industry
TV and Radio Broadcast Media TV Films Broadcasting
Visual Arts Visual Art Visual Arts (Painting 
and Sculpture
Museums and 
Galleries
Toys and Games Video and computer 
games
(Source: Comunian, Different classifications of creative and cultural industries, 2007: p. 11)
As the Table 7.1 demonstrates, an orchestra can be placed among the creative and 
cultural industries in the category of music or performing arts (DCMS, Caves), theatre, 
concerts and performance (O’Connor), or music industry (Hesmondhalgh). The 
Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism also placed performing arts among the 
cultural industries, and Korean municipal orchestras may be seen as belonging to the 
performing arts category.
Korean municipal orchestras are heavily subsidised and the effects of economic 
benefits such as the image of the city or tourism are hardly addressed, but they still 
have large commercial dimensions, because the money is spent on people involved in 
operating, marketing, and design. In addition, orchestras have a commercial arm, such 
as recordings (although this is uncommon for Korean municipal orchestras) or ticket 
selling, even though this rarely covers all their costs. Both Korean central and local 
governments oversee an orchestra’s cultural and economic value; and the latter 
supports an orchestra partly in order to ensure they become more professional and 
efficient in terms of playing and administration. When the government decides on 
public spending, it considers what is culturally or economically valuable. According to a 
2007 White Paper on the cultural industries (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture, 
Sports and Tourism, 2008b), the Korean government still focuses its efforts on
constructing or renovating arts centres and supporting the genres of Korean traditional 
music, theatre, film, dance, and animation. These are what Korean government 
believes are valuable. It is possible that the central government’s limited interest212 in 
orchestras has prompted local governments to publicly fund their municipal orchestras.
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Another reason is that orchestras are not popular with citizens. According to Khakee’s 
study (1988),213 the most important factor influencing decision making on public 
expenditure to the arts is public opinion (p. 7), and the second most important factor 
affecting municipal support for different art forms is the voters’ preferences for various 
arts activities (p. 9). In other words, the more people there are who enjoy western 
orchestral music, the bigger the budget will be: politicians are keen to follow the 
citizens’ interest in order to gain popularity, which is essential for re-election. In this way, 
local government decides on the amount and the distribution of its subsidy, in 
accordance with the preference of their voters.
Furthermore, the current role of a municipal symphony orchestra does not appear to a 
great need, and cannot appeal on the grounds that it is a necessity to citizens.
...if I think of my greed, I hope our status is exactly the same as that of civil 
servants, but it is an excessive requirement to our citizens in the current 
position of the municipal orchestra...because we don’t encompass the 
necessity of great service...the mood is that nobody cares, even if municipal 
orchestras were to become extinct tomorrow. There are some audience 
members ...but these are family members of players... (if I were a citizen) I 
wouldn’t support a municipal orchestra [...] we may play like a SPO  or the KBS 
Symphony Orchestra at least after 20 years...
[Player 9]
Classical music is not the main theme in Korea...investment in western 
classical music within the investment of arts and culture has 
decreased...especially, the total number of performances of opera, which has 
dramatically dropped. Furthermore, private operatic and orchestral companies 
are gradually disappearing, so only national operatic companies and municipal 
orchestras are surviving [...] only popular music is currently successful...
[Staff Member 10]
Player 9 describes the unfulfilled role and poor performance level of his orchestra, and 
believes that the citizens’ indifference and limited support derive from the failure of the 
orchestra. In contrast, Staff Member 10 points to the unpopularity of classical music,
212 Korean central government does not have music policy under categories of the cultural 
policy; and its public subsidy is excluded from municipal orchestras except a few one-off 
programmes.
™  He conducted a questionnaire survey on urban governments’ public support for arts among 
48 (public) decision makers and civil servants, who have responsibilities for cultural policy in 
Goteborg and Umea (p. 4).
and explains that, because of its unpopularity, orchestras are poorly funded. Although 
both Player 9 and Staff Member 10 consider western classical music (including 
orchestral music) as non-mainstream, Player 9 finds fault with the orchestra, whereas 
Staff Member 10 locates it in the consumer’s taste. The following narrative from Staff 
Member 7 describes the unpopularity of classical music.
Western classical music is declining because of a new custom led by the new 
generation...interest in classical music is reduced...if there are a number of 
orchestra audiences and performances, then we can give more (financial) 
supports. But it is hard under the current situation...orchestras survive today 
due to the public’s interest, but the degree of interest has also 
decreased...performance should be enjoyable...the reaction from audiences 
and the total number of audience members has declined...The yearly budget 
for the orchestra is very high and it increases every year...if there are large 
audience groups for western classical music, we can have support...but it is a 
fading industry, so why should it continue to be supported? The situation is like 
this, so it is hard to guarantee the budget for the orchestra...
[Staff Member 7]
The viewpoint of Staff Member 7 is similar to that of Staff Member 10. Financial 
sponsors do not increase support for orchestras, because there is insufficient audience 
for orchestral concerts. Without an audience, subsidies will not increase. He also 
mentions in a later interview that the orchestra has very high production costs. 
Although local governments or the KBS provide a certain amount of fixed financial 
support, orchestras are suffering from a deficit, and will never make a profit, something 
Baumol and Bowen (1968) refer to as a ‘cost disease’.
To summarise, Korean municipal orchestras are characterised as a public service, and 
have been heavily supported by local cities in accordance with cultural economics and 
cultural policy. Under such public support, it can be said that Korean municipal 
orchestras are financially and administratively in a stable condition. However, many 
people who have researched Korean orchestras over the years (especially municipal 
orchestras) have identified that they have been suffering from severe problems, a point 
confirmed by my own research. Of course, the current structure of the municipal 
orchestra is working in spite of some hardships, and generally these orchestras provide 
a relatively high quality of performance to their citizens. However, it seems that the real 
problem is that municipal orchestras do not themselves consider that they have a 
problem, and are simply not recognising the need to evolve with the times. The 
unchanging circumstances that surround municipal orchestras include stable but 
minimum subsidies, indifference from the audience, and poor role accomplishment as a 
public service. Current municipal orchestras are not keen to respond to new challenges, 
but they may need to deal with them in order to survive.
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Musicians and administrative staff interviewed in the present research, within the 
orchestra office, have already recognised that Korean municipal orchestras need to 
change.
The hardest thing is how to reach an agreement between a conductor and 
general manager...that is, administrative staff give priority to administration, 
whereas conductors are more focused on artistic matters...Nowadays, if there 
is no audience, an orchestra is useless...whether classical music is dead or 
not...To survive...we need to do something to remove the barrier between 
classic music, and popular music...Orchestras can visit audiences, and play 
anywhere...but conductors are against it...they say, 'how can I play in such a 
place? I can play in a theatre or concert hall...I can't play in tube station’...but 
we (the administrative team) think we have to do so...booking has 
declined...audiences don’t join the subscription...The administrative team says 
one thing, but the conductor says another...such a barrier is difficult...To 
survive, orchestras need to play in places audiences prefer and want...if not, 
classical music will not survive...The most popular arts organisations are those 
that travel and take their music to their audience...if they don’t do likewise, 
orchestras can’t survive...artists also notice it now...the administrative 
department felt it a few years ago, but artistic directors didn’t accept it...
[Staff Member 5]
This interviewee consistently emphasises the importance of the audience. To develop 
audiences, orchestras should play regardless of the venue or genre, and they need to 
offer various types of performance. He also pointed out that orchestras need to 
discover a negotiable point between traditional classical music and popular music to 
develop the audience. There are opposing attitudes between players and conductors: 
players seem to understand where orchestras are now, and the value of audience, 
whereas conductors are more conservative, and likely to adhere to a typical formation 
of concerts, with less consideration for external factors.
...the audience come to concerts because of the municipal orchestra...there is 
no audience in academic concerts, but people come to the concert hall if 
popular music is played...this is a reality...who knows a Shostakovich string 
quartet? But everybody knows Jo Kwan-Woo (Korean popular music singer) 
and his concerts...the lack of audience is not because of the ticket price [...] 
art is following the way where money comes, so popularity is 
necessary...classical music in the repertoire of municipal orchestras is not the 
answer...classical music is also written because of money...classical music as 
art is a bit exaggerated...
[Player 9]
He describes the unpopularity of classical music. The indifference of the audience is 
not so much about money as about preference and prejudice concerning classical 
music as high art. Thus, orchestras need to find a programme or repertoire based on 
the taste of the audience.
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The most important thing for our orchestra is to attract audiences and 
publicity...the role of the administrative staff in the orchestral executive 
constitution is to make an orchestra more efficient, and to maximise the 
number of audience members...The success of the orchestra is dependent on 
artistic matters...the feeling of listening to classical music through CDs and in a 
concert hall is different...there is something to attract people....if we (players) 
work hard and pay attention to our work, people may appreciate our hard work 
regardless of their understanding of music...
[Player 5]
He also explained that the success of the orchestra is dependent on the quality of the 
music that they play. It might be that live music conveys something special, and is more 
enjoyable to listen to, and this could be a good reason in itself to attend a concert; 
where one might disagree is with his idea that people merely like music because the 
orchestra works hard. If it is hard to understand the music, people may perhaps not 
attempt to listen to it again, and it can be very hard to attract a new audience. In fact, 
people may only be concerned with the quality and repertoire of the music, so that the 
actual skill of making music might be ignored.
Currently our financial situation is tougher than other orchestras...the budget of 
our cultural centre declined by 10% (this year), so they can’t cut our salary and 
reduce the number of performances. But players asked them to cut our salary 
instead of reducing the performances...if we do visiting concerts at schools or 
hospitals, the city pays us about 20,000 Won (£ 10) per hour. But players don’t 
care much about the amount of pay and spontaneously want to provide more 
concerts...we should care more about our citizens than civil servants...the first 
thing that local government reduces in a financial crisis is arts subsidy...this is 
a reality...citizens can eagerly desire the existence of municipal symphony 
orchestras in the city...when citizens want, city or government moves, so we 
wish to have more chances to meet audiences...probably, over 90% of players 
would like municipal orchestras to be more relevant to their citizens...
[Player 6]
In the narrative above, Player 6 seems to understand completely what the municipal 
orchestra is for, and the importance of the audience for its future: in addition, players 
know their role within the municipal orchestra, and try to provide more concerts for 
citizens.
...I don’t know when it started exactly, but orchestras give many concerts for 
the audience especially for youth...the majority of them have a commercial 
intention...there are very few youth programmes really made for the emotional 
purification of youth214...it is a kind of learning enterprise...as I suggested, the 
best thing for youth is for us to visit middle and high schools, and give concerts
214 In Korea, students are suffering from high levels for study stress, and Korean believe that 
S a f m u U“ n' ^ ,0 Ctea" 8nd re,reSh ,heir mi"d' be he!ped b^tenfng
with a commentary...The first youth concert was created by Geum Nan-Sae at 
the Seoul Arts Centre. It was extremely successful...tickets were always sold 
out...then municipal orchestras imitated the programme...Geum Nan-Sae is an 
idea bank about concerts...he really tries hard to develop audiences. He is a 
superstar in local cities...so many people come to him to get his signature...he 
really did a good job for audience development...as a matter of fact, we need 
such a star...
[Staff Member 9]
We may see the endeavour of orchestras to expand their programme, developing 
‘youth concerts’ as a main strategy. A case can hardly be made that financial 
considerations are wrong, since the arts cannot be entirely free from money matters. 
Orchestras may, at first, have good intentions in devising a suitable education 
programme, with financial benefits seen as a by-product. The order may be reversed. 
As long as youth concerts are interesting to citizens, orchestras should continue that 
programme. Staff Member 9 also mentions the popularity of the conductor. The 
conductor can be a factor in attracting audiences, and more conductors need to open 
their minds to communicating with the audience.
There are five narratives above, all emphasising the importance of the audience and 
mentioning ways in which to attract new members: 1) audience-focused concerts, 2) 
concerts based on the audience’s taste, 3) variety of programming, 4) marketing, and 5) 
an increase in the number of performances. Playing classical music alone is no longer 
appealing to today’s audiences, so all municipal orchestras currently focus on this 
issue when trying to attract more listeners. Most of the orchestras are in a situation of 
stagnation, making minor changes around audience development, pursued for the 
particular objectives of each orchestra, rather than in concern for general economic 
and commercial aspects. Thus, although it is no real success story, the cities, along 
with their respective orchestral executive constitutions have somehow managed to 
maintain their municipal orchestras without yet facing any major crisis.
A  necessity for Korean municipal orchestras is that should they respond to the 
challenges represented by the change in audience preferences, the increase of nation­
state cultural/arts centres (although this is more relaxed now), the increase in the forms 
and means of cultural consumption, the increase in attention to the cultural and media 
industries, the emphasis on tourism, and the impact of urban regeneration. It may be 
that municipal orchestras need to respond to these current issues in order to escape 
from chronic problems, to bring a fresh mood and energy into their activities, and to 
prepare for the time when local cities suddenly change their funding regime.
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Orchestral executive constitutions have been considering these issues. However, their
home cities are more likely to highlight the issues for economic reasons rather than as 
a matter of orchestral development. Studies investigating the relationship between 
cost and production for the performing arts, focusing on symphony orchestra 
performances, have been undertaken by Baumol and Bowen (1968), Throsby (1977), 
Lange et al. (1985), Lange and Luksetich (1993), Heilbrun and Gray (2001), and 
Andersson and Andersson (2006). According to research by Lange et al. (1985), 13 
orchestras operated efficiently, whereas 84 orchestras had declining marginal costs. 
This data was taken from a sample of 111 U.S. orchestras (p. 81). In contrast, the 
marginal cost of performances performed by Korean municipal orchestras always lies 
below the average cost. These orchestras are a good example of the 'cost disease’ that 
Baumol and Bowen (1968) identified. Thus, local cities that have municipal orchestras 
(especially in the case of the KBS) that invariably make a deficit, would like them to be 
independent, in order to free themselves from funding support. Even though these 
cities are likely to push their orchestras into the market, which might start with changing 
the funding regime towards orchestras, they have no clear plan for achieving such 
changes. Most municipal orchestras have imitated the model of the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra, so local cities are likely to follow its changes, and those of another Korean 
flagship orchestras, Seoul Philharmonic. It appears that perhaps municipal orchestras 
are sometimes troublesome for local city authorities: some cities may not be able to 
find good reason for public support for their orchestras, but they cannot simply 
eliminate it. Meanwhile, more orchestral executive constitutions and their home cities 
desire governance changes, especially after 2005, when the Seoul Philharmonic 
Orchestra achieved the recognition in western countries that Korean professionals 
have insisted it deserved for a long time. Thus, some cities started to think about 
emulating the transformation of the SPO. The following section explores these 
changes of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, which may be considered a future
example for Korean municipal orchestras by adapting a new governance system__a
foundation.
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7.4 Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra
There was a significant change in the history of Korean orchestras in 2005. That year, 
the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, one of Korea’s flagship orchestras, and with the 
longest history, shifted to being a foundation. This has been regarded as the ideal 
status of a municipal orchestra among Korean researchers and experts. This change 
was allowed mainly due to Myung-Park Lee, who was a former mayor of Seoul and is 
currently (2011) president of Korea.
In 2005, the city of Seoul celebrated its 'Cultural Year’. The city embraced the
transformation of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra into a foundation, to enhance its 
competitiveness and economic benefit. The city was interested in seeing the orchestra 
as an independent organisation, and saw that it should be run as a public service as 
well as a profit-making institution. After this announcement, the members of the Seoul 
Philharmonic Orchestra (SPO) rebelled against the decision because of job insecurity, 
and they demonstrated by playing Beethoven’s Funeral March from the Eroica on the 
street. Despite the players’ disagreement, the city of Seoul continued with the 
orchestra’s organisational transformation, and asked players to prove their musical 
capacity if they wanted to continue working in the SPO. Some people criticised the 
selfishness of the players, saying that many of them believed they should have 
continued job security regardless of their musical ability. Ultimately, despite severe 
conflict between the city and the players, the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra became a 
foundation, aiming to be recognised globally as the first world-class orchestra in 
Korean. To achieve this, with a large amount of subsidy from the city of Seoul, the 
orchestra changed its entire organisational structure, appointed Myung-Whun Cheong 
as Music Director, and Pal-Seung Lee, who was considered a successful CEO  as 
President (formerly the Chief Executive Officer of Woori Investment and Securities and 
an Executive Managing Director of Hanil Bank). It also established new goals, and 
scheduled auditions for every position throughout the orchestra. As a result of the open 
audition, 40% of the existing players were dismissed. Up to now (2011), the SPO  has 
continued to hire outstanding players from Korea, as well as from overseas.
There are 21 administrative members of staff in the management team of the SPO: one 
is the Head of Division of Management, four are in artistic administration, three in the 
education and culture department, five in marketing and PR, and there are five 
administrative staff, one Stage Manager, one Librarian, and an assistant to the Music 
Director. As can be seen from the chart below, administrative and artistic fields are 
clearly divided, with four management teams. There is not, however, an equal position 
between the Executive Director and the Music Director, for which Won-Chul Park had 
consistently asked. In this government structure, the position of President of the SPO 
seems very close to the position of Executive Director, and the position of Music 
Director is the lowest rank. The current organisational structure of the SPO embraces 
the biggest administrative team in the history of the Korean symphony orchestra.
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Figure 7.1 The organisational structure of the SPO
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(Source: Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009a: online)
The SPO  had three objectives:
• To enlarge the opportunity for the cultural enjoyment of citizens by providing 
regular visiting concerts and outside performances, a visiting school 
programme, and an open educational programme.
• To provide the best performances: inviting outstanding conductors and 
soloists; continuing the training of musicians; planning the best programme; 
and providing accurate and speedy information on concerts.
• To provide a customer satisfaction service.
The first two objectives are similar to those of other municipal orchestras, but the third 
was a new initiative. Suddenly, with this objective, the SPO showed an interest and 
concern in not only attracting its audience but also retaining it. A  further interesting 
point is that the SPO is also keen to provide relevant information on its activities in 
order to offer a better customer service. The Orchestra displays an economic and 
commercial mindset and has an audience development plan. To pursue these aims, 
the SPO  tries to provide an efficient management structure, a variety of marketing 
activities, a broader range of business in order to increase profit, and a better customer 
service (Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, 2009b: online).215
215 Available at: httD://www.seoulphil.co.kr/about/customer 01 .isp [Accessed 08 June 2009].
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As with any orchestra, the primary activity of the SPO is to be a concert giving outfit, 
and since 2005, it has provided over 100 concerts a year, including various outreach 
concerts. Between 2006 and 2008, the orchestra has provided at least nine 
visiting/outreach concerts throughout Seoul each month. All of these concerts were 
free of charge. The visiting concert programme is categorised in three parts: 
‘Enjoyment of Orchestral Music’, the ‘Beauty of Ensemble’, and ‘Playing with the 
Orchestra’. The first part of the programme plays traditional classical music in a 
medium or large-scale venue. The second focuses on providing light or easy listening 
classical music, such as soundtracks from movies or themes from soap operas, which 
are played in venues such as libraries or disability centres. The last part of the 
programme takes music to primary schools: students learn to play musical instruments, 
and take instructions from the professional musicians. As well as the visiting concert 
programme, in 2008 the SPO  provided a nine-concert ‘Masterpiece Series’ conducted 
by the principal conductor along with four 'Russian Music Series’ concerts and three 
‘Concerto in the Classic Period’ concerts conducted by guest conductors. Furthermore, 
the SPO  has a series titled ‘Ars nova’, which plays only contemporary Korean and 
western music, and provides pre-concert lectures to encourage audience appreciation.
The subscription system of the SPO is called ‘SPO Friends’. There are two types of 
membership of the SPO: paid subscription and unpaid subscription. Paid subscription 
is divided into three: youth subscription (applying to students of middle school and high 
school), general subscription, and corporation subscription. The benefits of paid 
subscription include an emailed newsletter, membership card, invitation to SPO  
concerts, the monthly magazine of the SPO, one CD per year, ticket discount, and a 
souvenir of the SPO. On the other hand, the benefits of unpaid subscription include an 
access to the website of the SPO  and an email service on concerts.
Regarding finance, approximately 80% of the orchestra’s income is from the city of 
Seoul. The total estimated budget of the SPO  in 2008 was 16 billion won (£ 8 million). 
13 billion won (£ 6.4 million) came from the city, and 2.8 million won (£1.4 million) was 
the income made up from ticket sales, etc. The total budget of the SPO  is the highest 
among Korean orchestras, and is twice as much as the KBS Symphony Orchestra 
which had a total budget of 8 billion Won (£ 4 million) in 2007 and 2008. However, the 
SPO  is still heavily dependent on a subsidy from the city, despite achieving the highest 
self-earning income of any Korean orchestra.
When the SPO belonged to the city of Seoul, every regulation or management
structure was created by civil servants. However, this is not always suitable for arts 
organisations, and makes it hard for orchestral executive constitutions to carry out their 
work. Decision making was an arduous process, often involving several people before 
reaching a conclusion. To overcome this problem, the authority of the orchestra shifted 
to the Sejong Performing Arts Centre, where the orchestra is based. This, however, 
created another problem for both the orchestra and the Sejong Performing Arts Centre, 
because the deficit of the SPO is entirely a matter for the Sejong Performing Arts 
Centre (SPAC) to deal with. The KBS Symphony Orchestra is facing the same situation 
with the KBS that the SPO and the SPAC had.
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...so the orchestra was treated with inhospitality...SPAC is a foundation, and 
needs to work hard to raise its own achievements...when the SPO  was a 
municipal orchestra, every problem was solved if there was an obligation that 
works for citizens, but the orchestra was treated coldly by the arts
centre...After the independence of the SPO, the orchestra is in the middle of 
every thing...administration only for the orchestra, marketing only for the 
orchestra...this is an advantage...on the other hand, more staff for 
administrative support, a bigger organisational structure to exist as a 
foundation, and bigger budget are necessary... this is a
disadvantage...However, the recent two-year activities after becoming a 
foundation achieved the highest profit in the history of Korean symphony 
orchestras...
[Staff Member 11]
Staff Member 11, who has been working in the SPO  over 24 years, described the 
changes. The SPO was a municipal orchestra in the city of Seoul, and then it was 
under the Sejong Performing Arts Centre, which shifted to a foundation in 1999. The 
Sejong Centre is more or less like a municipal arts centre that is financially and 
administratively supported by the city of Seoul. Nine municipal arts organisations216 *18 in 
Seoul have been in charge of the Sejong Centre. Finally, the SPO  became an 
independent foundation in 2005. If the independence of the SPO  is to be successful, 
the Sejong Centre and the city of Seoul will plan to transform the structure of other 
municipal arts organisations into something similar.
Table 7.2 The significant changes of the SPO
Year 1957-99 1999-2005 2005-present
Authority of 
management
The city of Seoul The Sejong Performing 
Arts Centre (SPAC)
Independence
'Status Municipal orchestra Arts organisation of the 
SPAC
Foundation
justification Cultural welfare Cultural welfare Cultural welfare; a symbol of 
Seoul; and a pride of Korea
216 The Seoul Metropolitan Orchestra (current Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra), Seoul
Metropolitan Dance Theatre, Seoul Metropolitan Chorus, Seoul Metropolitan Musical Theatre
Seoul Metropolitan Theatre, Seoul Metropolitan Opera, Seoul Metropolitan Youth Orchestra 
Seoul Metropolitan Junior Chorus, and Seoul Metropolitan Youth Traditional Music Orchestra
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In Table 7.2, it can be seen that when the authority of management shifts, the status 
and justification of the SPO changes.
Within the past three years, the transformation of the SPO has been considered very 
successful and the details are as follows.
Table 7.3 Successful figures of the SPO
Audience u Concert ^ ------------- (Unit: won!Earned incomeJ)2005 59,000 65 670 million (£334 000)2006 171,000 95 2.3 billion (£1.1 million)
2007 164,000 121 3.3 billion (£1.6 million)2008 * - 3.5 billion (£1.7 million*
(Sources: reter trom ' Ryo, 2006; ' ' Kim, 2008a) --------------- -----------
aMMKooeT*’6' Wh° ^  3 tlCke' Was m  (in 2006) compared ,0 arou"d A0% <"
According to research among 20 Korean orchestras in 2008 based on the data of 2007,
the SPO  was top in five sections, including the total number of performances and 
audience members, the number of audience members who bought a ticket, income 
from charitable activities, and total budget (Kim, 2008b). The SPO  was followed by the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra,217 which was considered the best orchestra before the re­
organisation of the SPO  as a foundation, but the situation now is reversed. The slump 
of the KBS Symphony Orchestra was caused by an absence of a principal conductor 
since 2004, severe conflicts between the KBS and the players, unsystematic 
management, and the forced resignation of the President of the KBS, whereas the 
SPO  has been making rapid progress since 2005 with its maestro, Myung-Whun 
Cheong.
To ensure its financial independence, which is one of new objectives of the SPO  in 
2006, the SPO changed the ticket price: the majority of concert tickets for the SPO  
used to be either free or very cheap, and since its reorganisation the orchestra has 
introduced ticket pricing with more economic awareness. However, this pricing 
structure has not deterred audiences, and if anything, it has encouraged people to 
attend, as they believe the higher ticket prices imply a higher standard of playing. As 
the president of the SPO, Pal-Seung Lee stated:
the level of the SPO  sharply increased after being transformed into a
The KBS Symphony Orchestra had been leading the total earning income budoet as well a* 
the total number of audience until June 2005. What is more, the salaries of the musicfans of the 
SPO are only 65-70% of the salary of the KBS Symphony Orchestra musicians of the
foundation with the appointment of Myung-Whun Cheong as Music 
Director...the total earned income including ticket selling and sponsorship was 
30 times increased compared to before...the present subsidy from Seoul is 
approximately 12 billion won (£ 5,976,000)...but the city is reducing its support 
as the self-income of the SPO  increases...the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra 
receives 50% of its budget from the city and 50% from private support...the 
SPO is also pursuing this model...the model of the SPO  is almost 20 years 
behind the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, but the gap has been narrowed to 
10 years now.
(Jeon, 2007)
Therefore, it can be seen that the SPO became a successful nonprofit organisation. 
The outcomes were visible and positive: an increase in the total number of audience 
members (especially those who paid for a ticket), of self-earned income (including 
ticket sales and private support), and an increase in performance level along with the 
introduction of various programmes (such as outreach concerts). However, despite all 
these positive signs, certain doubts remain as to the future success of the SPO.
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First, the city of Seoul gives significant support to the SPO  from a financial point of view, 
but this subsidy can be changeable, and continuous support may not be guaranteed 
The administrative staff interviewed for this project remained quite positive about 
consistent financial support, because they consider that the amount of money that the 
city provides is small, considering its wealth. The Music Director, Myung-Whun Cheong, 
also expressed an optimistic point of view regarding the subsidy of the orchestra:
...The promise of the government [the city of Seoul] that they will support us is 
not a private thing...a future principal conductor also carries out the previous 
conductor’s agreement...so it won’t happen [that the next mayor of Seoul will 
not fulfill the promise of the former mayor]...
(Myung-Whun Cheong’s interview with Kim, 2006b)
Despite such an optimistic view of future financial support, it cannot be denied that 
municipal arts organisations in Korea are much influenced by the intentions and 
attitude of city mayors. It is fine if the mayor has an interest in arts and culture, but the 
orchestra could be in trouble if a mayor who lacks this interest takes over. Therefore, 
public support received from the city of Seoul can be seen as being under a potential 
threat.
Second, the increase in audience numbers, ticket selling, private support and the rise 
of performance quality may have only been achieved because of the skill and 
popularity of Myung-Whun Cheong. If concerts are conducted by Myung-Whun 
Cheong, the price of tickets is much higher than for the concerts conducted by guest
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conductors.
Table 7.4 shows the comparison between the ticket price of the 'Masterpiece Series’, 
conducted by Myung-Whun Cheong in 2008; the ticket price without him; the highest 
ticket price of the SPO before 2005; and the highest price of other Korean municipal 
orchestras.
Table 7.4 Ticket prices compared
Group Ticket price
A 100,000 won 
(£50)
70,000 won 
(£35)
50,000 
won ( £ 25)
30,000 won 
(£15)
10,000 won 
(£5)
B 50,000 won 
(£25)
30,000 won 
(£15)
20,000won
(£10)
10,000won
(£5)
“
C 30,000 won 
(£15)
• * •
D 60,000 won 
(£30)
50,000 won 
(£14)
* •
Note: A. 2008 ticket price of
B. 2008 ticket price of the SPO with guest conductors;
C. SPO ’s highest ticket price before being a foundation;
D. The highest ticket price of other Korean municipal orchestras.
Approximately 80% of the SPO ’s total income was granted from the city of Seoul. 
Generally speaking, the ticket price of the SPO  is costly in real terms. Inevitably, some 
people criticise the ticket prices of the SPO, because the price may prevent certain 
people from attending. The excuse the SPO  makes is: 'raising the ticket price after the 
appointment of Myung-Whun Cheong is true, but the quality of the performance was 
increased and we reasonably adjusted the ticket price based on the initial cost' (Kim, 
2007). However, the ticket price thought reasonable by other municipal orchestras is an 
average 30,000 won (£  15), or 40,000 won (£ 20) according to Kim (2007), In addition, 
the leader of the advertising team, Byung-Yoon Jeon, explained that ‘the regular 
concerts of the SPO  with Myung-Whun Cheong are expensive, but we are increasing 
the number of free concerts (with the principal conductor) to counterbalance the rise in 
ticket prices’ (Kim, 2007).
Table 7.5 Concerts of the SPO
Year Total concerts 
(including visiting 
concerts)
Free
visiting
concerts
The number of concerts 
conducted by Myung- 
Whun Cheonq
The number of visiting 
concerts conducted by 
Myunq-Whun Cheonq
2006 81 33 27 9
“2007 101 54 21 6
2008 88 48 17 3
As we can see from Table 7.5, the principal conductor has been providing 9 6 and 3 
visiting concerts in 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively. The percentage of visiting
concerts out of total concerts was 40% in 2006, 53% in 2007 and 55% in 2008, and the 
S P O  ensures a balance between free concerts and subscription concerts. Yet the 
participant rate of the principal conductor in the visiting concerts is gradually declining: 
30% in 2006, 29% in 2007 and 18% in 2008— only limited high-quality concerts are 
provided for the general audience, thus Byung-Yoon Jeon ’s explanation about the 
increasing numbers of free concerts conducted by Cheong is not true. In other words, 
although the S P O  provides a number of free concerts, the high-quality performances of 
the S P O  conducted by Myung-Whun Cheong are only for those who can afford the 
ticket price. If people cannot afford the ticket, then they have to attend a free concert. 
Thus, the objective of providing the best performance and customer satisfaction only 
succeeds for those who have money.
High-priced tickets may not a problem for audiences who want to see the new principal 
conductor of the SPO , and this is evidenced by healthy ticket sales; but ticket sa les and 
audience numbers are not so good when the conductor is not Myung-Whun Cheong 
(Lee, 2006a). In addition, the concert schedule of the S P O  is reliant on the schedule of 
Myung-Whun Cheong. The majority of concerts are programmed in January, April, July, 
August, and December when Cheong is based in Korea (Kim, 2008c). He is currently 
also the Music Director of the Orchestre Philharmonique de Radio, and Specia l Artistic 
Adv iser of the Tokyo Philharmonic Orchestra, as well as a Music Director of the Seoul 
Philharmonic Orchestra. He also works as a guest conductor for major symphony 
orchestras such as the San Francisco Symphony Orchestra, Staatskapelle Dresden 
Orchestra, the Royal Concertgebouw Orchestra, and La Sca la  Orchestra.
Figure 7.2 SPO concert in 2006
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■  T o ta l number o f  concert
□  C oncerts conducted by  p rinc ipa l conductor
M  onth
(Source: refer from SPO 2005/2006 Season brochure)
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F ig u r e  7.3 S P O  c o n c e r t  in 2007
■  T o tn l num ber o f  concerts
□  C oncerts  conducted by p rinc ipa l conductor 
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(Source: refer from SPO 2006/2007 Season brochure)
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F ig u r e  7.4 S P O  c o n c e r t  in 2008
■  T o ta l number o f  concerts 
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(Source: refer from SPO 2007/2008 Season brochure)
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F ig u r e  7 .5 B B C  P h i lh a r m o n ic  c o n c e r t  in 2008
■  Total number o f  concerts 
□  C oncerts  conducted by  p rinc ipa l conductor
4.5
M  onth
(Source: refer from BBC Philharmonic 2007/2008 Season brochure)
F ig u r e  7.6 B B C  P h i lh a r m o n ic  c o n c e r t  in 2009
■  T o ta l num ber o f  concerts 
□  C oncerts  conducted by p rin c ipa l conductor
7
F e b . M a r . A p r i l  M a y  J u n e  Ju ly  A u g .  S e p . O c t . N o v .  D e e .
M o n t h
(Source: refer from BBC Philharmonic 2008/2009 Season brochure)
Therefore, Cheong is likely to stay in Korea when foreign orchestras take a rest,218 
so the SPO practices and performs intensive concerts within a short period, and 
this may influence the quality of performance. Continuous and more intensive 
training with a long term plan might be a consideration for a brighter future of the 
SPO.
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The performance level of the SPO  is also a matter of debate. According to Cahn (1992), 
one of the most challenging questions of all is to define quality in music (p. 29). The 
performance quality of the SPO might be evaluated with rather more focus on 
‘objective technical terms’ (i.e. unison of ensemble) than ‘subjective humanistic terms’ 
(i.e. enrichment of people’s feeling by a performance) (Cahn, 1992: p. 30). Generally 
speaking, reports, especially those written in 2008, have evaluated the overall standard 
of performance as significantly improved, but the quality of performance does vary 
considerably, depending on the conductor. A player of the SPO admitted the difference, 
and said: ‘when our music director conducts, several players of the Orchestre 
Philharmonique de Radio France join as guest players. It may not show in appearance, 
but I wonder whether it is our sound or not’ (Kim, 2008c). On the other hand, one of the 
successful strategies of the SPO is its continuous effort to hire excellent players 
throughout the world to raise the level of performance. Of course, it is important to 
employ well-trained professional musicians, as the sound of individual musicians in the 
orchestra is also a key element: ‘the evaluation of artistic quality depends on personal 
characteristics of the performers, such as education, previous experience, prior 
information, and on personal states of mind and taste’ (Lesle, 1984). But collecting a 
number of excellent individual musicians does not set the seal on an orchestra’s artistic 
quality, because the degree of synchronization between all musicians is an essential 
quality in orchestral performance (Boerner et al., 2004: p. 467).
...high artistic quality of the orchestra requires constant process coordination—  
the interplay of the musicians both within a section of instruments (strings, wind 
and percussion) and between those sections (Weeks, 1996)... A  major part of 
orchestral achievement is coordination in the artistic sense. Coordinating a 
crescendo or playing with the same articulation requires musicians to be in 
unison not only technically, but emotionally (Boemer, 2004; Williamon and 
Davidson, 2002). The musical unison necessary for a coherent interpretation by 
the orchestra will not be achieved until the group is emotionally in unison with 
itself.219
A  Korean player indicated how members of the SPO  are changed.
218 Cheong said during a press conference held by the city of Seoul after his appointment as a 
music director of the SPO that he might stay about 10 weeks per year (City of Seoul, 2005).
219 Quoted from Boerner and Streit, 2007: p. 133.
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...my friend who is a current member of the SPO  told me that the SPO  
consistently changes its members, so if he went to a place for practice, a 
newcomer sat next to him...without any notice, he had to play with new member, 
and felt very weird...If we (orchestra players) play with old members, we could 
notice each other’s thinking without exchanging a word and could know their 
body condition from the way of their playing. We have been training together for 
a long time, so we know how to cooperate each other and make a good 
ensemble... an excellent young player is also definitely needed, but making a 
music as an orchestra member is totally different to playing alone...So, firing 
elder musicians because their technical ability is not as excellent as young 
musicians... then filling the places with young musicians is not a right decision.
[Player 2]
World-class orchestras have their own characters, whereas none of the Korean 
symphony orchestras seem to have a special feature to distinguish them from other 
orchestras. Thus, for the SPO to pursue its objectives, it needs to find its own character 
and halt the continual change of players.
Another reason for regarding the success of the SPO  with suspicion is that it 
undertakes many hiring concerts to raise income, which is understandable. However 
some concerts given by the SPO  are contentious. As the SPO  receives a great deal of 
subsidy from Seoul, the regular/subscription concert that is the main programme of the 
orchestra should be open to everyone, giving priority to citizens, and emphasising its 
role as a public service rather than as a commercial outfit. The regular concert on 12 
December 2006 was held with the famous clarinetist Paul Meyer as a guest conductor 
and Pianist Nicholas Angelich, but the public found it difficult to purchase tickets 
because the SPO  sold only 500 tickets and the rest (2500) were given to commercial 
sponsors (Kim, 2006b). This happens in other concerts as well, and some concerts are 
not open to the public at all, so that although the public want to see a certain concert by 
the SPO  it is impossible to buy a ticket. It seems that the SPO  chooses its audience for 
a particular concert The SPO is a nonprofit arts organisation, supported by the city of 
Seoul for the cultural welfare of its citizens. Therefore, the SPO  might need to hold onto 
its role as a public sendee, and should strike a balance between commercial concerts 
and non-commercial concerts. In addition, the mixture of artistic programmes and 
popular programmes might be considered more carefully.
Finally, The SPO is dependent on the principal conductor. There is no doubt that the 
role of the conductor is significant, because the musical charisma, harmony with 
players and administrative staff and enthusiasm influence the entire orchestra 
However, some Koreans believe that the success of the orchestra is half-dependent on 
the conductor. They have illusions that if the orchestra is conducted by a famous
conductor, its concerts will automatically be internationally successful; and if the 
conductor is famous, the orchestra will, by default, become famous. This may not be 
true: according to Sang-Woo Han220 (2005), Korean symphony orchestras need a 
principal conductor who can spend most of his time with the orchestra more than they 
need a worldwide first-class conductor. In addition, spending money on inviting a 
famous conductor is the way that the name value of the orchestra is automatically 
higher in accordance with the fame of the conductor, so more attention should be given 
to developing the orchestras itself, instead of relying on a celebrated name. The 
important thing needed to be a good orchestra is to be able to make an ensemble, and 
an orchestra needs a conductor who can draw ensemble and harmonic capacity from 
players instead of simply being a star (Wadman and Kdping, 2005, Boerner and Streit, 
2007, Cahn, 1992, and Boerner et al., 2004). II Lee (2008a) rigorously criticised the 
decision of the SPO for choosing Myung-Whun Cheong as a principal conductor.
249
...in the case of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, it chose the wrong 
conductor...the SPO undertook a risky adventure that destroyed the previous 
SPO and made a new orchestra...but it tried to make a new orchestra with a 
famous conductor without considering the situation of Korea. The orchestra 
cannot establish itself just with one famous name. Music is made by a harmony 
of players rather than by the conductor’s baton...so the players and the 
conductor must be harmonised ...to do so, they should spend a lot of time 
together and try to understand each other...but he (Myung-Whun Cheong) 
does not have the enthusiasm or time for the SPO  [...] an internationally 
famous conductor should give intensive training, and raise the performance 
level of players up to an international level... conducting real 
regular/subscription concerts without training the players is bad behaviour, like 
stealing a fruit...The best orchestra is created where there is devotion and 
sacrifice...Look at Myung-Whun Cheong and ask whether he has such 
things...the success of an orchestra is dependent on the pure passion of 
people to make the best orchestra...
(Lee, 2008a: pp. 54-61)
As II Lee (2008a) remarked above, the SPO  seems to have made the wrong choice 
and put too much confidence in its principal conductor. Sang-Woo Han (2005) had 
earlier pointed out that Cheong might not be able to devote his time to the SPO, and 
could not lead any remarkable development of the SPO. Now, it might be time for the 
SPO  to prepare a firm musical structure and improve its musical capacity without 
inviting famous guest players.
So far, I have been examining the new governance of the SPO, along with its primary 
activities, subscription, finance, government structure, successful achievements and 
problematic factors (its financial dependency, dependency on the principal conductor,
220 One of most famous classical music critics in Korea.
and the balance between public service and commercial aspects). The change of the 
SPO  is significant because it is the first example and is likely to influence approximately 
thirty other municipal orchestras. The KBS Symphony Orchestra and the Seoul 
Philharmonic Orchestra have tried on numerous occasions in the past to become 
world-class orchestras, but failed. If the new-born SPO is not a success, the city of 
Seoul may dismantle it and establish another SPO as they have done in the past. The 
city tends to believe that complete organisational change is a panacea when their 
orchestra is not working well, and repeatedly makes the same errors. To ensure this
does not happen again, the city of Seoul may need to support and encourage the SPO 
in developing a long-term plan.
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Despite some drawbacks, the overall outcome of the SPO  may be viewed optimistically, 
and the president of the SPO insists on the need for more financial support 'to reach 
the level of global orchestras' (Lee, 2008b). However, it might be worth questioning 
how many municipal orchestras in local cities could afford the enormous financial 
support that is required to be a foundation.
Table 7.6 The annual budgets of Korean municipal orchestras
The Name of Municipal Orchestras 
KBS Symphony Orchestra
2004 11
6 ( £ 3,000,000)
tunit: Dimon won) 
2007 "
8 (£4,000,000)Seoul Symphony Orchestra 
(Current Seoul Philharmonic Orchestral
5 ( £ 2,500,000) 3) 13 (£6,500,000)
Daejeon Philharmonic Orchestra 3.5 (£1,750.000) 3.4 ( £ 1 700 000)
Suwon Philharmonic Orchestra 
Ulsan Symphony Orchestra
3.3 (£1,650,000) 6 ( £ 3.000,000)
Incheon Philharmonic Orchestra
 ^1 ** 11JUU, UQQ)
3 (£1,500,000)
2.6 (£1.300,000)
2.9 ( £ 1 450 nnm
Busan Philharmonic Orchestra 2.8 (£1,400,000) 3.7 ( £ 1.850 000}
Bucheon Philharmonic Orchestra 2.5 (£1,250,000) 3.3 ( £ 1 650 000}
Daegu City Symphony Orchestra 2.5 (£1,250,000) 2.5 (£ 1 250 000}
Jeju Philharmonic Orchestra 2.3 (£1.150,000) n/a
Gwangju Symphony Orchestra 2.2 (£1,100.000) n/a
Changwon Philharmonic Orchestra 2 (£1,000,000) 2 2 ( £ 1 100 000^
Cheongju City Philharmonic Orchestra 1.2 (£600,000) n/a
Jeonju Symphony Orchestra 1.2 (£600,000) 1.4 (£700.000)
As can be seen from Table 7.6, the yearly budget of municipal orchestras excepting 
the KBS Symphony Orchestra and the Seoul Symphony Orchestra, is very limited The 
average budget is around half of the total budget of these two top orchestras. The 
current budget of the SPO  is approximately twice as much as in 2004 (meanwhile they 
are seeking yet more money in order to be in securer position), whereas the current
budget of other municipal orchestra is more or less similar to the budget of 2004.221 
The SPO  was able to be transformed into a foundation mainly because of the powerful 
policy drive of the city of Seoul initiated by the former mayor (and current president of 
Korea) Myung-Park Lee. It was exceptional subsidy that came with the justification that 
the SPO  was to be a cultural representative of the city of Seoul and a world-class 
orchestra. This justification might apply in the case of the SPO (and perhaps the KBS 
Symphony Orchestra) but could not be made as the case for others to raise their 
subsidy. Moreover, most local governments do not have the financial capacity to 
support their orchestras like this. Therefore, municipal orchestras may need to focus on 
their role as public services, and find ways to maximise this role without significant 
organisational changes. At the same time, they may need to communicate more often 
with a wider audience, and explore ways of steering their audiences in a commercial 
direction.
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7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the role of the Korean municipal orchestra as a public 
service, the public support given by local government, and the restricted funding 
available. It has also examined changes in the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra that 
might serve as a future model for Korean municipal orchestras, helping them to 
respond to a new environment.
As has been indicated earlier, local governments support their municipal orchestras 
with the minimum of funding needed to maintain them. This is simply because 
orchestras are not something that local governments need to give priority to, compared 
to other public services catering for more basic needs, such as housing or health care. 
An orchestra forms no part of Korean cultural industries, which have become a main 
area of cultural policy, and municipal orchestras cannot even be assured of their value 
to cities.
The changing governance of orchestras, in imitation of the organisational structure of 
western top orchestras, has been regarded as something that would ensure a bright 
future for municipal orchestras in Korea. In recent years, the Seoul Philharmonic 
Orchestra has experienced the biggest change. Although the SPO  is facing up to some 
new challenges, such as communicating with a wider audience, developing a new 
programme, and setting a more commercial direction, it may not prove the appropriate
221 The KBS Symphony Orchestra has had its budget increased by 2 billion won ( £ 1 million) 
and the current total budget is around 8 billion won ( £ 4 million).
future model for the remaining municipal orchestras, especially in medium and small­
sized cities. What is more, the SPO continues to have difficulty in balancing its dual 
role as a both a public service and a business.
A summary and integration of the previous chapters, addressing the main research 
questions, will be presented in next chapter.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion
8.1 Introduction
The key objective of this study was to examine the diverse problems in contemporary 
Korean orchestras along with cultural policy and new performance environments. This 
chapter summarises the findings in relation to the research questions; and it draws some 
conclusions regarding the originality, implications, and limitations of this study.
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8.2 Summary of findings
The following sections are structured according to the study’s five research questions. The 
first section covers Korean cultural policy and its impact on municipal orchestras The 
second section describes the context of three Korean municipal orchestras, which 
represent types of organisational structure of municipal orchestras. The third section 
examines players’ and staff’s job satisfaction and turnover. The next section covers players’ 
and staff’s different types of conflicts and styles for handling interpersonal conflict. The 
final section covers the research questions regarding restricted public funding to municipal 
orchestras, and illustrates one way of responding to new challenges, through a case study 
of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra.
How does the changing context of Korean cultural policy impact upon orchestras?
As Chapter 3 revealed, Korean cultural policy has been strongly influenced by political 
economic, historical, and socio-cultural factors. In the beginning, the government's cultural 
policy was used in the main for political purposes and as a means of controlling cultural 
and arts activities. Then, Korean cultural policy became more focused on people’s cultural
welfare and entertainment, along with more awareness of commercial and economic 
aspects.
Government centered Korean cultural policy has invariably changed whenever there has 
been a change of regime, and it is difficult to expect consistent and rooted cultural policy 
The changes also affect the personnel of public arts and cultural organisations; after the 
new Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism was established in 2008, the president of the 
KBS, the chair of Arts Council Korea and, more recently, the chancellor of the Korean 
National University of Arts were each changed before the existing tenure of their 
predecessors was completed.
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It may be that Korean municipal orchestras are not appropriately directed, and they are 
ignored to some extent by local authorities. They cannot fully deliver their role as public 
services because of restricted public funding and shortage of staff. According to Maitlis 
(1998), the advantages of contract orchestras (such as Korean municipal orchestras) are 
that they are able to develop a consistent pattern of work, and long-term artistic 
development is ensured by the presence of a stable salary structure (p. 49). However, 
Korean municipal orchestras possess none of these advantages. Thus, they need to work 
to achieve them, in order to justify their public funding, which private symphony orchestras 
lack.
Although a few professionals claimed that there was no connection between Korean 
cultural policy and orchestras, there did appear to be some relationship, even though not 
very strong, because Korean municipal orchestras are primarily supported by their local 
governments, rather than the central government. Thus, local politicians led by the mayor 
are the final decision makers, and the budget is also decided upon by these local 
authorities, based on local financial status. It is important to justify or explain municipal 
orchestras’ existence to local government in order to secure their future, but it is 
sometimes difficult to persuade politicians about the significance of arts or culture.
I found that local governments did not pay attention to their municipal orchestras and often 
overlooked what they might be able to do for the orchestras, leaving them alone rather 
than giving more support: local governments provide enough money to maintain only the 
minimum of stability for their orchestras. They restrict public funding because they are not 
a main object for consideration by local politicians (compared to other public services). 
Moreover, the reason that local governments do not disband their orchestras is that they 
wish to avoid criticism from local citizens and orchestra lovers, and to prevent an adverse 
verdict from voters when the time comes for reeiection. As a result, local politicians aim to 
support orchestras at the existing level of funding but no more.
W h a t  is  th e  c o n te x t  o f  K o r e a n  m u n ic ip a l  o r c h e s t r a s ?
Chapter 4 explored the nature of the contexts of three Korean municipal orchestras, which 
between them offer examples of each type of organisational structure with which this study 
was concerned. Although there are some differences, Korean municipal orchestras share 
overall similarities in the way of managing and funding, and their actions are formulated in 
response to a government structure that operates in a similarly consistent fashion.
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All municipal orchestras, being public services, are full-scale professional ensembles 
aiming to provide cultural and arts entertainment to citizens. They mainly provide public 
concerts in their home cities, but the KBS Symphony Orchestra (KSO) gives more regional 
concerts and tours internationally. The KSO operates under auspices of the KBS 
broadcast company in a similar fashion to the BBC orchestras in the UK, but its primary 
remit is not to record for broadcasts. Although the KSO has been considered a 
representative Korean symphony orchestra and presents itself as a high-quality orchestra 
with celebrated conductors,222 there is no distinguishing feature for which the orchestra is 
known.
Korean municipal orchestras undertake concert engagements mainly within their local 
cities in order to gain extra income. However, commercial CD recording and national or 
international engagement concerts, which are significant parts of western orchestras’ 
income, are not a primary source of income for Korean municipal orchestras.
Traditionally, all Korean municipal orchestras are 100% financially supported by local 
governments, but this funding is restricted: the majority of the budget is used for personal 
expenses, because an orchestra is a labour intensive organisation, so there is a limited 
budget for activities. Thus, orchestras are barely capable of maintaining their current status, 
and they try to provide as many concerts as possible within their budget allowance.
Because of the 100% public funding from the cities (or from the KBS in the case of the 
KBS Symphony Orchestra), Korean municipal orchestras are administrated and controlled 
by authorities: this funding structure might lead to dual management structure (orchestral 
executive constitution and city, although the final say rests with the city), which creates an 
inefficient operation, as roles and responsibilities overlap and are unclear. The three 
municipal orchestras differ slightly in their government structure. The CPO  is, in practice 
run by its orchestral executive constitution, cooperating with civil servants at the city hall. 
The BPO is run by its orchestral executive constitution, along with staff 223
222 However, this orchestra has not had a principal conductor since 2004 until now (November 
2011).
223 Most staff at the arts centre are civil servants.
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at the municipal arts centre.
The KSO is managed by staff in the Division of Audience Relations within the KBS 
broadcast company. The orchestras’ decision-making power is centralised in the cities and 
the KBS broadcast company, and players’ opinion on management matters224 is almost 
ignored, except during the principal conductor’s appointment, when the authorizing body 
includes players (although the final decision always lies with the authority). However, most 
players interviewed in this study are not keen to be involved in decision making, and this 
might support Fogel's view on musicians: musicians are ’more comfortable not 
participating in the decision making processes', because this makes it easier to criticise 
decisions and to avoid the difficulties of responsibility (2000: p. 17). The membership of 
the orchestral executive constitution generally consists of between 5 and 10 people led by 
the Managing Director (orchestra manager)225 and the head of the division of audience 
relations in the case of the KSO.
All the orchestras have a musicians’ representative selected from the players and a 
musicians’ committee. The CPO and KSO have a musicians’ union, but not the BPO, 
because the city of Busan does not allow this (although the BPO had one formerly).
Although Korean municipal orchestras have received substantial funding from their cities 
(or from the KBS broadcast company in the case of the KBS Symphony Orchestra) and 
been less focused on profit or loss, they are under pressure because of anxiety about the 
reduction of public funding, the competitive market,226 and the need for more commercial 
awareness.
H o w  a n d  w h y  d o  p la y e r s  a n d  s t a f f  b e c o m e  s a t is f ie d  o r  d is s a t is f ie d  w ith  th e ir  j o b s ,  
a n d  d o e s  th is  l in k  to  tu rn o v e r?
In addressing this research question, Chapter 5 has discussed the job satisfaction of 
players and staff in relation to five facets: work, pay, supervision, promotion and co­
workers and its relationship with job turnover. A  summary of the research question is 
displayed in the following Table 8.1.
224 Players do not ptay a significant role in decision making on artistic matters such as programming’ 
s e r v a n t s ) * Pn" Cip COnductor and orchestral executive constitution (and civil 9‘
225 The Managing Director in a Korean municipal orchestra has responsibility for the dav-to-dav
running of the orchestra. 1 dy Udy
226 Unlike western orchestras Korean orchestras face less competition with other orchestras but 
more competition with other arts organisations or entertainments. However the
fnSinSf *° COmPe,i,i° " W',h °,h6r PUb'iC a"d •'¿SSSSSKSZ
257
Table 8.1 Summary of job satisfaction
Players Staff
Actual job satisfaction
Overall iob satisfaction based on the absolute JDI score
Satisfaction Work Work
Supervision
Co-workers
Dissatisfaction Pay
Promotion
Promotion
Pay
Neither satisfaction 
nor dissatisfaction
Supervision
Co-workers
N/A
Relative iob satisfaction
Most satisfaction Work N/A
Least satisfaction __________________________ N/A
Influential facet regarding job satisfaction
Most important Work Work
Least important Promotion Promotion
Sources of job 
dissatisfaction
Lack of control over work 
Hierarchical structure in 
orchestration 
Salary
Work conditions: lack of 
administrative autonomy 
Salary 
Promotion
Overall relations
Job satisfaction and 
demographic variables
Pay and age 
Pay and gender 
Pay and tenure
N/A
Job satisfaction and turnover Work and turnover: negative 
Co-worker and turnover: negative
N/A
Players and staff are satisfied with their current work, but dissatisfied with pay and 
promotion. The results of the survey and interviews indicated that although working as an 
orchestral musician is mentally and physically hard work, players and staff do something 
they love: especially in the case of players, they do exactly what they have been trained 
for years. Thus, symphony orchestra musicians, who have the most internal motivation 
compared to twelve other job groups based on the study of Allmendinger, Hackman, and 
Lehman on life and work in symphony orchestras (1996), are happy with what they are 
doing in tandem with their own pride and professionalism, and so are administrative staff. 
However, players and administrative staff are not happy with their current pay: both players 
and staff consider pay as the second most important facet influencing their job satisfaction, 
followed by work. Thus, they have complaints about current pay. Players’ financial 
difficulties found in this study are in line with the articles of Glynn (2000), Loebel (1977) 
Allmendinger, Hackman, and Lehman (1996), Faulkner (1973), and Price (2006), which 
mentioned lack of financial rewards: in addition, the Ford Foundation in 1965 described 
orchestra musicians as "one of the most underpaid professional groups in American 
society (Flanagan, 2008: p. 18).
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Players and staff are indeed unhappy with the promotion system, and Faulkner (1973) 
indicates that improving one’s position is a main concern of orchestral players. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, there are very limited opportunities to move up to the position of 
principal player or managing director: because players and administrative staff normally 
stay in an orchestra for a lifetime (dismissal is rare), and could be promoted only when 
higher positioned players or staff leave or retire. However, dissatisfaction with promotion 
does not seem to be a focal problem to Korean symphony orchestra musicians and 
administrative staff, because they considered promotion as the least important facet 
influencing their job satisfaction. Thus, the working environment of the orchestra needs to 
encourage the motivation of players and administrative staff, increase prestige, and find 
alternative means of financial rewards.
The interview results indicate that another source of players’ dissatisfaction is lack of 
involvement and influence in the orchestra. The American Symphony Orchestra League 
quotes from an anonymous participant in a forum about players' involvement in decision 
making: ‘The Board decides, while we go play’. Although musician involvement does not 
always result in advantageous outcomes, the Symphony Orchestra Institute believes that 
‘musician involvement increases the effectiveness of symphony organizations [...] 
Musician involvement is seen as a factor working for the overall good of the organization’ 
(Symphony Orchestra Institute, 1997: pp. 1-2). Similarly, the American Symphony 
Orchestra League (1993) states that orchestral organisations could increase their 
effectiveness when musicians’ participation is properly processed for achieving the mission 
of the orchestra (p. 182). Albert K. Webster, the former managing director and executive 
vice president at the New York Philharmonic, also explained the benefits of musician 
involvement (Symphony Orchestra Institute, 1997: p. 2).
On the other hand, administrative staff are not happy with lack of authority in relation to 
decision making. Unlike the managers of U.S. symphony orchestras, who have a 
remarkable degree of autonomy (Flanagan, 2008: p. 16), Korean administrative staff 
(including managing directors) have very little autonomy on most areas of decision making, 
such as artistic direction, music performance, or music-related community service: 
absence of autonomy could negatively influence satisfaction on work, based on Spector’s 
study (1986) on the relationship between autonomy and a variety of outcome variables. 
Thus, in order to decrease staff job dissatisfaction on this matter, Korean municipal 
orchestras might require flexibility on sharing the power of organisational governance 
between the orchestra’s management office and the local government authority.
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The results of the analyses cited above indicate the relationship between players’ job 
satisfaction and demographic variables and turnover, respectively. More specifically, the 
players in the younger age range, female, and short tenure groups are more satisfied with 
their pay, compared to those of the older age, male, and long tenure groups: it might be 
because the former groups have less responsibility for their family’s living.
This study also examined the relationship between job satisfaction and turnover, and the 
overall result shows that co-worker and work are negatively related to players’ turnover. 
The interviewees were generally well satisfied with their relationships with colleagues 
(although some slightly complained about a few of their co-workers’ deterioration of 
performance skill), thus the tendency of turnover in Korean municipal orchestras might be 
low. In addition, players of Korean municipal orchestras are highly satisfied with their 
work, so lower turnover could be expected.
What types end degrees of conflicts do plsyers and staff experience, and how do 
they handle conflicts with supervisors and peers?
Players and staff experienced various conflicts from different sources. Chapter 6 sought 
answers to the research question above together with six subsidiary objectives.
The relationships among players, conductor, administrative staff, and civil servants are 
complicated: the dual management structure (orchestral executive constitution and the 
city), hierarchical government structure (which gives enormous power to the conductor, 
without a controlling tool), and mistrust, lack of communication, and prejudice make such a 
complicated relationship worse. The majority of orchestras experience the culture of 
conflict, and a major challenge for orchestras is to resolve the conflict (American 
symphony Orchestra League, 1993). Sometimes, lifts between musicians and the 
administration team leads to a musicians' strike (Glynn, 2000), and players of Korean 
municipal orchestras, such as the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra or the KBS Symphony 
Orchestra, also exhibited their conflict towards orchestra office and local government by 
concert boycott.
When comparing group of players’ different types of conflict, intergroup conflict with staff is 
higher than intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, and intergroup conflict with civil 
servants: the group of players might experience communication difficulties and different
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perceptions (to their staff) or differences between personality, which were uncovered as 
sources of intergroup conflict in this study. The musicians’ strike mentioned above could 
also be caused by intergroup conflict with administrative staff related to ob concern..In the 
case of the KSO, the players have less intergroup conflict with their administrative staff 
than do those of the BPO and CPO.
There is significant difference between gender and intrapersonal conflict, intergroup 
conflict with staff, and intergroup conflict with civil servants: female players experience 
fewer of those conflicts than male players: thus, orchestra office and local government may 
need to pay more attention to male players.
In handling interpersonal conflict with their conductor, players prefer to use an obliging 
style. Using an obliging style means that players try to satisfy the conductor's demands, 
and show less concern for themselves: the conductor of a Korean symphony orchestra 
has absolute authority over the organisation on and off stage, and the players seem to be 
obedient to the conductor as members of team. Meanwhile, when players are handling 
interpersonal conflict with peers, they are likely use a dominating style, which would mean 
their concerns for themselves are greater than those for others: however, the degree of 
this conflict with peers may be not serious, because the players interviewed in this study 
seem to understand and support each other when a concert takes place, and also 
describe some conflicts as a small personal matter.
Loebel (1977) advises potential future orchestral musicians that “there should be some 
basic understanding about the conflict of interests among the parties involved in the 
running of an orchestra [...] a certain amount of conflict is inevitable and understandable” 
(p. 84). He continues that although the motivation and aims of the various parties may 
differ, a willingness toward accommodation should lead to the solution of mutual problems. 
According to the American Symphony Orchestra League (1993: p. 76-78), “orchestras 
exist in order to make good music and to serve as a resource for their communities”, and 
the League recommends them to open “the doors of communication to break down 
barriers that lead to suspicion and mistrust." Therefore, it might profitable for orchestra to 
share their thinking, concerns, and organisational information by increasing 
communication, which could "break down barriers that lead to suspicion and mistrust” 
(American Orchestra League, 1993: p. 78). Table 8.7 summarises various conflicts 
occurring in Korean municipal orchestras.
Table 8.2 Conflicts in Korean municipal orchestras
Type of conflict Sources of relation 
conflict
Subject Issues
Intergroup conflict Different perception Orchestra player as a job/gender Male player: a main means of living 
Female: a side job or an escape path
Orchestra (art appreciation) Players: productive subject 
Civil servant: unproductive subject
Working time Players: official attendance time plus outside activities related to music 
Civil servant: official attendance time
Regulation to enroll on an outside activity Players: controlling tool
Administrative staff: helpful tool for players' achievement
Ensemble Players: an important activity, and it takes long time to make a good 
ensemble
Civil servants: a kind of background music for the main event; an 
ensemble can be organised anytime as long as there are players; the 
quality of performance is not important
Audition Players: controlling tool
Civil servant and Administrative Staff: orchestra’s development
Intragroup conflict Environmental change Audition Increasing competition between players 
Cause of major conflict
Intergroup conflict Prejudice Players: civil servants are ignorant of the arts; civil servants cannot or do 
not want to understand arts and musicians
Civil servants: musicians are stubborn; musicians are rich; musicians 
are not likely to play popular music
Intrapersonal conflict Age Different life style between younger generations and older generations 
Related to Confucianism
Intragroup conflict Attitude Rude attitude of conductors towards players 
Unfair attitude of conductors towards players 
Unfair attitude of administrative staff toward players
Intergroup conflict Communication/ gender Male players: difficult to communicate with female fellow players 
Players: poor communication with civil servants 
Civil servants: communication difficulties with musicians and 
administrative staff in orchestral executive constitution
Sources of task conflict Issues
Intrapersonal conflict Inefficient work Players: inefficient working of orchestral executive constitution 
Civil servants: inefficient work of managing director 
Players: mistakes of fellow players 
Conductor's lack of conducting technique
Intragroup conflict Attitude Oppressive attitude of conductors towards civil servants
Why is local government public funding to municipal orchestras restricted, and 
how far can Korean municipal orchestras adapt and grow in the current situation?
As an extension of the previous two research questions, Chapter^ explored the reason 
for the restncted funding given to municipal orchestras and, by examining the activities 
of the SPO, the response to the current situation in which Korean municipal orchestras 
find themselves.
The municipal orchestra is not a significant sector for local government when compared 
to other public services or other areas of cultural policy, and the cities provide a 
marginal level of funds, with which orchestras are able to pursue limited activities. 
Along with a strong emphasis on cultural industries, due to their economic benefit, local 
governments would like to push or encourage their orchestras into the market 
Although musicians and staff of the orchestral executive constitution perceive pressure 
from the city and new environmental changes, the majority of Korean municipal 
orchestras appear to be incapable of responding to these challenges.
Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra is the only Korean symphony orchestra to respond 
effectively to the new challenges, aided by strong support from a previous mayor of 
Seoul. They have transformed themselves into a completely independent organisation 
in terms of administration,227 but still receive an exceptionally high amount of subsidy 
from the city of Seoul: public funding covered about 80% of their total budget in 2007.
In spite of the strong objections and protests from the musicians about their having a 
civil servant-like status, the SPO was able to process sweeping changes of governance 
because the city of Seoul gave them financial and political support. Their aim was not 
only to please the citizens of Seoul, but also to have the SPO ’s name acknowledged 
abroad as the premier Korean symphony orchestra. Seoul has potential to enlarge its 
classical music market, and the SPO could experiment with their activities, and attract 
and hire talented musicians from abroad by offering high salaries: Korean major 
symphony orchestras in Seoul relate to their roles as national metropolitan orchestras 
and are more exposed to global influences and connect more closely with the global 
aspirations of Korea, whereas the other orchestras, being more local in character, 
become locked into local power networks. Thus, it is almost impossible for middle­
ranking municipal orchestras to emulate the transformation of the SPO. In addition, the 
result of the SPO ’s change-whether or not it is successfu l-*  still a matter of debate, 
and it is too early to draw conclusions.
Korean municipal orchestras will perhaps become financially self-sufficient, because 
most symphony orchestras (including municipal symphony orchestras in France and
227 The SPO has the largest administrative team in the history of Korean orchestras.
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Germany) ‘suffer from perennial budget concerns’ (Lehman, 2002: p. 207). The local 
governments have a general tendency to believe that if the municipal orchestra 
becomes a legally autonomous foundation, this is a seal of the orchestra’s success, 
and relieves them from financial burden. However, without proper preparation, such a 
change might not lead to their ultimate development, or mean they respond effectively 
to all new challenges. If they try to do this, they may lose both old and new audiences, 
dilute their initial aims, and weaken their legitimacy. The real challenge for Korean 
municipal orchestra lies with players, administrative staff, and the cities, along with their 
cooperation.
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There is, however, no organisation uniting and supporting professional orchestras in 
Korea, comparable to the Association of British Orchestras (ABO) or the American 
Symphony Orchestra League (ASOL).
The objectives of the ABO, for example, are:
• To be an advocate for the orchestral profession of the UK, ensuring that the 
voice of British orchestras is heard by all relevant parties.
• To provide the principal forum through which members communicate 
collectively with each other to facilitate shared knowledge, collaborative 
initiatives and problem solving.
• To provide accurate, timely and comprehensive information on issues and 
events that impact on the management, development and legal 
responsibilities of orchestras.
• To provide and enable training and continuing professional development 
opportunities at all levels of orchestral management.
(ABO, 2009: online228)
These activities of the ABO can be recommended to Korean municipal orchestras, in 
order to protect the orchestras from outside influence and to efficiently and flexibly 
manage orchestras via cooperation. However, although having a professional 
orchestral association is desirable, it may be difficult to establish because Korean 
municipal orchestras have very limited autonomy; they are inward looking and not likely 
to share information each other, and the way each orchestra differs (for example, in 
size of orchestra and management, team, or budget) also has to be considered.
So far, the research findings have been discussed alongside the research questions. 
The findings can be integrated into three parts, as follows:
The key facts regarding context
• Local cities' emphasis on economic benefits in the aspect of cultural 
industries and financial independence of municipal orchestras.
228 Available at: http.7/www.abo.orq.uk/About-Us/Mission/ [Accessed 11 June 2009],
• Financial insecurity following a political election.
• Local government’s ignorance about the orchestra, and no long-term plan or
music policy for the orchestra.
• No orchestral association.
• Lack of sustainability of the municipal orchestra in terms of developing a
consistent pattern of work, long-term artistic development, and audience 
development.
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The key facts regarding job satisfaction
• Dissatisfaction with pay to both players and staff.
• Great satisfaction with work of both players and staff.
• Pay and age are positively associated: the younger age group of player is
more satisfied with pay; pay and tenure are positively significant: players 
with shorter tenure are more satisfied with pay; pay and gender are 
negatively associated: female players are more satisfied with pay, 
compared to male players.
• Players’ job turnover is negatively associated with work and co-workers,
respectively: if players are satisfied with work and co-workers, they think 
less of turnover.
• Players are dissatisfied with the lack of authority, the hierarchical structure,
and salary, whereas staff are dissatisfied with the lack of administrative 
autonomy, salary, and promotion.
• Despite players’ complaints, auditions that are closely related to promotion
might be a good method to encourage players’ motivation if the result of the 
auditions practically affect to the players’ orchestral position or salary.
The key facts regarding conflict
• Gender and Intrapersonal conflict, intergroup conflict with staff and with civil
servants: male players have a higher perception of intrapersonal conflict, 
intergroup conflict with staff, and intergroup conflict with civil servants, 
compared to female players.
• Male players use more integrating and compromising style when handling
conflict with peers than are female players.
• When comparing intrapersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict
with staff, and intergroup conflict with civil servants, players have higher 
perception of intergroup conflict with staff.
• Players do not prefer to use a Dominating style when there is interpersonal
conflict with conductors or peers.
• There is no statistic evidence that female players use more avoiding style
when there is a conflict with peers, although male players believe that to be 
so.
• Players and staff generally believe that if staff are music graduates, there is
less conflict between them. The result of this study indicates that the staff’s 
educational background only influences intragroup conflict of staff, which 
occurs related to goals, tasks, and policies, or a result of incompatibilities, 
disagreements, or inconsistencies: non-music-graduated staff have more 
perception of intragroup conflict than music-graduated staff.
8.3 Originality
This research is a unique study of Korean municipal symphony orchestras in relation to 
cultural policy and changing environments, and has been achieved through an 
investigation of the thoughts, attitudes and values in everyday practice. Several studies
have been carried out regarding Korean professional symphony orchestras and have 
indicated current problematic situations in terms of finance, managerial structure, and 
administration (see Table 1.1). A  flagship study on Korean orchestras was written by 
Seok-Heung Kang in 2000. Kang’s thesis made a large contribution to the 
systematisation of studies on Korean symphony orchestras by clearly classifying 
features and problems in three different areas: organisational structure and 
management systems, performing activities, and the status of financial management. 
However, although Kang’s (2000) studies make a significant contribution to 
understanding the management and organisation of symphony orchestras in Korea 
using examples from other developed countries, the limitation is that he simply 
describes the problematic situations within Korean symphony orchestras without regard 
to the external environmental factors or issues that Korean symphony orchestras are 
facing. Moreover, he does not explain how the various management methods of other 
orchestras might be applied to Korean orchestral management. After Kang’s thesis, the 
majority of studies on symphony orchestras have been carried out by Korean student 
researchers. However, most of the studies simply repeat the same issues using 
different cases, and continue to neglect contemporary Korean realities.
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The second original contribution of this study is its different approach to orchestra 
structure. Korean researchers have suggested a particular model of orchestra 
government structure, especially as related to power position. For example, Won-Chul 
Park (2004) insists that the orchestra needs an independent executive constitution 
controlled by an Executive Director and that a stable management system can be 
obtained if the Artistic Director and Executive Director have an equality of position and 
active communication. Soo-Jin Jung (2004) points to the unequal position between 
Artistic Director and Executive Director as a problem of the Korean orchestra 
structure229. However, some people are of a different opinion concerning the power 
position: Kyung-Ok Lee (2005b) considers that giving the highest position to the 
conductor (or Artistic Director) is the most appropriate solution for the organisational 
governance structure. These comments show that Korean researchers are likely to 
focus mainly on the power balance between Artistic Director and Executive Director 
and to insist on the independence of the orchestral executive constitution. However, 
with examples of the organisational structure of American orchestras described by 
Fogel (2000), Levine (2001), and Morris (2002), it became apparent that the important 
things are each component of organisational structure and its role in performance 
rather than in the power structure. In addition, this study emphasis the importance of
229 However, she did not mention a preferred 
Executive Director. power structure between the Artistic Director and
the orchestral executive constitution for managerial efficiency, along with its lack of
authority and the welfare of staff, which negatively influences motivation and job
satisfaction.
This study has investigated the interrelationships between players, conductors, civil 
servants, and administrative staff in orchestral executive constitutions, focusing 
especially on conflict relationships. Previous Korean orchestra studies overlooked the 
conflicts occurring within an orchestra, despite its significance for the smooth operation 
and artistic quality of an orchestra. It may be that Korean researchers are likely to think 
conflict exists everywhere, and so it is of no great import. There are a number of 
business and economic studies on conflict and stress, and their influence on outcomes, 
but this study is unusual in being a comprehensive attempt to gain a deeper 
understanding of organisational behaviour in the context of Korean municipal 
orchestras.
Finally, no previous Korean researchers have considered seriously why local 
governments have been supporting their municipal orchestras without making any 
major changes in terms of administration and finance. Instead, researchers have 
merely criticised the limited funds from local government given to municipal orchestras. 
To address this neglect, this study considered the justification of local government 
subsidy, along with an investigation of the reasons for restricted public subsidy and an 
assessment of the new challenges facing municipal orchestras.
8.4 Implications
Korean cultural policy has mainly evolved in tandem with the Korean regime. Korean 
municipal orchestras, however, are directly influenced by the local government and its 
circumstances rather than state cultural policy or the state itself: there is very little 
connection between Korea cultural policy and Korean municipal orchestras because 
most of them were founded by local government.
Like musicians in German classical orchestras, players and administrative staff in 
Korean municipal orchestras have civil servant-like status regarding salary and job 
security (Schulze and Rose, 1998: p, 228); the public funding from local government is 
exceptionally high, as Korean municipal orchestras rely on a 100% public subsidy of 
their total budget. The economic effects and Importance of art and culture have
received attention, and have been placed at the centre of Korean cultural policy, with 
the exception of classical music.
The legitimacy of public spending on Korean municipal orchestras is a thorny topic 
because they are for a limited audience, yet it is expensive to maintain and support
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their activities. Also, orchestras are perceived to be opposed to popular music, so 
justification needs to be very strong here: it is evident that there is pressure on 
orchestras to become more commercial. More economic awareness is inevitable, and 
Korean municipal orchestras are being encouraged to consider the market. However, 
they may not feel able to deal with the challenges they face.
Some problems such as finance, management, and artistic policy have always been 
present, but the arrival of newly educated Koreans in arts management have made this 
even more difficult: the cultural policy agenda has moved forward, leaving the 
orchestras feeling outmoded. It is also an ideological shift away from the public 
subsidizing of elitist arts to making them find audiences and business sponsors who 
will pay. This means marketization, which links to an emphasis on cultural industries.
However, this shift may not undermine the original function or goal of Korean municipal 
orchestras. We can change this goal to deal with the modern audience, but without its 
necessitating performing only popular classical music. Korean municipal orchestras 
might want to develop and expand new audiences by looking to new kinds of w o rk -  
new kinds of programming, focusing on modern music, Korean music, young people’s 
workshops, and better presentation involving interesting marketing and a website. It 
would mean that they could modernize their goals without this being described as 
commercialization. In addition, they could use subsidy to experiment, or to provide new 
kinds of social and cultural services. These activities make an orchestra a commercial 
enterprise, and demand organisational changes. However, these changes may find 
more support from the orchestral executive constitution and musicians, because they 
could expand their artistic vision rather than requiring that all their energies are put into 
making money at any cost.
Cities may see the need to speak to a wider audience and raise more money as a way 
of pursuing a commercial direction. Korean municipal orchestras have not yet been and 
will never become fully self-sufficient, and if they try to accomplish this, they might 
merely become poor quality orchestras and lose both old and new audiences. Thus 
the cities may have to rethink how their orchestras can become relevant, and this is the 
challenge for the local cities (part of the wider challenge to their existing cultural 
policies). Certainly, they should continue to fund their orchestras, but they may need to 
rethink policy.
A part of this study was conducted in the context of organisational behaviour and 
examined job satisfaction and conflict in municipal orchestras. The study revealed
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players and staffs factors of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. They both show strong 
loyalty to their work, and it was evident by the result of multiple regression analysis and 
factual information that their turnover rate in the last 5 years was insignificant. Players' 
satisfaction with co-workers is significantly related to turnover. According to Boerner 
(2004), the artistic quality of an orchestra is highly dependant on the degree of the 
musicians’ synchronization. Boerner and Von Streit (2007) state that Ibe musical 
unison necessary for a coherent interpretation by the orchestra will not be achieved 
until the group is emotionally in union with itself (p. 133). Therefore, it is important that
players maintain good relationships each other and reduce the rate of turnover, in order 
to achieve a high quality of performance.
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The experience of authority in an orchestra depends on the type of decision being 
made (Broughton, 2001: p. 337). As this study found, it is not surprising that players 
have little or nearly no authority in influencing decision making in matters of music and 
administration. This power structure within Korean municipal orchestras has many 
similarities in spite of differing musical histories. Players dislike the orchestral executive 
constitution and civil servants, but they have an ambivalent attitude to the conductor 
they allow the conductor control in return for a brilliant performance (Adorno 1976- p
110), but they consider the conductor as belonging to the opposite side, tell negative 
stories, and readily criticise conductors.
To unify musicians, who are often described as individualistic and even self-centred by 
many musicians themselves (Wadman and Kbping, 2005), and to deliver a great 
performance, the conductor inevitably needs to exercise a certain authority over the 
musicians (although, in general, authority may be perceived as a negative term) When 
players are employed, they are aware of the circumstances around the orchestra 
including the hierarchical relationship with the conductor, and joining an orchestra 
entails a willingness to accept such conditions.
Musicians may complain about their conductors and their own lack of authority, but 
they may need to recognise that these are natural parts of their job and that the 
conductor's authority is a necessary evil: conductors should practice their authority with 
caution as a conductor's leadership style relates closely to the quality of performance 
According to Wadman and Kbping (2005), conductors often appreciate the importance 
of each member of the orchestra, and the conductors' job is to make each of them 
realise that. Such action by conductors helps to develop a positive interaction between 
players and themselves (Wadman and KSping, 2005: p. 7), and Interaction is a key 
factor determining an orchestra's artistic quality (Faulkner, 1983). The players of 
Korean municipal orchestras are thereby given the will to cooperate with each other in 
order to achieve high quality performances. It is the conductor's job to encourage.
motivate, and drive players to achieve performances of high artistic quality. Players 
should know that if they want authority it comes with responsibility.
The model for the organisational structure of Korean municipal orchestras follows 
neither the American nor the London variety. It springs from a different origin: whereas 
western symphony orchestras have been founded by wealthy individuals or a group of 
players, most Korean municipal orchestras have been intentionally founded by the local 
city following a particular cultural policy, especially that related to the local autonomy 
system in the 1990s.230 *Because of this background, the major administrative and 
musical responsibilities of Korean municipal orchestras are given to civil servants of a 
city, who often do not have general knowledge about the nature of an orchestra. As 
was shown in Chapter 6, the orchestral executive constitution of Korean municipal 
orchestras occupies a middle position between the city and musicians, handling the 
day-to-day operating of the orchestra with limited autonomy. This is a main reason for 
the staff’s job dissatisfaction. Although a dual management structure seems inevitable 
under the present funding regime, local governments could think of sharing 
administrative authority with orchestral executive constitution, and grant artistic 
decisions to this constitution and the conductor. It would mean that the orchestral 
executive constitution and conductor would have a legal responsibility for their decision 
making. Furthermore, local governments might think of providing proper training in 
managing municipal performing organisations to those civil servants who intend to work 
in the culture and tourism division at city hall, or appoint those who are interested in 
arts and culture, rather than giving orders to officials at random. This might help to 
decrease conflicts caused by misunderstanding and distrust among staff, players, and 
civil servants.
Although this study did not pay it much attention, staff complained about their lack of 
numbers in the orchestral executive constitution, and cite this as the reason (along with 
lack of funding) that they provide only a restricted range of activities to citizens. Thus, it 
may be useful to think of offering unpaid internships to those who are willing to 
participate in the operation of orchestra. The city and orchestras might consider linking 
this opportunity to departments of arts administration, or music, in local universities.
Players and staff are very dissatisfied with their present salary. Regarding public 
support, Korean municipal orchestras receive an exceptionally high subsidy. German 
public orchestras receive direct public funding for over 80% of their total budget
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230 The BPO and the KBS Symphony Orchestra were not established under the influence of 
1990s cultural policy, as the BPO was founded in 1962 and the KSO in 1956. Nevertheless the
objective of its foundation was the same.
(Schulze and Rose, 1998: p. 228), and the Orchestra of Paris receives public funding 
that covers about 90% of total cost (Guillard, 1985: p. 36). An orchestra is a labour- 
intensive non-profit organisation. A significant disadvantage of a contract orchestra 
indicated by Maitlis (1998), is ‘the considerable overhead the orchestra carries,’ 
regardless of the amount of work available' (p. 49). That means it may be extremely 
difficult to increase the salary of players and staff under the present funding regime. 
One of the world’s most successful orchestras, the Berlin Philharmonic, is not an 
exception for the salary issue. The Principal Conductor, Simon Rattle, supported the 
musicians’ demand for a higher wage, but it took some time to increase the salary 
(Lehman, 2002). It is not likely that the principal conductors of Korean municipal 
orchestras would become involved in the fight with cities for an increase in players' 
salary, as Simon Rattle did.
An expansion of orchestras’ engagements, along with a new goal and artistic vision, 
could help to decrease the players' dissatisfaction with current pay; however, the matter 
of players’ salary seems less severe than that of staff. As a member of an orchestra 
players have more chance to earn extra income from various activities (compared to 
those who are not a member of an orchestra), and the cities are also aware of this. 
Staff have no source of extra income, and this makes it difficult (especially for married 
men231) to keep working in an orchestra. Administrative staff have a civil-servant-like 
status, but the salary and pension are lower than usual for civil servants; the rate of 
salary increase is also lower despite long tenure, and staff are excluded from the 
welfare benefits offered to civil servants.232 Therefore, the cities might wish to rethink 
the wage system of staff in order to remove some degree of pay-related job 
dissatisfaction.
Regarding finance, arts promotion funds or other public arts and culture funds from 
central government and private sector sponsorship are not available to Korean 
municipal orchestras. Thus, plural funding, such as subsidies from local municipalities, 
the federal government, the state, or private individuals (which many western public 
orchestras receive), might ease municipal orchestras’ financial difficulties. In addition, 
the cities or central government could revise the law that restricts external financial 
support.
There is a complicated network of relationships within Korean municipal orchestras. As
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2 3 2  Traditionally, in Korea, family living expenses are mainly the responsibility of male
The salary of staff in the three Korean municipal orchestras studied here is hinh ,
the other municipal orchestras such as Jinju Symphony Orchestra anrt m ~  JS c c°mPared t0
pension*’3 33 ^  *"
has already been mentioned, older male players are likely to have more responsibility 
for their families1 living expenses than younger players and female players, so some of 
them might secure their position in the orchestra by making much of their work 
experience rather than emphasizing their performance ability. Similarly, although there 
is a clear need for a musicians1 union, this might not be used to protect players whose 
lack of performance ability disqualifies them from the orchestra. Although players' self- 
protection is understandable, such attitudes may harm their orchestra’s reputation, 
because orchestras are evaluated by the quality of their performance, and they need to 
be ever more brilliant in the current challenging environment.
The avoiding style, which involves sidestepping and withdrawal, is the players’ 
preferred way of dealing with interpersonal conflict with peers. Yet they may need to
change their attitude, because low concern for self and others offers no fundamental 
solution.
271
Folklore indicated that players and staff experienced less conflict between them when 
members of staff were music graduates: players trusted staff who were music 
graduates more than they did others, because they were considered to be on their side. 
However, this study reveals that whether or not staff are music graduates makes no 
difference to handle intrapersonal conflict, intergroup conflict with players, and 
intergroup conflict with civil servants (except intragroup conflict).
For players, the audition was one of most significant issues and generally considered a 
bad thing. But if the audition has the practical outcome of changing a player’s position 
within the orchestra, it helps to increase that player’s job satisfaction with promotion.233 
There are contradictory opinions about auditions: some say they are necessary for 
improving the quality of orchestras; others say it is not the solution. It might not be true 
that regular audition leads the development of an orchestra, but regular audition could 
motivate players if the result really does give players a chance to be promoted. Local 
governments should revise their orchestral auditions so that they lead to practical 
results. Regular audition may be a necessary evil under the present organisational 
structure, but might not be as bad as players think if it is appropriately and objectively 
processed.
8.5 Limitations of the study
The first limitation is the extent of generalisation, which was due to the small sample 
size (especially of staff). Although this study chose three orchestras that covered the
233 This could also help orchestras that might have top players 
mean they play better. amongst its staff, which could
different organisational structures of Korean municipal orchestras, the results from 
each orchestra may not represent other orchestras because there are many variable 
factors influencing players and staff, such as organisational culture, size, and history. 
Furthermore, there is no way of concluding decisively whether the differences in job 
satisfaction and conflict resulted from the differences of Individuals or from the 
differences of organisation.
The second limitation concerns the case of the KSO: at the time this study conducted, 
the players of the KSO were engaged in acts of resistance against the KSO, due to the 
long time absence of a principal conductor, unfilled vacancies of orchestral position 
and the announcement that the orchestra's status was changing to a legally 
autonomous agency. The results of both qualitative and quantitative research may, in 
these circumstances, have been distorted, and research conducted in future may 
produce different results on job satisfaction and conflict.
Third, data could not be collected from conductors due to the difficulty of access,234 so 
the data on conductors' relationships with players, staff, and civil servants Is incomplete 
In addition, the data collected from civil servants were not abundant, as most of them 
were not willing to say much about the issues being investigating.
This study focused partly on the relationships between job satisfaction, tenure, and 
conflict. Although job satisfaction was measured using five subscales, overall job 
satisfaction was not included. Job turnover was measured based on the degree of 
thinking about quitting; thus, the whole process of how job dissatisfaction leads to 
players’ and staff's turnover, the relation between thinking about quitting and eventual 
turnover, and the reasons for turnover were not included. The amount of the three 
types of conflict, the five styles of handling interpersonal conflict with different parties, 
the sources of conflict, and the relationship between the amount of conflict and conflict­
handling styles were all measured; these data are useful in determining whether the 
members of an organisation are making too little, too much, or moderate use of each 
conflict, but whether the five styles of handing interpersonal conflict were properly used 
to deal with different situations were excluded (Rahim, 1986: p. 37 and p. 68) The 
relationship between job satisfaction, turnover, and conflict and job performance was 
omitted due to the ambiguity of how to evaluate the success of job performance in an 
orchestra-for instance, should it be by judged by artistic quality or by how many
234 I was able to gain interview permission from two conductors both nreviou* nriB.|M . 
conductors of the CPO (one of them was the current conductor at the time of the K  - x 
however, conductors in other orchestras could not be accessed so I deriLn  £  ?™lew):
collected from conductors. ea' so l decided to omit data
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tickets were sold?
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8.6 Conclusion
This study began with a recognition of the diverse problems faced by Korean municipal 
orchestras. Debates regarding finance, authority, leadership, and organisational 
structure could all be found in professional orchestras. This study has provided 
information regarding Korean cultural policy, the changes in cultural industries and their 
affect on Korean symphony orchestras, the contexts of Korean municipal orchestras, 
job satisfaction, conflict, and new challenges; and it has also provided several 
recommendations.
The study found that even though Korean municipal orchestras have been faced with 
pressure and concern given Ihe economic and commercial aspects of their activities in 
recent years, it is worth considering that local governments might choose not to push 
their orchestras further, and might not decide to make their orchestras legally 
autonomous agencies like symphony orchestras in western countries. Korean 
municipal orchestras were founded as a public service to local citizens, and economic 
or commercial outcomes used to be of little concern, compared to the orchestras in the 
west, where economic aspects are significant for their survival. Korean municipal 
orchestras are simply not ready to be in the market, and this form of autonomous 
agency might not be appropriate to most Korean municipal orchestras in local cities, 
due to a lack of audience infrastructure and no recognition of the importance of 
orchestras. Therefore, rather than having Its legal status changed, the Korean 
municipal orchestra might need to keep to its original role as a public service and 
provide better services to Its citizens with a solid aim and mission and a readiness to 
respond to the taste of audiences.
Despite some negative features regarding job satisfaction, the findings indicate that the 
players and staff of Korean municipal orchestras enjoy their job, even if severely 
dissatisfied with present pay. The financial difficulty faced by staff is more serious than 
that for players. It is, thus, imperative that the local government (should) consider the
current pay system of municipal orchestras.
Various conflicts were found in Korean municipal orchestras. Conflict is not a new issue 
in symphony orchestras, but the conflicts between players, administrative staff 
conductor, and civil servants found in this study need further consideration Strong 
conflict between players and conductor were, from the viewpoint of players a 
consequence of the conductor’s partiality to certain players, or excessive charismatic
leadership that caused disrespect, mistrust, and (in some cases) verbal violence. Thus, 
conductors might use their leadership more carefully in order to reduce players’ 
complaints, to achieve players’ synchronisation and coherence, and to ultimately 
achieve a climate of cooperation, which is a key feature of an orchestra's quality.
Although it is understandable that an orchestra is not the primary issue for local 
government when compared with other social services, local government might revise 
its policy toward municipal orchestras with respect to the audition system, fundraising, 
and the autonomy of the orchestral executive constitution.
To conclude: players, administrative staff, the conductor, and civil servants experience 
unpleasant relations and are prone to blaming each other for these, but their common 
aim is to make their orchestras better. To achieve this, they need to be open-minded, 
interactive, and try to cooperate with each other rather than resorting to complaints and 
slander. Finally, each of them is important to the success of the orchestra, and they 
should feel a strong responsibility for what they are doing to ensure a bright future for 
Korean municipal orchestras.
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Appendix A. Letter of introduction
Dear____________________
My name is Young-Mi Song, a PhD student at the school of performance and cultural 
industries at the University of Leeds, UK. The aim of this research is to examine 
diverse aspects relating to the problem of contemporary Korean municipal orchestras, 
along with the cultural policy situation and the new environment. In order to discover 
the problems of Korean orchestras related to job satisfaction and conflict, the 
information from your own unique experiences working in an orchestra is crucial to this 
study.
The interview will last approximately one to two hours. All information you provide will 
be treated in strict confidence, and you do not need to worry about the possible risks 
associated with your participation.
I would like to hear from you. If you have any questions about the interview, please 
contact me at pcuvms@leeds.ac.uk or sonqsario@hotmail.com or by calling at +44- 
7796-420-260. You may also contact Justin O ’Connor at M.J.O’Connor@leeds.ac.uk. 
Once I obtain permission from you, I will contact you again to make arrangements for 
the interview.
Thank you very much for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Young-Mi Song
A p p e n d ix  B. Letter o f  c o n se n t
I have agreed to be interviewed by Young-Mi Song under the supervision of Professor 
Justin O ’Connor and Mr. Peter Collis of the School of Performance and Cultural 
Industries of the University of Leeds. I have read the information letter, and my 
participation in this interview is entirely voluntary. I understand that all information will 
be kept in complete confidence, and my name will not be used in the study or any 
associated publications under any circumstances (except with your permission). I am 
also aware that the interviews will be tape recorded and transcribed. However, I 
understand that I am free to withdraw from my decision of participation at any time; and 
also free to refuse to answer any questions or to request to stop tape recording.
I am informed that if I have any concerns or questions resulting from my contribution to 
this interview, I may contact Young-Mi Song.
Print Name____________________________________________
Signature of Participant..________________________________
Date ____________________________________________
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Appendix C. Interview schedule for staff
Note: This interview schedule is intended as a guide and[ not as a rigid questionnaire. 
The following questions are designed for administrative staff, and modified questions 
(based on questions here) are used for players and civil servants in the participating 
orchestras. The interview will be conducted in a flexible way, based on the attitude of 
the interviewee and the flow of the conversation.
Interviewee’s name: 
Date:
Place:
Time:
Section A. Personal information
1. Birth date:
2. Age:
3. Sex:
4. Current position:
5. Academic background:
6. Tenure with current orchestra:
Section B. Job  orientation
7. How did you start to work at orchestra? Is there any particular reason or 
motivation?
8. What was your work experience before joining an orchestra?
9. What do you think are the most fundamental elements as a member of the 
administrative staff? Please give reasons for your answer.
Section C. Role, responsibility, and task difficulties
10. How would you describe a typical day as a member of the administrative staff?
11. What would you regard as your main duties?
12. Which aspects of your work are you most comfortable with? Why? Which of 
your works are you least comfortable with? Why?
13. What is your contribution to your orchestra? Please explain your answer.
14. Do you think that the city or arts centre plays a role as an authority body of the 
orchestra as well?
15. In general, how do you evaluate players’ work within your orchestra?
16. How about the conductor? Does he show his enthusiasm for training orchestra?
17. Who are the most impressive people in your work?
18. What was the worst memory in your work experience? Why?
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19. Do you have any difficulties or constraints in carrying out your daily work? If so, 
please give reasons for your answer.
20. Have you have any colleague who you found it difficult to get along with 
(related to work)? Why?
21. What is the most difficult part of managing an orchestra, from your personal 
experiences? How do you deal with this problem?
(Decision making: optional)
22. What kinds of decision making occur in your orchestra? Do you have any role 
in decision making?
23. If yes, what sort of decision making do you participate in? And do you have any 
influence on the decision?
24. What is the whole process of decision making? And who is the decision maker? 
Please explain your answer.
25. Are you willing to participate in the decision making of orchestras? Do you 
think it is effective if all administrative staff join the decision making? Please 
give reasons for your answer.
26. What do you think of the players’ participation in decision making? Do you 
support it?
Section D. Orchestral structure and management
27. Can you explain the orchestra’s structure and how it operates (e.g. staff 
members, work process)?
28. How far does decision making in daily-based work affect your work? Do you 
think that it positively or negatively influences your ability to carry out your work?
29. Do you think having an independent orchestral executive constitution helps 
orchestral management?
30. What do you think about the current power relationship between the executive 
director and principal conductor in your orchestra? Are they equal or unequal?
31. Which power structure do you think works most effectively?
32. What is most needed in terms of effective orchestral management? Why?
Section E. Job  satisfaction
33. Are you generally satisfied with your work and position? Please give reasons 
for your answer.
34. What factors make you less satisfied with your work?
35. Has your job ever disrupted your personal?
36. Do you have any promotion prospects?
37. Has your job satisfaction varied in the past when working for an orchestra? If 
so, how has it differed, and why?
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38. Have you ever thought of quitting your job? If so, when and why? What is the 
main reason? How did you deal with that matter?
39. Would you choose your current job again if you had the opportunity to do so?
40. Has your training been adequate when joining an orchestra? Which relevant 
training have you received since joining an orchestra? What supervision do 
you receive in your current role?
Section F. Conflicts and relationship
41. How would you describe your general relationship with players? How would 
you describe your general relationship with civil servants? And how would you 
describe your general relationship with conductor?
42. Is there any conflict with players, conductors, or civil servants (if applicable)? If 
so, why? Please give reasons for your answer.
43. How about your relationship with other administrative staff? Is there any 
conflict relationship?
44. What do you think about the relationship between players and conductor; and 
between players and civil servants?
45. Have you ever had the experience of changing a conductor as a result of 
conflict with players?
46. In your view, what are the causes of conflict among players?
47. Have you ever experienced any problems with colleague or supervisor? If so, 
how did you deal with it? How could these problems be prevented?
Section G. Key issues and changes
48. What do you think about transforming municipal orchestras into independent 
charitable foundations which are considered as an ideal formation for future 
Korean orchestras?
49. (in case of KSO players and staff) Do you agree with the decision of the KBS 
that asks to KBS Symphony Orchestras to be independent? Please give 
reasons.
50. (in case of KSO players and staff) Your orchestra has been performing without 
a principal conductor and several players because of the KBS ’s decision 
regarding orchestral independence. Does KBS have any plan to invite a 
principal conductor and fill vacant orchestral positions?
51. As an administrative staff, how do you define a success of orchestra? Please 
explain your answer.
52. Some believe that orchestra’s success is decided by principal conductor. Do 
you agree with this opinion? If so (if not), why?
53. What kind of conductor do you prefer? Do you think he/she needs to have a 
role in orchestral management, or to focus on music?
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54. Is there any priority change regarding orchestral management when the 
executive director or principal conductor changes? Please give examples.
55. Related to the objectives of municipal orchestras, how does your orchestra 
pursue the objectives?
Section H. M usicians’ union
56. Does your orchestra have a musicians’ union?
57. What does your city think of musicians’ union? If city is not favorable, do you 
know the reason?
58. (in case of players) Are you a member of a musicians’ union?
59. How many players belong to the musicians’ union? What is their role? Is there 
any other players’ representative body? If so, what is the name of organisation; 
how many people joined?; and what is its role?
60. Do you know why some players do not join the union?
Section I. Audition
61. Do you have a regular audition in your orchestra? If so, how often do you have?
62. What do you think about regular auditions? Do you think they are necessary 
for an orchestra’s development?
63. What is your opinion about having regular audition? Any suggestions?
Section J. Financial resources
64. What is the main source of income? If your orchestra has extra income from 
engagement concerts, does this go into the orchestra’s account or the city?
65. Has your orchestra experienced financial difficulties? If so, how did you deal 
with it?
66. Can I have a financial statement for your orchestra later?
(Final comments)
67. Do you have any other comments or suggestions you would like to give?
Thank you very much for your cooperation.
